• Extraordinaire #déni

    The Extreme Ambitions of West Bank Settlers | The New Yorker
    https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-extreme-ambitions-of-west-bank-settlers

    [Questions/réponses]

    In a lot of these places where settlements have been developed, from 1967 to the present day, there have been Palestinian communities and Palestinian families. What is your feeling about where these people should go?

    It’s the opposite. None of the communities in Judea and Samaria are founded on an Arab place or property, and whoever says this is a liar. I wonder why you said it. Why did you say that, since you have no idea about the real facts of history? That’s not true. The opposite is true. Who got this idea into your mind?

    Palestinian communities have been removed from their land, kicked off their land by—

    No, you never read things like that. No. There are no pictures. [ According to a report by Btselem, an Israeli human-rights group, parts of Kedumim, where Weiss lives, were built on private Palestinian land; in 2006, Peace Now found that privately owned Palestinian land comprised nearly forty per cent of the territory of West Bank settlements and outposts. ]

  • Garantir une #liberté_académique effective

    Ce billet est consacré à la notion de liberté académique. Auparavant, nous traitons succinctement de trois sujets d’actualité.

    #Maccarthysme — Depuis le 16 février, nous vivons une de ces séquences maccarthystes qui ont fait le quotidien des Bolsonaro, Trump, Johnson et autres Orbán [1], et qui se répètent désormais dans le nôtre. L’attaque de l’exécutif contre les scientifiques a été déclenchée à l’approche des élections régionales par Mme #Vidal, possiblement tête de liste à Nice. Cet épisode politicien consternant ouvre la campagne des présidentielles pour le chef de l’État ainsi que pour les autres ministres chargés de chasser sur les terres lexicales de l’#extrême_droite. La charge consiste à désigner comme non scientifiques certains domaines de la #recherche et à les associer au #terrorisme, par un nom chimérique construit sur le modèle de l’adjectif « #judéo-bolchévique », de sinistre mémoire. La #menace est réelle. Mais elle ne vient pas des travaux insufflés par une libido politique, qui innervent aujourd’hui un grand nombre de disciplines des sciences dures et humaines, elle vient de la #stratégie_politique qui accuse la recherche et l’#Université d’être politisées tout en leur enjoignant ailleurs de légitimer les choix « sociétaux » des politiques [2] ou de répondre dans l’urgence à une crise par des appels à projet [3]. Elle s’entend dans ce lexique confusionniste et moraliste qui prétend dire ce qu’est la #science sans en passer par la #méthode_scientifique. Elle se reconnaît à la fiction du débat qui occupe l’#espace_médiatique par #tribunes de #presse et, bien pire, sur les plateaux des chaînes de #télévision singeant le modèle de Fox News et des médias ultraconservateurs états-uniens.

    La menace nous appelle donc à forger de solides réseaux de #solidarité pour les affronter et à nous réarmer intellectuellement, pour réinstituer l’Université.

    #Zéro_Covid — Nous avons à nouveau demandé au Président de la République, au Premier Ministre et au Ministre de la santé de recevoir une délégation de chercheurs pour proposer une série de mesures de sécurisation sanitaire composant une stratégie globale Zéro Covid (https://rogueesr.fr/zero-covid), conformément à la tribune (https://rogueesr.fr/zero-covid) signée, déjà, par plus de mille chercheuses et chercheurs.

    #Hcéres — Dans ce contexte, il peut être pertinent de revenir sur le fonctionnement du Hcéres, instance symptomatique s’il en est des menaces institutionnelles qui pèsent sur la liberté académique. Le collège du Hcéres réuni le 1er mars a entériné le recrutement de M. #Larrouturou comme directeur du département d’évaluation des organismes nationaux de recherche. M. Larrouturou était, avant sa démission le soir de l’adoption de la LPR, à la tête de la Direction générale de la recherche et de l’innovation (DGRI). À ce titre, il a organisé la nomination de M. #Coulhon à la présidence du collège du Hcéres. À qui en douterait encore, ce renvoi d’ascenseur confirme l’imbrication des différentes bureaucraties de la recherche et leur entre-soi conduisant au #conflit_d’intérêt permanent.

    Certains militants d’une fausse liberté académique, dans une tribune récemment publiée, ont par ailleurs présenté le département d’évaluation de la recherche comme l’instance légitime pour une mission de contrôle politique des facultés. Il est donc intéressant de relever que ce département demeurera dirigé par un conférencier occasionnel de l’#Action_Française, le mouvement de #Charles_Maurras à qui l’on doit le mythe de l’Université inféodée aux quatre États confédérés (Juifs, Protestants, Francs-Maçons, « Métèques ») [4].

    Enfin, trois membres d’instances nationales de La République en Marche apparaissent dorénavant dans l’organigramme du Hcéres, confortant les craintes de constitution d’un ministère Bis en charge de la reprise en main de la recherche.

    Garantir une liberté académique effective — Vous trouverez ici la première partie de notre synthèse : Réinstituer la liberté académique : https://rogueesr.fr/liberte-academique.

    –---

    [1] À ce sujet, on pourra lire l’actualité récente en Angleterre, frappante de similitude :

    - Government to appoint “free-speech champion” for English universities : https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/14/government-to-appoint-free-speech-champion-for-universities-heritage-hi
    - A political scientist defends white identity policies : https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/a-political-scientist-defends-white-identity-politics-eric-kaufmann-white
    - Gavin Williamson using “misleading” research to justify campus free-speech law : https://www.theguardian.com/education/2021/feb/27/gavin-williamson-using-misleading-research-to-justify-campus-free-speec

    [2] Le CNRS célèbre ses 80 ans : http://www.cnrs.fr/fr/cnrsinfo/le-cnrs-celebre-ses-80-ans

    [3] Face aux attentats : un an de mobilisation au CNRS : https://www.cnrs.fr/fr/face-aux-attentats-un-de-mobilisation-au-cnrs

    [4] Les convictions politiques de la personne en question n’auraient pas vocation à apparaître sur la place publique s’il n’était pas précisément question de lui confier une mission de contrôle politique des universités. D’autre part, nous nous refusons à mentionner des liens vers des pages pointant vers des sites d’extrême-droite. Les lecteurs soucieux de vérification les trouveront sans peine.

    https://rogueesr.fr/2021/03/03
    #libertés_académiques

    –—

    ajouté au fil de discussion autour des propos tenus par Vidal :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/902062

    • La #résistance s’organise à #Sorbonne_Univresité

      Les paniques identitaires n’ont pas leur place à @Sorbonne_Univ_ !

      Le 07 et 08 Janvier se tiendra en Sorbonne le colloque « Après la déconstruction : reconstruire les sciences et la culture ».
      Nous nous opposons à l’accueil des idées réactionnaires au sein de notre université

      Avec Solidaires Étu SU, l’ASU, la BAFFE et le NPA Jussieu-ENS, nous dénonçons l’accueil de ce pseudo colloque portant sur la "cancel culture" et la lutte contre les discriminations qui menacerait "le monde éducatif, où elle y a déjà causé quelques dégâts" d’après sa description.

      Nous demandons à ce que @Sorbonne_Univ_ se désolidarise de la tenue d’un tel colloque dans l’un de ses campus !
      Nous soulignons également la présence du ministre Blanquer qui préfère à l’éducation nationale crédibiliser les fantasmes identitaires !

      https://twitter.com/UNEFsorbonneU/status/1479104625533804551

      #résistance

    • Ceci n’est pas un colloque universitaire - communiqué

      Du 7 au 8 Janvier, l’association loi 1901 "Le Collège de Philosophie" présidé par l’un de nos collègues de la Faculté des Lettres (Pierre-Henri Tavoillot) organise un colloque intitulé « Après la déconstruction : reconstruire les sciences et la culture ». Utilisant pernicieusement le crédit de l’université qui l’héberge - l’université est un lieu de liberté d’expression, cette réunion partisane se présente comme un colloque "d’échanges scientifiques" visant à « étudier les tenants et aboutissants de la pensée décoloniale, "wokisme", ou "cancel culture" et comment elle s’introduit dans le système éducatif pour y imposer une morale au détriment de l’esprit critique » (sic). Les conclusions de ce "colloque" sont déjà connues, puisqu’elles sont dans son titre : la "cancel culture" (terme utilisé par les conservateurs américains et amalgamé ici avec la pensée décoloniale, courant intellectuel anti-raciste) venue des États-Unis aurait détruit les sciences et la culture, et il faudrait les reconstruire. Par un grossier retournement de la réalité, ce pseudo-colloque universitaire implémente exactement ce qu’il entend dénoncer : le camouflage d’une idéologie sous couvert de recherche universitaire, aidé par la localisation de cette réunion politique dans une université !

      La liberté d’expression est la règle à l’université, et il est donc possible d’y organiser des réunions politiques. Une réunion de La France Insoumise ou d’En Marche qui y aurait lieu n’entraînerait aucun doute sur l’absence de caractère universitaire d’une telle réunion. Par contre, un "colloque" organisé par "le Collège de Philosophie" (qui n’a aucune reconnaissance universitaire) utilise la tutelle du lieu pour déguiser des propos idéologiques en "recherche" ou "échanges scientifiques".

      SUD Éducation appelle les collègues de toute catégorie professionnelle et les étudiant.e.s à ne pas tomber dans le panneau de ce colloque idéologique pseudo-scientifique
      1. Un parti pris idéologique revendiqué, indigne d’un vrai colloque scientifique

      Sans prendre en compte la réalité du racisme, du sexisme, des oppressions coloniales, ce colloque s’oppose à leur étude sociologique ou historique. Le constat est fait dès la présentation du colloque : un "ordre moral" serait introduit (comment ? par qui ?) qui serait "incompatible" avec le système éducatif. On parle d’ailleurs de "wokisme" ou de "cancel culture" dont les définitions sont absentes, ce qui peut laisser penser que les organisateurs et organisatrices ne les connaissent pas elles-mêmes ou choisissent délibérément de les garder dans le flou (rendant ainsi plus facile leur caricature et leur condamnation). On peut remarquer que le terme "pensée décoloniale", présenté comme synonyme de ces termes, est au contraire revendiqué par des courants anti-racistes, ce qui confirme la connaissance rigoureuse que les organisateurs du colloque semblent avoir des courants de pensée dont ils entendent discuter.
      Et surtout, dans ce "colloque", aucune trace de la disputatio, une des règles de base de la recherche et de son intégrité. Aucun-e représentant-e des études décoloniales n’intervient dans cet évènement. Ceci n’est donc pas un colloque universitaire mais un colloque politique et idéologique.

      2. Une réunion politique et publicitaire

      Les intervenant.e.s de ce colloque ne sont pas neutres. Une discussion sérieuse autour de questions scientifiques impliquerait la présence d’intervenant.e.s varié.e.s et la possibilité d’un débat contradictoire. Toutefois, beaucoup des intervenant.e.s invité.e.s sont connu.e.s plutôt pour leur opposition médiatique aux questions de l’antiracisme et du féminisme, que pour leur travaux de recherche sur ces questions : Mathieu Bock-Côté et ses aspirations identitaires décrites dans "L’empire du politiquement correct", qui remplace désormais Éric Zemmour sur CNEWS, Jacques Julliard qui ironise sur une gauche qui aurait abandonné la nation et l’identité nationale au profit de la diversité (voir les conclusions "L’esprit du peuple"), Nathalie Heinich dont on peut supposer qu’elle parlera "des enjeux épistémologiques de la post-vérité" plutôt en tant que signataire de la tribune "Non au séparatisme islamiste" du Figaro (mars 2018) qu’en tant que sociologue de l’art, pour prendre des exemples connus... De plus que vient faire une table ronde de "témoins" du "néoracisme", invitant entre autres Pascal Bruckner, essayiste, dans un colloque universitaire ? La présence du romancier fait résonner ses propos manichéen sur la lutte contre l’islamophobie, la comparant à une "chasse aux sorcières", ou ses accusations contre Rokhaya Diallo, mettant en cause son militantisme comme ayant entraîné les attentats meurtriers contre Charlie Hebdo en 2015. Face à des intervenant.e.s aussi politisé.e.s et venu.e.s défendre leurs écrits politiques au regard du programme, où est la contradiction ? Remarquons que le ministre de l’Éducation Nationale semble avoir le temps de sonner le départ de ces deux jours de réunion, alors que la situation des établissements scolaires est catastrophique.

      3. Un évènement de propagande de la "pensée" réactionnaire

      En conséquence, nous appelons nos collègues et les étudiant.e.s de Sorbonne Université a être vigilant.e.s vis-à-vis du déguisement universitaire d’une idéologie réactionnaire en vogue actuellement. Ce "colloque" ne peut être considéré comme indépendant des attaques médiatiques et politiciennes envers des collègues, accusé.e.s d’"islamogauchisme" par les ministres de l’ESR et de l’Éducation Nationale, ainsi que des personnalités politiques dans la droite ligne de l’extrême-droite qui en d’autres temps accusait l’Université d’être sous l’emprise judéo-maçonnique (voir la Une de Paris Soir du samedi 31 Novembre 1940). Nous pensons que ce colloque pseudo-scientifique vise à légitimer ces attaques, et à censurer toute pensée universitaire critique des dominations. Dans le respect des traditions universitaires, nous appelons au contraire à défendre les libertés pédagogiques et de recherche et l’indépendance de nos collègues face à l’ingérence des tutelles politiques nationales ou régionales. Ce n’est que dans de telles conditions que la recherche et les idées nouvelles peuvent s’épanouir !

      https://sud-su.fr/spip.php?article36

    • Communiqué FERC Sup Sorbonne Université - Ceci est-il un colloque universitaire ?

      Les 7 et 8 janvier 2022 se tiendra dans un amphithéâtre de la Sorbonne un événement intitulé « Après la déconstruction : reconstruire les sciences et la culture ».

      Cette réunion se présente comme un colloque "d’échanges scientifiques" visant à "étudier les tenants et aboutissants de la pensée décoloniale, "wokisme", ou "cancel culture" et comment elle s’introduit dans le système éducatif pour y imposer une morale au détriment de l’esprit critique".

      Ce colloque va être ouvert par Blanquer le ministre de l’Éducation nationale qui affirmait il y a un an, sans jamais être revenu sur ses dires que « Notre société a été beaucoup trop perméable à des courants de pensée « Ce qu’on appelle l’islamo-gauchisme fait des ravages », « Il fait des ravages à l’université, il fait des ravages quand l’UNEF cède à ce type de chose, il fait des ravages quand dans les rangs de la France Insoumise, vous avez des gens qui sont de ce courant-là et s’affichent comme tels. Ces gens-là favorisent une idéologie qui ensuite, de loin en loin, mène au pire ».

      Ce colloque pourrait-il être instrumentalisé en meeting politique qui s’inscrirait dans la droite ligne des discours de Blanquer et Vidal ? Blanquer, comme Vidal, prétendent que l’islamogauchisme (terme maintenant remplacé par celui de wokisme) « gangrène l’université ». Or, cette parole ministérielle, pendant une année de campagne présidentielle, et en pleine pandémie qui étouffe encore un peu plus les personnels de l’éducation nationale et l’hôpital, dans un colloque universitaire soulève des questions bien légitimes.

      En outre, cet événement est organisé sur le site de Sorbonne Université. Dès lors, la responsabilité et l’image de notre université sont engagées.

      La plupart des intervenants de cette manifestation sont signataires du « manifeste des 100 » qui appelait à la dénonciation des "islamo-gauchistes". Un certain nombre sont également membres de l’« Observatoire du décolonialisme », dont l’activité principale semble aussi être de dénoncer des collègues sur internet. Cet événement qui aura lieu les 7 et 8 janvier reprend les mêmes thèmes, en évitant soigneusement le terme d’« islamo-gauchisme » (devenu trop sulfureux ?) mais en ciblant les études décoloniales, sans laisser place au débat contradictoire. Ainsi, le colloque annoncé pourrait paraître comme une opération politique à laquelle participeront des personnes qui appellent régulièrement à la dénonciation et à la censure de collègues sur le site de l’« Observatoire du décolonialisme ».

      Il y a pourtant moins d’un an, l’ancien président de Sorbonne Université, Jean Chambaz avait pris position très clairement au sujet de l’"islamo-gauchisme", à contre-courant des déclarations de la ministre Mme Vidal : "Il y a une orientation de ce gouvernement qui va draguer des secteurs de l’opinion publique dans des endroits assez nauséabonds" "L’islamo-gauchisme est un terme absolument peu précis, issu des milieux de la droite extrême, repris par certains députés LR qui voudraient interdire l’enseignement de certaines disciplines à l’université. On se croirait dans l’ancienne Union soviétique. Ça me fait davantage penser aux slogans du 20e siècle dénonçant le judéo-bolchévisme." Selon l’ancien président de Sorbonne Université, le mal qui "gangrène" la société n’est pas cet "islamo-gauchisme" mal défini et qui est agité, selon lui, comme un chiffon rouge. "On accole deux mots qui font peur pour ne pas définir une réalité. Mais qu’est-ce que ça veut dire ? martèle-t-il. Qu’est-ce qui gangrène la société ? C’est la discrimination, c’est la ghettoïsation, c’est l’inégalité sociale dans l’accès au travail, dans l’accès à l’éducation, à la culture, et l’échec des politiques publiques dans ce domaine depuis cinquante ans.".

      Nous ne demandons pas l’annulation de cette manifestation qui doit être reconnue comme telle. Mais il ne peut y avoir d’appel à la délation et de chasse à certains collègues. Ce que nous attendons de la nouvelle présidente de l’université, c’est un engagement lié à votre fonction qui vous charge d’une mission de protection des personnels de l’université.

      Pour mémoire, début 2021, comme 2000 personnes qui avaient signé cette réponse au manifeste des 100, votre prédécesseur M.Chambaz avait accordé la protection fonctionnelle aux collègues qui en avaient fait la demande après avoir été mis en cause publiquement dans cette chasse aux sorcières.

      Ce que nous attendons donc de la présidence de l’université, c’est qu’elle donne l’assurance à nos collègues :

      - qu’il sera accordé systématiquement le bénéfice de la protection fonctionnelle à toutes celles et tous ceux qui seront mis-es en cause publiquement dans l’exercice de leurs missions d’enseignement et de recherche,
      - et qu’il sera donné pour consigne à la direction des affaires juridiques de l’université d’effectuer un signalement auprès du ministère de l’intérieur pour toute dénonciation calomnieuse publiée sur internet ou ailleurs, sur simple demande de la personne concernée.

      https://www.ferc-cgt.org/communqiue-ferc-sup-sorbonne-universite-ceci-est-il-un-colloque-universita

  • Why Rich Countries Should Subsidize Vaccination Around the World | The New Yorker
    https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-rich-countries-should-subsidize-vaccination-around-the-world

    when you compare 27 billion dollars with something close to 2000 billion dollars, then the decision is trivial for an economist—you should actually invest in this covax initiative and avoid paying a higher toll down the road.

    (interview avec les chercheuse et chercheur Selva Demiralp et Muhammed A. Yildirim)

    • Rien de neuf sur le principe : il faut essayer de convaincre ceux qui nous gouvernent de prendre les décisions qui devraient s’imposer sur des bases éthiques minimales, en leur parlant avec des mots qu’ils comprennent, c’est-à-dire en milliards de dollars en bas d’un tableur.

      L’entretien vaut mieux que ce résumé, avec pas mal de considérations sur l’imbrication des économies, etc.

  • A Political Philosopher on Why Democrats Should Think Differently About Merit | The New Yorker
    https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/a-political-philosopher-on-why-democrats-should-think-differently-about-m

    Looming above America’s present struggles over injustice and inequality is the sense that certain self-mythologies are beginning to evaporate. When Barack Obama was in the White House, he often studded his speeches with a favorite pop lyric, “You can make it if you try.” He mentioned it more than a hundred and forty times, even though the facts of declining social mobility rendered that image less and less convincing. In various studies, no more than eight per cent of Americans who are born into the bottom fifth of U.S. households, as measured by income, ever reach the top fifth; more than a third stay at the bottom.

    That analysis of Obama’s language is just one of the startling facts in the latest book by the political philosopher Michael Sandel, who has spent decades scrutinizing the tenets of Western liberalism, including beliefs about justice, markets, and, now, meritocracy. In “The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good?,” Sandel examines how the notion of “meritocracy,” a word coined in 1958 by Michael Young, a left-leaning British sociologist, was torqued into an American shibboleth. Over time, Sandel argues, it fed a “toxic brew of hubris and resentment.” He writes, “It flattered the winners and insulted the losers. By 2016, its time was up. The arrival of Brexit and Trump, and the rise of hyper-nationalist, anti-immigrant parties in Europe, announced the failure of the project.” In the final months of Sandel’s writing, he found that the pandemic underscored the political problems he was describing. “The question now is what an alternative political project might look like,” he wrote. Among his prescriptions, he favors some popular liberal proposals, such as introducing a tax on financial transactions, but also some provocative suggestions, such as creating a lottery system for élite college admissions.

    In the early days of the pandemic, we often heard the reassuring slogan “We are all in this together.” We heard it from politicians, advertisers, celebrities. The slogan was all around us. It was inspiring in a way because it reminded us of our shared vulnerability in the face of the virus. But I think many people felt that the slogan rang hollow, even in the early weeks, because we knew, and felt, and sensed that we were not truly all in this together. It soon became clear that some of us would ride out the pandemic working from home, relatively removed from the risks, while others—including those whose work enabled the rest of us to work from home—had little choice but to expose themselves to the risks that come from working in stores, and in warehouses, and delivering goods. So it quickly became clear that we were not all in this together.

    I should first explain what I mean by “meritocratic hubris.” It’s the tendency of those who land on top to believe that their success is their own doing, the measure of their merit, and, by implication, that those who struggle, those who were left behind, must deserve their fate as well. It’s the tendency to forget our indebtedness to family, teachers, community, country, and the times in which we live as conditions for the success that we enjoy. The more we believe that our success is our own doing, the harder it is to see ourselves in other people’s shoes, the harder it is to feel a sense of mutual responsibility for the fate of our fellow-citizens, including those who aren’t flourishing in the new economy.

    In the book, you detail some practical proposals that you’d like to see introduced to confront these problems. But, in the short term, what would you like to see Joe Biden do in the next couple of months, to give life to those ideas, that you think might help?

    I would urge Biden to play out an instinct that he has already voiced when he speaks about the “dignity of work.” What the rhetoric of rising has missed is the lost dignity of work that a great many people spend their lives engaged in. Not only in terms of stagnant wages, but also in terms of social recognition. Honor. At the heart of the resentment of many working people is the sense that the work they do isn’t respected in the way it once was. Not only the economy but also the culture has left them behind. If he should be elected, as I hope he will be, he should put the dignity of work at the center of his Presidency, which could make life better for everyone, not only the well credentialled. That could be the starting point for moving beyond the tyranny of merit, toward a politics of the common good.

    #Inégalités #Mérite #Mépris_social #Nouvelle_domesticité

  • The Coronavirus Meets Authoritarianism in Turkey- The New-Yorker
    Turkey, where more than two hundred people have died from the new coronavirus, has one of the world’s fastest-growing outbreaks, but Erdoğan has resisted urgent action, calling only for a “voluntary quarantine” for most of the country.
    #Covid-19#Turquie#Erdogan#couvre-feu#Surveillance#Politique#Liberté#Tracage#migrant#migration

    https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-coronavirus-meets-authoritarianism-in-turkey

    • En fait, c’est pas marrant du tout. Quel sacré pignouf, celui-là.

      “When did people start identifying so relentlessly with victims, and when did the victim’s world view become the lens through which we began to look at everything?” So begins Bret Easton Ellis’s take on, of all things, Barry Jenkins’s film “Moonlight,” which he describes as “an elegy to pain.” Ellis’s first work of nonfiction, “White,” is an interlocking set of essays on America in 2019, combining memoir, social commentary, and criticism; more specifically, it’s a sustained howl of displeasure aimed at liberal hand-wringers, people obsessively concerned with racism, and everyone who is not over Donald Trump’s election. His targets range from the media to Michelle Obama to millennials (including his boyfriend). Ellis also defends less popular people, from Roseanne Barr to Kanye West, whom he perceives as having been given a raw deal by the mob.

  • The Underworld of Online Content Moderation | The New Yorker
    https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-underworld-of-online-content-moderation

    More than one hundred thousand people work as online content moderators, viewing and evaluating the most violent, disturbing, and exploitative content on social media. In a new book, “Behind the Screen,” Sarah T. Roberts, a professor of information studies at U.C.L.A., describes how this work shapes their professional and personal lives. Roberts, who conducted interviews with current and former content moderators, found that many work in Silicon Valley, but she also travelled as far as the Philippines, where some of the work has been outsourced. From her research, we learn about the emotional toll, low wages, and poor working conditions of most content moderation. Roberts never disputes that the work is crucial, but raises the question of how highly companies like Facebook and Google actually value it.

    I recently spoke by phone with Roberts. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why finding and deleting offensive content is so tricky, why the job is so psychologically taxing, and the fixes that could help these workers and make them better at their jobs.

    The example I’ll give there is blackface. One person that I talked with said time and again he would see these videos that were filled with blackface, and he would go and argue with his supervisor, saying, “This is racist, we supposedly don’t allow racist or hate speech on our platform,” and he could get no traction. So the policies that were in place almost parodied themselves. They were so specific on the one hand and totally missing the forest for the trees on the other that you really had to embed yourself into the logic of the particular platform, and of course every platform has its own set of policies that it makes up.

    I think they cared enough that they had an entire apparatus devoted to the creating and designing and thinking through their policies, but what became clear to me through the course of this work was that the primary function of people doing commercial content moderation at these platforms was for brand management of the social-media platform itself. There would be a great side-benefit of keeping some bad stuff out of people’s way, or “cleaning up” the platform. But ultimately this was in the service of the brand, so that the brand could continue to function as a site where advertisers might want to come. And so I feel that this whole practice really laid that bare for me.

    What could be done to make the lives of these workers better, given that this is a job that needs to be done? And it needs to be done by smart people doing it well, who need to be very well-trained.

    This is a question that I’ve often posed to the workers themselves because I certainly am not possessed of the answers on my own. They want better pay. And I think we can read that in a lot of ways: they want better pay, they want to be respected. The nature of the way the work has been designed has been for the work to be secret. In many cases, their N.D.A. precludes them from even talking about the work. And the industry itself formulated the job as a source of shame in that sense, an industry source of shame. They were not eager to tout the efforts of these people, and so instead they hid them in the shadows. And, if nothing else, that was a business decision and a value judgment that could have gone another way. I think there’s still a chance that we could understand the work of these people in a different way and value it differently, collectively. And we could ask that the companies do that as well.

    There’s a rich history of labor organizing and worker-led, or worker-informed, movements, and in this case it might have to be region by region or specific to particular parts of the world. Or it could be something that crossed geographic and cultural boundaries where workers learn to identify with each other despite where they’re located.

    We talk a lot about automation. I think that’s what you’re saying about the tech companies. Their solution is always automation, or that’s what gets foregrounded, but, I think if you talk to anyone in the industry who’s in the know, the likelihood of humans going away anytime soon is pretty much nil. And we also need to support them with mental-health support. There are things we can do technologically to maybe make it less difficult to look at some of the content.

    Facebook, just about ten days or so ago, announced a major initiative where they were going to raise the base pay of all their content moderators. I was thrilled about that. On the other hand, we could read between the lines of such an announcement to learn that until now these people were probably making minimum wage or close to that. And we could also read the deafening silence from other firms that they haven’t done that and aren’t really willing to do that yet. Because, if they were, they’d be issuing a press release, too. We’ve got a ways to go on that.

    #Content_moderation #Modération #Médias_sociaux #Travail

  • An Indian Political Theorist on the Triumph of Narendra Modi’s Hindu Nationalism | The New Yorker
    https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/an-indian-political-theorist-on-the-triumph-of-narendra-modis-hindu-natio

    Comprendre la situation en Inde devrait nous aider à penser la démocratie globale. Et ce n’est pas rose.

    Hindu majoritarianism traditionally appealed more to higher-caste Hindus than to lower-caste Hindus and non-Hindus. And you are saying that this might be beginning to change?

    Yes, that is significantly beginning to change. And I think the political evidence of this is that the B.S.P. [the Bahujan Samaj Party, the third-largest party, which represents lower castes and ethnic minorities] in Uttar Pradesh, which is headed by Mayawati—a very, very formidable leader—had one of its worst performances. It’s not clear she will turn out most of the Dalit [the lowest caste] vote in U.P., let alone transfer it to her allies. That is the most visible political manifestation. I think the attempt to create Dalit social movements, which would traditionally have opposed Hindutva, are at their weakest. Hindutva is no longer simply an upper-class or élite phenomenon. It is spreading across social groups, and the incentive to oppose it, even if you don’t want to actively participate, certainly seems to be declining.

    Modi is often talked about as a populist. Is there more of a history of populism in post-independence India than people realize, or is his way of campaigning pretty sui generis?

    I think there are elements of continuity and elements of change. The elements of continuity are that mobilizing elements of nationalism and Hindutva have a long history in Indian politics, and that has been an undercurrent since partition. I think where he represents a radical departure, and I think this is part of the appeal he projected, is that he has been able to basically say that India’s power structure was constituted by Anglicized élites, and that secularism has become a cultural symbol for a contempt of Hinduism rather than a constitutional philosophy of toleration. That there was an élite that was very comfortable, for the most part, with what Modi and the B.J.P. call dynastic politics. That [other parties] are largely family fiefdoms whose intellectual legitimacy was sustained by élite intellectual culture. That what politics should aim for is also a cultural regeneration of Hindutva and an open assertion of cultural majoritarianism. In that sense, it is of a piece with populists elsewhere who try to combine cultural majoritarianism with anti-élitism.

    How is Modi distinct from other demagogic figures whom we see rising? He seems both more broadly popular and more ideological, no?

    I think both of these things are true. He is a genuinely popular figure, and I think the level of popular identification that he has managed to produce is, in a sense, truly astounding. We can do a lot of sophisticated sociological analysis, but ultimately this election is about two words: Narendra Modi.

    The way I think he quite differs from Trump is that he has access to an astonishing array of deeply entrenched civil-society organizations that have been doing the ideological groundwork for his victory for years and years. And what the base of that organization does is it gives him an army of foot soldiers whose target is long-term. These are people who have a very simplistic and clear-eyed goal, namely, the entrenchment of cultural majoritarianism in the Indian state. And I think the extent of the success of those organizations—that they have managed to transform what used to be the default common sense of public discourse, which was a certain kind of embarrassment about majoritarianism—has played a significant part in this victory. He is not just a political phenomenon; he is also a large social movement.

    They lost in 2014, and, even five years later, even among those of us who were rooting for Congress to do much better in this election, it is very hard to point to anything as a sign that the things that made Congress weak are being transformed. Here is Modi running on a platform that says he is against old feudal India, which is a shorthand for dynastic politics. What does the Congress Party do? They win two state elections, and the first act of the two chief ministers is to give their sons [key positions], even though the sons have no visible track record of political achievement. And I think one of the most remarkable things about this election is how many of those dynasts have actually lost in some ways. Part of it was this desperation, was trying to get your friends to see the precipice they are walking on.

    My position on Mr. Modi in 2014, which I still do maintain, was that one of the big mistakes that those of us who disagree with him made is to not recognize his political strengths. I got a lot of flak for saying he has deep democratic legitimacy. You cannot deny the fact he is an absolutely extraordinary politician, in terms of thinking about the aesthetics of politics, in terms of thinking about what communication means in politics, in terms of thinking about political organization. One of his remarkable gifts—and I will use the word remarkable—is that he actually takes politics seriously. Most other political parties were in thrall of a certain kind of sociological determinism that says, so long as I can keep this caste behind me or create some sort of [caste] alignment, I will be successful. What he does as a politician is to say, “You can create a new reality. You are not trapped by inherited categories of thinking.” His ability to think politically—and, through that thinking, make lots and lots of people feel democratically empowered—is quite astounding. It is precisely that ability that also poses a major danger.

    If there were two dangers implicit in 2014 that have become explicit now, they are the dangers of concentration of power and the deification and personification of one leader. This has happened to an extraordinary degree.

    What are your biggest fears about the next five years?

    I think we have already seen evidence, particularly in the last year, that democracy requires some fragmentation of power. There has to be some credible opposition that can hold the government to account. And I think with the kind of mandate they have got—and potentially the B.J.P. can get an even bigger mandate in the upper house of parliament—means their ability to get through constitutional amendments and legislation is enhanced a great deal. Plus, they control most of India’s states now. So I think the absence of even a minimal opposition is certainly a worrying sign because there will be no one holding the government to account..

    Secondly, I think what we have seen over the past year and a half is that a lot of India’s independent institutions—the Election Commission of India, even the Supreme Court of India, and, at the edges and margins, even the armed forces of India—are being accused of deep and significant political partisanship. If these institutions inch toward the government, or become more executive-minded than the executive, then I think the checks and balances of constitutional government will be significantly weakened.

    And what do you think the next five years might mean for India’s Muslim minority?

    On the specifics, it is hard to tell. I think what we can say, based on the track record of this government, is that certainly the attempt to culturally marginalize them will continue. Will there be a large-scale outbreak of violence? I hope not. I think the strategy in the previous government was to let small-scale incidents fester, specifically lynchings of people allegedly trading in cattle and beef. And those lynchings had the remarkable political effect that they could be ignored, because they were not, like, a large riot, like in 2002.

    Yet they were always sending subtle signals to communities to stay in their place. I suspect some of that will continue. Whether that escalates into large-scale violence? I hope not. Given the mandate they have, there may not be a need to engage in that. But I think that subtle politics of signalling will continue. I think there will be regional variations. The state of West Bengal is the state I am most worried about, at this point. It has a long history of electoral violence. I think that the political context in West Bengal will mean a lot of violence. But I think the politics of saying to India’s minorities that you are irrelevant to India’s political and cultural life is likely to deepen.

    #Narendra_Modi #Inde #Démocratie #Fascisme

  • L’interview de Michael Oren, ancien ambassadeur d’Israël aux États-Unis (2009-2013), se termine mal :
    – toute la Palestine m’appartient, c’est mon héritage biblique depuis 3000 ans
    – pourtant vous êtes né à New York ?
    – je n’aime pas vos questions, cette interview est terminée…

    Michael Oren Cuts Short a Conversation About Israel
    https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/michael-oren-hangs-up-on-a-call-about-israel

    Where did you get that right?

    It’s my heritage for three thousand years. It’s the same exact right I have from where I am talking to you. I am talking to you from Jaffa. I live in Jaffa. The same right I have to live in Jaffa I have in [the settlement] Beit El or Efrat, or in Hebron. Exact same right. Take away one right, the other right makes no sense. By the way, P.S., most of the lands of pre-1967 Israel are not even in the Bible. Haifa is not in the Bible; Tel Aviv is not in the Bible.

    O.K., I just want to understand this because I don’t want to misunderstand it. You are saying there are Palestinians living in various areas of the West Bank right now—

    There are, indeed.

    —which may or may not at some point become a state. But you are saying that, wherever they are living, they have less right to be there than you as a Jew born in New York.

    I didn’t say that. Don’t impute words to me I didn’t say.

    I’m sorry, I thought you just said that.

    No, I did not say that in any way. Listen, I don’t think I want to continue this interview. I don’t think this is a constructive interview.

    • I really believe that all the behaviors, all the values are not equal, and I believe that respect of women is better than non-respect of women. I really believe that secularism is better than bigotry. I believe that not because they are Western values but because they are values that protect and save bodies of people.

      Yeah, if you are a woman in Libya or Iran, a woman who works at a hotel in New York, whatever it is.

      [Long pause] Yeah. [Long pause]

      Sir, can you hear me?

      I’m here. I’m here.

      I just said that they deserve to be respected and heard.

      Yeah, yeah, yeah. I got it. I got it. I heard you. I heard.

      Assez jouissif...

      #Bernard-Henri_Lévy #BHL

    • Puisque semi #paywall :

      Bernard-Henri Lévy on the Rights of Women and of the Accused
      By Isaac Chotiner, The New-Yorker, March 18, 2019

      “The history of France, a permanent miracle, has the singular privilege of impassioning the peoples of the earth to the point where they all take part in French quarrels,” the French author André Maurois wrote. With Bernard-Henri Lévy, it often seems that the world’s most famous French intellectual is taking part in everyone else’s quarrels. Born in Algeria, to a Jewish family, B.H.L. (as he is known) made a name for himself as a journalist in East Pakistan, in the early seventies, during its struggle to become Bangladesh. A few years later, he was part of a group of young French writers, called the New Philosophers, who broke decisively from Marxism and the influence of Sartre. Over the past several decades, he has written philosophy and history and journalism, on subjects ranging from the war in Bosnia to the death of Daniel Pearl and the need for a strong stand against Islamic fundamentalism.

      He has also, unlike some of his forebears, evinced a passionate love for the United States. He retraced Tocqueville’s footsteps in a series of essays for The Atlantic (which became the book “American Vertigo”), speaks proudly of his “anti-anti-Americanism,” and has urged the United States to exercise its power, voicing support for military action in Libya. (He played a large role in convincing the French government to help overthrow Muammar Qaddafi.) His new book is called “The Empire and the Five Kings: America’s Abdication and the Fate of the World,” and it explains why an American “retreat” from the global stage is likely to have calamitous effects, with other, less democratic countries filling the void.

      Lévy has sparked controversy for a number of his stances, including his advocacy for France’s burqa ban, his “unconditional love” of Israel, and his criticism of the rape cases against the film director Roman Polanski, who pleaded guilty to statutory rape, in 1978, and fled to France to avoid imprisonment, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former managing director of the International Monetary Fund. Strauss-Kahn, a friend of Lévy’s, has been repeatedly accused of sexual misconduct. In 2011, New York prosecutors charged him with the sexual assault of a maid at a Manhattan hotel; the charges were dropped, but not before Lévy published a piece defending Strauss-Kahn, in which he questioned why a maid would have gone into Strauss-Kahn’s hotel room alone, and claimed that his friend had been “thrown to the dogs.”

      I recently spoke twice by phone with Lévy. During our conversations, which have been edited for length and clarity, we discussed his feelings about the war in Libya, the rights of women in Muslim societies, and his support for Polanski and Strauss-Kahn.

      Has the rise of Donald Trump made you rethink anything you believed about America?

      No, because I am an admirer of the democracy in America, of the institutions in America, of the creed in America. But I always knew that there was a part of this country that was unfaithful and wary of this creed, institutions, and values. When I wrote “American Vertigo,” I knew that this America existed, this populist America, sometimes this semi-Fascist America, this America turning its back on its own glorious identity. I always knew that. It’s not a surprise. The surprise is that, because of the world’s big populist wave, No. 1, and because of the electoral college, No. 2, this America came in the White House. It makes a big difference, of course, but I am sure it does not change my admiration for America.

      Does it make you think that if America is going to elect people like Donald Trump, we should think differently about how active America should be in the world?

      No. I just think that America is currently playing against its values and its self-interests. It’s lose-lose behavior, losing on every ground, losing on principles, losing on interests. I don’t believe in this idea of America making deals and so on. I think that when America, contemporary America, turns its back on its vocation—exceptionalism, creed, and so on—it is bad for the rest of America. It is not a source of prosperity; it is the opposite. So my hope and my belief is that the time will come, sooner probably than what Americans think, when the country will match again with its creed and its self-interests.
      Video From The New Yorker
      Unearthing Black History at the Freedom Lots

      You were instrumental in pushing for action to overthrow Qaddafi. How do you evaluate that eight years later?

      It was the right thing to do. I was instrumental in France, but not only. Hillary Clinton, by the way, related it also in her memoirs. She spoke about my visit to her, my pressure with the Libyan revolutionaries. I absolutely believe it was the right thing to do for you and for us and for the Libyans. My view is that if we had not done that, we would have today not only one but two Syrias. And Syria is something else than the problem that Libya faces. In Libya, you have disorder and you have civil war of low intensity and you have some pockets of jihadism, but the pockets of jihadism were picked out and were destroyed by the Libyans themselves, in Derna, in Sirte, in Misurata. The civil war is not good, of course, but it is low intensity. Syria is the opposite. It’s a huge war against civilians. As you know, millions of refugees. Absolutely incomparable. In other words, when you [do the math], the result of noninvolvement and of involvement, the first one is much worse, the balance of noninvolvement is absolutely a thousand per cent more heavy.

      You wrote, at the time, “What is dying: an ancient concept of sovereignty in which all crimes are permitted as long as they go on within the frontiers of the state. What has been born: the idea of the universality of rights that is no longer a pious hope but a passionate obligation for all who truly believe in the unity of mankind and in the virtue of the right to intervene, which is its corollary.” Has Libya at least changed your mind about people in the West being overconfident about the ability of regime change to have long-lasting accomplishments?

      No. There are two different things. In terms of principles, we have to hold firm. It is a duty, a moral duty, to hold firm the idea that there is no people, no ethnicity, forbidding democracy. Democracy is a universal value and it can be adopted in any situation, and it is absolutely a racist point of view to say that this part of the world or that part of the world is unable to build a democracy. No. 2, to build a democracy, you don’t do that overnight—with one exception, and that is Israel, a democracy built overnight in 1948. Except for that, democracy takes time.

      You write in the book, “During the war in Libya, and then during the freeze, the convulsions, and the confusion that followed, when the very idea of an Arab democratic revolution seemed lost, I continued to make myself available—for an attempted mediation in Paris, for a summit in Tunis,” et cetera. Are you still available to play that role?

      Of course. To my last minute. I am available for two things. No. 1, to write books—when I isolate myself, and I close my ears, and I dive in the depths of my words—but, yes, I am available for what you said, for what I said in this part of the book. If tomorrow there is a call from a friend in Libya or Syria, if I can help, of course I will do it.

      Lest people think you uncritically love America—and maybe I have given that perception—it’s absolutely the case that you have criticized America. One thing you have criticized is our criminal-justice system, and particularly the cases of Roman Polanski and Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Why do you think America cracked down on these men?

      Because of the madness, because of political correctness having become mad. This is class justice reversed. Former Marxists spoke about class justice, which means there is impunity for the powerful, the famous, the rich, and heavy justice for the powerless, the poor, and the have-nots. Today, in America, you have this huge wave of political correctness, which was good at the start, which was good in principle, but which has, as often, produced some crazy effects, and this is one. You have class justice reversed. It was clear in the case of Strauss-Kahn that the fact that he was rich, he was white, and he was powerful made him be treated in a way particularly severe, with the perp walk and so on, with this big show of justice. This show.

      You stated that Roman Polanski had “perhaps had committed a youthful error” and wrote, in 2010, “The ‘illegal sexual intercourse’ that Roman Polanski acknowledged he was guilty of 32 years ago is not, for all that, the deadly crime, even crime against humanity, that the avengers hot on his heels have been denouncing for the past 10 days. Yes, it is a crime. But there are degrees in the scale of crimes. And it is an insult to good sense, an assault on reason, a door left open to all kinds of confusion, to muddle everything, to try to make everyone believe that a rape is a crime of the same nature as, for example, the one his wife Sharon Tate was a victim of.” You say, “Perhaps had committed a youthful error.” He was, I guess, thirteen at the time. Oh no, no, his victim was thirteen at the time. He was forty-three.

      What I wanted to tell you was that, a few years ago, I made a little investigation, and I discovered that the year when he committed this crime, in the same county of California, he was probably the most heavily punished among the men who did such crimes. Because he was famous and rich and so on, he was not spared by justice but exactly the reverse.

      For raping a thirteen-year-old, we are talking about?

      Yes, raping. Fourteen, fifteen, thirteen, whatever. It’s a crime, anyway. He was the most heavily punished. He went in jail and so forth. My point is that we are in a time where sometimes you have this class justice reversed. I remember, for the New York Times, I did an interview with Bill Keller [the former executive editor of the Times]. He told me that you, Bernard-Henri Lévy, generally defend minorities, ethnic minorities, the poor, and the have-nots. How can you defend a rich, powerful white man? And I told him, I’m sorry, but justice has nothing to do with being white or not white, powerful or not. Justice is justice. Law is law. The penalty has to be adapted to the guiltiness. The guiltiness has to be scrutinized first.

      Do you feel that we have this political correctness, which you said you thought was helpful at the beginning, but now people are freaking out about raping thirteen-year-old girls?

      To rape a thirteen-year-old girl is a huge crime, which deserves a huge penalty, which deserves jail and so on. But, when the penalty has been purged, the system of justice is that you have paid your debt—that’s what they tell you. To rape, in general, is a crime, and one of the good virtues of the #MeToo movement is to have imposed the idea to every single man in America and the Western world that to rape is a huge crime against the essence of humanity for a woman, or for a man when a man is raped. No, no, no, I didn’t say that. But Roman Polanski paid his debt and went to jail.

      Polanski left the country.

      He left the country after having paid his penalty. He went to jail first.

      He was still a fugitive, just to be clear. And to turn to Dominique Strauss-Kahn—when another woman accused him of attempted rape, you wrote, “I hold it against all those who complacently accept the account of this other young woman, this one French, who pretends to have been the victim of the same kind of attempted rape, who has shut up for eight years but, sensing the golden opportunity, whips out her old dossier and comes to flog it on television.” [After Strauss-Kahn was charged with rape, in 2011, a French journalist said that he had tried to rape her several years earlier.] How do you know she was pretending?

      Where did I say that?

      You wrote an article where you said “who pretends to have been the victim of the same kind of attempted rape.”

      What is the name of this girl and where did I publish this article?

      The woman was Tristane Banon.

      O.K. O.K. And then? What I think is that these crimes, these acts are huge crimes. And you cannot—

      The Daily Beast is where you wrote it.

      So this has to be treated very seriously, and to take very seriously an alleged crime is to go to justice, is to scrutinize, is to exchange arguments and exchange witnesses, word against word. Until the moment that this crime has been proven, it is alleged or pretended.

      I asked because you said “pretend,” and you didn’t mention that a lot of women don’t come forward initially because it was a traumatic experience or they are not believed or, you know, people will say they are pretending.

      MORE FROM

      Q. & A.

      No, no, no, no. I don’t say . . . I say that “pretend” is a clear word in law, in the state of law. Until a crime is proved, it is alleged. When it is proved, it is committed and it has to be punished, any crime, according to the scale of law.

      [Levy later clarified that he meant “pretends” in the sense of the French “prétendre,” or “to claim.” The article had been translated from French, and “prétendre” appeared in the original.]

      So when you said she “shut up for eight years but, sensing the golden opportunity, whips out her old dossier and comes to flog it on television . . . ”

      O.K. It’s a quote from me. So what?

      I want to understand what you meant by that.

      I meant exactly what I said.

      So “sensing the golden opportunity” is what you meant?

      I don’t remember this text, sir. If it is in the Daily Beast, it is my text, no doubt.

      You have written a lot about troubles within Islam. You recently tweeted, “Hijab Day at Sc Po [Sciences Po]. So when is there going to be a sharia day? Or stoning day? Or slavery day?” You have also compared a head scarf to inviting rape.

      No, no, no, no. I never said that. That is a false quote which are on and on. I never said this sentence of veil and rape. Never ever.

      So it’s a fake quote?

      I never said that.

      “So when the Muslims say that the veil is to protect women, it is the contrary. The veil is an invitation to rape.”

      No, no. I never said that. What I say is that the veil for women is a sign of submission, a sign of power of the men over the women, a sign of the inferiority of the women, and what I say is that I cannot see the reason why a woman should be forbidden to show her face or her hair, and I find absolutely disgusting the idea that we men have sort of purity and that the hair of women [is a sign of] impurity. I never said this sentence.

      The quote appeared in an October, 2006, profile of you in the Jewish Chronicle, a London-based newspaper. Do you know the piece I am talking about?

      I know the piece and I said various times that I never said that.

      So they made it up?

      It is not a quote by me.

      I agree with you completely that men telling women what they should be able to wear is disgraceful. I was wondering what you think about France’s policy of also having restrictions on what women can wear, in terms of the burqa ban, and whether you think that has been a successful policy.

      I am in favor of the burqa ban because I think that the burqa is a jail—a jail of tissue, but still a jail. It is a sign of slavery. Even when a woman says that she accepts or she wishes to be a slave, I don’t think that a democratic society should bless slavery, even when it is consented to, even when it is accepted. Democratic society cannot bless slavery.

      So you think all women who wear the veil are essentially slaves?

      All women who wear the burqa are put in a state of slavery, and all the women who wear the veil accept the idea or are forced to accept the idea that they are not the equal of men, that there is something un-pure in their hair, in their freedom, in the grace of the way they move, which is only reserved to women and which is not the case for the man.

      Have you talked to women who wear a covering and who feel differently, and what do they say to you?

      Of course, I spoke with this sort of woman. Sometimes they are obliged by the law of the micro-society or big society or are compelled to do that, and if they don’t do that, they put themselves apart from the society. Sometimes they accept it really. What I see, what I hear, when I speak with them, is that they share a vision of the world which is built by the men and which creates a state of inferiority for them. They interiorize this doctrine, this theory.

      Do you think the ban was helpful for France?

      I think so, because it was healthy for the huge majority of Muslims in France who are secular, who are democrats. They found themselves helped, encouraged, in their behavior. If we had accepted the veil, it would have been as if we, the French Republic, led them to their destiny. The ban of the veil was an extended hand to this part of Muslim society that wants to embrace secular values.

      I think it’s important for different communities and faiths to embrace secular and feminist ways, in a society where, when women come forward about things like sexual assault, they are, broadly speaking, believed. All these things are very important.

      Yeah. I’m sorry. What was the question?

      I was agreeing that we need secularism and a society where women are respected—

      I really believe that all the behaviors, all the values are not equal, and I believe that respect of women is better than non-respect of women. I really believe that secularism is better than bigotry. I believe that not because they are Western values but because they are values that protect and save bodies of people.

      Yeah, if you are a woman in Libya or Iran, a woman who works at a hotel in New York, whatever it is.

      [Long pause] Yeah. [Long pause]

      Sir, can you hear me?

      I’m here. I’m here.

      I just said that they deserve to be respected and heard.

      Yeah, yeah, yeah. I got it. I got it. I heard you. I heard.

      Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer at The New Yorker, where he is the principal contributor to Q. & A., a series of timely interviews with major public figures in politics, media, books, business, technology, and more.Read more »