• EU judges slam France’s migrant pushbacks

    Ruling examines decision to shut French border to non-EU nationals.

    The EU’s top court ruled against France’s policy of turning away migrants at its borders.

    The European Court of Justice announced on Thursday (https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-09/cp230145en.pdf) that those actions breached the EU’s rules on migrant returns.

    The ruling comes as France closed its border to Italy amid a recent surge in migrant arrivals to the Italian island of Lampedusa.

    France’s center-right Home Affairs Minister Gerard Darmanin had on Monday vowed that “France will not take in a single migrant from Lampedusa” after meeting his Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi in Rome (https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/09/18/darmanin-la-francia-non-accogliera-migranti-da-lampedusa_2f53eae6-e8f7-4b82-9d7).

    But EU rules compel member countries to initiate a formal procedure when expelling an irregular migrant, and give that person sufficient time to leave the country.

    So-called pushbacks of migrants, or forcing a migrant directly back across a border, may only be carried out as a last resort, the judges in Luxembourg ruled.

    They also noted that non-EU citizens who lack permission to stay may not be turned away at internal EU borders.

    Commenting on the ruling, the European Commission’s Home Affairs spokesperson Anitta Hipper told a daily media briefing that “reintroducing [internal EU] border controls must remain an exceptional measure.” (https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-246319)

    She added that the EU executive is in consultations with countries that have sealed their borders.

    This ruling comes as the European Parliament’s home affairs committee on Wednesday backed legislation that allows EU countries to enact border controls only when faced with emergencies such as health or terrorism threats, and only for a limited time period.

    https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-judges-slam-france-migrant-pushback

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #frontière_sud-alpine #Italie #France #frontières #push-backs #refoulements #fermeture_des_frontières #Alpes #justice #C-143/22 #Cour_de_justice_de_l'Union_européenne (#CJUE) #frontières_intérieures

    • JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)

      (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Border control, asylum and immigration – Regulation (EU) 2016/399 – Article 32 – Temporary reintroduction of border control by a Member State at its internal borders – Article 14 – Refusal of entry – Equation of internal borders with external borders – Directive 2008/115/EC – Scope – Article 2(2)(a))

      In Case C‑143/22,

      REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Conseil d’État (Council of State, France), made by decision of 24 February 2022, received at the Court on 1 March 2022, in the proceedings

      Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE),

      Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE),

      Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT),

      Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade),

      Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI),

      Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI),

      Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH),

      Le paria,

      Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF),

      SOS – Hépatites Fédération

      v

      Ministre de l’Intérieur,

      intervening party :

      Défenseur des droits,

      THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),

      composed of C. Lycourgos (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, L.S. Rossi, J.-C. Bonichot, S. Rodin and O. Spineanu-Matei, Judges,

      Advocate General : A. Rantos,

      Registrar : M. Krausenböck, Administrator,

      having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 19 January 2023,

      after considering the observations submitted on behalf of :

      – Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF) and SOS – Hépatites Fédération, by P. Spinosi, lawyer,

      – the Défenseur des droits, by C. Hédon, Défenseure des droits, M. Cauvin and A. Guitton, acting as advisers, and by I. Zribi, lawyer,

      – the French Government, by A.-L. Desjonquères and J. Illouz, acting as Agents,

      – the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna, E. Borawska-Kędzierska and A. Siwek-Ślusarek, acting as Agents,

      – the European Commission, by A. Azéma, A. Katsimerou, T. Lilamand and J. Tomkin, acting as Agents,

      after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 30 March 2023,

      gives the following

      Judgment

      1 This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2016 L 77, p. 1, ‘the Schengen Borders Code’), and of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98).

      2 The request has been made in proceedings between Association Avocats pour la défense des droits des étrangers (ADDE), Association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers (ANAFE), Association de recherche, de communication et d’action pour l’accès aux traitements (ARCAT), Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués (Cimade), Fédération des associations de solidarité avec tou.te.s les immigré.e.s (FASTI), Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigré.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l’homme (LDH), Le Paria, Syndicat des avocats de France (SAF), SOS – Hépatites Fédération, and Ministre de l’Intérieur (Minister of the Interior, France) regarding the legality of the ordonnance no 2020-1733 du 16 décembre 2020 portant partie législative du code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Order No 2020-1733 of 16 December 2020, laying down the legislative part of the Code on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum) (JORF of 30 December 2020, Text No 41).

      Legal context

      European Union law

      The Schengen Borders Code

      3 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code :

      ‘For the purposes of this Regulation the following definitions apply :

      1. “internal borders” means :

      (a) the common land borders, including river and lake borders, of the Member States ;

      (b) the airports of the Member States for internal flights ;

      (c) sea, river and lake ports of the Member States for regular internal ferry connections ;

      2. “external borders” means : the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders ;

      …’

      4 Title II of that code, which concerns ‘External Borders’, includes Articles 5 to 21.

      5 Article 14 of the code, entitled ‘Refusal of entry’, states :

      ‘1. A third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States. This shall be without prejudice to the application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international protection or the issue of long-stay visas.

      2. Entry may only be refused by a substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal. The decision shall be taken by an authority empowered by national law. It shall take effect immediately.

      The substantiated decision stating the precise reasons for the refusal shall be given by means of a standard form, as set out in Annex V, Part B, filled in by the authority empowered by national law to refuse entry. The completed standard form shall be handed to the third-country national concerned, who shall acknowledge receipt of the decision to refuse entry by means of that form.

      Data on third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused shall be registered in the EES in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 (OJ 2017 L 327, p. 20)].

      3. Persons refused entry shall have the right to appeal. Appeals shall be conducted in accordance with national law. A written indication of contact points able to provide information on representatives competent to act on behalf of the third-country national in accordance with national law shall also be given to the third-country national.

      Lodging such an appeal shall not have suspensive effect on a decision to refuse entry.

      Without prejudice to any compensation granted in accordance with national law, the third-country national concerned shall, where the appeal concludes that the decision to refuse entry was ill-founded, be entitled to the correction of the data entered in the EES or of the cancelled entry stamp, or both, and any other cancellations or additions which have been made, by the Member State which refused entry.

      4. The border guards shall ensure that a third-country national refused entry does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned.

      5. Member States shall collect statistics on the number of persons refused entry, the grounds for refusal, the nationality of the persons who were refused entry and the type of border (land, air or sea) at which they were refused entry and submit them yearly to the Commission (Eurostat) in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 23)].

      6. Detailed rules governing refusal of entry are given in Part A of Annex V.’

      6 Title III of the Schengen Borders Code, which concerns ‘Internal Borders’, includes Articles 22 to 35.

      7 Article 25 of that code, entitled ‘General framework for the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where, in the area without internal border control, there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in a Member State, that Member State may exceptionally reintroduce border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders for a limited period of up to 30 days or for the foreseeable duration of the serious threat if its duration exceeds 30 days. The scope and duration of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders shall not exceed what is strictly necessary to respond to the serious threat.’

      8 Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, entitled ‘Provisions to be applied where border control is reintroduced at internal borders’, provides :

      ‘Where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of Title II shall apply mutatis mutandis.’

      9 Annex V, Part A, of the Schengen Borders Code provides :

      ‘1. When refusing entry, the competent border guard shall :

      (a) fill in the standard form for refusing entry, as shown in Part B. The third-country national concerned shall sign the form and shall be given a copy of the signed form. Where the third-country national refuses to sign, the border guard shall indicate this refusal in the form under the section “comments” ;

      (b) for third-country nationals whose entry for a short stay has been refused, register in the EES the data on refusal of entry in accordance with Article 6a(2) of this Regulation and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 ;

      (c) annul or revoke the visas, as appropriate, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 34 of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) (OJ 2009 L 243, p. 1)] ;

      (d) for third-country nationals whose refusals of entry are not to be registered into the EES, affix an entry stamp on the passport, cancelled by a cross in indelible black ink, and write opposite it on the right-hand side, also in indelible ink, the letter(s) corresponding to the reason(s) for refusing entry, the list of which is given on the standard form for refusing entry as shown in Part B of this Annex. In addition, for these categories of persons, the border guard shall record every refusal of entry in a register or on a list stating the identity and nationality of the third-country national concerned, the references of the document authorising the third-country national to cross the border and the reason for, and date of, refusal of entry.

      The practical arrangements for stamping are set out in Annex IV.

      2. If a third-country national who has been refused entry is brought to the border by a carrier, the authority responsible locally shall :

      (a) order the carrier to take charge of the third-country national and transport him or her without delay to the third country from which he or she was brought, to the third country which issued the document authorising him or her to cross the border, or to any other third country where he or she is guaranteed admittance, or to find means of onward transportation in accordance with Article 26 of the Schengen Convention and Council Directive 2001/51/EC [of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (OJ 2001 L 187, p. 45)] ;

      (b) pending onward transportation, take appropriate measures, in compliance with national law and having regard to local circumstances, to prevent third-country nationals who have been refused entry from entering illegally.

      …’

      10 Pursuant to Article 44 of that code, entitled ‘Repeal’ :

      ‘Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (OJ 2006 L 105, p. 1)] is repealed.

      References to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex X.’

      11 In accordance with that correlation table, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code corresponds to Article 13 of Regulation No 562/2006.

      Directive 2008/115

      12 Article 2(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115 states :

      ‘1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State.

      2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who :

      (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of [Regulation No 562/2006], or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State ;

      (b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.’

      13 Article 3 of that directive provides :

      ‘For the purpose of this Directive the following definitions shall apply :

      2. “illegal stay” means the presence on the territory of a Member State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of [Regulation No 562/2006] or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State ;

      3. “return” means the process of a third-country national going back – whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced – to :

      – his or her country of origin, or

      – a country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements, or

      – another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted ;

      …’

      14 Article 4(4) of the directive provides :

      ‘With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the scope of this Directive in accordance with Article 2(2)(a), Member States shall :

      (a) ensure that their treatment and level of protection are no less favourable than as set out in Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 9(2)(a) (postponement of removal), Article 14(1)(b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into account needs of vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention conditions) and

      (b) respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      15 Article 5 of Directive 2008/115 provides :

      ‘When implementing this Directive, Member States shall take due account of :

      (a) the best interests of the child ;

      (b) family life ;

      (c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned,

      and respect the principle of non-refoulement.’

      16 Article 6 of that directive provides :

      ‘1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.

      2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to the territory of that other Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance by the third-country national concerned with this requirement, or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is required for reasons of public policy or national security, paragraph 1 shall apply.

      3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if the third-country national concerned is taken back by another Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In such a case the Member State which has taken back the third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1.

      …’

      17 The first subparagraph of Article 7(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a period shall be granted only following an application by the third-country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application.’

      18 Article 15(1) of that directive provides :

      ‘Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular when :

      (a) there is a risk of absconding or

      (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process.

      Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.’

      French law

      19 Article L. 213-3-1 of the Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile (Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum), in the version resulting from the loi no 2018-778, du 10 septembre 2018, pour une immigration maîtrisée, un droit d’asile effectif et une intégration réussie (Law No 2018-778 of 10 September 2018 for controlled immigration, an effective right of asylum and successful integration) (JORF of 11 September 2018, Text No 1) (‘the former Ceseda’), stated :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders provided for in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code], the decisions referred to in Article L. 213-2 may be taken in respect of foreign nationals who have arrived directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention signed on 19 June 1990, who have entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and were checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres behind it. The procedures for these checks are defined by decree in the Conseil d’État [(Council of State, France)].’

      20 Order No 2020-1733 recast the legislative part of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. Article L. 332-2 of that code, as amended (‘the amended Ceseda’) provides :

      ‘The decision refusing entry, which shall be in writing and substantiated, shall be taken by an officer belonging to a category prescribed by regulations.

      The notification of the decision refusing entry shall state that the foreign national has the right to inform, or cause to be informed, the person he or she has indicated that he or she intended to visit, his or her consulate or the adviser of his or her choice. It shall state that the foreign national has the right to refuse to be repatriated before one clear day has passed, under the conditions laid down in Article L. 333-2.

      The decision and the notification of rights which accompanies it shall be provided to him in a language he or she understands.

      Particular attention shall be paid to vulnerable persons, especially minors whether accompanied by an adult or not.’

      21 Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda provides :

      ‘The procedure laid down in Article L. 332-2 is applicable to the decision to refuse entry taken against the foreign national pursuant to Article 6 of the [Schengen Borders Code]. It shall also apply to checks carried out at an internal border in the event of the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the [Schengen Borders Code].’

      The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling

      22 The associations referred to in paragraph 2 of the present judgment are challenging the validity of Order No 2020-1733 before the Conseil d’État (Council of State), in an action for annulment of that order, on the grounds, inter alia, that Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda resulting from it infringes Directive 2008/115 in that it allows decisions to refuse entry at internal borders where checks have been reintroduced.

      23 The referring court observes that the Court held, in its judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others (C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220), that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115, read in conjunction with Article 32 of the Schengen Borders Code, does not apply to the situation of an illegally staying third-country national who was apprehended in the immediate vicinity of an internal border of a Member State, even where that Member State has reintroduced border control at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or to internal security in that Member State.

      24 The Conseil d’État (Council of State) points out that, in its Decision No 428175 of 27 November 2020, it held that the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda, which provided that in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders, a foreign national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990 and which entered into force on 26 March 1995 (OJ 2000 L 239, p. 19, ‘the Schengen Convention’), could be refused entry under the terms of Article L. 213-2 of the former Ceseda if he or entered the territory of Metropolitan France crossing an internal land border without being authorised to do so and was checked in an area between the border and a line drawn 10 kilometres inside that border, were contrary to Directive 2008/115.

      25 Admittedly, according to the Conseil d’État (Council of State), Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda does not repeat the provisions of Article L. 213-3-1 of the former Ceseda. However, Article L. 332-3 of the amended Ceseda again provides only for the adoption of a refusal of entry while carrying out border checks at internal borders in the event of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of the Schengen Borders Code.

      26 That court therefore considers it necessary to determine whether, in such a case, a third-country national arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention who presents themselves at an authorised stationary or mobile border crossing point, without being in possession of documents justifying an authorisation to enter or right to stay in France, may be refused entry on the basis of Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, without Directive 2008/115 being applicable.

      27 In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling :

      ‘In the event of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders, under the conditions laid down in Chapter II of Title III of [the Schengen Borders Code], can foreign nationals arriving directly from the territory of a State party to the Schengen Convention … be refused entry, when entry checks are carried out at that border, on the basis of Article 14 of that [code], without [Directive 2008/115] being applicable ?’

      Consideration of the question referred

      28 By its question referred for a preliminary ruling, the national court asks, in essence, whether the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out, a decision refusing entry, within the meaning of Article 14 of that code, without being subject to compliance with that directive.

      29 Article 25 of the Schengen Borders Code allows, exceptionally and under certain conditions, a Member State to reintroduce temporarily border control at all or specific parts of its internal borders where there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security in that Member State. Under Article 32 of the code, where border control at internal borders is reintroduced, the relevant provisions of the Title II of the code relating to external borders shall apply mutatis mutandis.

      30 That is the case with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, which provides that a third-country national who does not fulfil all the entry conditions laid down in Article 6(1) and does not belong to the categories of persons referred to in Article 6(5) shall be refused entry to the territories of the Member States.

      31 However, it is important to remember that a third-country national who, after entering the territory of a Member State illegally is present on that territory without fulfilling the conditions for entry, stay or residence is, therefore, staying illegally, within the meaning of Directive 2008/115. Under Article 2(1) of that directive, and without prejudice to Article 2(2) of the directive, that third-country national falls within the scope of the directive, without his or her presence in the territory of the Member State concerned being subject to a condition as to minimum duration or intention to remain in that territory. He or she must therefore, in principle, be subject to the common standards and procedures laid down by the directive for the purpose of his or her removal, as long as his or her stay has not, as the case may be, been regularised (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 37 and 39 and the case-law cited).

      32 This also applies where the third-country national has been apprehended at a border crossing point, provided that the border crossing point is on the territory of that Member State. In that respect, it should be noted that a person may have entered the territory of a Member State even before crossing a border crossing point (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 February 2020, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Signing-on of seamen in the port of Rotterdam), C‑341/18, EU:C:2020:76, paragraph 45).

      33 It should also be specified, by way of example, that when checks are carried out on board a train between the time when the train leaves the last station located on the territory of a Member State sharing an internal border with a Member State that has reintroduced checks at its internal borders, and the moment when that train enters the first station situated on the territory of the latter Member State, the check on board that same train must, unless otherwise agreed between those two Member States, be regarded as a check carried out at a border crossing point situated on the territory of the Member State which has reintroduced such checks. A third-country national who has been checked on board this train will necessarily remain on the territory of the latter Member State following the check, within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Directive 2008/115.

      34 However, it should also be noted that Article 2(2) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States to exclude, exceptionally and under certain conditions, third-country nationals who are staying illegally on their territory from the scope of that directive.

      35 Thus, on the one hand, Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 allows Member States not to apply that directive, subject to the provisions of Article 4(4) thereof, in two specific situations, namely that of third-country nationals who are the subject to a refusal of entry at an external border of a Member State, in accordance with Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code, or that of third-country nationals who are apprehended or intercepted in connection with the irregular crossing of such an external border and who have not subsequently obtained authorisation or a right to reside in that Member State.

      36 However, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that those two situations relate exclusively to the crossing of an external border of a Member State, as defined in Article 2 of the Schengen Borders Code, and do not therefore concern the crossing of a border common to Member States forming part of the Schengen area, even where checks have been reintroduced at that border, pursuant to Article 25 of that code, on account of a serious threat to public policy or the internal security of that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraphs 45 and 67).

      37 It follows, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 35 of his Opinion, that Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115 does not authorise a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders to derogate from the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive in order to remove a third-country national who has been intercepted, without a valid residence permit, at one of the border crossing points situated in the territory of that Member State where such checks are carried out.

      38 On the other hand, although Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2008/115 authorises Member States not to apply that directive to third-country nationals who are subject to a criminal penalty providing for or resulting in their return, in accordance with national law, or who are subject to extradition proceedings, it must be noted that such a case is not the one referred to by the provision at issue in the main proceedings.

      39 It follows from the foregoing, first, that a Member State which has reintroduced checks at its internal borders may apply, mutatis mutandis, Article 14 of the Schengen Borders Code and paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex V to that code in respect of a third-country national who is intercepted, without a legal residence permit, at an authorised border crossing point where such checks are carried out.

      40 On the other hand, where the border crossing point is located on the territory of the Member State concerned, the latter must ensure that the consequences of such application, mutatis mutandis, of the provisions referred to in the previous point do not result in disregard of the common standards and procedures laid down in Directive 2008/115. The fact that this obligation on the Member State concerned is likely to render ineffective to a large extent any decision to refuse entry to a third-country national arriving at one of its internal borders is not such as to alter that finding.

      41 With regard to the relevant provisions of that directive, it should be recalled, in particular, that it follows from Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/115 that any third-country national staying illegally on the territory of a Member State must, without prejudice to the exceptions provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of that article and in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Article 5 of that directive, be the subject of a return decision, which must identify, among the third countries referred to in Article 3(3) of that directive, the country to which he or she must return (judgment of 22 November 2022, Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (Removal – Medicinal cannabis), C‑69/21, EU:C:2022:913, paragraph 53).

      42 In addition, a third-country national who is the subject of such a return decision must still, in principle, be given, under Article 7 of Directive 2008/115, a certain period of time in which to leave the territory of the Member State concerned voluntarily. Forced removal is to take place only as a last resort, in accordance with Article 8 of that directive, and subject to Article 9 thereof, which requires Member States to postpone removal in the cases it sets out (judgment of 17 December 2020, Commission v Hungary (Reception of applicants for international protection), C‑808/18, EU:C:2020:1029, paragraph 252).

      43 Furthermore, it follows from Article 15 of Directive 2008/115 that the detention of an illegally staying third-country national may only be imposed in certain specific cases. However, as the Advocate General pointed out, in essence, in point 46 of his Opinion, that article does not preclude a national from being detained, pending his or her removal, where he or she represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or domestic security, provided that such detention complies with the conditions set out in Articles 15 to 18 of that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2020, Stadt Frankfurt am Main, C‑18/19, EU:C:2020:511, paragraphs 41 to 48).

      44 Furthermore, Directive 2008/115 does not rule out the possibility for Member States to impose a prison sentence for offences other than those relating solely to illegal entry, including in situations where the return procedure established by that directive has not yet been completed. Consequently, that directive also does not preclude the arrest or placing in police custody of an illegally staying third-country national where such measures are adopted on the ground that that national is suspected of having committed an offence other than simply entering the national territory illegally, and in particular an offence likely to threaten public policy or the internal security of the Member State concerned (judgment of 19 March 2019, Arib and Others, C‑444/17, EU:C:2019:220, paragraph 66).

      45 It follows that, contrary to what the French Government maintains, the application, in a case such as that referred to in the reference for a preliminary ruling, of the common standards and procedures laid down by Directive 2008/115 is not such as to make it impossible to maintain public order and safeguard internal security within the meaning of Article 72 TFEU.

      46 In light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling is that the Schengen Borders Code and Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that code, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down by that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      Costs

      47 Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

      On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules :

      Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) and Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals,

      must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Member State has reintroduced controls at its internal borders, it may adopt, in respect of a third-country national who presents himself or herself at an authorised border crossing point situated on its territory and where such controls are carried out, a decision refusing entry, by virtue of an application mutatis mutandis of Article 14 of that regulation, provided that the common standards and procedures laid down in that directive are applied to that national with a view to his or her removal.

      https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62022CJ0143

    • Contrôle des frontières : le gouvernement contraint de sortir de l’illégalité

      Communiqué commun signé par la LDH

      Après 8 ans de pratiques illégales du gouvernement français en matière de contrôle et d’enfermement des personnes en migration aux frontières intérieures, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) confirme, dans un arrêt du 21 septembre, qu’elles sont contraires au droit.

      La CJUE rappelle à la France qu’elle doit se conformer au droit de l’Union européenne, et il appartient au gouvernement français de prendre des mesures immédiates sans attendre que le Conseil d’État en tire toutes les conséquences.

      Associations signataires : Avocats pour la Défense des Droits des Etrangers (ADDE), Alliance-DEDF, Amnesty International France, Anafé (association nationale d’assistance aux frontières pour les personnes étrangères), Bizi migrant.es, Emmaüs Roya, Federation Etorkinekin Diakité, Gisti, La Cimade, LDH (Ligue des droits de l’Homme), Médecins du Monde, Roya citoyenne, Syndicat des avocats de France (Saf), Syndicat de la magistrature (SM), Tous Migrants, Tous Migrants 73, Utopia 56 (antenne Toulouse)

      Paris, le 21 septembre 2023

      https://www.ldh-france.org/controle-des-frontieres-le-gouvernement-contraint-de-sortir-de-lillegali

    • Corte di giustizia UE: vietato il respingimento sistematico alle frontiere interne

      La sentenza della Corte nella causa #C-143/22 promossa da diverse associazioni francesi

      Il 21 settembre 2023 una sentenza della Corte di giustizia dell’Unione europea (CGUE) ha dichiarato che, anche se un Paese UE ha introdotto controlli alle sue frontiere, non ha il diritto di effettuare respingimenti sistematici. Deve rispettare la direttiva europea «rimpatri» che prevede che a un cittadino extraeuropeo possa “essere concesso un certo periodo di tempo per lasciare volontariamente il territorio“.

      Tutto era partito dal ricorso di varie associazioni francesi 1 che hanno contestato dinanzi al Consiglio di Stato francese la legittimità di un’ordinanza che ha modificato il codice sull’ingresso e sul soggiorno degli stranieri e sul diritto d’asilo (Ceseda).

      Esse hanno sostenuto che, consentendo alle autorità francesi di rifiutare l’ingresso di cittadini di paesi terzi alle frontiere con altri Stati membri (ossia le «frontiere interne»), alle quali sia stato temporaneamente ripristinato un controllo di frontiera in forza del codice frontiere Schengen in ragione di una minaccia grave per l’ordine pubblico o la sicurezza interna della Francia, il Ceseda contravverrebbe alla direttiva «rimpatri». Secondo tale direttiva, qualsiasi cittadino di un paese terzo il cui soggiorno è irregolare deve, di norma, essere oggetto di una decisione di rimpatrio. Tuttavia, l’interessato deve, in linea di principio, beneficiare di un certo termine per lasciare volontariamente il territorio. L’allontanamento forzato avviene solo in ultima istanza.

      Il Consiglio di Stato ha quindi interrogato la CGUE sulla questione dichiarando che «in una situazione del genere, un provvedimento di respingimento può essere adottato sulla base del codice frontiere #Schengen ma che, ai fini dell’allontanamento dell’interessato, devono comunque essere rispettate le norme e le procedure comuni previste dalla direttiva “rimpatri” (https://openmigration.org/glossary-term/direttiva-rimpatri), il che può condurre a privare di una larga parte della sua utilità l’adozione di un siffatto provvedimento di respingimento».

      «La sentenza della CGUE impone la giurisprudenza a tutti gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea, ma in particolare è rivolta alla Francia, che dal 2015 ha reintrodotto i controlli alle frontiere interne.»

      Negli ultimi otto anni, tutti i treni che passano per #Menton sono stati controllati, gli agenti di polizia hanno controllato i passaggi di frontiera e pattugliato i valichi alpini. Dal 1° giugno è ulteriormente stata dispiegata un militarizzazione delle frontiere con personale aggiuntivo, il supporto dell’esercito, droni con termocamere.

      La Francia è stata accusata di respingere le persone migranti che cercano di entrare nel Paese, anche quelli che chiedono asilo e perfino i minorenni. Diversi rapporti di organizzazioni e collettivi hanno messo in luce queste pratiche violente e illegali, soprattutto nella zona di Ventimiglia. Secondo le testimonianze raccolte, si tratta di respingimenti “sistematici”.

      «In poche parole, questa decisione dice che la Francia sta perseguendo una politica illegale di chiusura delle frontiere», riassume Flor Tercero, dell’Association pour le Droit des Etrangers (ADDE) intervistato da Infomigrants. Questa decisione «è chiaramente una vittoria» e «significa che il governo non può ignorare il diritto dell’Unione europea».

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/09/corte-di-giustizia-ue-vietato-il-respingimento-sistematico-alle-frontier

      #frontières_intérieures #directive_retour #illégalité

    • European Court of Justice rules systematic pushbacks are illegal

      European countries do not have the right to refuse entry to irregular migrants even if they have border controls in place, the ECJ has ruled. Activists say the decision means that France has been violating EU law by pushing back migrants coming from Italy.

      When a member state decides to reintroduce checks at its internal borders, can it systematically refuse entry to all irregular foreign nationals? No, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ruled earlier this month. It must comply with the “Return Directive,” a law which says that a non-European national can “be granted a certain period of time to voluntarily leave the territory.”

      “A decision to refuse entry may be decided but, when seeking the removal of the person concerned, the common standards and procedures provided for by the Return Directive must still be respected,” the Luxembourg court stated.

      It also said that “excluding from the scope of this directive foreign nationals who are staying irregularly in the territory” can only be done “exceptionally.”

      The ruling on September 21 is at odds with the policy pursued by France, which re-established controls at its internal EU borders in 2015. For the past eight years, all trains passing through the French coastal city of Menton have been checked, and police have monitored border posts and patrolled the Alps.

      Activist groups say France has been taking advantage of the temporary border controls in order to turn back migrants who try to enter the territory — even those who come to ask for asylum. In an August report, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) teams in Ventimiglia documented practices of pushbacks at the border between Italy and France. “Systematic” pushbacks target unaccompanied minors, even sometimes separating families, according to the report.
      ’An illegal policy’

      “In a nutshell, this decision means that France is pursuing an illegal policy of closing borders,” Flor Tercero, of the Association for Foreigners’ Rights (ADDE), told InfoMigrants. ADDE is one of the associations involved in bringing the lawsuit to court.

      “Pushing back means, in a way, refusing these people the possibility of coming to France to apply for asylum or to cross France to go elsewhere in the EU. France for eight years has decided to carry out border checks. And as it re-established checks, it considered itself entitled to be able to push back migrants coming from Italy, in particular,” he added.

      “After eight years of illegal practices by the French government controlling and detaining migrants at internal borders, the CJEU confirms (...) that [these practices] are contrary to the law,” a joint press release of twenty organizations added.

      https://twitter.com/anafeasso/status/1704893792266969108

      For Flor Tercero, this decision is a clear victory. “This means that the government cannot forego European law,” he said.
      France ’will not welcome migrants’ from Lampedusa

      The court decision came at a time when attention was focused on the French-Italian border. Following the recent arrival of a very large number of people on the Italian island of Lampedusa, the French interior minister, Gérald Darmanin, announced that 200 additional police officers would be sent to the border between the two countries, in the expectation that the migrants would eventually make their way from Italy to France.

      France “will not welcome migrants” from the Italian island, the minister stated.

      Meanwhile the departmental director of the border police, Emmanuelle Joubert, announced that more than 3,000 migrants had been arrested in Menton within a fortnight. This brings to 32,000 the number of arrests since the start of the year along the Franco-Italian border. Of those, 24,000 were rejected and handed over to the Italian authorities

      Joubert said she had been informed about the judgment by the CJEU. “The State is carrying out an analysis, we will have instructions later,” she said, adding that migrants who had recently arrived in Lampedusa should not arrive at the French border for “several weeks.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/52117/european-court-of-justice-rules-systematic-pushbacks-are-illegal

  • « Renvoi préjudiciel – Règlement (UE) no 1169/2011 – Information des consommateurs sur les denrées alimentaires – Mention obligatoire du pays d’origine ou du lieu de provenance d’une denrée alimentaire dans le cas où son omission est susceptible d’induire les consommateurs en erreur – Obligation, pour les denrées alimentaires originaires de territoires occupés par l’État d’Israël, de porter la mention de leur territoire d’origine, accompagnée, dans le cas où elles proviennent d’une colonie israélienne à l’intérieur de ce territoire, de la mention d’une telle provenance »
    ARRÊT DE LA COUR (grande chambre) - 12 novembre 2019 (*)
    http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=B93A31FC32E576E779123469D62397B8?text=&docid=22

    (...) 33 Dans la présente affaire, la juridiction de renvoi énonce que les denrées alimentaires en cause au principal sont originaires de « territoires occupés par l’État d’Israël depuis 1967 » et, plus précisément, ainsi qu’il ressort de l’avis ministériel, de la Cisjordanie, en ce compris Jérusalem-Est, et du plateau du Golan.

    34 Or, selon les règles du droit international humanitaire, ces territoires sont soumis à une juridiction limitée de l’État d’Israël, en tant que puissance occupante, tout en disposant chacun d’un statut international propre et distinct de celui de cet État.

    35 En effet, la Cisjordanie est un territoire dont le peuple, à savoir le peuple palestinien, jouit du droit à l’autodétermination, ainsi que la Cour internationale de justice l’a rappelé dans son avis consultatif du 9 juillet 2004, Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé (CIJ Recueil 2004, p. 136, paragraphes 118 et 149). Quant au plateau du Golan, il fait partie du territoire d’un État autre que l’État d’Israël, à savoir la République arabe syrienne.

    36 Compte tenu de ce qui précède, il y a lieu de considérer que le fait d’apposer, sur des denrées alimentaires telles que celles en cause au principal, la mention selon laquelle l’État d’Israël est leur « pays d’origine », alors que ces denrées alimentaires sont en réalité originaires de l’un des territoires visés au point 33 du présent arrêt, serait de nature à tromper les consommateurs.

    37 En outre, afin d’éviter que les consommateurs ne puissent être induits en erreur quant au fait que l’État d’Israël est présent dans ces territoires en tant que puissance occupante et non pas en tant qu’entité souveraine au sens décrit au point 29 du présent arrêt, il apparaît nécessaire de leur indiquer que lesdites denrées alimentaires ne sont pas originaires de cet État.

    38 Partant, la mention du territoire d’origine de denrées alimentaires telles que celles en cause au principal ne saurait être omise et doit donc être regardée comme revêtant un caractère obligatoire en vertu des articles 9 et 26 du règlement no 1169/2011.

    39 En ce qui concerne, en troisième et dernier lieu, la notion de « lieu de provenance », figurant à l’article 26, paragraphe 2, sous a), du règlement no 1169/2011, celle-ci renvoie, selon l’article 2, paragraphe 2, sous g), première phrase, de ce règlement, au lieu dont provient une denrée alimentaire, mais qui n’est pas le « pays d’origine » de celle-ci. Cette dernière disposition précise toutefois que l’indication du nom, de la raison sociale ou encore de l’adresse du producteur ne saurait tenir lieu d’indication de la provenance de cette denrée alimentaire. (...)

    #colonisation_étiquetée

    • Cour de justice del’Union européenneCOMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE n° 140/19Luxembourg, le 12 novembre 2019
      https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-11/cp190140fr.pdf

      Les denrées alimentaires originaires des territoires occupés par l’État d’Israël doivent porter la mention de leur territoire d’origine, accompagnée, lorsque ces denrées proviennent d’une colonie israélienne à l’intérieur de ce territoire, de la mention de cette provenance

      Dans l’arrêt Organisation juive européenne et Vignoble Psagot (C-363/18),prononcé le 12novembre 2019 et portant sur l’interprétation du règlement (UE) no1169/20111, la Cour, réunie en grande chambre, a dit pour droit que les denrées alimentaires originaires de territoires occupés par l’État d’Israël doivent porter la mention de leur territoire d’origine, accompagnée, dans le cas où elles proviennent d’une localité ou d’un ensemble de localités constituant une colonie israélienne à l’intérieur de ce territoire, de la mention de cette provenance.

      Le litige au principal opposait l’Organisation juive européenne et Vignoble Psagot Ltd au ministre de l’Économie et des Finances (France)au sujet de la légalité d’un avis relatif à l’indication de l’origine des marchandises issues des territoires occupés par l’État d’Israël depuis le mois de juin 1967 et exigeant que ces denrées alimentaires soient revêtues des mentions en question. Cet avis faisait suite à la publication, par la Commission européenne, d’une communication interprétative relative à l’indication de l’origine des marchandises issues de ces territoires2. (...)

      Par ailleurs, s’agissant de la question de savoir si la mention « colonie israélienne » revêt un caractère obligatoire, la Cour a tout d’abord souligné que les colonies de peuplement installées dans certains des territoires occupés par l’État d’Israël se caractérisent par la circonstance qu’elles concrétisent une politique de transfert de population menée par cet État en dehors de son territoire, en violation des règles du droit international humanitaire7. La Cour a ensuite jugé que l’omission de cette mention, impliquant que seul le territoire d’origine serait mentionné, est susceptible d’induire les consommateurs en erreur. En effet, ceux-ci ne peuvent pas savoir, en l’absence de toute information de nature à les éclairer à ce sujet, qu’une denrée alimentaire a pour lieu de provenance une localité ou un ensemble de localités constituant une colonie de peuplement installée dans l’un desdits territoires en méconnaissance des règles de droit international humanitaire. Or, la Cour a noté que, en vertu des dispositions du règlement no1169/20118, l’information des consommateurs doit permettre à ces derniers de se décider en toute connaissance de cause et dans le respect non seulement de considérations sanitaires, économiques, écologiques ou sociales, mais également de considérations d’ordre éthique ou ayant trait au respect du droit international. La Cour a souligné à cet égard que de telles considérations pouvaient influencer les décisions d’achat des consommateurs.

  • The service provided by Uber connecting individuals with non-professional drivers is covered by services in the field of transport - cp170136en.pdf
    https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-12/cp170136en.pdf

    Court of Justice of the European Union PRESS RELEASE No 136/17
    Luxembourg, 20 December 2017
    Judgment in Case C-434/15 Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL

    The service provided by Uber connecting individuals with non - professional drivers is covered by services in the field of transport Member States can
    therefore regulate the conditionsfor providing that service

    #Taxi #Uber #Europa #Urteil

  • Par voie judiciaire et syndicale, un front mondial se lève contre #Uber
    http://multinationales.org/Par-voie-judiciaire-et-syndicale-un-front-mondial-se-leve-contre-Ub

    Fragilisé par les scandales, le patron et co-fondateur d’Uber, Travis Kalanick, vient d’annoncer son départ du groupe, sous pression des actionnaires. Mais au-delà la personnalité de son dirigeant emblématique, c’est le modèle commercial même d’Uber - une stratégie du bulldozer visant à s’imposer en faisant fi de toute les réglementations, alimentée par les milliards de Wall Street - qui se trouve aujourd’hui de plus en plus efficacement contestée par les autorités publiques, les #syndicats et les (...)

    Actualités

    / #Equal_Times, #Transports, Uber, syndicats, #droits_des_travailleurs, #normes_et_régulations

    « https://www.equaltimes.org/par-voie-judiciaire-et-syndicale »
    « https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170050en.pdf »
    « https://www.equaltimes.org/une-decision-monumentale-prepare?lang=fr »

  • Uber: Stress an allen Fronten | Telepolis
    https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Uber-Stress-an-allen-Fronten-3733601.html

    Das Unternehmen verbrennt auch im ersten Quartal 700 Millionen US-Dollar und am europäischen Gerichtshof und in diversen Ländern formiert sich massiver Widerstand

    Der umstrittene Mobilitätsanbieter Uber will vor allem in der sogenannten Sharing Economy viel Geld verdienen. Doch bisher schreibt er nur massive Verluste, die allerdings im ersten Quartal allerdings auf „nur“ noch 700 Millionen US-Dollar gesenkt werden konnten. In einigen Ländern entwickelt sich massiver Widerstand gegen Uber und andere Fahrdienste wie Cabify, die immer militanter werden.

    Vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof (EuGH) ist nun eine wichtige Vorentscheidung gegen das dubiose Geschäftsmodell gefallen. Der Generalanwalt, dessen Einschätzung das Gericht fast immer folgt, meint, dass Uber Lizenzen wie Taxis benötigt. Und auch der Bundesgerichtshof hat gerade dem EuGH einen Fall zur Vorentscheidung vorgelegt.

    Ohne lockere Geldpolitik undenkbar

    Uber ist eines der Internetunternehmen, das ohne die Blase, die sich durch die lockere Geldpolitik der Notenbanken aufbläst, undenkbar wäre. Viele dieser Firmen verbrennen Quartal für Quartal viel Geld. Twitter ist dafür wohl das beste Beispiel, denn die Firma aus dem Silicon Valley hat seit dem Start vor elf Jahren noch in keinem Quartal Geld verdient und inzwischen Verluste von mehr als 2,3 Milliarden Dollar angehäuft.

    Für Uber sind das aber eher „Peanuts“. Der umstrittene Mobilitätsanbieter hat allein im ersten Quartal 708 Millionen Dollar verbrannt. Als „Erfolg“ verbucht man in San Francisco - wie bei Twitter -, dass man zuletzt die Verluste reduzieren konnte. Denn im Vorquartal standen noch 991 Millionen als dicke roten Zahlen in den Büchern. Das Unternehmen aus Kalifornien hat also in einem halben Jahr schon fast so viel Geld verbrannt, wie Twitter in mehr als einem Jahrzehnt.

    Wie viel Geld - vermutlich Milliarden - insgesamt schon verbraten wurden, kann man nur schätzen. Uber ist nicht verpflichtet, da es nicht an den Börsen notiert ist, seine Zahlen zu veröffentlichen. So wurde auch nicht offengelegt, wie hoch die Verluste im vergangenen Jahr insgesamt waren.

    Allerdings hatte die Firma gegenüber dem Wall Street Journal erklärt, noch über 7,2 Milliarden Dollar als Brennstoff zu verfügen. Da die Firma insgesamt 15 Milliarden auch an Risikokapital von Goldman Sachs, Google und anderen eingefahren hatte, kann man abschätzen, dass mehr als die Hälfte davon schon weg ist.

    Man ist aber offensichtlich geneigt, sich im Notfall auch noch weitere Milliarden zu beschaffen. Dass zuletzt nun Quartalszahlen veröffentlicht wurden, bestätigt Gerüchte, dass auch Uber an die Börse gehen will, um von der Dotcom-Blase 2.0 zu profitieren, um das Brennstofflager aufzufüllen.

    An der Börse sind risikofreudige Anleger auch angesichts der Nullzinspolitik bereit, viel Geld in solche Firmen zu stecken, bei den ziemlich unklar ist, ob sie jemals Geld verdienen werden. Das hatte zuletzt Snapchat sehr deutlich gezeigt (vgl. Tech-Sektor-Blase: Das alte Dilemma am nicht mehr „Neuen Markt“).

    Ein lukratives Geschäftsmodell?

    Gegenüber dem Wall Street Journal meinte Uber zuletzt: „Die Reduzierung der Verluste im ersten Quartal bringt uns auf guten Kurs zur Profitabilität.“ Klingt ambitioniert. Aber eine solche Phraseologie kennt man von Twitter und Co auch schon seit Jahren. Allerdings, das sei auch angemerkt, hat Uber wenigstens ein Geschäftsmodell, das nicht allein auf Werbeeinahmen abzielt.

    Einnahmen werden auch aus dem Geschäft heraus generiert. Denn die Fahrer führen bis zu 25% des Fahrpreises an die Firma ab. Dass man aber mit diesem Geschäftsmodell wirklich Gewinne machen kann, wird bezweifelt.

    Dunkle Wolken gibt es viele, die sich im und um das Unternehmen herum in den letzten Jahren gebildet haben. Dass es kriselt, zeigt auch die Tatsache an, dass Manager reihenweise von der Stange gehen oder gehen müssen. Gerade hat auch der bisherige Finanzchef Gautam Gupta das Weite gesucht. Und kürzlich wurde auch der Entwicklungschef und Spezialist für die selbstfahrenden Autos gefeuert. Hinter der Entlassung von Anthony Levandowski stehen Patentstreitigkeiten mit Google, die noch sehr teuer werden können.

    Schon im März ging Präsident Jeff Jones von der Stange. Das war ausgerechnet der Mann, der das schlechte Image der Firma aufpolieren sollte. Gesprochen wird längst von einem „Exodus“, denn seit Februar wurden etwa ein Dutzend Manager gefeuert oder haben das Unternehmen verlassen, das auch wegen Vorwürfe des Sexismus und sexueller Belästigung mit einem massiven Problem konfrontiert ist.

    Kritik von Kunden

    Das Geschäftsgebaren von Uber hatten schon Kunden kritisiert, doch die Firma muss immer wieder auch Millionen an seine Fahrer zurückzahlen, weil deren Provisionen seit Jahren falsch berechnet wurden. Gerechnet wird damit, dass die Firma allein in New York nun bis zu 45 Millionen Dollar zurückgeben muss. Da ein ähnlicher Fehler bereits aus Philadelphia bekannt war, der sich mit einer Zahlung von 20 Millionen Dollar an die Fahrer in den Büchern niederschlägt, kann es durchaus sein, dass aus etlichen Städten und Ländern noch Nachforderungen kommen.

    In New York wurde die Provision für die Vermittlung der Fahrt schlicht auf den Endpreis der Kunden angewendet. Vereinbart ist allerdings, dass zuvor alle Steuern abgezogen werden müssen.

    Zudem wird der Firma nicht nur vorgeworfen, die eigenen Fahrer zu betrügen, sondern vorgebracht wird auch, dass Kunden abgezockt würden. So wurde die Firma gerade dafür verklagt, dass sie nicht die effizientesten Routen, sondern zu lange Strecken abrechne. Darüber soll die Firma angeblich monatlich etwa 7,5 Millionen Dollar zusätzlich einnehmen. Leidtragende sind dabei auch die Fahrer, denn ihre Einnahmen werden auf Basis der besten Route berechnet. Einige haben ebenfalls die Firma verklagt, der sie „Diebstahl“ vorwerfen.

    Heftige Proteste in Spanien

    Vor allem an zwei Fronten haben Uber und ähnliche Anbieter in Europa zu kämpfen: auf der Straße und vor höchsten Gerichten. In Spanien gehen gerade die Taxifahrer gegen die Fahrdienste vehement auf die Straße, greifen Uber- und Cabify-Fahrer auch an und fackeln vermutlich bisweilen sogar die Autos der Fahrdienste ab. So wurden kürzlich im südspanischen Sevilla neun Wagen des spanischen Pendants von Uber gezielt zerstört. Die Cabify-Fahrzeuge waren zur Verstärkung während der Aprilmesse in die Stadt gebracht worden und gingen dort in Flammen auf.

    Am vergangenen Dienstag fand ein großer landesweiter Streik der Taxifahrer in ganz Spanien statt. Sie werfen Uber und Cabify unlauteren Wettbewerb und/oder illegale Konkurrenz vor. Wer an diesem Tag ein Taxi an den zentralen Flughäfen in Madrid oder Barcelona suchte, traf nur auf leere Taxistände.

    In den Innenstädten sah es ähnlich aus, denn die Beteiligung war enorm. Das zeigte auch, dass in der Hauptstadt in der Nähe des Parlaments 20.000 bis 25.000 Taxi-Fahrer demonstriert haben. Sie kündigten weitere massive Proteste und Streiks im Urlaubssommer an, wenn die konservative Regierung an ihrer Politik festhalte.

    Mit früheren Protesten und Erfolgen vor Gericht, wurde schon dafür gesorgt, dass „Uber Pop“ auch in Spanien eingestellt werden musste. Über eine App auf dem Smartphone wurden Fahrten mit privaten Fahrern vermittelt, die über keinerlei Lizenz, besondere Versicherungen oder einen Personenbeförderungsschein verfügten, im eigenen Auto unterwegs waren und meist keinerlei Steuern oder Sozialabgaben entrichtet haben. Gerichte in vielen EU-Mitgliedstaaten haben Uber Pop Service inzwischen verboten, auch in Spanien.

    Da die neoliberale Regierung der rechten Volkspartei (PP) aber mit allen Mitteln auch den Taxi-Service deregulieren will, wurde eine gesetzlich Regulierung für „Uber X“ gefunden. Das ist ein Fahrdienst mit professionellen und versicherten Fahrern, die über eine eingeschränkte und deutlich billigere Lizenz (VTC) verfügen.

    Geduldiges Papier

    Allerdings wurde im Gesetz festgelegt - Papier ist in Spanien besonders geduldig -, dass es für 30 Taxi-Lizenzen nur eine VTC geben darf. Doch sogar die offiziellen Zahlen sagen etwas ganz anderes. Derzeit gibt es im ganzen Land gut 67.000 Taxi-Lizenzen und dazu kommen schon fast 6.000 VTC-Lizenzen hinzu, wie sogar das Ministerium für Infrastruktur zugibt.

    Es sind also landesweit schon jetzt drei Mal so viele VTC-Lizenzen im Umlauf als es sie eigentlich geben dürfte. Haben die zuständigen Behörden also ein großes Problem mit Grundrechenarten oder hatte man mit der Quote nur vor, die Taxifahrer zunächst ruhig zu halten?

    Das gelang jedenfalls nicht lange. Und das hat auch damit zu tun, dass in Madrid sogar nur noch sieben Taxi-Lizenzen auf eine Fahrdienst-Lizenz kommen. In Málaga sind sogar nur noch drei.

    So fordern die streikenden und protestierenden Fahrer, dass das Gesetz eingehalten wird und die Fahrer mit VTC-Lizenzen auch kontrolliert werden. Denn die dürfen nur nach vorhergehender Absprache Personen befördern, aber keine Kunden auf der Straße aufnehmen. Die Taxiverbände sprechen von „klandestinen Taxiständen“ in der Nähe von Zonen, wo viel Taxi-Nachfrage besteht.

    Möglich wird das über das regulierende Gesetz. Denn früher mussten die Fahrdienste nach einer vorab bestellten Fahrt stets zur Zentrale zurückkehren. Nun können sie aber irgendwo parken, die App anschalten und praktisch doch wie ein Taxi arbeiten. Das ist ein Effekt, der gewollt war, um eine Konkurrenz für Taxis zu schaffen und eine Liberalisierung voranzutreiben.

    Linke unterstützt Taxi-Fahrer

    Unterstützt werden die Taxi-Fahrer im Land von der gesamten Linken. Denn Firmen wie Uber wirft zum Beispiel der Podemos-Chef Pablo Iglesias ein „parasitäres“ Verhalten vor. Von einer „korrupten Regierung“ würden solche Firmen unterstützt, die „keine Steuern in Spanien zahlen, sondern in Steuerparadiesen sitzen“.

    Letztlich handele es sich um ein Transportunternehmen, das auch die gesetzlichen Vorschriften, Arbeitsschutz und ähnliches einhalten sowie Steuern im Land bezahlen müsse.

    Dass es einer sehr schlecht organisierten zersplitterten Gruppe gelang, einen so massiven Protest zu organisieren, wird allseits hervorgehoben. Viele schließen sich längst der Meinung an, dass sich der radikale Kapitalismus hinter dem Begriff Sharing Economy versteckt, hinter der wiederum das Finanzkapital stehe.

    Deshalb treffen die Proteste der Taxi-Fahrer auch auf viel Sympathie. Dass in Barcelona die Menschen sogar umsonst von den Streikenden in Notfällen in Krankenhäuser gefahren wurden, hat die Sympathien verstärkt.

    Das Arbeitsrecht und der Generalanwalt am Europäischen Gerichtshof (EuGH)

    Borja Suárez, Professor für Arbeitsrecht an der Universität von Madrid, kritisiert die arbeitsrechtlichen Auswirkungen für Uber-Fahrer. Eigentlich basiere das Arbeitsrecht auf einer „Abhängigkeit des Beschäftigten“ gegenüber seiner Firma. „Im diesem Fall ist die Abhängigkeit von einer digitalen Plattform total und absolut.“

    Man könne daher die Beschäftigten nicht als Selbstständige darstellen. Es sei klar, dass Firmen wie Uber dabei einen „klaren Missbrauch“ begingen, sagt der Arbeitsrechtler. Er hält die Vorgänge und die Proteste für einen Katalysator in Bezug auf die Probleme, die sich mit der sogenannten Sharing Economy in vielen Bereichen der Gesellschaft auftun.

    Ähnlich sieht, ganz im Gegensatz zu Uber und Co, das auch der Generalanwalt am Europäischen Gerichtshof (EuGH) in Luxemburg. Denn bis zum höchsten Gericht in der Gemeinschaft haben die Taxiverbände ihre Klage getragen. Sie sehen sich durch dessen Gutachten mehr als bestätigt.

    Es zeichnet sich für den Sektor vor dem Gerichtshof eine schwere Schlappe ab, weil die Richter in fast allen Fällen dem Generalanwalt folgen. Der heißt Maciej Szpunar und meint, dass Uber und Co dem Verkehrssektor zuzuordnen seien und Verkehrsdienstleistungen können deutlich strenger reguliert werden als Online-Dienste.

    Uber erklärt dagegen stets, nur ein reiner Online-Dienst zu sein, und will so von vielen Regelungen ausgenommen werden. Es ist aber eigentlich allen klar, dass Uber keine Art neuer Mitfahrzentrale ist, wie man es in Kalifornien gerne darzustellen versucht.

    Nach Ansicht von Szpunar brauchen Firmen wie Uber - wie alle anderen Firmen auch - die üblichen Lizenzen und Genehmigungen. Denn die Uber-Fahrer übten eben keine eigenständige Tätigkeit unabhängig von der Plattform aus. Die gäbe es nur dank der Plattform. Uber lege zudem die Bedingungen der Beschäftigung fest.

    In seiner Presserklärung zum Gutachten des Generalanwalts schreibt der Gerichtshof, dass „für die Tätigkeit von Uber der Grundsatz des freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs im Rahmen der ’Dienste der Informationsgesellschaft’ nicht gilt und dass sie somit den Bedingungen für die Zulassung von Verkehrsunternehmern zum Verkehr innerhalb eines Mitgliedstaats unterliegt, in dem sie nicht ansässig sind“.

    Folgen die Richter dem Gutachten, so hat das auch weitgehend arbeitsrechtliche Konsequenzen. Das Geschäftsmodell von Uber dürfte praktisch obsolet sein. Die Entscheidung wäre auch eine Vorentscheidung für andere Bereiche der Sharing Economy und soll bis zum Jahresende fallen.

    Das Gericht muss sich demnächst noch einmal mit Uber befassen, da nun auch der Bundesgerichtshof ein Verfahren zur Vorabentscheidung dem EuGH vorgelegt hat. In dem geht es um die Rückkehrpflicht, die auch in Spanien kritisiert wird. Denn auch ein Berliner Taxiunternehmen hatte dagegen geklagt, dass die Fahraufträge nicht am Unternehmenssitz eingehen, sondern bei „Uber Black“ über die Uber-Server und sie damit ebenfalls über deren App an jedem Ort abgerufen werden können.

    Damit werde die Rückkehrpflicht von Vermittlung von Limousinen mit Chauffeuren auch in Deutschland unterlaufen. So fordere Uber die Fahrer auf, sich im Stadtgebiet bereitzuhalten, wie auch ihre spanischen Kollegen schon festgestellt haben.

    Eigentlich sieht der Bundesgerichtshof darin längs einen Verstoß gegen geltendes Recht, wie auch alle Vorinstanzen schon festgestellt hatten. Er will aber nun in Luxemburg feststellen lassen, ob ein Verbot gegen EU-Vorschriften verstoßen würde. Die Frage lautet auch hier, ob man es mit einer Verkehrsdienstleistung zu tun hat.

    Links:
    https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Tech-Sektor-Blase-Das-alte-Dilemma-am-nicht-mehr-Neuen-Markt-3713620.html
    https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-posts-708-million-loss-as-finance-head-leaves-1496272500
    https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Snapchat-und-die-neue-Dotcom-Blase-3646908.html
    https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Uber-Sexismus-Vorwurf-fuehrt-zu-interner-Untersuchung-3630594.html
    https://www.fastcompany.com/40424171/lawsuit-accuses-uber-of-fare-fraud
    http://www.diariodesevilla.es/sevilla/Queman-Cabify-reforzaban-servicio-Feria_0_1132087310.html
    https://www.heise.de/tp/features/Globaler-Protest-gegen-zweifelhafte-Uber-Geschaefte-3365857.html
    https://www.heise.de/tp/news/Verschaerfter-Weihnachtsstress-fuer-Uber-2506846.html
    https://www.heise.de/tp/news/Spaniens-Regierungspartei-immer-tiefer-im-Korruptionssumpf-3700417.html
    http://www.publico.es/actualidad/uber-taxistas-vacian-calles-aeropuertos.html
    http://www.publico.es/actualidad/uber-capitalismo-radical-disfraza-economia.html
    http://www.eleconomista.es/mercados-cotizaciones/noticias/8392969/05/17/Madrid-se-queda-sin-taxis-hasta-las-seis-de-la-tarde-por-una-huelga.htm
    http://www.publico.es/sociedad/uber-servira-huelga-taxi-siglo.html
    https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/rc4_170743/en
    https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170050en.pdf
    https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170050de.pdf

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