American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

https://www.aclu.org

  • You Are Being Tracked
    https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/location-tracking/you-are-being-tracked

    How License Plate Readers Are Being Used To Record Americans’ Movements A little noticed surveillance technology, designed to track the movements of every passing driver, is fast proliferating on America’s streets. Automatic license plate readers, mounted on police cars or on objects like road signs and bridges, use small, high-speed cameras to photograph thousands of plates per minute. The information captured by the readers – including the license plate number, and the date, time, and (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #activisme #vidéo-surveillance #surveillance # #conducteur·trice·s #ACLU

    ##_

  • L’urgence de santé publique, ce n’est pas la surveillance massive mais le dépistage de masse !
    https://reflets.info/articles/l-effet-placebo-du-tracage-informatique

    Tracking GSM, GPS ou Bluetooth ? Aucun système ne pourra répondre à l’urgence sanitaire

    Quand bien même les applis Bluetooth seraient assez précises, un autre contre-argument n’est jamais pointé du doigt : les ondes passent à travers les cloisons, portes et fenêtres, ou tout simplement à travers une vitre ou une plaque en plexiglass ! Ainsi, être à moins d’un mètre derrière un guichet protégé (conforme aux « gestes barrières ») pourrait être identifié, à tort, comme « contact à risque »… Comme de côtoyer tous les jours un voisin très proche... derrière un mur mitoyen. Tout autre système de géolocalisation (antennes relais comme GPS) possède le même inconvénient.

    Une foule d’autres points noirs invalident l’utilité même du contact tracing. Comme la nécessité d’atteindre une certaine « masse critique » d’utilisateurs pour être efficace — comme l’a reconnu le gourou numérique du gouvernement, Cedric O. Cette masse critique, selon divers avis convergents, doit représenter au moins 60 % d’une population. Même à Singapour, État policier — et ultraconnecté — de 7 millions d’habitants, moins de 20% utilisent l’appli. Sans même parler des taux d’équipements en smartphone, très inégalitaires selon les régions ou les classes sociales, et qui excluent en premier les plus de 70 ans.

    • #merci pour cet argumentaire complet et sérieux.

      Une petite remarque, la proposition #DP3T répond à l’objection "il sera plus facile pour le gouvernement de lui ajouter des fonctions coercitives" car elle fonctionne de manière décentralisée.

      Un détail : triangularisation => triangulation

    • Liens vers
      https://www.aclu.org/report/aclu-white-paper-limits-location-tracking-epidemic
      http://news.mit.edu/2020/bluetooth-covid-19-contact-tracing-0409
      https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.13670
      https://www.laquadrature.net/2020/04/14/nos-arguments-pour-rejeter-stopcovid

      La surveillance par satellite ou bornes GSM, on oublie. Blootooth ?

      Si séduisante soit-elle, la solution Bluetooth a ses limites. La précision et la fiabilité des données recueillies dépendent énormément du type de matériel utilisé (composants, antenne, batterie...). Une discrimination technique serait alors à l’œuvre — les modèles bas de gamme étant forcément moins fiables. Devant de telles disparités pratiques, personne ne peut garantir un corpus de données assez fiable pour prendre de bonnes décisions. D’où le risque de produire, là aussi, des milliers de « faux positifs » qui ne manqueront pas d’encombrer davantage les services de santé.

      Tout le monde comprend qu’utiliser des données non fiables serait contre-productif et risquerait de désorganiser davantage les services de santé. En terme statistique, on parle de « faux positifs » : en l’espèce, identifier à tort des personnes comme potentiellement contaminées. Sur une cohorte de plusieurs centaines de millions d’individus, les faux positifs pourraient donc être plusieurs millions… De quoi engendrer d’énormes demandes qui ne pourront pas, à l’évidence, être prises en charge. À commencer par le #dépistage sérologique, dont les capacités mondiales sont déjà sous-dimensionnées. Cela rendrait-il service aux autorités sanitaires de devoir gérer cet afflux massif de prises en charge, alors que la pénurie de #tests est loin d’être résolue ?

      Alors pourquoi doit-on subir cette injonction à lever le pied sur le principe de la protection des données pour les besoins de l’urgence sanitaire ? Lancer un tel débat possède un intérêt majeur dans le processus d’acceptation sociale : profiter de l’état de sidération (cf « La #stratégie_du_choc » de Naomi Klein) pour travailler au corps les plus réticents dans l’intention de pouvoir l’imposer à tous avec un minimum d’opposition et de défiance. Brandir LA solution technologique permet d’occuper l’espace médiatique et prépare le terrain à la « phase d’après », à savoir le contrôle social et disciplinaire de celles et ceux qui ne respecteraient pas les mesures de #quarantaine, de #confinement ou de couvre-feu.

      Le téléphone privé devient alors une sorte de bracelet électronique universel et multi-tâches. Pourquoi ne pas imaginer que le smartphone serve de mouchard pour vérifier l’assiduité d’un « prisonnier » incarcéré à domicile ? D’ailleurs, les premiers cobayes pourraient être les personnes reconnues coupables du nouveau délit créé par la loi sur l’état d’urgence sanitaire, qui réprime les « violations réitérées au confinement » (jusqu’à six mois de prison et 3750€ d’amende). La géolocalisation n’a donc aucun intérêt immédiat en termes de santé publique. Mais c’est un outil de dissuasion parfait pour traquer déplacements interdits ou comportements « déviants ». Il n’est pas impossible, comme le suggère la Quadrature du net, que l’appli Stopcovid, prototype sorti tout droit de la start-up nation, soit détourné de son usage premier, "pour la bonne cause" :

      Ce débat technico-juridique fait figure de diversion, de vaste écran de fumée — en terme médical, on parle « d’effet placebo ». L’heure n’est pas à la surveillance de masse mais au dépistage de masse !

      Pendant ce temps, on questionne beaucoup moins l’incapacité chronique de l’État à fournir des tests de dépistage, ne serait-ce qu’aux populations les plus fragiles. Ce qui amènerait à remettre en cause les mécanismes économiques de dérégulation et de délocalisations industrielles qui ont fabriqué des champions du médicament comme Sanofi et précarisé nos systèmes hospitaliers — tout en organisant l’incapacité du même marché à répondre à temps à la demande de soins, de protection et de dépistage qu’exigent de telles pandémies.

      En nous incitant à alimenter et à participer à ce débat technologique truqué, c’est un peu notre « système immunitaire politique » que l’on essaye de fragiliser, de corrompre et de compromettre. Notre immunité de groupe, on la gagnera en refusant de choisir avec quel type de chaîne on va nous tenir en laisse.

      #surveillance

  • ACLU White Paper : The Limits of Location Tracking in an Epidemic | American Civil Liberties Union
    https://www.aclu.org/aclu-white-paper-limits-location-tracking-epidemic

    Un dossier de l’ACLU sur l’usage des données de géolocalisation dans la lutte contre le COVID-19.

    However, policymakers must have a realistic understanding of what data produced by individuals’ mobile phones can and cannot do. As always, there is a danger that simplistic understandings of how technology works will lead to investments that do little good, or are
    actually counterproductive, and that invade privacy without producing commensurate benefits.
    As we write this white paper, public health experts say that the nation hasthree urgent needs: strong social distancing measures, widespread testing capability, and material support for hospitals being overwhelmed by victims. However, once our hospitals reach a point where they’re able to handle the stream of new patients, experts say that indiscriminate population
    –wide social distancing measures may give way to a new phase: chronic, lower-level waves of infection in which a combination of widespread testing, individualized quarantine orders, and traditional epidemiological contact tracing once again become a principal means of combatting the disease. It would be in such a period
    — the window between the end of the initial wave and
    the development of a vaccine — that using certain forms of data generated by cell phones — such as location histories or records of proximity to other devices might make sense.
    The challenges posed by COVID-19 are extraordinary, and we should consider with an open mind any and all measures that might help contain the virus consistent with our fundamental principles. We note some of those possible uses in this paper.
    At the same time, location data contains an enormously invasive and personal set of information about each of us, with the potential to reveal such things as people’s social, sexual, religious, and political associations.The potential for invasions of privacy, abuse, and stigmatization is enormous.
    Any uses of such data should be temporary, restricted to public health agencies and purposes, and should make the greatest possible use of available techniques that allow for privacy and anonymity to be protected even as the data is use

    #Géolocalisation #Coronavirus #Libertés

  • ACLU White Paper : The Limits of Location Tracking in an Epidemic | American Civil Liberties Union
    https://www.aclu.org/aclu-white-paper-limits-location-tracking-epidemic

    As Americans struggle to confront the COVID-19 outbreak, some have suggested that cell phone location tracking technology can help in the effort to contain the disease. The tech industry and the White House are reportedly having conversations over how information technology might be deployed, and there is increasing discussion about how foreign countries are using technology. The governor of Florida has even floated the idea of using an app to track visitors from COVID-19 hotspot New York. (...)

    #algorithme #smartphone #géolocalisation #BigData #métadonnées #santé #surveillance #ACLU

    ##santé

  • Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing | Pepp-Pt
    https://www.pepp-pt.org

    PEPP-PT makes it possible to interrupt new chains of SARS-CoV-2 transmission rapidly and effectively by informing potentially exposed people. We are a large and inclusive European team. We provide standards, technology, and services to countries and developers. We embrace a fully privacy-preserving approach. We build on well-tested, fully implemented proximity measurement and scalable backend service. We enable tracing of infection chains across national borders.

    Proximity Tracing YES, Giving Up Privacy NO!

    #surveillance voir aussi https://seenthis.net/messages/836812

    #contact_tracing #virusphone

    • Le fonctionnement technique de la 3ème appli (basée sur des échanges bluetooth entre les téléphones ...mais qui nécessite quand même un serveur centralisé) :

      Le twitt de présentation du système : (de Carmela Troncoso)

      As countries deploy data-hungry contact tracing, we worry about what will happen with this data. Together with colleagues from 7 institutions, we designed a system that hides all personal information from the server. Please read and give comments!

      => La présentation complète : https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Data%20Protection%20and%20Security.pdf
      => le fil Twitter en mode « questions/réponses » : https://twitter.com/mikarv/status/1246124667355660291

      #bluetooth #data-paranoia #vie_privée #centralisation_des_données

    • Ce qui me chagrine, c’est que l’article du Monde, ainsi que l’article de Science,
      https://science.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/03/30/science.abb6936
      n’approfondissent les difficultés que je notais ici :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/839937

      Je trouve qu’on reste vraiment à la surface des choses, et je trouve ça dangereux. Parce que soit on se retrouve à avoir une opposition frontale de nos propres amis (pas de traçage du tout c’est du fascisme), soit ces articles qui disent qu’on peut le faire façon RGPD mais en évitant les questions qui fâchent, soit tout simplement des grandes entreprises déjà spécialistes du flicage généralisé, avec leurs solutions clé en main. Et en face, des politiques à qui l’on impose de « sauver des vie », et qui ont donc comme interlocteurs soit des gauchistes qui ne veulent rien entendre (même avec de bons arguments, ça ne l’aide pas le politique, dans cette situation), soit des partisans RGPD qui ne répondent pas aux questions pratiques, soit des entreprises milliardaires avec des solutions de flicage out of the box (qui sont déjà largement utilisées par ailleurs…) qui promettent qu’avec ça, on va sauver les gens, et que l’action volontariste de l’État (avec les types en blanc qui débarquent encadrés par l’armée dans une barre d’immeuble de banlieue pour traquer l’infecté qui se cache parmi nous…) sera pour le coup parfaitement visible.

      Je veux dire : le choix me semble vite fait.

    • vous êtes terrifiants, prêts à tourner casaques et à vous faire embobiner par les VRP de la surveillance, plutot rouge, jaune ou bleu le baton technologique ? C’est un gag ?
      Le débat est détourné, car ce n’est ni une question technologique de surveillance ou une question éthique des moyens de flicages à mettre en place dont il faut débattre.
      Avant toute chose, débattons des moyens techniques réels qui sont donnés pour se protéger d’une pandémie.
      Vous pensez vraiment qu’un traçage blutooth va servir, poussons donc le bouchon en terme technique, comment cela va-t-il fonctionner même si nous acceptons d’insérer sous notre peau un mouchard qui nous géolocalise et prend notre température et l’envoi à un serveur centralisé ?
      On va détecter quoi et comment va-t-on traiter ces données ? la distance ? la charge virale ? les moments où on a retiré son masque ? le moment où l’on est contagieux mais sans symptômes ? On va prévenir ceux qui ont été au moins une demie heure en contact avec nous 15 jours avant ? Tu prends le métro tout les jours 1h00, tu as croisé 12000 voyageurs.

      STP pense juste à porter un masque et à faire des tests réguliers, on reparlera ensuite de la façon dont le débat a été détourné par les politiques et les industriels de la surveillance.

    • Comme @laquadrature @touti tu extrapoles à des implants big brother, des obligations d’installer des apps qui te géolocalisent en permanence, l’État qui te traque partout et à toute heure.

      L’extrapolation est crédible dès lors que c’est ce que l’État aime faire avec l’informatisation, et le complexe militaro-industriel-surveillance est prêt à opérer… mais c’est ça que ces projets tentent de contrer, en montrant qu’il peut exister des méthodes « propres ».

      Si on lit ce projet précis, il s’agit, si tu as choisi d’activer une app de ce genre, de pouvoir faire remonter une information concernant le résultat d’un test aux personnes qui pourraient avoir été en contact avec toi.

      Par conséquent ça ne s’oppose en rien aux tests, bien au contraire. Ca veut dire que le test que tu as fait va pouvoir (peut-être) être aussi utile à (quelques) autres.

      Perso j’apprécierais assez qu’une personne que j’ai croisée et qui a fait un test puisse me prévenir, comme ça je peux me mettre à l’isolement et éviter de contaminer mes proches, faire un test s’il y en a, etc. ; et je me sentirais mal dans le cas où je serais dépisté et je ne pourrais prévenir personne des gens que j’ai pu contaminer la veille.

      L’exemple du métro est intéressant, car en effet si chaque fois qu’on prend le métro on risque d’infecter 12 000 personnes, il faut peut-être fermer le métro. Ça n’a pas grand chose à voir avec le sujet, à part si ce que tu veux dire c’est que l’explosion combinatoire est de toute façon impossible à freiner.

      le débat a été détourné par les politiques et les industriels de la surveillance

      On est sur les mêmes débats que sur le logiciel libre. Je suis pessimiste sur l’issue, mais, je me répépète, il s’agit là de chercheurs de la recherche publique européenne, qui tentent de répondre à ces deux impératifs (santé, vie privée). Si on les flingue sans autre forme de procès, il ne restera en effet que les industriels de la surveillance (plus de la moitié des papiers signalés sous le tag #virusphone).

      Sans forcément conclure ni choisir ma casaque, je trouve que ça mérite l’intérêt plutôt qu’un rejet épidermique.

    • Comme @laquadrature @touti tu extrapoles à des implants big brother, des obligations d’installer des apps qui te géolocalisent en permanence, l’État qui te traque partout et à toute heure.

      Ça commence mal avec cette caricature qui me catalogue, et j’ai dut mal m’exprimer car je donne cet exemple non pas par parano mais pour comprendre que même au maximum de la surveillance, ça ne résout pas la question première qui est une question du comment fera-t-on techniquement pour détecter avec qui tu as été en contact.
      Pour le moment je ne parle même pas du problème éthique.

    • Je crois que ce qui me pose problème c’est qu’on a l’expérience de ce que le rejet de malades ou présumés malades peut générer (pestiférés, malades du sida/séropositifs voir HHH, lépreux etc.), indépendamment de la rationalité des critères de contamination/protection. Généraliser la communication de son statut sérologique de cette manière me gêne notamment si il faut en plus croiser à terme les critères complémentaires qui semblent être associés au covid-19 (groupe sanguin, facteurs de risque etc. Je ne suis pas luddite, mais je ne fais pas particulièrement confiance à ce type de pratiques nominatives et de croisement en terme de santé (je dis bien nominatives car adresses bluetooth et autres mac-adress uniques permettent d’identifier les personnes).

    • Merci à tou·tes pour ce débat. J’ai tendance à trouver que sur le terreau d’ignorance où prolifère ce virus (ignorance des comportements pour limiter sa propagation, ignorance de notre état de santé et de notre capacité à le propager), la connaissance de nos mouvements et possibilités de propagation, c’est un peu la charrue mise devant les bœufs, qu’il y a encore beaucoup de mesures low-tech à mettre en œuvre avant, dont nous pourrions nous priver, aveuglé·es par l’efficacité d’une solution high-tech (et puis les masques et le gel, c’est cher). Je ne sais pas si l’existence de dispositifs moins intrusifs et moins dangereux pour les libertés peut empêcher des gouvernants gourmands de #stratégie_du_choc pour nous écraser la gueule de choisir de nous surveiller de manière plus éthique.

    • @antonin, plutôt qu’ignorance (qui peut faire penser que d’autres savent alors que le flou règne) je dirais inconnues , comme dans les formules d’algo prédictifs avec des inconnues médicales parfois réellement ignorées et beaucoup trop nombreuses à être décisives dans le cas de la pandémie actuelle. Etonnée que je suis de voir certaines vidéos en démonstrations de formules magiques mathématiques pour te persuader des bienfaits du traçage, ce qui ressemble à un vaste écran de fumée pour accéder rapidement au miracle technologique à venir, censé nous sauver du personnel soignants manquants, des lits d’hopitaux inexistants, des médicaments l’année prochaine, de la douleur sans curare, des masques, tests, aides à la recherche qui manquent toujours pour endiguer la pandémie et nous laisser sortir. Donc oui, le recours au low-tech et peut-être à une vision plus humaine dédiée aux soins et à la lutte pour plus d’égalités, et non qui risque de nous diviser (délinquants sans logiciel anticovid).

      Autre terme qui me gêne, voire me faire rire jaune, c’est la surveillance éthique , et là du coup c’est vraiment une question non plus d’efficience mais de choix de société, du basculement collectif, qui touche la limite de la démocratie et le politique (qu’est-ce qu’on fait ensemble ?). Raa le St Graal de l’éthique (à coller comme un sucre quand on veut faire avaler le terme qui le précède), de l’anonymisation, de la bénédiction de la CNIL, tout cela sent le grand bain des croyances au secours de nos angoisses.

  • Experts Say ’Emotion Recognition’ Lacks Scientific Foundation
    https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/experts-say-emotion-recognition-lacks-scientific

    Emotion recognition is a hot new area, with numerous companies peddling products that claim to be able to read people’s internal emotional states, and AI researchers looking to improve computers’ ability to do so. This is done through voice analysis, body language analysis, gait analysis, eye tracking, and remote measurement of physiological signs like pulse and breathing rates. Most of all, though, it’s done through analysis of facial expressions. A new study, however, strongly suggests that (...)

    #algorithme #biométrie #émotions #surveillance #ACLU

  • An Army of Robot Surveillance Guards Is Coming
    https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/army-robot-surveillance-guards-coming

    We are surrounded by surveillance cameras that record us at every turn. But for the most part, while those cameras are watching us, no one is watching what those cameras observe or record because no one will pay for the armies of security guards that would be required for such a time-consuming and monotonous task. But imagine that all that video were being watched — that millions of security guards were monitoring them all 24/7. Imagine this army is made up of guards who don’t need to be (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #vidéo-surveillance #surveillance #ACLU

  • Edward Snowden Explains Blockchain to His Lawyer — and the Rest of Us | American Civil Liberties Union
    https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/edward-snowden-explains-blockchain-his-lawyer-and-rest-us

    ES: In a word: trust. Imagine an old database where any entry can be changed just by typing over it and clicking save. Now imagine that entry holds your bank balance. If somebody can just arbitrarily change your balance to zero, that kind of sucks, right? Unless you’ve got student loans.

    The point is that any time a system lets somebody change the history with a keystroke, you have no choice but to trust a huge number of people to be both perfectly good and competent, and humanity doesn’t have a great track record of that. Blockchains are an effort to create a history that can’t be manipulated.

    BW: A history of what?

    ES: Transactions. In its oldest and best-known conception, we’re talking about Bitcoin, a new form of money. But in the last few months, we’ve seen efforts to put together all kind of records in these histories. Anything that needs to be memorialized and immutable. Health-care records, for example, but also deeds and contracts.

    ES: Let’s pretend you’re allergic to finance, and start with the example of an imaginary blockchain of blog posts instead of going to the normal Bitcoin examples. The interesting mathematical property of blockchains, as mentioned earlier, is their general immutability a very short time past the point of initial publication.

    For simplicity’s sake, think of each new article published as representing a “block” extending this blockchain. Each time you push out a new article, you are adding another link to the chain itself. Even if it’s a correction or update to an old article, it goes on the end of the chain, erasing nothing. If your chief concerns were manipulation or censorship, this means once it’s up, it’s up. It is practically impossible to remove an earlier block from the chain without also destroying every block that was created after that point and convincing everyone else in the network to agree that your alternate version of the history is the correct one.

    So on the technical level, a blockchain works by taking the data of the new block — the next link in the chain — stamping it with the mathematic equivalent of a photograph of the block immediately preceding it and a timestamp (to establish chronological order of publication), then “hashing it all together” in a way that proves the block qualifies for addition to the chain.

    Think about our first example of your bank balance in an old database. That kind of setup is fast, cheap, and easy, but makes you vulnerable to the failures or abuses of what engineers call a “trusted authority.” Blockchains do away with the need for trusted authorities at the expense of efficiency. Right now, the old authorities like Visa and MasterCard can process tens of thousands of transactions a second, while Bitcoin can only handle about seven. But methods of compensating for that efficiency disadvantage are being worked on, and we’ll see transaction rates for blockchains improve in the next few years to a point where they’re no longer a core concern.

    Yet the hard truth is that the only thing that gives cryptocurrencies value is the belief of a large population in their usefulness as a means of exchange. That belief is how cryptocurrencies move enormous amounts of money across the world electronically, without the involvement of banks, every single day. One day capital-B Bitcoin will be gone, but as long as there are people out there who want to be able to move money without banks, cryptocurrencies are likely to be valued.

    BW: But what about you? What do you like about it?

    ES: I like Bitcoin transactions in that they are impartial. They can’t really be stopped or reversed, without the explicit, voluntary participation by the people involved. Let’s say Bank of America doesn’t want to process a payment for someone like me. In the old financial system, they’ve got an enormous amount of clout, as do their peers, and can make that happen. If a teenager in Venezuela wants to get paid in a hard currency for a web development gig they did for someone in Paris, something prohibited by local currency controls, cryptocurrencies can make it possible. Bitcoin may not yet really be private money, but it is the first “free” money.

    BW: So if Trump tried to cut off your livelihood by blocking banks from wiring your speaking fees, you could still get paid.

    ES: And all he could do is tweet about it.

    BW: The downside, I suppose, is that sometimes the ability of governments to track and block transactions is a social good. Taxes. Sanctions. Terrorist finance.

    We want you to make a living. We also want sanctions against corrupt oligarchs to work.

    ES: If you worry the rich can’t dodge their taxes without Bitcoin, I’m afraid I have some bad news. Kidding aside, this is a good point, but I think most would agree we’re far from the low-water mark of governmental power in the world today. And remember, people will generally have to convert their magic internet money into another currency in order to spend it on high-ticket items, so the government’s days of real worry are far away.

    BW: How would you describe the downsides, if any?

    ES: As with all new technologies, there will be disruption and there will be abuse. The question is whether, on balance, the impact is positive or negative. The biggest downside is inequality of opportunity: these are new technologies that are not that easy to use and still harder to understand. They presume access to a level of technology, infrastructure, and education that is not universally available. Think about the disruptive effect globalization has had on national economies all over the world. The winners have won by miles, not inches, with the losers harmed by the same degree. The first-mover advantage for institutional blockchain mastery will be similar.

    BW: And the internet economy has shown that a platform can be decentralized while the money and power remain very centralized.

    ES: Precisely. There are also more technical criticisms to be made here, beyond the scope of what we can reasonably get into. Suffice it to say cryptocurrencies are normally implemented today through one of two kinds of lottery systems, called “proof of work” and “proof of stake,” which are a sort of necessary evil arising from how they secure their systems against attack. Neither is great. “Proof of work” rewards those who can afford the most infrastructure and consume the most energy, which is destructive and slants the game in favor of the rich. “Proof of stake” tries to cut out the environmental harm by just giving up and handing the rich the reward directly, and hoping their limitless, rent-seeking greed will keep the lights on. Needless to say, new models are needed.

    ES: The tech is the tech, and it’s basic. It’s the applications that matter. The real question is not “what is a blockchain,” but “how can it be used?” And that gets back to what we started on: trust. We live in a world where everyone is lying about everything, with even ordinary teens on Instagram agonizing over how best to project a lifestyle they don’t actually have. People get different search results for the same query. Everything requires trust; at the same time nothing deserves it.

    This is the one interesting thing about blockchains: they might be that one tiny gear that lets us create systems you don’t have to trust. You’ve learned the only thing about blockchains that matters: they’re boring, inefficient, and wasteful, but, if well designed, they’re practically impossible to tamper with. And in a world full of shifty bullshit, being able to prove something is true is a radical development.

    #Blockchain #Edward_Snowden #Pédagogie #Bitcoin

  • #ICE Detention Center Says It’s Not Responsible for Staff’s Sexual Abuse of Detainees

    All 50 states, the District of #Columbia, and the federal government impose criminal liability on correctional facility staff who have sexual contact with people in their custody. These laws recognize that any sexual activity between detainees and detention facility staff, with or without the use of force, is unlawful because of the inherent power imbalance when people are in custody. Yet, one immigration detention center is trying to avoid responsibility for sexual violence within its walls by arguing that the detainee “consented” to sexual abuse.

    https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/ice-detention-center-says-its-not-responsible
    #rétention #détention_administrative #migrations #asile #réfugiés #abus_sexuels #viols #USA #Etats-Unis

  • Une juge fédérale d’Arizona décide que les Etats (des USA) ne peuvent pas punir une entreprise pour le boycott d’Israël
    Isaac Stanley-Becker, Washington Post, le 1er octobre 2018
    http://www.france-palestine.org/Une-juge-federale-d-Arizona-decide-que-les-etats-des-USA-ne-peuven

    Dans sa vie professionnelle, cependant, il était tenu par une loi promulguée par l’Etat d’Arizona en 2016 exigeant de toute entreprise sous contrat avec l’État qu’elle certifie qu’elle ne boycottait pas Israël. Il a contesté la directive devant les tribunaux, affirmant qu’elle violait ses droits au titre du premier amendement.

    Un juge fédéral en Arizona a jugé sa plainte fondée. La juge américaine Diane Humetewa a émis une injonction la semaine dernière, bloquant l’application de cette mesure qui oblige toute entreprise passant un contrat avec l’état à fournir une garantie écrit qu’elle ne participe pas à des activités de boycott visant Israël.

    Cette conclusion est la deuxième cette année à revenir sur une vague de lois au niveau des Etats, qui utilisent les fonds publics pour décourager les activités anti-israéliennes. Elle est dans la lignée d’un jugement similaire prononcé en janvier, lorsqu’un juge fédéral du Kansas a statué pour la première fois que l’application d’une disposition de l’Etat obligeant les contractants à signer un certificat de non-boycott violait le droit d’expression garanti par le Premier amendement. Selon l’American Civil Liberties Union, des dispositions similaires sont en vigueur dans plus d’une douzaine d’États, dont le Maryland, le Minnesota et la Caroline du Sud.

    A propos du #Maryland :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/236008

    A propos du #Kansas :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/637433
    https://seenthis.net/messages/669929
    http://www.aurdip.fr/un-tribunal-du-kansas-bloque.html
    https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/koontz-v-watson-opinion

    A propos de la #Caroline_du_sud :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/690067

    #Palestine #USA #Arizona #BDS #boycott #criminalisation_des_militants

  • Encrypted Messaging Apps Have Limitations You Should Know
    https://www.wired.com/story/encrypted-messaging-isnt-magic

    Encrypted communication used to be too complicated for mainstream use, but approachable apps like WhatsApp and Signal have become a no-brainer for digital privacy. With all of their security-minded features, like disappearing messages and identity-confirming safety numbers, secure chat apps can rightfully give you peace of mind. You should absolutely use them. As the adage goes, though, there’s no such thing as perfect security. And feeling invincible could get you in trouble.

    End-to-end encryption transforms messages into unintelligible chunks of data as soon as a user presses send. From there, the message isn’t reconstituted into something understandable until it reaches the receiver’s device. Along the way, the message is unreadable, protected from prying eyes. It essentially amounts to a bodyguard who picks you up at your house, rides around with you in your car, and walks you to the door of wherever you’re going. You’re safe during the transport, but your vigilance shouldn’t end there.

    “These tools are hugely better than traditional email and things like Slack” for security, says Matthew Green, a cryptographer at Johns Hopkins University. “But encryption isn’t magic. You can easily get it wrong. In particular, if you don’t trust the people you’re talking to, you’re screwed.”

    On one level it’s obvious that both you and the person you’re chatting with have access to the encrypted conversation—that’s the whole point. But it’s easy to forget in practice that people you message with could show the chat to someone else, take screenshots, or retain the conversation on their device indefinitely.

    Former Trump campaign chair Paul Manafort found this out the hard way recently, when the FBI obtained messages he’d sent over WhatsApp from the people who received them.

    In another current investigation, the FBI was able to access Signal messages sent by former Senate Intelligence Committee aide James Wolfe, and had at least some information about the encrypted messaging habits of New York Times reporter Ali Watkins, after the Justice Department seized her communications records as part of a leak investigation. Though it’s unknown how the FBI gained access to these encrypted chats, it wouldn’t necessarily have taken a crypto-breaking backdoor if investigators had device access or records from other chat participants.

    You also need to keep track of how many devices you’ve stored your encrypted messages on. If you sync chats between, say, your smartphone and your laptop, or back them up in the cloud, there are potentially more opportunities for the data to be exposed. Some services, like iMessage and WhatsApp, either have cloud backups enabled by default or nudge users toward it to streamline the user experience. Manafort provides a useful illustration once again; investigators accessed his iCloud to access some of the same information informants gave them, as well as to glean new information about his activity. The chats were encrypted in WhatsApp; the backups were not.

    “Digital systems strew data all over the place,” Green notes. “And providers may keep metadata like who you talked to and when. Encrypted messaging apps are valuable in that they tend to reduce the number of places where your data can live. However, the data is decrypted when it reaches your phone.”

    That’s where operations security comes in, the process of protecting information by looking holistically at all the ways it could be obtained, and defending against each of them. An “opsec fail,” as it’s known, happens when someone’s data leaks because they didn’t think of a method an attacker could use to access it, or they didn’t carry out the procedure that was meant to protect against that particular theft strategy. Relying solely on these encrypted messaging tools without considering how they work, and without adding other, additional protections, leaves some paths exposed.

    “Good opsec will save you from bad crypto, but good crypto won’t save you from bad opsec,” says Kenn White, director of the Open Crypto Audit Project, referencing a classic warning from security researcher The Grugq. “It’s easy for people to be confused.”

    The stakes are especially high in government, where encrypted chat apps and disappearing message features are increasingly popular among officials. Just last week, sources told CNBC that investigators for special counsel Robert Mueller have been asking witnesses to voluntarily grant access to their encrypted messaging apps, including Dust, Confide, WhatsApp, and Signal. CNBC reported that witnesses have cooperated to avoid being subpoenaed.

    Several encrypted messaging apps offer a disappearing message feature to help ensure that neither you nor the person you’re chatting with keeps data around longer than necessary. But even this precaution needs to come with the understanding that the service you’re using could fail to actually delete the messages you mark for erasure from their servers. Signal had a recent problem, first reported by Motherboard, where a fix for one bug inadvertently created another that failed to delete a set of messages users had set to disappear. The app quickly resolved the issue, but the situation serves as a reminder that all systems have flaws.

    “Encrypted communication apps are tools, and just like any other tool, they have limited uses,” says Eva Galperin, director of cybersecurity at the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

    In fact, simply choosing an encrypted messaging service may cary unknown risks. Some services like Confide and Telegram haven’t allowed an independent auditor to evaluate their cryptography, meaning it’s difficult to know how trustworthy they are, which of their promises they keep, and what user data they actually retain. And iMessage may collect more metadata than you think.

    Signal, WIRED’s secure messaging recommendation, is open source, but it also proved its trustworthiness in a 2016 case where the service was subpoenaed. Developer Open Whisper Systems responded to a grand jury subpoena saying it could only produce the time an account was created and the most recent date that a user’s Signal app connected to its servers. The court had asked for significantly more detail like user names, addresses, telephone numbers, and email addresses. Signal had retained none of it.

    While end-to-end encryption is a vital privacy protection that can thwart many types of surveillance, you still need to understand the other avenues a government or attacker could take to obtain chat logs. Even when a service works perfectly factors like where messages are stored, who else has received them, and who else has access to devices that contain them play an important role in your security. If you’re using encrypted chat apps as one tool in your privacy and security toolbox, more power to you. If you’re relying on it as a panacea, you’re more at risk than you realize.

    Lily Hay Newman - 06.14.18

    https://www.wired.com/story/ditch-all-those-other-messaging-apps-heres-why-you-should-use-signal
    https://www.wired.com/story/encrypt-all-of-the-things
    https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/06/06/the-cybersecurity-202-paul-manafort-s-case-may-undermine-the-fbi-s-encryption-argument/5b16ae5e1b326b08e8839150
    https://blogsofwar.com/hacker-opsec-with-the-grugq
    https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/mueller-team-zeroes-in-on-encrypted-apps-as-witness-turn-in-phones.html
    https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/bj3pxd/signal-disappearing-messages-not-disappearing
    https://theintercept.com/2016/09/28/apple-logs-your-imessage-contacts-and-may-share-them-with-police
    https://www.wired.com/story/ditch-all-those-other-messaging-apps-heres-why-you-should-use-signal
    https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/new-documents-reveal-government-effort-impose-secrecy-encryption?redirect=blog/free-future/new-documents-reveal-government-effort-impose-secrecy-encryption-company

    #vie_privée #messagerie_chiffrée #protection_des_données_personnelles #autodéfense_numérique #cryptography #chiffrement #Signal #gnupg

    • There are many similar instant messaging systems, and each person can only handle so many of them. And they don’t talk to each other. So if you’re in touch with two people who use Signal and another three use Wire and you want to chat with all five of them, how do you do it? Email has the advantage of universal interoperability.

      Email are interoperable because there is well-documented standard behind it. And it is federated.
      XMPP is well-documented and federated too.

      The collapse of domain fronting means that some network operators can, and do, block Signal, Telegram, and other centralized messaging services like them. People stuck behind those networks simply can’t use these tools at all.

      Domain fronting is required because Signal is centralized. In a federated network, one has to block all possible communication channels between two arbitrary people. It is much harder to block a federated network unless you are willing to maintain a whitelist.

      Some people can only be contacted by email and have no public Signal number. For example, the EFF’s contact page lists email addresses (with PGP fingerprints) and office phone numbers, but no Signal numbers. If I’ve switched off end-to-end email security in favor of Signal, how am I supposed to communicate with the EFF securely?

      That’s bad practice from EFF. Not a first. But it cannot be attributed to Signal.

      Signal requires registration to a phone number. Not everyone has a phone number, knows the phone number of the person they want to contact, or is willing to share their phone number with other people.

      XMPP uses arbitrary identifiers. Phone numbers are possibly sensitive and allow som eattackers to track people geolocation. Phone numbers are bad. Arbitrary identifiers are good. This has been discussed at the last CCC conference as well.

      Some versions of the Signal app have similar problems to those outlined in EFail.

      No, they don’t have similar problems, except if the “similar problems” are “having a vulnerability”. This is bad phrasing. Signal has many problems but none that are as bad as emails.

      My advice, as always, is: use XMPP with OMEMO. There are Windows, GNU/Linux, Mac, Android and iOS clients. You can have a free account at https://jabber.lqdn.fr or a paying one at conversations.im. Conversations for Android has excellent ideas regarding seamless secure communication. More on that here: https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/publication/chiffrement-de-messagerie-quasi-instantanee-a-quel-protocole-se-vouer

  • Encore une tentative de changer la loi sur l’antisémitisme pour empêcher l’antisionisme, ici en Caroline du Sud (USA) :

    Landmark bill restricting criticism of Israel sneaks through South Carolina Senate
    Alison Weir, If Americans Knew, le 24 avril 2018
    https://israelpalestinenews.org/landmark-bill-restricting-criticism-of-israel-sneaks-through-so

    Ce genre de tentatives apparaît un peu partout dans le monde depuis quelques temps :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/337856
    https://seenthis.net/messages/580647
    https://seenthis.net/messages/603396
    https://seenthis.net/messages/604402
    https://seenthis.net/messages/606801

    #antisémitisme #antisionisme #Palestine #censure #Liberté_d'expression #Etats-Unis #Caroline_du_Sud #BDS

  • My Guantánamo Diary, Uncensored
    https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/my-guantanamo-diary-uncensored

    Mohamedou Ould Slahi was released one year ago from the prison at Guantánamo Bay, after 14 years without charge or trial. This week, the best-selling memoir he wrote from prison was rereleased — with the U.S. government’s redactions restored.

    If I wanted to, I could put my pen down right now, close my office door behind me, and go for a long walk outside.

    Today in Nouakchott, Mauritania, it is terribly hot and dry, so that would not be the wisest choice, but freedom is having that option. And freedom is choosing to write instead, not because my life depends on it, but because these days, thank God, it finally doesn’t.

    A year ago this week, a U.S. military cargo plane touched down on this city’s arid runway and I was escorted, unshackled, down the airplane’s ramp and toward a group of government officials. With each step I pulled farther ahead of my American guards, farther away from the territory of bondage, and toward the territory of freedom.

  • Artificial Intelligence at Any Cost Is a Recipe for Tyranny

    But we shouldn’t just be concerned about “false positives.” If we worry only about how error-prone these systems are, then more accurate surveillance systems will be seen as the solution to the problem.

    https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/artificial-intelligence-any-cost-recipe-tyranny

    Mentionné (vers la 21ème minute) sur « Les chiens de Garde », le podcast de https://crypto.quebec
    #machineLearning #ethics #podcast #netsec

  • Quelques références trouvées dans le livre Violent Borders de Reece Jones (excellent, par ailleurs), sur les #statistiques des décès de migrants (certains, voire beaucoup déjà signalés sur seenthis):

    Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.-Mexico Border

    This report is the result of a cooperative agreement entered into by Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties to explore and use binational strategies to protect the human rights of immigrants in the border region. The report describes the unacceptable human tragedy that takes place daily in this region. The study was conducted and written by immigration and border policy advocate Maria Jimenez who resides in Houston, Texas.

    https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/humanitarian-crisis-migrant-deaths-us-mexico-border

    Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration

    In October 2013, over 400 people lost their lives in two shipwrecks close to the Italian island of Lampedusa. While these two events were highly publicized, sadly they are not isolated incidents; the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in 2013 and 2014 nearly 6,500 migrants lost their lives in border regions around the world. Because many deaths occur in remote areas and are never reported, counts of deaths fail to capture the full number of lives lost.

    Despite recognition that actions must be taken to stop more unnecessary deaths, as yet there remains very little information on the scale of the problem. The vast majority of governments do not publish numbers of deaths, and counting lives lost is largely left to civil society and the media. Drawing upon data from a wide range of sources from different regions of the world, Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration investigates how border-related deaths are documented, who is documenting them, and what can be done to improve the evidence base to encourage informed accountability, policy and practice.

    Regionally focused chapters present most recent statistics and address a number of key questions regarding how migrant border-related deaths are enumerated. Chapters address: migration routes through Central America to the United States, with a focus on the United States–Mexico border region; the southern European Union bordering the Mediterranean; routes from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa; routes taken by migrants emigrating from the Horn of Africa towards the Gulf or Southern Africa; and the waters surrounding Australia.

    Numbers have the power to capture attention, and while counts of border-related deaths will always be estimates, they serve to make concrete something which has been left vague and ill-defined. In a way, through counting, deaths too often invisible are given existence. More complete data can not only serve to highlight the extent of what is taking place, but is also crucial in guiding effective policy response.

    https://publications.iom.int/fr/books/fatal-journeys-tracking-lives-lost-during-migration
    #fatal_journeys

    Beyond Walls and Cages: Prisons, Borders, and Global Crisis

    The crisis of borders and prisons can be seen starkly in statistics. In 2011 some 1,500 migrants died trying to enter Europe, and the United States deported nearly 400,000 and imprisoned some 2.3 million people―more than at any other time in history. International borders are increasingly militarized places embedded within domestic policing and imprisonment and entwined with expanding prison-industrial complexes. Beyond Walls and Cages offers scholarly and activist perspectives on these issues and explores how the international community can move toward a more humane future.Working at a range of geographic scales and locations, contributors examine concrete and ideological connections among prisons, migration policing and detention, border fortification, and militarization. They challenge the idea that prisons and borders create safety, security, and order, showing that they can be forms of coercive mobility that separate loved ones, disempower communities, and increase shared harms of poverty. Walls and cages can also fortify wealth and power inequalities, racism, and gender and sexual oppression.As governments increasingly rely on criminalization and violent measures of exclusion and containment, strategies for achieving change are essential. Beyond Walls and Cages develops abolitionist, no borders, and decolonial analyses and methods for social change, showing how seemingly disconnected forms of state violence are interconnected. Creating a more just and free world―whether in the Mexico-U.S. borderlands, the Morocco-Spain region, South Africa, Montana, or Philadelphia―requires that people who are most affected become central to building alternatives to global crosscurrents of criminalization and militarization.


    https://www.amazon.com/Beyond-Walls-Cages-Geographies-Transformation/dp/0820344125

    The Human Costs of Border Control (2007)

    This article outlines the relationship between irregular immigration, increased border control, and the number of casualties at Europe’s maritime borders. The conclusion is that the number of fatalities is increasing as a result of increased border control. The author argues that States have a positive obligation under international law to address this issue, and formulates concrete proposals to monitor the number of border deaths.

    http://thomasspijkerboer.eu/migrant-deaths-academic/the-human-costs-of-border-control-2007

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #chiffres #décès #morts #rapport #USA #Etats-Unis #frontières #Mexique

  • 2 out of every 3 Americans lost Fourth Amendment protections to DHS | Computerworld
    https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights-governments-100-mile-border-zone-map

    Two out of every three people reading this could have your electronic devices searched, without there being any reasonable suspicion, because the Department of Homeland Security has decided that such search and seizures do not violate your Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Border agents don’t need probable cause and they don’t need a stinking warrant since they don’t need to prove any reasonable suspicion first. Nor, sadly, do two out of three people have First Amendment protection; it is as if DHS has voided those Constitutional amendments and protections they provide to nearly 200 million Americans.

  • Baltimore Police Secretly Running Aerial Mass-Surveillance Eye in the Sky
    https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/baltimore-police-secretly-running-aerial-mass-surveillance-eye-sky

    Bloomberg Businessweek reported late Tuesday that the Baltimore police have been subjecting that city to a vast and powerful aerial surveillance system since January, without telling, let alone asking, the public that they serve. This is a big deal. This system, known as “wide-area surveillance” and run by an Ohio company called Persistent Surveillance Systems, involves the deployment of megapixel cameras on a Cessna aircraft, which circles over a city for up to 10 hours at a time, (...)

    #PSS #CCTV #surveillance #surveillance #ACLU

  • A South Carolina Student Was Arrested for ‘Disturbing a School’ When She Challenged Police Abuse, So We Sued | American Civil Liberties Union
    https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/south-carolina-student-was-arrested-disturbing-school-when-she-challenged-poli

    One day last fall, Niya Kenny was sitting in her math class at Spring Valley High School in Richland County, South Carolina, when a police officer came into the classroom. A girl in her class had refused to put away her cell phone, and the teacher had summoned an administrator, who called on the officer assigned to the school.

    Niya thought the officer’s appearance was bad news — his name was Ben Fields, but he was so aggressive that students knew him as Officer Slam. As soon as he entered the room, she called out for other students to record him.

    #droits_civiques #droits_humains #états-unis #racisme #violence #pays_de_fous