• #Haut-Karabakh le conflit entre Arméniens et Azéris - #Dessous_des_cartes

    Depuis la fin du mois de septembre, l’#Arménie et l’#Azerbaïdjan s’affrontent dans des combats meurtriers. Drones, chars, armes anti-aériennes, bombardement de cibles civiles : le différend qui oppose les deux pays depuis de nombreuses années ressemble de plus en plus à une véritable guerre. C’est le contentieux autour de la question du Haut-Karabagh qui a précipité le conflit.

    Cette zone montagneuse à majorité arménienne enclavée en plein Azerbaïdjan cristallise en effet les tensions entre les deux États. Mais comment le Haut-Karabagh a-t-il hérité d’une situation géographique si particulière ? Pourquoi l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan entretiennent des relations aussi conflictuelles ? Quel est le rôle joué par les puissances régionales turque, russe et iranienne dans les événements actuels ? Doit-on encore craindre une aggravation de la situation ?

    https://youtu.be/QIsIvWuiBM4

    #Haut_Karabakh #Caucase #Turquie #Erdogan #Russie #Iran

  • Assassinat de Samuel Paty : “Il faut trouver un moyen de limiter les partages pulsionnels sur les réseaux sociaux” | Interview d’Olivier Ertzscheid
    https://www.telerama.fr/idees/assassinat-de-samuel-paty-il-faut-trouver-un-moyen-de-limiter-les-partages-

    Spécialiste en sciences de l’information et de la communication, Olivier Ertzscheid pointe l’incapacité politique à comprendre les enjeux des échanges numériques, et la propension structurelle des réseaux sociaux à diffuser la haine. Il appelle à une réflexion large, des concepteurs aux régulateurs et aux utilisateurs des outils de communication virtuels.

    Huit jours. C’est le temps qui s’est écoulé entre l’allumage de la mèche et l’explosion de la charge. Entre le virtuel et le réel. Entre la vidéo d’un parent d’élève prenant nommément à partie Samuel Paty, le professeur d’histoire-géo de sa fille, et l’assassinat barbare de celui-ci, décapité près de son collège de Conflans-Sainte-Honorine par un individu qui, il y a deux semaines encore, ignorait jusqu’à son existence.
    Abonné Assassinat de Samuel Paty : “Être musulman, c’est respecter l’autre dans sa dignité absolue” Youness Bousenna 8 minutes à lire

    Pendant ces huit jours, jusqu’à leur épouvantable culmination, l’enseignant a été la cible d’une campagne de dénigrement, à l’intensité centuplée par les réseaux sociaux, en public et en privé, en messages et en boucle. Avec l’aide de Facebook, WhatsApp ou Snapchat, la vindicte populaire a même franchi les frontières géographiques pour arriver jusqu’en Algérie. On n’en a rien su. Ou trop tard. Qu’aurait-il fallu faire pendant ces huit jours, aussi courts qu’interminables ?

    Dans cet embrasement, le problème n’est pas l’anonymat, déjà pris pour cible par certains responsables politiques désarmés, mais la foule et son viatique numérique. Comme un précipité des passions les plus tristes de l’époque, cet attentat vient rappeler que la raison voyage toujours moins vite que le bruit, et repose, dans les pires conditions possibles, cette question aussi vitale qu’indémêlable : comment rendre vivables nos conversations en ligne ? Comment faire pour que, a minima, on n’en meure pas ?

    Pour Olivier Ertzscheid, maître de conférences en sciences de l’information et de la communication à l’université de Nantes, auteur du Monde selon Zuckerberg (éditions C&F, 2020), la solution s’écrit lentement : à l’urgence omnipotente des plateformes, il faut réussir à opposer un peu de friction et une certaine lenteur.

    En de pareilles circonstances, pourquoi accuse-t-on systématiquement les réseaux sociaux ?
    Il y a un effet de visibilité sur les réseaux sociaux, particulièrement dans la temporalité d’un attentat : ce que les gens disent de l’événement en ligne est immédiatement observable. Par un effet de raccourci intellectuel paresseux, il est facile de se raconter cette fable selon laquelle les réseaux sociaux seraient seuls responsables. C’est ainsi qu’on remobilise en catastrophe la loi Avia contre les discours de haine, alors qu’elle a été censurée par le Conseil constitutionnel et ferait plus de mal que de bien.
    Hommage à Samuel Paty : un pays sur une ligne de crête
    Valérie Lehoux 3 minutes à lire

    Quel regard portez-vous sur les déclarations de certains responsables politiques, notamment Xavier Bertrand, qui saisissent ce moment pour réclamer la fin de l’anonymat en ligne ?
    Il faut d’abord rappeler qu’il est totalement hors sujet de convoquer l’anonymat par rapport à ce qui s’est passé à Conflans-Sainte-Honorine. En dehors du compte Twitter qui a publié la photo de la tête décapitée de Samuel Paty, tous les acteurs de la chaîne sont identifiés. En vérité, ce réflexe pavlovien traduit deux choses : une incapacité politique à comprendre ce qui se joue sur les espaces numériques, et la tentation d’un discours liberticide, la volonté d’une prise de contrôle, d’une hyper-surveillance. À cet égard, certains de nos responsables politiques ne sont visiblement pas sortis du syndrome sarkozyste, qui décrivait Internet comme un « Far West » à civiliser.

    Difficile toutefois d’escamoter la part de responsabilité des réseaux sociaux. Le problème ne se situe-t-il pas dans leur architecture ?
    La finalité de ces espaces est de générer une rente attentionnelle, d’être un réceptacle publicitaire pour déclencher des actes d’achat, qu’il s’agisse de produits ou d’opinions. Je considère aujourd’hui les réseaux sociaux comme des espaces « publicidaires », c’est-à-dire qu’ils tuent toute possibilité d’un discours qui ne soit pas haineux. Tant qu’on ne changera pas ce modèle, économique et politique, on ne résoudra rien. Revenons vingt ans en arrière : quand Sergey Brin et Larry Page, les fondateurs de Google, ont créé PageRank, l’algorithme de leur moteur de recherche, ils ont expliqué leur démarche, en arguant que les autres moteurs – contrairement au leur – étaient biaisés et dangereux pour la démocratie. Regardons où ça nous a menés…
    “La vidéo du parent d’élève qui a déclenché cette spirale infernale a été partagée par de grands comptes, très suivis. Pas nécessairement parce qu’ils adhèrent au fond, mais parce que c’était facile.”

    Qu’aurait-il fallu faire pendant les huit jours qui ont séparé la mise en ligne de la première vidéo d’un parent d’élève et l’assassinat de Samuel Paty ?
    Dans un monde idéal, où les plateformes seraient soucieuses de produire des espaces de discours régulés, nous aurions pu mettre en place des mécanismes de friction afin de briser les chaînes de contamination. La vidéo du parent d’élève qui a déclenché cette spirale infernale a été partagée par de grands comptes, très suivis. Pas nécessairement parce qu’ils adhèrent au fond, mais parce que c’était facile. Ça ne coûte rien cognitivement et ça rapporte beaucoup socialement.

    Ces partages sont perdus dans un brouillard d’intentionnalité. Prenons l’exemple de la mosquée de Pantin : elle a d’abord diffusé la vidéo du père de famille puis, quelques heures après l’attentat, l’a finalement supprimée en exprimant ses regrets et en appelant aux rassemblements de soutien. Le temps de l’éditorialisation a complètement disparu, plus personne ne sait pourquoi tel ou tel contenu est relayé. Or les réseaux sociaux mettent en proximité des communautés qui ne s’entendent pas. Et parfois, ce mécanisme d’hystérisation déclenche chez quelqu’un une pulsion.
    “Dans une démocratie de deux milliards d’habitants comme Facebook, il n’est pas normal qu’il n’y ait pas de haltes, de ralentissements.”

    Faudrait-il renvoyer les discours de haine dans la sphère privée, au risque de favoriser un phénomène de balkanisation, de morcellement, qui nous empêcherait de repérer les départs d’incendie ?
    Facebook et consorts ont fait le choix de mettre en avant le partage privé dans ce qu’on appelle le « dark social » [c’est-à-dire le trafic de l’ombre, constitué d’informations échangées hors de la sphère publique, NDLR]. Il y a chez les plateformes une volonté de capter les moments d’agitation de surface pour alimenter des conversations privées.

    Il y a une clé pour comprendre le problème de la hiérarchisation entre espaces publics et interpersonnels : le design d’interface. Comme le formulait Lawrence Lessig [professeur de droit à Harvard et théoricien de l’Internet libre, NDLR] en 1999, « le code, c’est la loi », et ceux qui le fabriquent ne peuvent pas faire l’économie d’une profonde réflexion éthique. Ce n’est pas anodin de voir aujourd’hui un très grand nombre d’ingénieurs de la Silicon Valley regretter leurs créations, qu’il s’agisse du bouton j’aime ou du scrolling infini.

    On le voit, ce débat oppose l’urgence de la réaction à la lenteur, salutaire. Comment les réconcilier ?
    Dans une démocratie de deux milliards d’habitants comme Facebook, il n’est pas normal qu’il n’y ait pas de haltes, de ralentissements. Je ne dis pas qu’il faut rationner le nombre de contenus qu’on peut relayer quotidiennement sur les réseaux sociaux, ou qu’il faut instaurer un permis à points, mais il faut trouver un moyen de limiter les partages pulsionnels. Dans mes cours, j’oblige par exemple mes étudiants à recréer des liens hypertextes pour qu’ils produisent un effort intellectuel même minime avant de les envoyer. Pour autant, on ne peut pas uniquement blâmer l’utilisateur.

    Nous sommes dans un espace-temps qui nous sort de notre posture lucide, et personne ne se regarde en train d’utiliser les réseaux sociaux, pas plus qu’on ne s’observe en train de visionner un film au cinéma. Il faut travailler sur un cycle, qui va de la conception des plateformes – le premier levier – à l’éducation, en passant par la régulation. À condition de ne pas tout attendre du design (design utilisateur, ou UX design, ndlr), du politique ou de l’internaute, on peut y arriver.

    #Olivier_Ertzscheid #Samuel_Paty #Médias_sociaux

  • Les Turcs, et pas seulement leur président, ont un vrai sentiment d’injustice sur la répartition des richesses en Méditerranée

    https://www.franceculture.fr/geopolitique/gaz-la-turquie-veut-sa-part-des-richesses-de-la-mediterranee

    ... La Turquie est donc le plus grand pays de Méditerranée orientale en termes d’accès à la mer.

    Sauf que ces eaux territoriales ne dépassent pas quelques kilomètres. La façade maritime turque, surtout sur la mer Egée, est très étroite, limitée par l’énorme chapelet d’iles grecques, une sorte de mur à ses portes. Exemple type : Kastellorizo, caillou de 9 km2, à 550 kms d’Athènes et à 2 kilomètres de la Turquie. Mais du coup, les eaux sont grecques.

    Pas étonnant que la Turquie regarde cette situation comme une aberration au regard de la géographie.

    Même thème traité ici
    https://seenthis.net/messages/875584

    #Turquie #Grèce #Erdogan #gaz #Mediterranée

    Organiser des négociations entre les deux pays serait la seule chose raisonnable à faire (ce qu’il me semble, avait commencé à initier Angela Merkel), plutôt que de vendre des armes à la Grèce (qui s’était déjà surendettée en achetant des rames) comme le fait Micron.

  • Rubik’s Cube Inventor Opens Up About His Creation in New Book ’Cubed’ - The New York Times
    https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/16/books/erno-rubik-rubiks-cube-inventor-cubed.html

    The first person to solve a Rubik’s Cube spent a month struggling to unscramble it.

    It was the puzzle’s creator, an unassuming Hungarian architecture professor named Erno Rubik. When he invented the cube in 1974, he wasn’t sure it could ever be solved. Mathematicians later calculated that there are 43,252,003,274,489,856,000 ways to arrange the squares, but just one of those combinations is correct.

    When Rubik finally did it, after weeks of frustration, he was overcome by “a great sense of accomplishment and utter relief.” Looking back, he realizes the new generation of “speedcubers” — Yusheng Du of China set the world record of 3.47 seconds in 2018 — might not be impressed.

    “But, remember,” Rubik writes in his new book, “Cubed,” “this had never been done before.”

    In the nearly five decades since, the Rubik’s Cube has become one of the most enduring, beguiling, maddening and absorbing puzzles ever created. More than 350 million cubes have sold globally; if you include knockoffs, the number is far higher. They captivate computer programmers, philosophers and artists. Hundreds of books, promising speed-solving strategies, analyzing cube design principles or exploring their philosophical significance, have been published. The cube came to embody “much more than just a puzzle,” the cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter wrote in 1981. “It is an ingenious mechanical invention, a pastime, a learning tool, a source of metaphors, an inspiration.”

    “On the way to trying to understand the nature of the cube, I changed my mind,” Rubik said. “What really interested me was not the nature of the cube, but the nature of people, the relationship between people and the cube.”

    Reading “Cubed” can be a strange, disorienting experience, one that’s analogous to picking up and twisting one of his cubes. It lacks a clear narrative structure or arc — an effect that’s deliberate, Rubik said. Initially, he didn’t even want the book to have chapters or even a title.

    “I had several ideas, and I thought to share this mixture of ideas that I have in my mind and leave it to the reader to find out which ones are valuable,” he said. “I am not taking your hands and walking you on this route. You can start at the end or in the middle.”

    Rubik got a contract at an American company, Ideal Toy, which wanted one million cubes to sell overseas. In 1980, Ideal Toy brought Rubik to New York to a toy fair. He wasn’t the most charismatic salesman — a shy architecture professor with a then-limited command of English — but the company needed someone to show that the puzzle was solvable.

    Sales exploded. In three years, Ideal sold 100 million Rubik’s Cubes. Guides to solving the cube shot up the best-seller lists. “There’s a sense in which the cube is very, very simple — it’s only got six sides, six colors,” said Steve Patterson, a philosopher and author of “Square One: The Foundations of Knowledge,” who has written about the cube as an embodiment of paradoxes. “In a very short period of time, it becomes unbelievably complex.”

    Reports of the cube’s death were premature. In the 1990s, a new generation of enthusiasts discovered it. New speedcubing records were set, as were records for solving the cube underwater, while skydiving, while blindfolded, while juggling. The World Cube Association now hosts more than 1,000 speedcubing competitions each year.

    Rubik himself wouldn’t make the cut. He can solve the cube in about a minute — an improvement from that first, agonizing process — but he’s not interested in speed. “The elegant solution, the quality of the solution, is much more important than timing,” he said.

    #Rubik_cube #Autobiographie #Erno_Rubik

  • Quand l’Europe aide la Chine pour surveiller massivement ses concitoyens
    https://www.telerama.fr/idees/quand-leurope-aide-la-chine-pour-surveiller-massivement-ses-concitoyens-670

    Amnesty International publie un rapport qui montre que plusieurs entreprises européennes fournissent à Pékin des technologies de reconnaissance faciale. L’ONG pointe une faille majeure : aucun garde-fou européen ne limite l’exportation de ce type de technologies. On connaissait déjà la propension de la Chine à exporter son modèle numérique intrusif, des faubourgs de Quito aux rues de Valenciennes. L’itinéraire inverse est plus méconnu, et pourtant : ce lundi, en amont d’un trilogue européen – qui (...)

    #Nexa #AMESys #Ercom #Idemia #Morpho #Oberthur #algorithme #CCTV #Skynet #biométrie #émotions #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #surveillance (...)

    ##Wassenaar

  • Dérive autour de Ranglin… Hier comme on continuait la nécro de la légende Toots, je mettais un lien vers son brodage jazz sur 54-46 https://seenthis.net/messages/875702#message875885
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXndod3lFJA

    Du coup je réécoutais Ranglin que j’adore. Son album Below the bassline qui contient le morceau précédent est un de mes albums préférés de tous les temps. Ranglin a toujours été virtuose sans se la péter, pas de vitesse pour la vitesse, toujours au service d’une mélodie, Below the bassline étant le summum de ses albums pour ça je crois. Dû très sûrement au fait qu’à côté de ses propres compos, il a été arrangeur et guitariste pour de nombreux morceaux ou groupes populaires une bonne partie de sa carrière, et pas pour du menu fretin (Marley ! Skatalites !…).
    Playlist album complet : https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL5ILpPbaM4lKm7ceUe-9Iy7Q-U31m_Syp

    Sur cet album, comme sur plein d’autres il joue (quasi à égalité, cf les solos) avec son ami Monty Alexander, grand pianiste jazz jamaïcain (avec qui il fera de nombreux albums, sous l’un ou l’autre de leur nom).
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6zm1FFrCk8

    Au fil de l’eau revient dans mon navigateur le lien que je m’étais mis de côté de son improbable album disco, que j’avais annoncé https://seenthis.net/messages/784493

    Album produit par King Sporty, un musicien et producteur jamaïcain, parti à Miami. Il est connu pour avoir co-écrit Buffalo Soldier (quand même !) mais ensuite il a fait du funk, de la disco, et même de l’électro. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_Sporty

    Il était aussi marié à… Betty Wright, autre grande chanteuse. Du coup j’écoute et je me retrouve sur Seenthis car @sinehebdo annonce sa mort dans la triste longue liste des gens morts pendant la pandémie.
    https://seenthis.net/messages/852101

    Dans ce seen, @vanderling annonce que Millie Small est morte aussi la même semaine… Millie dont la carrière a débuté et explosé très jeune, à 15-16 ans, avec l’album « My boy lollipop », dont le morceau éponyme est considéré comme le premier morceau de ska diffusé massivement (quand même !). Et ça ça vient d’où ? C’est Chris Blackwell, le fondateur d’Island, qui a décidé d’associer… Ernest Ranglin avec Millie Small, qui a donc été le directeur artistique, l’arrangeur, et la lead guitar sur cet album. C’est lui qui a ré-arrangé cette reprise d’un morceau existant.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xQ5udNSa46A

    Au passage la première version de ce morceau, 10 ans plus tôt, interprété par Barbie Gaye
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1OYZ1PZtV0


    a été joué en première partie de… Little Richard, dont @sinehebdo annonçait la mort aussi, au même moment que Betty Wright et Millie Small.

    #tout_est_lié ! (ce tag n’existe pas en 10 ans de seens, c’est une honte)

    Bon mais Ernest lui il est encore vivant, même s’il a quand même 88 ans, et ne doit pas forcément faire des milliers de choses (et on ne lui demande pas tant vu tout ce qu’il a déjà fait). Le wiki français ne sert pas à grand chose :
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Ranglin

    Finissons sur un autre album que j’ai en physique, son voyage en musical en Afrique de l’ouest, « In search of the lost riddim ». C’est vraiment un tout autre style, où son jazz se mélange à la kora ❤︎, et divers chants (dont une avec une chanteuse de 14 ans qui est incroyable). Cet album est vraiment très très beau.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MtD8OwQ2Sw0

    #musique #Ernest_Ranglin #King_Sporty #Betty_Wright #Millie_Small #Barbie_Gaye

  • La #Cour_des_comptes appelle à renforcer sans tarder la lutte contre la #fraude_sociale | Public Senat
    https://www.publicsenat.fr/article/parlementaire/la-cour-des-comptes-appelle-a-renforcer-sans-tarder-la-lutte-contre-la-f

    Auditionné ce 8 septembre 2020 devant la commission des Affaires sociales du Sénat, le premier président de la Cour des comptes, Pierre Moscovici, n’a pas pu livrer une estimation précise du volume des fraudes aux #prestations_sociales. En cause : le manque d’enquêtes de la part de différents organismes de #protection_sociale, la « zone grise » entre #erreurs et fraudes, ou encore le calendrier contraint de la Cour pour remettre ses conclusions.

    https://www.ccomptes.fr/system/files/2020-09/20200908-rapport-Lutte-contre-fraudes-prestations-sociales.pdf

  • Aux côtés du peuple kurde

    Pierre Bance

    https://lavoiedujaguar.net/Aux-cotes-du-peuple-kurde

    André Métayer
    Vingt-cinq années aux côtés du peuple kurde
    Histoire des Amitiés kurdes de Bretagne (1994-2019)

    Pourquoi s’intéresser aux Kurdes ? Pour le présent, ce ne sont pas les Kurdes par eux-mêmes qui intéressent, mais leur révolution au Rojava. Ainsi depuis sept ou huit ans, la cause kurde suscite de la curiosité en France. Encore ne faut-il pas exagérer, cet intérêt n’est souvent que compassionnel, quand il ne s’égare pas dans une exaltation qui risque fort d’être refroidie par la réalité.

    Il en est dont l’engagement est plus ancien et dont la durée assure de sa solidité. En des temps où nul ne connaissait le Rojava, où le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) était suspecté de stalinisme, bien avant son abandon du marxisme-léninisme et du nationalisme dans les années 2000. Des temps, où Abdullah Öcalan, son leader, était encore libre, avant d’être kidnappé par les services secrets américains et turcs en 1999, puis emprisonné à vie dans une île de la mer de Marmara. C’était en 1994. Un petit groupe venu de Bretagne visite le Kurdistan de Turquie. Parmi eux, André Métayer. Ce qui n’aurait pu être que du tourisme militant va se muer en un engagement sous le coup de l’émotion. De ses yeux, voir un village détruit par l’armée turque comme le furent quelque quatre mille autres dans ces années de plomb, voir un peuple entier terrorisé dans ses villes et ses campagnes par la violence militaire et policière, bouleversa ces voyageurs qui prirent la résolution de se solidariser avec ces Kurdes qui paraissaient d’éternels vaincus alors qu’ils étaient d’éternels résistants. (...)

    #Kurdes #Bretagne #Turquie #résistance #amitié #solidarité #PKK #Öcalan #Erdoğan #Rojava #Moyen-Orient

  • Ernie Paniccioli Photo Archive | Cornell University Library Digital Collections
    https://digital.library.cornell.edu/collections/paniccioli

    This collection offers digital versions of nearly 20,000 photographs by Ernie Paniccioli, one of #Hip_Hop’s most prolific and prominent photographers. Presented by Cornell University Library’s Hip Hop archives with the permission of #Ernie_Paniccioli, these photographs provide an unprecedented visual history of #Hip_Hop_culture of the 1980s, 90s, and early 2000s.

    #musique

  • Die #Philosophie Hegels war in der Geschichte der Entwicklung mensc...
    https://diasp.eu/p/11135873

    Die #Philosophie Hegels war in der Geschichte der Entwicklung menschlichen Denkens in der Tat ein bedeutendes #Ereignis. Sie war das letzte und abschließende Wort jener pantheistischen und abstrakt-humanitären Bewegung des deutschen Geistes, die mit den Werken Lessings begonnen und ihre allseitige Entfaltung in den Werken Goethes erreicht hatte; einer Bewegung, die eine unendlich weite, reiche, hohe und gleichsam völlig rationale #Welt geschaffen hat, welche dabei aber der Erde, dem Leben und der #Wirklichkeit ebenso fremd war wie dem christlich-theologischen Himmel. Folglich verwandelte diese Welt als Fata Morgana, die den #Himmel nicht erreichte und auch die Erde nicht berührte, sondern zwischen Himmel und Erde hing, das #Leben ihrer Anhänger, ihrer reflektierenden und poetisierenden (...)

    • (...) ihrer reflektierenden und poetisierenden Bewohner, in eine ununterbrochene Kette von somnambulen Vorstellungen und Erkenntnissen, machte sie überall für das Leben untauglich oder, was noch schlimmer ist, verdammte sie dazu, in der wirklichen Welt völlig dem zuwiderhandeln, was sie im poetischen oder metaphysischen Ideal vergötterten.
      So erklärt sich erstaunliche Umstand, der uns in #Deutschland immer wieder verblüfft hat, dass sich nämlich die glühenden Verehrer Lessings, Schillers, Goethes, Kants, Fichtes und Hegels noch heute so häufig zu ergebenen und sogar freiwilligen Vollstreckern von Maßnahmen machen lassen, die alles andere als human und liberal sind, die ihnen aber von der Regierung vorgeschrieben werden. Man kann sogar verallgemeinernd sagen, dass das Leben des Deutschen und Handeln in der lebendigen Wirklichen um so abstoßender und gemeiner ist, je erhabener seine ideale Welt ist.

      Letzte Vollendung dieser erhaben-idealen Welt war die Philosophie Hegels. Mit ihren metaphysischen Konstruktionen und Kategorien brachte sie sie voll zum Ausdruck und erklärte sie, zerstörte sie aber auch eben dadurch, indem sie (die Philosophie Hegels) mit eiserner #Logik zur endgültigen Erkenntnis dieser idealen Welt und ihres eigenen unendlichen Ungenügens, ihrer Wirkungslosigkeit und schlicht gesagt, ihrer Leere gelangte.
      Die #Schule Hegels teilte sich bekanntlich in zwei einander entgegengesetzte Richtungen, wobei sich natürlichen noch eine dritte, mittlere Partei dazwischen herausbildete, von der es hier übrigens nichts zu sagen gibt. Die eine, nämlich die konservative Richtung, fand in der neuen Philosophie Rechtfertigung und Legitimation alles Seienden, wobei sie sich an den bekannten Ausspruch Hegels hielt: „Alles Wirkliche ist vernünftig“. Sie schuf die sogenannte offizielle Philosophie der preußischen Monarchie, die schon von Hegel selbst als Ideal einer politischen #Ordnung hingestellt worden war.
      Aber die andere Partei der sogenannten revolutionären Hegelianer erwies sich als konsequenter und ungleich kühner als #Hegel selbst; sie riss seiner Lehre die konservative Maske ab und stellte sie damit in ihrer erbarmungslosen #Negation bloß, die ihr wahres Wesen ausmacht. An die Spitze dieser Richtung stellte sich der berühmte Feuerbach, der die logische Konsequenz nicht nur bis zur völligen Negation jeder göttlichen Welt, sondern sogar der Metaphysik selbst trieb. Weiter konnte er nicht gehen. Obwohl selbst Metaphysiker, musste er seinen rechtmäßigen Erben, den Vertretern der materialistischen oder realistischen Schule Platz machen, von denen sich übrigens ein großer Teil, wie z.B. Büchner, #Marx und andere, auch noch nicht vom Vorherrschen metaphysisch-abstrakten Denkens freimachen kann.
      In den dreißiger und vierziger Jahren herrschte die Meinung, dass eine #Revolution, die der Verbreitung des Hegelianismus folgt, der doch im Sinne völliger Negation entwickelt ist, ungleich radikaler, tiefer, unerbittlicher und weitrechender in ihren Zerstörungen sein wird als die Revolution von 1793. so dachte man deshalb, weil das von Hegel erarbeitete und von seinen Schülern ins Extrem weiter entwickelte philosophische #Denken wirklich abgerundeter, vielseitiger und tiefer war als das Denken Voltaires und Rousseaus, die bekanntlich einen sehr direkten und längst nicht immer nützlichen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung und vor allem den Ausgang der ersten französischen Revolution hatten. So besteht z.B. kein Zweifel, dass Staatsmänner vom Schlage eines Mirabeau Bewunderer Voltaires waren, der instinktiv die Volksmassen, die dumme Menge, verachtete, und dass der fanatische Anhänger Jean Jaques Rousseaus, Maximilien Robespierre, der Erneuerer der göttlichen und reaktionär-bürgerlichen Ordnung in #Frankreich war.
      In den dreißiger und vierziger Jahren nahm man an, dass, wenn wieder die Zeit für revolutionäres Handeln anbricht, die Doktoren der Philosophie aus der Schule Hegels die mutigsten Persönlichkeiten der neunziger Jahre weit hinter sich zurücklassen und die Welt durch ihren streng logischen, unerbittlichen Revolutionsgeist in Erstaunen versetzen werden. Zu diesem Thema schrieb der Dichter #Heine viele schöne Worte, so sagte er zu den Franzosen: „All Eure Revolutionen sind nichts vor unserer künftigen deutschen Revolution. Wir, die wir den Mut hatten, systematisch, wissenschaftlich die ganze göttliche Welt zu vernichten, wir werden auch auch nicht vor irgendwelchen Götzenbildern auf der Erde zurückschrecken, noch ruhen, ehe wir nicht auf den Trümmern von Privilegien und Macht vollkommene #Gleichheit und #Freiheit für die ganze Welt erobert haben“. Mit fast den gleichen Worten verhieß Heine den Franzosen die zukünftigen Wunder einer deutschen Revolution. Und viele glaubten ihm. Aber o weh! 1848 und 1849 konnte man genügend Erfahrungen sammeln, die diesen Glauben zunichte machten. Es war nicht nur so, dass die deutschen Revolutionäre keineswegs die Helden der ersten französischen Revolution übertrafen, sie konnten sich noch nicht einmal mit den französischen Revolutionären der dreißiger Jahre messen.
      Was ist wohl die Ursache für dieses bedauernswerte Ungenügen? Es erklärt sich natürlich vor allem aus dem besonderen geschichtlichen Charakter der Deutschen, der sie sehr viel eher zum treu-ergebenen Gehorsam bestimmt, als zur #Rebellion, erklärt sich aber auch aus der abstrakten Methode, mit der man die Revolution anging. Entsprechend also dieser Natur, ging man nicht vom Leben zum Denken, sondern vom Denken zum Leben. Wer aber vom abstrakten Denken ausgeht, der wird niemals das Leben einholen, denn von der #Metaphysik zum Leben führt kein Weg. Sie sind durch einen Abgrund getrennt. Und diesen Abgrund zu überwinden, muss man einen Salto mortale vollführen, oder das, was Hegel selbst einen qualitativen Sprung aus der Welt der Logik in die Welt der #Natur, der lebendigen Wirklichkeit nennt, und das ist bisher noch niemandem gelungen und wird wohl auch niemals gelingen. Wer mit Abstraktionen operiert, der wird in ihnen zugrunde gehen.

      Michail #Bakunin (30.5.1814 – 1.7.1976), „Staatlichkeit und #Anarchie“, 1873

      #Hegel #idéalisme_allemand

    • Oui, un maire à son deuxième mandat et qui a des visées plus hautes désormais...
      C’était des bruits, ça devient petit à petit plus concret...
      Ici une rencontre récente de Piolle avec Mélenchon...

      Merci @JLMelenchon pour l’accueil. Notre pays doit relever d’immenses défis. Identifions nos convergences, travaillons. Notre objectif est commun : gagner et changer la vie, pour la justice sociale et climatique. Notre adversaire est commun : Macron et la droite.

      https://twitter.com/EricPiolle/status/1296845806478282755

      #Piolle #Eric_Piolle #France_insoumise #Mélenchon #EELV #Verts #Les_Verts

    • Éric Piolle, maire EELV de Grenoble, présenté par les médias comme l’adversaire de la ligne libérale de Yannick Jadot chez les Verts. Lui et Jean-Luc Mélenchon ont déambulé à travers les stands avant de monter ensemble sur scène. Le député de Marseille a réaffirmé le combat des insoumis contre la loi du marché. Le tribun a aussi rappelé que les insoumis n’étaient pas seulement « contre » un système. Mais bien également « pour » un programme. Le leader des insoumis a aussi rappelé que l’écologie populaire portait la défense des biens communs : l’air, l’eau, la science, etc., et que ces combats rassemblaient largement le peuple. Il a enfin redit l’attachement des insoumis aux concepts de République et de Nation.

      Éric Piolle a affirmé un même attachement à ces deux concepts et a rappelé qu’il avait été un soutien engagé de Jean-Luc Mélenchon lors de l’élection présidentielle de 2017. Le maire de Grenoble a expliqué vouloir rassembler un arc humaniste tout en affirmant très clairement : « Si nous voulons transformer le pays, nous le transformerons pas avec les 10% d’en haut (…) mais pas non plus juste avec ceux qui sont bien installés, qui viennent me voir et qui me disent : « Ok Éric, on comprend ton projet politique, tu es radical, ok, on est d’accord pour y aller, mais qu’est-ce que tu fais là avec l’extrême gauche, c’est quoi le problème ? ». Et moi je leur dis : « Les amis, c’est juste que je ne changerai pas le monde avec vous. Voilà. Nous changerons le monde ensemble, avec ceux qui sont insoumis, avec ceux qui s’indignent, avec ceux qui ont dans leurs tripes l’envie et le désir de changer le monde. » Le message a sans doutes été bien reçu chez les insoumis.

      https://linsoumission.fr/2020/08/21/piolle-eelv-aux-amfis-nous-changerons-le-pays-avec-ceux-qui-sont-insou

    • #Mélenchon et Piolle s’affichent ensemble pour plaider le dialogue entre LFI et EELV

      Le chef de file de LFI et le maire EELV de Grenoble ne veulent pas se voir comme des concurrents et évoquent un rapprochement

      Ne pas se voir comme des « concurrents ». Le chef de file de La France insoumise, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, et le maire EELV de Grenoble, Eric Piolle, ont ensemble plaidé le dialogue, vendredi aux Amphis d’été des Insoumis à Châteauneuf-sur-Isère (Drôme).

      Les deux hommes se sont entretenus en privé à l’arrivée de l’écologiste avant de traverser ensemble les stands de l’événement et de prendre la parole sur scène, devant les militants Insoumis.
      « Savourer ce sur quoi on est d’accord »

      Jean-Luc Mélenchon a salué en Eric Piolle un « ami » et « l’un des porte-parole les plus notoires » d’EELV, déclarant que « sa présence ici a une signification » : « Il faut aller à l’essentiel, certes discuter sur les désaccords mais aussi savourer ce sur quoi on est d’accord ».

      EELV a remporté plusieurs grandes villes aux élections municipales en juin, tandis que le poids de LFI, très discrète dans la campagne, a été faible. Jean-Luc Mélenchon a cependant envoyé plusieurs signaux, ces dernières semaines, sur une probable candidature à la présidentielle de 2022.

      Eric Piolle, un contrepoids aux ambitions de l’eurodéputé Yannick Jadot

      Très applaudi à son arrivée, Eric Piolle, dont la majorité est composée d’Insoumis, a quant à lui rappelé : « si nous avons gagné à Grenoble en 2014, c’est que nous avions la conviction que l’envie de faire ensemble dépassait tout ». « Ce poids, je veux aujourd’hui le mettre au service d’une ambition collective qui aille encore plus loin que ce que tu as fait en 2017 » (lorsque le leader Insoumis avait récolté 19,58 % des voix), a lancé l’édile grenoblois.

      « Si nous voulons transformer le pays, nous le ferons » avec les « foules qui se sont alors levées », a plaidé Eric Piolle. Celui-ci multiplie les apparitions médiatiques depuis quelques mois, apportant un contrepoids au sein d’EELV aux ambitions de l’eurodéputé Yannick Jadot, jugé trop libéral par LFI.
      Une alliance dans au moins quatre régions pour les élections de 2021 ?

      Jean-Luc Mélenchon a affirmé que les Insoumis seraient importants dans les prochaines échéances : « On a besoin de leur capacité d’indignation ». « Certes, nous avons une dette à l’égard du courant historique de l’écologie politique, mais de votre côté, vous ne pouvez pas faire comme si tout vous était réservé », a-t-il insisté.

      Eric Piolle a proposé qu’EELV et LFI « fassent la démonstration qu’ensemble on peut gagner » en s’alliant dans quatre régions pour les élections de 2021. « Piolle est la seule personne (à EELV) qui dit que c’est possible », s’est réjoui Jean-Luc Mélenchon, qui veut cependant aller plus loin : « Il y a 13 régions, nous sommes pour que ce soit la même chose partout ».

      https://www.20minutes.fr/politique/2843939-20200821-melenchon-piolle-affichent-ensemble-plaider-dialogue-entr

    • Pendant ce temps là, à droite, Bruno Retailleau sera candidat à une primaire dans la course à la présidentielle.
      https://twitter.com/BrunoRetailleau/status/1297116992265244674
      Xavier Bertrand se prépare aussi à l’élection présidentielle de 2022 mais, lui, se refuse à l’idée de se plier à une quelconque primaire. selon le Canard il a dit dans « Corse-Matin » 10/08 : « Je ne veux plus de filtre entre le peuple et moi, et je ne me soumettrai pas à des règles fixées par les partis politiques. » Xavier et Jean-Luc, c’est un peu kif-kif bourricot.
      #dans_les_starting_bloks

    • Xavier et Jean-Luc, c’est un peu kif-kif bourricot

      J’essaie, mais j’y arrive pas.
      Je bute par exemple, c’est juste pour illustrer et pour dire qu’il y a des choses qui font que j’y arrive pas au « kif-kif », et donc par exemple, d’un côté, t’as un type qui a été au pouvoir, et qui a démontré sa capacité de nuisance, de l’autre, il a eu des postes de pouvoir et il n’a pas démontré de telle capacité. D’un côté, il y en a un qui explique qu’il veut un programme de droite, privatisation des profits, socialisation des pertes. De l’autre, un type qui parle collectif et progrès humain.

      Après, je comprends. Il y a un cadre institutionnel, et si tu souhaites prendre le pouvoir, t’es bien obligé de t’y soumettre... et de faire avec ses contraintes.

    • Et cet article du Figaro...

      Les folies des nouveaux maires écolos : leurs obsessions, leur idéologie, leurs dégâts

      Élus en juin avec des taux d’abstention records, ils se sont empressés d’imprimer leur marque sur la vie quotidienne de leurs administrés. #Transports, #urbanisme, #alimentation, #rapports_hommes-femmes : pas un domaine n’échappe à leur ardeur réformatrice. Florilège.

      Vite, vite, vite ! Les nouveaux maires estampillés #EELV (Europe Écologie Les Verts) de #Lyon, #Bordeaux, #Strasbourg ou #Besançon, mais aussi leurs collègues de gauche écolo-compatibles de #Marseille ou de #Rennes n’ont pas perdu une minute pour engager le « changement de modèle » dont ils rêvent. Malgré ou parfois grâce à la crise sanitaire, à l’instar d’Anne Hidalgo qui a chassé les voitures de plusieurs grands axes parisiens au nom de la lutte contre le coronavirus, ils ont profité de leurs premières semaines de mandat pour modifier la physionomie de leur ville. C’est que le temps presse : quand on caresse des projets aussi ambitieux que, par exemple, l’autosuffisance énergétique et alimentaire - l’objectif d’Anne Vignot pour Besançon - six ans risquent de ne pas suffire.

      La politique est d’abord affaire de messages. La maire de Paris y avait déclaré l’ « état d’urgence climatique » en 2019. Pierre Hurmic, à Bordeaux, et Jeanne Barseghian, à Strasbourg, l’ont imitée dès leur prise de fonction, et la plupart de leurs collègues écolos ont suivi. Le concept ne repose sur aucune base juridique. Il vise simplement à légitimer une restriction des libertés individuelles au nom d’un intérêt proclamé supérieur. « Défendre une limitation des libertés au nom du changement climatique n’est pas liberticide », a résumé, fin août, devant les Verts, Manon Aubry, ex-tête de liste aux européennes d’une France insoumise qui rivalise de zèle écologiste avec EELV. Le secrétaire national du parti écolo David Cormand a approuvé.

      “Assemblées citoyennes”

      Mais rien n’énerve plus les écologistes que d’être traités de « Khmers verts » . Ne sont-ils pas des apôtres de la « démocratie participative » ? Dans les municipalités qu’ils ont conquises, il n’est question que d’ « assises du pouvoir partagé » (Bordeaux), d’ « assemblées citoyennes » (Besançon) et de « codécision » (Poitiers), de référendums et de « droit de pétition » ou d’ « interpellation citoyenne » . En plus de cette panoplie, Anne Vignot va doter Besançon d’un conseil de scientifiques et d’experts, sur le modèle du Giec (Groupement intergouvernemental d’experts sur les évolutions du climat), appelé à se prononcer sur « tous les projets de la ville » . Elle compte notamment sur lui pour mener à bien le projet d’écoquartier qui doit remplacer les jardins des Vaîtes. Elle le portait déjà au sein de la majorité précédente en tant qu’adjointe à l’environnement, mais il est contesté par… plus écolo qu’elle ! L’avis des experts primera car, a prévenu la maire, « ça serait quand même aberrant que l’on prenne des décisions justes parce que l’on aime bien avoir des jardins autour de soi ! »

      À Tours, Emmanuel Denis n’a consulté personne quand il a interdit les voitures, mi-août, sur le pont Wilson, qui enjambe la Loire dans le centre-ville. Tollé de l’opposition, que le nouveau maire a traitée par le mépris : « C’est le vieux monde qui résiste ! » L’arrêté a été pris pour trois mois, à titre expérimental, mais Emmanuel Denis envisage déjà d’y installer les villages du marché de Noël cet hiver. Des mesures comparables ont été prises cet été dans toutes les villes écolos, sans concertation véritable.

      Quand les commerçants ont protesté, on leur a répondu « expérimentation » ! Et l’expérience n’en finit jamais, comme à Annecy, où le maire écolo sans étiquette François Astorg vient de prolonger la période-test pour des pistes cyclables, au grand dam des ambulanciers qui dénoncent des ralentissements préjudiciables à leurs patients. La méthode Piolle fait des émules. Seul maire écolo d’une ville de plus de 120.000 habitants élu dès 2014, Éric Piolle a déployé à Grenoble des « autoroutes à vélo » à un rythme à faire pâlir de jalousie Anne Hidalgo avec ses « corona pistes » .

      Les maires écologistes ont beau se revendiquer champions du « pluralisme » , ils répugnent à partager les vrais leviers de pouvoir, au niveau de la municipalité comme de la métropole quand ils y sont majoritaires. Pierre Hurmic à Bordeaux, Grégory Doucet à Lyon ou, encore, Jeanne Barseghian à Strasbourg n’ont attribué qu’à des proches les postes de décision stratégiques, notamment les délégations des intercommunalités. Ils ont aussi revisité les attributions de leurs adjoints et, surtout, leurs intitulés. Pour changer la réalité, changeons les mots ! Éric Piolle avait lancé le mouvement en se dotant notamment d’une « adjointe à la tranquillité publique et au temps de la ville » en lieu et place d’une adjointe à la sécurité. Ses émules l’ont parfois dépassé : « transition écologique » , « résilience » et « inclusion » sont partout à l’honneur.

      “Résilience alimentaire”

      À Marseille, où Michèle Rubirola a été élue grâce à un accord tardif avec EELV, l’organigramme municipal a des accents orwelliens : le premier adjoint est « en charge de l’action municipale pour une ville plus juste, plus verte et plus démocratique » et le portefeuille de la culture devient celui de « la culture pour tous et toutes » , entre autres exemples. À Strasbourg, la « ville résiliente » et la « ville inclusive » ont chacune leur adjointe. À Poitiers, Léonore Moncond’huy a une adjointe « à l’économie circulaire et à l’économie de proximité » . Bordeaux annonce la couleur avec une première adjointe « en charge des finances, du défi climatique et de l’égalité entre les femmes et les hommes » , une autre « chargée de la démocratie permanente, de la vie associative et de la gouvernance par l’intelligence collective » , un adjoint à « l’urbanisme résilient » , des conseillers municipaux délégués à la « sobriété du numérique » et la « résilience alimentaire » , à l’ « économie circulaire » , au « zéro déchet » et au développement d’une « monnaie locale ». À Annecy, François Astorg a lui aussi décidé de développer une monnaie locale « complémentaire et solidaire » .

      En attendant de donner de la consistance à leurs ambitions, les élus écolos se sont empressés de faire un grand ménage dans les projets de leurs prédécesseurs. Si ce n’est pas de la « décroissance » , concept difficile à vendre à une population qui voit venir l’explosion du chômage, ça y ressemble fort. À Lyon, le projet de bouclage du périphérique et le développement de l’aéroport de Saint-Exupéry sont officiellement abandonnés. Grégory Doucet l’a dit à la Tribune de Lyon avant même de s’installer dans son fauteuil de maire : « Ce que je souhaite, c’est qu’on puisse avoir en valeur absolue beaucoup moins de gens qui viennent à Lyon en avion. » Y compris la clientèle d’affaires internationale, qu’il assume de voir baisser. Plus question, donc, d’ouvrir les lignes prévues avec Montréal et Dubaï. Le nouveau maire aurait aussi voulu en finir avec le projet de LGV Lyon-Turin, qui doit permettre de supprimer des poids lourds au profit du rail, mais il n’en a pas le pouvoir. En revanche, il lui a suffi d’un trait de plume pour annuler le projet de construction de tours à la Part-Dieu de Gérard Collomb. Pierre Hurmic, lui, est allé jusqu’à décréter le gel de tous les programmes immobiliers. À Grenoble, la politique mise en œuvre par Éric Piolle s’est traduite par une dégringolade de près de 40 % des permis de construire des logements depuis 2014.

      À Tours, Emmanuel Denis a promis de ne pas renouveler le contrat qui lie la municipalité à la compagnie Ryanair et qui s’achève en 2021. Des militants de Greenpeace et d’Extinction Rebellion avaient bloqué l’accès à l’aéroport début juillet pour exiger l’arrêt des subventions « écocides » au transport aérien. À Besançon, Anne Vignot a pris position contre le projet de dédoublement de la RN57, qui contourne la ville. Elle entend « travailler avec le préfet » pour trouver des solutions alternatives, au premier rang desquelles « désynchroniser les heures de travail » . Y a qu’à… Toutes les villes « verdies » ont décrété un gel, plus ou moins rigoureux, de l’artificialisation des sols et un moratoire sur l’installation de grandes surfaces sur des terrains non bâtis.

      Haro contre la 5G

      L’objectif général est d’emmener les entreprises sur le chemin de la vertu environnementale, en alternant incitations et contrainte. À Strasbourg, Jeanne Barseghian va flécher sur la rénovation thermique et énergétique l’essentiel des 350 millions d’euros d’emprunt qu’elle a annoncés. À Lyon, Grégory Doucet réservera les aides de la ville aux entreprises qui réduiront leur empreinte carbone. Tous ces maires veulent choyer « l’économie sociale et solidaire » , que le programme de Pierre Hurmic, « Bordeaux respire ! » , promeut en tant qu’ « alternative à la privatisation des profits » .

      Tous, aussi, crient haro contre la 5G, cette technologie « qui sert à regarder du porno en HD dans les ascenseurs » selon Éric Piolle. Le plus virulent sur le sujet est aussi Pierre Hurmic. « Il y a des dangers de la 5G » , a-t-il affirmé à plusieurs reprises, sans s’appuyer sur la moindre donnée scientifique. Et pour cause : il n’en existe pas. Ce qui n’empêche pas le maire de Bordeaux de promettre un moratoire, le temps que la population ait « un vrai débat » sur le passage à la 5G dans sa ville, où l’Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (Arcep) a autorisé des entreprises à l’expérimenter. Pierre Hurmic est un adepte du « low-tech » (par opposition au high-tech), autrement dit d’un progrès technique économe en énergie, peu coûteux et qui produit des outils que des non-spécialistes peuvent réparer, voire construire eux-mêmes. Il a même confié un poste de conseiller municipal délégué à l’un des fondateurs de l’association Low-tech Bordeaux.

      Réélue à Nantes grâce à un accord avec la liste verte, la socialiste Johanna Rolland a dû se rallier elle aussi à la demande d’un moratoire sur la 5G, également réclamé par Anne Vignot à Besançon. Cette campagne a bien peu de chances d’aboutir, puisque le Conseil d’État, saisi, a déjà précisé que les maires ne disposent pas du pouvoir de « réglementer l’installation des antennes relais sur le territoire de leur commune » , qui relève d’ « une compétence exclusive » des « autorités de l’État » . Emmanuel Denis, tout aussi remonté contre la 5G, mais plus pessimiste que ses collègues sur l’issue du bras de fer, a promis aux Tourangeaux de « créer des logements protégés pour les personnes électrosensibles » . Rappelons que si l’OMS a bien identifié une « hypersensibilité électromagnétique » , personne n’a encore réussi à établir un lien entre ces ondes et la liste de symptômes divers et variés que présentent les personnes qui s’en plaignent. Le maire de Tours, lui, est convaincu de la nocivité de la 5G. Il faut dire qu’il a longtemps milité au sein de l’association Robin des toits, qui lutte contre l’expansion du téléphone portable et les installations d’antennes relais…

      De tous les aspects de la vie quotidienne, il en est un qui passionne beaucoup moins les nouveaux élus : la sécurité. Éric Piolle n’a pas réagi la semaine dernière aux vidéos d’autopromotion diffusées par les dealers locaux, mais il a regretté l’opération de police qui s’est ensuivie en parlant de « coup de com’ » du gouvernement. Le maire de Grenoble, où le niveau de délinquance était déjà supérieur de 53 % à celui enregistré en moyenne dans les agglomérations de même taille en 2018 (notre enquête dans Le Figaro Magazine du 17 février 2020), ne s’est pas non plus ému outre mesure des sept fusillades, dont trois mortelles, qui se sont produites dans sa ville depuis fin juin. Son réflexe est toujours le même : pointer les défaillances de l’État. « Nous avons demandé des effectifs supplémentaires au début du confinement parce que nous savions que ça allait créer des tensions, a-t-il affirmé sur BFMTV. Nous n’avons pas eu de réponse. » Ausitôt, Gérald Darmanin a publié le courrier sanglant qu’il lui a envoyé pour lui rappeler que l’État s’est mobilisé mais que la ville, elle, se distingue par « un niveau particulièrement bas d’investissement dans la sécurité » .

      À Lyon, où un policier municipal s’est fait rouer de coups par une bande début juillet, Grégory Doucet envisage d’augmenter les effectifs d’une vingtaine d’agents seulement (ils sont actuellement 335) pendant son mandat. Pendant la campagne, il avait estimé que « la première sécurité des Lyonnaises et des Lyonnais, c’est d’être en bonne santé, d’avoir accès aux soins, mais aussi de ne pas tomber malade du fait des conditions environnementales » car « les incivilités ne forment pas le seul enjeu qui conditionne la paix dans la cité » . Pour améliorer la « tranquillité publique de tous » , il avait parlé de créer un « budget sensible au genre » .

      Conseillère voilée

      À Bordeaux en revanche, Amine Smihi, l’adjoint chargé de la sécurité, espère doubler les effectifs municipaux sur le terrain d’ici à la fin du mandat de Pierre Hurmic. Des « faits graves » dus essentiellement à des « conflits de territoire entre dealers » se sont produits « de façon quasi quotidienne entre le 28 juin et le 28 juillet » dans les quartiers bordelais les plus sensibles, rapporte-t-il. Très sévère pour le bilan du juppéiste Nicolas Florian sous la mandature précédente, où il affirme que « la police municipale était l’un des services les moins dotés » , il s’insurge contre la « caricature des écolos en beatniks » indifférents à la délinquance. « La sécurité est évidemment une préoccupation pour nous, mais pas un étendard » , corrige-t-il. Même s’il juge nécessaire dans certains cas une « réponse sociale » , il reconnaît volontiers que « ce ne sont pas des médiateurs qui vont régler les problèmes de trafic de drogue ! » Pour autant, il n’envisage pas d’armer les policiers municipaux, ni de multiplier les caméras dans les rues « comme Christian Estrosi à Nice » . « Je ne parle pas de vidéosurveillance mais de vidéoprotection, et la nuance sémantique est importante, précise Amine Smihi. Les caméras ont un outil au service d’une police de proximité et d’îlotage que nous souhaitons développer. S’il s’avère qu’il faut les augmenter dans ce but, aucun souci, d’autant que dans le cadre de notre plan “Bordeaux marchable”, la vidéoverbalisation aura toute sa place » . Problème : la Commission nationale informatique et liberté a déjà rappelé àl’ordre plusieurs communes qui abusaient de la vidéoverbalisation par reconnaissance des plaques d’immatriculation, autorisée seulement en cas d’infractions au stationnement payant.

      Selon l’adjoint à la sécurité, les problèmes de radicalisation islamiste, eux, sont « de loin le sujet le moins préoccupant à Bordeaux » . « Nous sommes relativement épargnés, mis à part quelques problèmes très localisés » , affirme-t-il. En matière de communautarisme, sujet connexe, les écolos sont en général très accommodants, surtout quand ils sont alliés à La France insoumise. Les Grenoblois avaient pu apprécier l’embarras et les contorsions d’Éric Piolle sur le port du burkini dans les piscines municipales. Ce défenseur autoproclamé de l’égalité des sexes n’a aucune opinion sur les symboles de la soumission de la femme dans l’islam. Jeanne Barseghian, elle, a été plus claire : les Strasbourgeois ont désormais une conseillère municipale voilée. On peut encore voir sur les réseaux sociaux une vidéo, tournée pendant la campagne, où un soutien de la candidate EELV vante au pied d’une cité « la seule liste avec une daronne voilée » . Comble de l’ironie : il se fait rembarrer par les habitants présents, choqués qu’il utilise le voile comme argument électoral.

      Dans ce domaine comme dans d’autres, les élus écolos ne peuvent encore donner leur pleine mesure, puisqu’ils sont obligés de faire avec les budgets votés par leurs prédécesseurs. Rendez-vous l’an prochain !

      Élucubrations vertes

      • « Dégenrer » les cours de récréation. C’est l’un des grands chantiers lancés cet été par Éric Piolle à Grenoble. Il estime que les cours d’écoles sont « trop réservées aux pratiques des garçons » . Mais au fait, dire que les jeux de ballon sont des jeux de garçon, ce ne serait pas un stéréotype sexiste ?

      • Interdire la voiture en ville. Ils en rêvent tous, mais Pierre Hurmic a commis la maladresse de le dire tout haut, en précisant que sa stratégie consisterait à « dégoûter progressivement l’automobiliste » de circuler à Bordeaux.

      • Réquisitionner les logements vides. Sur ce sujet-là aussi, Pierre Hurmic s’est montré le plus directif, en pointant du doigt les odieux spéculateurs : « Quand vous êtes investisseur, même un logement vide rapporte de l’argent » , a-t-il affirmé.

      • Le Tour de France indésirable. Officiellement, c’est pour des raisons financières que la maire PS de Rennes a refusé d’accueillir le départ du Tour, mais ses alliés écolos lui reprochent de polluer et de dégrader l’image de la femme. En revanche, la Cyclonudista naturiste et écologiste programmée le 13 septembre est la bienvenue.

      • Lyon zone interdite pour la Patrouille de France. Les Alpha Jet devaient survoler Lyon le 13 juillet avant de participer au défilé le lendemain à Paris, mais Grégory Doucet a décidé de priver les Lyonnais du spectacle, pour ne pas provoquer d’attroupement en période de crise sanitaire. Quand le coronavirus sert d’alibi à l’antimilitarisme.

      • Généraliser l’écriture inclusive. Pourtant dénoncée comme un « péril mortel » pour notre langue par l’Académie française, l’écriture inclusive s’est imposée à tous les étages dans les villes écolos. Les « électeur·rice·s » leur en seront sûrement reconnaissants.

      https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/les-folies-des-nouveaux-maires-ecolos-leurs-obsessions-leurs-ideologies-leu

    • La vague verte a des reflets bleus
      http://cqfd-journal.org/La-vague-verte-a-des-reflets-bleus

      Les nouveaux maires Europe Écologie-Les Verts mettront-ils fin à la surenchère technosécuritaire à l’échelle locale ? L’analyse de leurs programmes, déclarations et premières décisions ne laisse augurer aucun changement majeur. En termes de vidéosurveillance, comme d’armement ou d’effectifs des polices municipales, la désescalade attendra.

      paru dans CQFD n°190 (septembre 2020), par Tom Vieillefond, illustré par Gautier Ducatez

  • #presse_fasciste italienne en #Erythrée
    Dans le livre de Alessandro Leogrande, La Frontiera (2017), il y a une partie dédiée à la #presse_fasciste italienne en #Erythrée... (pp. 168-176). Je reprends les titres ici, on ne sait jamais...

    Et le petit texte en intro :

    «Impieghiamo un pomeriggio intero per sfogliarli tutti. Sono davvero tanti, ma ancora più sorprendente è la varietà delle testate. Quotidiani, settimanali, fogli di informazione, riviste giovanili, testate sportive. Una selva di caratteri stampati da rotative giunte allora dall’Europa rivela parole, annunci economici, notizie, commenti, invettive. Riproduce una pluralità d’opinioni, speculari a quelle che andavano sorgendo in Italia nello stesso periodo. Vista attraverso il prisma della sua stampa vivace, l’Eritrea del passato sembra una regione italiana, solo un po’ più a sud delle altre, con un occhio rivolto ai grandi eventi internazionali e l’altro a se stessa, alla propria cronaca quotidiana.
    ’Tutto questo è proseguito ben oltre la fine della Seconda guerra mondiale e il crollo del fascismo’, mi dice Sandro mentre fa un po’ di spazio sulla sua scrivania. Nell’Eritrea passata prima sotto il mandato britannico e poi sotto il controllo etiopico, la comunità italiana, era rimasta molto forte. Le scuole in lingua italiana (...) erano ancora numerose.
    Lo stesso valeva per i giornali, benché solo pochissimi esemplari siano conservati nelle biblioteche e nelle emeroteche italiane. Probabilmente molti meno di quelli contenuti nei due borsonoi che abbiamo rovesciato a quattro mani sul tavolo dello studio»

    –—

    Voici les titres dont parle Alessandro Leogrande :
    – Il quotidiano eritreo
    – Il lunedì dell’Eritrea
    – Il Carroccio
    – La pagina sportiva
    – Asmara sport
    – Mai Taclì

    #colonialisme #Italie #fascisme #journaux #colonisation #Erythrée

    ping @albertocampiphoto @wizo

  • [08] Augustin Souchy - Erich Mühsam, chevalier de la liberté
    https://www.partage-noir.fr/07-augustin-souchy-erich-muhsam-chevalier-de-la-liberte

    Le soir de l’incendie du Reichstag (la nuit du 27 au 28 février 1933, NOE), je dînais chez moi en compagnie d’Erich Mühsam. Les nouvelles diffusées par la radio n’annonçaient rien de bon. Le Völkische Beobachter (« L’Observateur natio­nal »), l’organe du parti nazi, avait depuis longtemps excité la haine contre #Erich_Mühsam, « juif et anarchiste ». On lui reprochait sa participation à la République des conseils de Bavière et d’être responsable de l’exécution des otages du 25 avril 1919, bien qu’il eût déjà été (...) Augustin Souchy 3 - Attention : anarchiste !

    / Erich Mühsam

    #Augustin_Souchy_3_-_Attention :_anarchiste !

  • Coronavirus cases rising in Erbil, says health official - ESTA KRD

    Spokesman for the General Directorate of Health in Erbil Dr. Bzhar Musa said COVID-19 patients were in a “bad condition” in Erbil, as most of them have serious symptoms.

    “The condition of patients at Rizgari hospital is bad, and most of them are under ventilators, and some others need oxygen,” Musa told Esta Media Network.
    “Some of the patients have severe symptoms of the virus,” he said.
    The Kurdistan Region’s ministry of health recorded 218 coronavirus cases and six deaths in Erbil on Tuesday. There were 16 cases and four deaths in Sulaimani. The Region’s total number of infections reached 15,173, with 586 deaths.
    In Sulaimani, deputy director of health Dr. Herish Said Salim said the situation in the province was “good” and that the number of cases were decreasing.

    As part of measures against the virus, the interior ministry ordered the closure of several places, including tourist sites, parks, cafeterias and teahouses in the Region

    The Region’s ministry of health said in a statement that 218 new infections were in Erbil, 16 in Sulaimani, 28 in Garmian and 83 in Duhok.

    https://esta.krd/En/news.aspx?id=4082&mapid=1
    https://esta.krd/En/news.aspx?id=4074&mapid=1

    #Covid-19#Iraq#KRG#Erbil#Seconde_vague#Pandémie#Santé#migrant#migration

    • EU: Frontex splashes out: millions of euros for new technology and equipment (19.06.2020)

      The approval of the new #Frontex_Regulation in November 2019 implied an increase of competences, budget and capabilities for the EU’s border agency, which is now equipping itself with increased means to monitor events and developments at the borders and beyond, as well as renewing its IT systems to improve the management of the reams of data to which it will have access.

      In 2020 Frontex’s #budget grew to €420.6 million, an increase of over 34% compared to 2019. The European Commission has proposed that in the next EU budget (formally known as the Multiannual Financial Framework or MFF, covering 2021-27) €11 billion will be made available to the agency, although legal negotiations are ongoing and have hit significant stumbling blocks due to Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic and political disagreements.

      Nevertheless, the increase for this year has clearly provided a number of opportunities for Frontex. For instance, it has already agreed contracts worth €28 million for the acquisition of dozens of vehicles equipped with thermal and day cameras, surveillance radar and sensors.

      According to the contract for the provision of Mobile Surveillance Systems, these new tools will be used “for detection, identification and recognising of objects of interest e.g. human beings and/or groups of people, vehicles moving across the border (land and sea), as well as vessels sailing within the coastal areas, and other objects identified as objects of interest”. [1]

      Frontex has also published a call for tenders for Maritime Analysis Tools, worth a total of up to €2.6 million. With this, Frontex seeks to improve access to “big data” for maritime analysis. [2] The objective of deploying these tools is to enhance Frontex’s operational support to EU border, coast guard and law enforcement authorities in “suppressing and preventing, among others, illegal migration and cross-border crime in the maritime domain”.

      Moreover, the system should be capable of delivering analysis and identification of high-risk threats following the collection and storage of “big data”. It is not clear how much human input and monitoring there will be of the identification of risks. The call for tenders says the winning bidder should have been announced in May, but there is no public information on the chosen company so far.

      As part of a 12-month pilot project to examine how maritime analysis tools could “support multipurpose operational response,” Frontex previously engaged the services of the Tel Aviv-based company Windward Ltd, which claims to fuse “maritime data and artificial intelligence… to provide the right insights, with the right context, at the right time.” [3] Windward, whose current chairman is John Browne, the former CEO of the multinational oil company BP, received €783,000 for its work. [4]

      As the agency’s gathering and processing of data increases, it also aims to improve and develop its own internal IT systems, through a two-year project worth €34 million. This will establish a set of “framework contracts”. Through these, each time the agency seeks a new IT service or system, companies selected to participate in the framework contracts will submit bids for the work. [5]

      The agency is also seeking a ’Software Solution for EBCG [European Border and Coast Guard] Team Members to Access to Schengen Information System’, through a contract worth up to €5 million. [6] The Schengen Information System (SIS) is the EU’s largest database, enabling cooperation between authorities working in the fields of police, border control and customs of all the Schengen states (26 EU member states plus Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) and its legal bases were recently reformed to include new types of alert and categories of data. [7]

      This software will give Frontex officials direct access to certain data within the SIS. Currently, they have to request access via national border guards in the country in which they are operating. This would give complete autonomy to Frontex officials to consult the SIS whilst undertaking operations, shortening the length of the procedure. [8]

      With the legal basis for increasing Frontex’s powers in place, the process to build up its personnel, material and surveillance capacities continues, with significant financial implications.

      https://www.statewatch.org/news/2020/june/eu-frontex-splashes-out-millions-of-euros-for-new-technology-and-equipme

      #technologie #équipement #Multiannual_Financial_Framework #MFF #surveillance #Mobile_Surveillance_Systems #Maritime_Analysis_Tools #données #big_data #mer #Windward_Ltd #Israël #John_Browne #BP #complexe_militaro-industriel #Software_Solution_for_EBCG_Team_Members_to_Access_to_Schengen_Information_System #SIS #Schengen_Information_System

    • EU : Guns, guards and guidelines : reinforcement of Frontex runs into problems (26.05.2020)

      An internal report circulated by Frontex to EU government delegations highlights a series of issues in implementing the agency’s new legislation. Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, the agency is urging swift action to implement the mandate and is pressing ahead with the recruitment of its new ‘standing corps’. However, there are legal problems with the acquisition, registration, storage and transport of weapons. The agency is also calling for derogations from EU rules on staff disciplinary measures in relation to the use of force; and wants an extended set of privileges and immunities. Furthermore, it is assisting with “voluntary return” despite this activity appearing to fall outside of its legal mandate.

      State-of-play report

      At the end of April 2020, Frontex circulated a report to EU government delegations in the Council outlining the state of play of the implementation of its new Regulation (“EBCG 2.0 Regulation”, in the agency and Commission’s words), especially relating to “current challenges”.[1] Presumably, this refers to the outbreak of a pandemic, though the report also acknowledges challenges created by the legal ambiguities contained in the Regulation itself, in particular with regard to the acquisition of weapons, supervisory and disciplinary mechanisms, legal privileges and immunities and involvement in “voluntary return” operations.

      The path set out in the report is that the “operational autonomy of the agency will gradually increase towards 2027” until it is a “fully-fledged and reliable partner” to EU and Schengen states. It acknowledges the impacts of unforeseen world events on the EU’s forthcoming budget (Multi-annual Financial Framework, MFF) for 2021-27, and hints at the impact this will have on Frontex’s own budget and objectives. Nevertheless, the agency is still determined to “continue increasing the capabilities” of the agency, including its acquisition of new equipment and employment of new staff for its standing corps.

      The main issues covered by the report are: Frontex’s new standing corps of staff, executive powers and the use of force, fundamental rights and data protection, and the integration into Frontex of EUROSUR, the European Border Surveillance System.

      The new standing corps

      Recruitment

      A new standing corps of 10,000 Frontex staff by 2024 is to be, in the words of the agency, its “biggest game changer”.[2] The report notes that the establishment of the standing corps has been heavily affected by the outbreak of Covid-19. According to the report, 7,238 individuals had applied to join the standing corps before the outbreak of the pandemic. 5,482 of these – over 75% – were assessed by the agency as eligible, with a final 304 passing the entire selection process to be on the “reserve lists”.[3]

      Despite interruptions to the recruitment procedure following worldwide lockdown measures, interviews for Category 1 staff – permanent Frontex staff members to be deployed on operations – were resumed via video by the end of April. 80 candidates were shortlisted for the first week, and Frontex aims to interview 1,000 people in total. Despite this adaptation, successful candidates will have to wait for Frontex’s contractor to re-open in order to carry out medical tests, an obligatory requirement for the standing corps.[4]

      In 2020, Frontex joined the European Defence Agency’s Satellite Communications (SatCom) and Communications and Information System (CIS) services in order to ensure ICT support for the standing corps in operation as of 2021.[5] The EDA describes SatCom and CIS as “fundamental for Communication, Command and Control in military operations… [enabling] EU Commanders to connect forces in remote areas with HQs and capitals and to manage the forces missions and tasks”.[6]

      Training

      The basic training programme, endorsed by the management board in October 2019, is designed for Category 1 staff. It includes specific training in interoperability and “harmonisation with member states”. The actual syllabus, content and materials for this basic training were developed by March 2020; Statewatch has made a request for access to these documents, which is currently pending with the Frontex Transparency Office. This process has also been affected by the novel coronavirus, though the report insists that “no delay is foreseen in the availability of the specialised profile related training of the standing corps”.

      Use of force

      The state-of-play-report acknowledges a number of legal ambiguities surrounding some of the more controversial powers outlined in Frontex’s 2019 Regulation, highlighting perhaps that political ambition, rather than serious consideration and assessment, propelled the legislation, overtaking adequate procedure and oversight. The incentive to enact the legislation within a short timeframe is cited as a reason that no impact assessment was carried out on the proposed recast to the agency’s mandate. This draft was rushed through negotiations and approved in an unprecedented six-month period, and the details lost in its wake are now coming to light.

      Article 82 of the 2019 Regulation refers to the use of force and carriage of weapons by Frontex staff, while a supervisory mechanism for the use of force by statutory staff is established by Article 55. This says:

      “On the basis of a proposal from the executive director, the management board shall: (a) establish an appropriate supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on use of force by statutory staff, including rules on reporting and specific measures, such as those of a disciplinary nature, with regard to the use of force during deployments”[7]

      The agency’s management board is expected to make a decision about this supervisory mechanism, including specific measures and reporting, by the end of June 2020.

      The state-of-play report posits that the legal terms of Article 55 are inconsistent with the standard rules on administrative enquiries and disciplinary measures concerning EU staff.[8] These outline, inter alia, that a dedicated disciplinary board will be established in each institution including at least one member from outside the institution, that this board must be independent and its proceedings secret. Frontex insists that its staff will be a special case as the “first uniformed service of the EU”, and will therefore require “special arrangements or derogations to the Staff Regulations” to comply with the “totally different nature of tasks and risks associated with their deployments”.[9]

      What is particularly astounding about Frontex demanding special treatment for oversight, particularly on use of force and weapons is that, as the report acknowledges, the agency cannot yet legally store or transport any weapons it acquires.

      Regarding service weapons and “non-lethal equipment”,[10] legal analysis by “external experts and a regulatory law firm” concluded that the 2019 Regulation does not provide a legal basis for acquiring, registering, storing or transporting weapons in Poland, where the agency’s headquarters is located. Frontex has applied to the Commission for clarity on how to proceed, says the report. Frontex declined to comment on the status of this consultation and any indications of the next steps the agency will take. A Commission spokesperson stated only that it had recently received the agency’s enquiry and “is analysing the request and the applicable legal framework in the view of replying to the EBCGA”, without expanding further.

      Until Frontex has the legal basis to do so, it cannot launch a tender for firearms and “non-lethal equipment” (which includes batons, pepper spray and handcuffs). However, the report implies the agency is ready to do so as soon as it receives the green light. Technical specifications are currently being finalised for “non-lethal equipment” and Frontex still plans to complete acquisition by the end of the year.

      Privileges and immunities

      The agency is also seeking special treatment with regard to the legal privileges and immunities it and its officials enjoy. Article 96 of the 2019 Regulation outlines the privileges and immunities of Frontex officers, stating:

      “Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the TFEU shall apply to the Agency and its statutory staff.” [11]

      However, Frontex notes that the Protocol does not apply to non-EU states, nor does it “offer a full protection, or take into account a need for the inviolability of assets owned by Frontex (service vehicles, vessels, aircraft)”.[12] Frontex is increasingly involved in operations taking place on non-EU territory. For instance, the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states, primarily in the Western Balkans, concerning Frontex activities in those countries. To launch operations under these agreements, Frontex will (or, in the case of Albania, already has) agree on operational plans with each state, under which Frontex staff can use executive powers.[13] The agency therefore seeks an “EU-level status of forces agreement… to account for the partial absence of rules”.

      Law enforcement

      To implement its enhanced functions regarding cross-border crime, Frontex will continue to participate in Europol’s four-year policy cycle addressing “serious international and organised crime”.[14] The agency is also developing a pilot project, “Investigation Support Activities- Cross Border Crime” (ISA-CBC), addressing drug trafficking and terrorism.

      Fundamental rights and data protection

      The ‘EBCG 2.0 Regulation’ requires several changes to fundamental rights measures by the agency, which, aside from some vague “legal analyses” seem to be undergoing development with only internal oversight.

      Firstly, to facilitate adequate independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO), special rules have to be established. The FRO was introduced under Frontex’s 2016 Regulation, but has since then been understaffed and underfunded by the agency.[15] The 2019 Regulation obliges the agency to ensure “sufficient and adequate human and financial resources” for the office, as well as 40 fundamental rights monitors.[16] These standing corps staff members will be responsible for monitoring compliance with fundamental rights standards, providing advice and assistance on the agency’s plans and activities, and will visit and evaluate operations, including acting as forced return monitors.[17]

      During negotiations over the proposed Regulation 2.0, MEPs introduced extended powers for the Fundamental Rights Officer themselves. The FRO was previously responsible for contributing to Frontex’s fundamental rights strategy and monitoring its compliance with and promotion of fundamental rights. Now, they will be able to monitor compliance by conducting investigations; offering advice where deemed necessary or upon request of the agency; providing opinions on operational plans, pilot projects and technical assistance; and carrying out on-the-spot visits. The executive director is now obliged to respond “as to how concerns regarding possible violations of fundamental rights… have been addressed,” and the management board “shall ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the fundamental rights officer.” [18] The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation.

      The state-of-play report says that “legal analyses and exchanges” are ongoing, and will inform an eventual management board decision, but no timeline for this is offered. [19] The agency will also need to adapt its much criticised individual complaints mechanism to fit the requirements of the 2019 Regulation; executive director Fabrice Leggeri’s first-draft decision on this process is currently undergoing internal consultations. Even the explicit requirement set out in the 2019 Regulation for an “independent and effective” complaints mechanism,[20] does not meet minimum standards to qualify as an effective remedy, which include institutional independence, accessibility in practice, and capacity to carry out thorough and prompt investigations.[21]

      Frontex has entered into a service level agreement (SLA) with the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) for support in establishing and training the team of fundamental rights monitors introduced by the 2019 Regulation. These monitors are to be statutory staff of the agency and will assess fundamental rights compliance of operational activities, advising, assisting and contributing to “the promotion of fundamental rights”.[22] The scope and objectives for this team were finalised at the end of March this year, and the agency will establish the team by the end of the year. Statewatch has requested clarification as to what is to be included in the team’s scope and objectives, pending with the Frontex Transparency Office.

      Regarding data protection, the agency plans a package of implementing rules (covering issues ranging from the position of data protection officer to the restriction of rights for returnees and restrictions under administrative data processing) to be implemented throughout 2020.[23] The management board will review a first draft of the implementing rules on the data protection officer in the second quarter of 2020.

      Returns

      The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) – a network of 15 European states and the Commission facilitating cooperation over return operations “as part of the EU efforts to manage migration” – is to be handed over to Frontex. [24] A handover plan is currently under the final stage of review; it reportedly outlines the scoping of activities and details of “which groups of returnees will be eligible for Frontex assistance in the future”.[25] A request from Statewatch to Frontex for comment on what assistance will be provided by the agency to such returnees was unanswered at the time of publication.

      Since the entry into force of its new mandate, Frontex has also been providing technical assistance for so-called voluntary returns, with the first two such operations carried out on scheduled flights (as opposed to charter flights) in February 2020. A total of 28 people were returned by mid-April, despite the fact that there is no legal clarity over what the definition “voluntary return” actually refers to, as the state-of-play report also explains:

      “The terminology of voluntary return was introduced in the Regulation without providing any definition thereof. This terminology (voluntary departure vs voluntary return) is moreover not in line with the terminology used in the Return Directive (EBCG 2.0 refers to the definition of returns provided for in the Return Directive. The Return Directive, however, does not cover voluntary returns; a voluntary return is not a return within the meaning of the Return Directive). Further elaboration is needed.”[26]

      On top of requiring “further clarification”, if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate. Statewatch has launched an investigation into the agency’s activities relating to voluntary returns, to outline the number of such operations to date, their country of return and country of destination.

      Frontex is currently developing a module dedicated to voluntary returns by charter flight for its FAR (Frontex Application for Returns) platform (part of its return case management system). On top of the technical support delivered by the agency, Frontex also foresees the provision of on-the-ground support from Frontex representatives or a “return counsellor”, who will form part of the dedicated return teams planned for the standing corps from 2021.[27]

      Frontex has updated its return case management system (RECAMAS), an online platform for member state authorities and Frontex to communicate and plan return operations, to manage an increased scope. The state-of-play report implies that this includes detail on post-return activities in a new “post-return module”, indicating that Frontex is acting on commitments to expand its activity in this area. According to the agency’s roadmap on implementing the 2019 Regulation, an action plan on how the agency will provide post-return support to people (Article 48(1), 2019 Regulation) will be written by the third quarter of 2020.[28]

      In its closing paragraph, related to the budgetary impact of COVID-19 regarding return operations, the agency notes that although activities will resume once aerial transportation restrictions are eased, “the agency will not be able to provide what has been initially intended, undermining the concept of the EBCG as a whole”.[29]

      EUROSUR

      The Commission is leading progress on adopting the implementing act for the integration of EUROSUR into Frontex, which will define the implementation of new aerial surveillance,[30] expected by the end of the year.[31] Frontex is discussing new working arrangements with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). The development by Frontex of the surveillance project’s communications network will require significant budgetary investment, as the agency plans to maintain the current system ahead of its planned replacement in 2025.[32] This investment is projected despite the agency’s recognition of the economic impact of Covid-19 on member states, and the consequent adjustments to the MFF 2021-27.

      Summary

      Drafted and published as the world responds to an unprecedented pandemic, the “current challenges” referred to in the report appear, on first read, to refer to the budgetary and staffing implications of global shut down. However, the report maintains throughout that the agency’s determination to expand, in terms of powers as well as staffing, will not be stalled despite delays and budgeting adjustments. Indeed, it is implied more than once that the “current challenges” necessitate more than ever that these powers be assumed. The true challenges, from the agency’s point of view, stem from the fact that its current mandate was rushed through negotiations in six months, leading to legal ambiguities that leave it unable to acquire or transport weapons and in a tricky relationship with the EU protocol on privileges and immunities when operating in third countries. Given the violence that so frequently accompanies border control operations in the EU, it will come as a relief to many that Frontex is having difficulties acquiring its own weaponry. However, it is far from reassuring that the introduction of new measures on fundamental rights and accountability are being carried out internally and remain unavailable for public scrutiny.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Note: this article was updated on 26 May 2020 to include the European Commission’s response to Statewatch’s enquiries.

      It was updated on 1 July with some minor corrections:

      “the Council of the EU has signed or initialled a number of Status Agreements with non-EU states... under which” replaces “the agency has entered into working agreements with Balkan states, under which”
      “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in any detail in the Regulation beyond monitoring the agency’s ’compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations’” replaces “The investigatory powers of the FRO are not, however, set out in the Regulation”
      “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it further exposes the haste with which legislation written to deny entry into the EU and facilitate expulsions was drafted” replaces “if Frontex is assisting with “voluntary returns” that are not governed by the Returns Directive, it is acting outside of its legal mandate”

      Endnotes

      [1] Frontex, ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG 2.0 Regulation in view of current challenges’, 27 April 2020, contained in Council document 7607/20, LIMITE, 20 April 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/may/eu-council-frontex-ECBG-state-of-play-7607-20.pdf

      [2] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [3] Section 1.1, state of play report

      [4] Jane Kilpatrick, ‘Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards’, Statewatch Analysis, March 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-355-frontex-recruitment-standing-corps.pdf

      [5] Section 7.1, state of play report

      [6] EDA, ‘EU SatCom Market’, https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/activities/activities-search/eu-satcom-market

      [7] Article 55(5)(a), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex 2019 Regulation), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [8] Pursuant to Annex IX of the EU Staff Regulations, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:01962R0031-20140501

      [9] Chapter III, state of play report

      [10] Section 2.5, state of play report

      [11] Protocol (No 7), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.202.01.0001.01.ENG#d1e3363-201-1

      [12] Chapter III, state of play report

      [13] ‘Border externalisation: Agreements on Frontex operations in Serbia and Montenegro heading for parliamentary approval’, Statewatch News, 11 March 2020, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/frontex-status-agreements.htm

      [14] Europol, ‘EU policy cycle – EMPACT’, https://www.europol.europa.eu/empact

      [15] ‘NGOs, EU and international agencies sound the alarm over Frontex’s respect for fundamental rights’, Statewatch News, 5 March 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/mar/fx-consultative-forum-rep.htm; ‘Frontex condemned by its own fundamental rights body for failing to live up to obligations’, Statewatch News, 21 May 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/may/eu-frontex-fr-rep.htm

      [16] Article 110(6), Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [17] Article 110, 2019 Regulation

      [18] Article 109, 2019 Regulation

      [19] Section 8, state of play report

      [20] Article 111(1), 2019 Regulation

      [21] Sergio Carrera and Marco Stefan, ‘Complaint Mechanisms in Border Management and Expulsion Operations in Europe: Effective Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, CEPS, 2018, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Complaint%20Mechanisms_A4.pdf

      [22] Article 110(1), 2019 Regulation

      [23] Section 9, state of play report

      [24] ERRIN, https://returnnetwork.eu

      [25] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [26] Chapter III, state of play report

      [27] Section 3.2, state of play report

      [28] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [29] State of play report, p. 19

      [30] Matthias Monroy, ‘Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders’, Statewatch Analysis, February 2020, http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-354-frontex-drones.pdf

      [31] Section 4, state of play report

      [32] Section 7.2, state of play report
      Next article >

      Mediterranean: As the fiction of a Libyan search and rescue zone begins to crumble, EU states use the coronavirus pandemic to declare themselves unsafe

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/eu-guns-guards-and-guidelines-reinforcement-of-frontex-runs-into-problem

      #EBCG_2.0_Regulation #European_Defence_Agency’s_Satellite_Communications (#SatCom) #Communications_and_Information_System (#CIS) #immunité #droits_fondamentaux #droits_humains #Fundamental_Rights_Officer (#FRO) #European_Return_and_Reintegration_Network (#ERRIN) #renvois #expulsions #réintégration #Directive_Retour #FAR (#Frontex_Application_for_Returns) #RECAMAS #EUROSUR #European_Aviation_Safety_Agency (#EASA) #European_Organisation_for_the_Safety_of_Air_Navigation (#EUROCONTROL)

    • Frontex launches “game-changing” recruitment drive for standing corps of border guards

      On 4 January 2020 the Management Board of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) adopted a decision on the profiles of the staff required for the new “standing corps”, which is ultimately supposed to be staffed by 10,000 officials. [1] The decision ushers in a new wave of recruitment for the agency. Applicants will be put through six months of training before deployment, after rigorous medical testing.

      What is the standing corps?

      The European Border and Coast Guard standing corps is the new, and according to Frontex, first ever, EU uniformed service, available “at any time…to support Member States facing challenges at their external borders”.[2] Frontex’s Programming Document for the 2018-2020 period describes the standing corps as the agency’s “biggest game changer”, requiring “an unprecedented scale of staff recruitment”.[3]

      The standing corps will be made up of four categories of Frontex operational staff:

      Frontex statutory staff deployed in operational areas and staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Central Unit[4];
      Long-term staff seconded from member states;
      Staff from member states who can be immediately deployed on short-term secondment to Frontex; and

      A reserve of staff from member states for rapid border interventions.

      These border guards will be “trained by the best and equipped with the latest technology has to offer”.[5] As well as wearing EU uniforms, they will be authorised to carry weapons and will have executive powers: they will be able to verify individuals’ identity and nationality and permit or refuse entry into the EU.

      The decision made this January is limited to the definition of profiles and requirements for the operational staff that are to be recruited. The Management Board (MB) will have to adopt a new decision by March this year to set out the numbers of staff needed per profile, the requirements for individuals holding those positions, and the number of staff needed for the following year based on expected operational needs. This process will be repeated annually.[6] The MB can then further specify how many staff each member state should contribute to these profiles, and establish multi-annual plans for member state contributions and recruitment for Frontex statutory staff. Projections for these contributions are made in Annexes II – IV of the 2019 Regulation, though a September Mission Statement by new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen urges the recruitment of 10,000 border guards by 2024, indicating that member states might be meeting their contribution commitments much sooner than 2027.[7]

      The standing corps of Frontex staff will have an array of executive powers and responsibilities. As well as being able to verify identity and nationality and refuse or permit entry into the EU, they will be able to consult various EU databases to fulfil operational aims, and may also be authorised by host states to consult national databases. According to the MB Decision, “all members of the Standing Corps are to be able to identify persons in need of international protection and persons in a vulnerable situation, including unaccompanied minors, and refer them to the competent authorities”. Training on international and EU law on fundamental rights and international protection, as well as guidelines on the identification and referral of persons in need of international protection, will be mandatory for all standing corps staff members.

      The size of the standing corps

      The following table, taken from the 2019 Regulation, outlines the ambitions for growth of Frontex’s standing corps. However, as noted, the political ambition is to reach the 10,000 total by 2024.

      –-> voir le tableau sur le site de statewatch!

      Category 2 staff – those on long term secondment from member states – will join Frontex from 2021, according to the 2019 Regulation.[8] It is foreseen that Germany will contribute the most staff, with 61 expected in 2021, increasing year-by-year to 225 by 2027. Other high contributors are France and Italy (170 and 125 by 2027, respectively).

      The lowest contributors will be Iceland (expected to contribute between one and two people a year from 2021 to 2027), Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. Liechtenstein is not contributing personnel but will contribute “through proportional financial support”.

      For short-term secondments from member states, projections follow a very similar pattern. Germany will contribute 540 staff in 2021, increasing to 827 in 2027; Italy’s contribution will increase from 300 in 2021 to 458 in 2027; and France’s from 408 in 2021 to 624 in 2027. Most states will be making less than 100 staff available for short-term secondment in 2021.

      What are the profiles?

      The MB Decision outlines 12 profiles to be made available to Frontex, ranging from Border Guard Officer and Crew Member, to Cross Border Crime Detection Officer and Return Specialist. A full list is contained in the Decision.[9] All profiles will be fulfilled by an official of the competent authority of a member state (MS) or Schengen Associated Country (SAC), or by a member of Frontex’s own statutory staff.

      Tasks to be carried out by these officials include:

      border checks and surveillance;
      interviewing, debriefing* and screening arrivals and registering fingerprints;
      supporting the collection, assessment, analysis and distribution of information with EU member and non-member states;
      verifying travel documents;
      escorting individuals being deported on Frontex return operations;
      operating data systems and platforms; and
      offering cultural mediation

      *Debriefing consists of informal interviews with migrants to collect information for risk analyses on irregular migration and other cross-border crime and the profiling of irregular migrants to identify “modus operandi and migration trends used by irregular migrants and facilitators/criminal networks”. Guidelines written by Frontex in 2012 instructed border guards to target vulnerable individuals for “debriefing”, not in order to streamline safeguarding or protection measures, but for intelligence-gathering - “such people are often more willing to talk about their experiences,” said an internal document.[10] It is unknown whether those instructions are still in place.

      Recruitment for the profiles

      Certain profiles are expected to “apply self-safety and security practice”, and to have “the capacity to work under pressure and face emotional events with composure”. Relevant profiles (e.g. crew member) are required to be able to perform search and rescue activities in distress situations at sea borders.

      Frontex published a call for tender on 27 December for the provision of medical services for pre-recruitment examinations, in line with the plan to start recruiting operational staff in early 2020. The documents accompanying the tender reveal additional criteria for officials that will be granted executive powers (Frontex category “A2”) compared to those staff stationed primarily at the agency’s Warsaw headquarters (“A1”). Those criteria come in the form of more stringent medical testing.

      The differences in medical screening for category A1 and A2 staff lie primarily in additional toxicology screening and psychiatric and psychological consultations. [11] The additional psychiatric attention allotted for operational staff “is performed to check the predisposition for people to work in arduous, hazardous conditions, exposed to stress, conflict situations, changing rapidly environment, coping with people being in dramatic, injure or death exposed situations”.[12]

      Both A1 and A2 category provisional recruits will be asked to disclose if they have ever suffered from a sexually transmitted disease or “genital organ disease”, as well as depression, nervous or mental disorders, among a long list of other ailments. As well as disclosing any medication they take, recruits must also state if they are taking oral contraceptives (though there is no question about hormonal contraceptives that are not taken orally). Women are also asked to give the date of their last period on the pre-appointment questionnaire.

      “Never touch yourself with gloves”

      Frontex training materials on forced return operations obtained by Statewatch in 2019 acknowledge the likelihood of psychological stress among staff, among other health risks. (One recommendation contained in the documents is to “never touch yourself with gloves”). Citing “dissonance within the team, long hours with no rest, group dynamic, improvisation and different languages” among factors behind psychological stress, the training materials on medical precautionary measures for deportation escort officers also refer to post-traumatic stress disorder, the lack of an area to retreat to and body clock disruption as exacerbating risks. The document suggests a high likelihood that Frontex return escorts will witness poverty, “agony”, “chaos”, violence, boredom, and will have to deal with vulnerable persons.[13]

      For fundamental rights monitors (officials deployed to monitor fundamental rights compliance during deportations, who can be either Frontex staff or national officials), the training materials obtained by Statewatch focus on the self-control of emotions, rather than emotional care. Strategies recommended include talking to somebody, seeking professional help, and “informing yourself of any other option offered”. The documents suggest that it is an individual’s responsibility to prevent emotional responses to stressful situations having an impact on operations, and to organise their own supervision and professional help. There is no obvious focus on how traumatic responses of Frontex staff could affect those coming into contact with them at an external border or during a deportation. [14]

      The materials obtained by Statewatch also give some indication of the fundamental rights training imparted to those acting as deportation ‘escorts’ and fundamental rights monitors. The intended outcomes for a training session in Athens that took place in March 2019 included “adapt FR [fundamental rights] in a readmission operation (explain it with examples)” and “should be able to describe Non Refoulement principle” (in the document, ‘Session Fundamental rights’ is followed by ‘Session Velcro handcuffs’).[15] The content of the fundamental rights training that will be offered to Frontex’s new recruits is currently unknown.

      Fit for service?

      The agency anticipates that most staff will be recruited from March to June 2020, involving the medical examination of up to 700 applicants in this period. According to Frontex’s website, the agency has already received over 7,000 applications for the 700 new European Border Guard Officer positions.[16] Successful candidates will undergo six months of training before deployment in 2021. Apparently then, the posts are a popular career option, despite the seemingly invasive medical tests (especially for sexually active women). Why, for instance, is it important to Frontex to know about oral hormonal contraception, or about sexually transmitted infections?

      When asked by Statewatch if Frontex provides in-house psychological and emotional support, an agency press officer stated: “When it comes to psychological and emotional support, Frontex is increasing awareness and personal resilience of the officers taking part in our operations through education and training activities.” A ‘Frontex Mental Health Strategy’ from 2018 proposed the establishment of “a network of experts-psychologists” to act as an advisory body, as well as creating “online self-care tools”, a “psychological hot-line”, and a space for peer support with participation of psychologists (according to risk assessment) during operations.[17]

      One year later, Frontex, EASO and Europol jointly produced a brochure for staff deployed on operations, entitled ‘Occupational Health and Safety – Deployment Information’, which offers a series of recommendations to staff, placing the responsibility to “come to the deployment in good mental shape” and “learn how to manage stress and how to deal with anger” more firmly on the individual than the agency.[18] According to this document, officers who need additional support must disclose this by requesting it from their supervisor, while “a helpline or psychologist on-site may be available, depending on location”.

      Frontex anticipates this recruitment drive to be “game changing”. Indeed, the Commission is relying upon it to reach its ambitions for the agency’s independence and efficiency. The inclusion of mandatory training in fundamental rights in the six-month introductory education is obviously a welcome step. Whether lessons learned in a classroom will be the first thing that comes to the minds of officials deployed on border control or deportation operations remains to be seen.

      Unmanaged responses to emotional stress can include burnout, compassion-fatigue and indirect trauma, which can in turn decrease a person’s ability to cope with adverse circumstance, and increase the risk of violence.[19] Therefore, aside from the agency’s responsibility as an employer to safeguard the health of its staff, its approach to internal psychological care will affect not only the border guards themselves, but the people that they routinely come into contact with at borders and during return operations, many of whom themselves will have experienced trauma.

      Jane Kilpatrick

      Endnotes

      [1] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [2] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [3] Frontex, ‘Programming Document 2018-20’, 10 December 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/feb/frontex-programming-document-2018-20.pdf

      [4] The ETIAS Central Unit will be responsible for processing the majority of applications for ‘travel authorisations’ received when the European Travel Information and Authorisation System comes into use, in theory in late 2022. Citizens who do not require a visa to travel to the Schengen area will have to apply for authorisation to travel to the Schengen area.

      [5] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [6] Article 54(4), Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [7] ‘European Commission 2020 Work Programme: An ambitious roadmap for a Union that strives for more’, 29 January 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_124; “Mission letter” from Ursula von der Leyen to Ylva Johnsson, 10 September 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/mission-letter-ylva-johansson_en.pdf

      [8] Annex II, 2019 Regulation

      [9] Management Board Decision 1/2020 of 4 January 2020 on adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/MB_Decision/2020/MB_Decision_1_2020_adopting_the_profiles_to_be_made_available_to_the_

      [10] ‘Press release: EU border agency targeted “isolated or mistreated” individuals for questioning’, Statewatch News, 16 February 2017, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/feb/eu-frontex-op-hera-debriefing-pr.htm

      [11] ‘Provision of Medical Services – Pre-Recruitment Examination’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-documents.html?cftId=5841

      [12] ‘Provision of medical services – pre-recruitment examination, Terms of Reference - Annex II to invitation to tender no Frontex/OP/1491/2019/KM’, https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-document.html?docId=65398

      [13] Frontex training presentation, ‘Medical precautionary measures for escort officers’, undated, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-presentation-medical-precautionary-measures-deportation-escor

      [14] Ibid.

      [15] Frontex, document listing course learning outcomes from deportation escorts’ training, http://statewatch.org/news/2020/mar/eu-frontex-deportation-escorts-training-course-learning-outcomes.pdf

      [16] Frontex, ‘Careers’, https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/careers/frontex-border-guard-recruitment

      [17] Frontex, ‘Frontex mental health strategy’, 20 February 2018, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/89c168fe-e14b-11e7-9749-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

      [18] EASO, Europol and Frontex, ‘Occupational health and safety’, 12 August 2019, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/17cc07e0-bd88-11e9-9d01-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-103142015

      [19] Trauma Treatment International, ‘A different approach for victims of trauma’, https://www.tt-intl.org/#our-work-section

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/frontex-launches-game-changing-recruitment-drive-for-standing-corps-of-b
      #gardes_frontières #staff #corps_des_gardes-frontières

    • Drones for Frontex: unmanned migration control at Europe’s borders (27.02.2020)

      Instead of providing sea rescue capabilities in the Mediterranean, the EU is expanding air surveillance. Refugees are observed with drones developed for the military. In addition to numerous EU states, countries such as Libya could also use the information obtained.

      It is not easy to obtain majorities for legislation in the European Union in the area of migration - unless it is a matter of upgrading the EU’s external borders. While the reform of a common EU asylum system has been on hold for years, the European Commission, Parliament and Council agreed to reshape the border agency Frontex with unusual haste shortly before last year’s parliamentary elections. A new Regulation has been in force since December 2019,[1] under which Frontex intends to build up a “standing corps” of 10,000 uniformed officials by 2027. They can be deployed not just at the EU’s external borders, but in ‘third countries’ as well.

      In this way, Frontex will become a “European border police force” with powers that were previously reserved for the member states alone. The core of the new Regulation includes the procurement of the agency’s own equipment. The Multiannual Financial Framework, in which the EU determines the distribution of its financial resources from 2021 until 2027, has not yet been decided. According to current plans, however, at least €6 billion are reserved for Frontex in the seven-year budget. The intention is for Frontex to spend a large part of the money, over €2 billion, on aircraft, ships and vehicles.[2]

      Frontex seeks company for drone flights

      The upgrade plans include the stationing of large drones in the central and eastern Mediterranean. For this purpose, Frontex is looking for a private partner to operate flights off Malta, Italy or Greece. A corresponding tender ended in December[3] and the selection process is currently underway. The unmanned missions could then begin already in spring. Frontex estimates the total cost of these missions at €50 million. The contract has a term of two years and can be extended twice for one year at a time.

      Frontex wants drones of the so-called MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) class. Their flight duration should be at least 20 hours. The requirements include the ability to fly in all weather conditions and at day and night. It is also planned to operate in airspace where civil aircraft are in service. For surveillance missions, the drones should carry electro-optical cameras, thermal imaging cameras and so-called “daylight spotter” systems that independently detect moving targets and keep them in focus. Other equipment includes systems for locating mobile and satellite telephones. The drones will also be able to receive signals from emergency call transmitters sewn into modern life jackets.

      However, the Frontex drones will not be used primarily for sea rescue operations, but to improve capacities against unwanted migration. This assumption is also confirmed by the German non-governmental organisation Sea-Watch, which has been providing assistance in the central Mediterranean with various ships since 2015. “Frontex is not concerned with saving lives,” says Ruben Neugebauer of Sea-Watch. “While air surveillance is being expanded with aircraft and drones, ships urgently needed for rescue operations have been withdrawn”. Sea-Watch demands that situation pictures of EU drones are also made available to private organisations for sea rescue.

      Aircraft from arms companies

      Frontex has very specific ideas for its own drones, which is why there are only a few suppliers worldwide that can be called into question. The Israel Aerospace Industries Heron 1, which Frontex tested for several months on the Greek island of Crete[4] and which is also flown by the German Bundeswehr, is one of them. As set out by Frontex in its invitation to tender, the Heron 1, with a payload of around 250 kilograms, can carry all the surveillance equipment that the agency intends to deploy over the Mediterranean. Also amongst those likely to be interested in the Frontex contract is the US company General Atomics, which has been building drones of the Predator series for 20 years. Recently, it presented a new Predator model in Greece under the name SeaGuardian, for maritime observation.[5] It is equipped with a maritime surveillance radar and a system for receiving position data from larger ships, thus fulfilling one of Frontex’s essential requirements.

      General Atomics may have a competitive advantage, as its Predator drones have several years’ operational experience in the Mediterranean. In addition to Frontex, the European Union has been active in the central Mediterranean with EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. In March 2019, Italy’s then-interior minister Matteo Salvini pushed through the decision to operate the EU mission from the air alone. Since then, two unarmed Predator drones operated by the Italian military have been flying for EUNAVFOR MED for 60 hours per month. Officially, the drones are to observe from the air whether the training of the Libyan coast guard has been successful and whether these navy personnel use their knowledge accordingly. Presumably, however, the Predators are primarily pursuing the mission’s goal to “combat human smuggling” by spying on the Libyan coast. It is likely that the new Operation EU Active Surveillance, which will use military assets from EU member states to try to enforce the UN arms embargo placed on Libya,[6] will continue to patrol with Italian drones off the coast in North Africa.

      Three EU maritime surveillance agencies

      In addition to Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) are also investing in maritime surveillance using drones. Together, the three agencies coordinate some 300 civil and military authorities in EU member states.[7] Their tasks include border, fisheries and customs control, law enforcement and environmental protection.

      In 2017, Frontex and EMSA signed an agreement to benefit from joint reconnaissance capabilities, with EFCA also involved.[8] At the time, EMSA conducted tests with drones of various sizes, but now the drones’ flights are part of its regular services. The offer is not only open to EU Member States, as Iceland was the first to take advantage of it. Since summer 2019, a long-range Hermes 900 drone built by the Israeli company Elbit Systems has been flying from Iceland’s Egilsstaðir airport. The flights are intended to cover more than half of the island state’s exclusive economic zone and to detect “suspicious activities and potential hazards”.[9]

      The Hermes 900 was also developed for the military; the Israeli army first deployed it in the Gaza Strip in 2014. The Times of Israel puts the cost of the operating contract with EMSA at €59 million,[10] with a term of two years, which can be extended for another two years. The agency did not conclude the contract directly with the Israeli arms company, but through the Portuguese firm CeiiA. The contract covers the stationing, control and mission control of the drones.

      New interested parties for drone flights

      At the request of the German MEP Özlem Demirel (from the party Die Linke), the European Commission has published a list of countries that also want to use EMSA drones.[11] According to this list, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal and also Greece have requested unmanned flights for pollution monitoring this year, while Bulgaria and Spain want to use them for general maritime surveillance. Until Frontex has its own drones, EMSA is flying its drones for the border agency on Crete. As in Iceland, this is the long-range drone Hermes 900, but according to Greek media reports it crashed on 8 January during take-off.[12] Possible causes are a malfunction of the propulsion system or human error. The aircraft is said to have been considerably damaged.

      Authorities from France and Great Britain have also ordered unmanned maritime surveillance from EMSA. Nothing is yet known about the exact intended location, but it is presumably the English Channel. There, the British coast guard is already observing border traffic with larger drones built by the Tekever arms company from Portugal.[13] The government in London wants to prevent migrants from crossing the Channel. The drones take off from the airport in the small town of Lydd and monitor the approximately 50-kilometre-long and 30-kilometre-wide Strait of Dover. Great Britain has also delivered several quadcopters to France to try to detect potential migrants in French territorial waters. According to the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, eight gendarmes have been trained to control the small drones[14].

      Information to non-EU countries

      The images taken by EMSA drones are evaluated by the competent national coastguards. A livestream also sends them to Frontex headquarters in Warsaw.[15] There they are fed into the EUROSUR border surveillance system. This is operated by Frontex and networks the surveillance installations of all EU member states that have an external border. The data from EUROSUR and the national border control centres form the ‘Common Pre-frontier Intelligence Picture’,[16] referring to the area of interest of Frontex, which extends far into the African continent. Surveillance data is used to detect and prevent migration movements at an early stage.

      Once the providing company has been selected, the new Frontex drones are also to fly for EUROSUR. According to the invitation to tender, they are to operate in the eastern and central Mediterranean within a radius of up to 250 nautical miles (463 kilometres). This would enable them to carry out reconnaissance in the “pre-frontier” area off Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. Within the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex shares the recorded data with other European users via a ‘Remote Information Portal’, as the call for tender explains. The border agency has long been able to cooperate with third countries and the information collected can therefore also be made available to authorities in North Africa. However, in order to share general information on surveillance of the Mediterranean Sea with a non-EU state, Frontex must first conclude a working agreement with the corresponding government.[17]

      It is already possible, however, to provide countries such as Libya with the coordinates of refugee boats. For example, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) must be informed of actual or suspected emergencies. With EU funding, Italy has been building such a centre in Tripoli for the last two years.[18] It is operated by the military coast guard, but so far has no significant equipment of its own.

      The EU military mission “EUNAVFOR MED” was cooperating more extensively with the Libyan coast guard. For communication with European naval authorities, Libya is the first third country to be connected to European surveillance systems via the “Seahorse Mediterranean” network[19]. Information handed over to the Libyan authorities might also include information that was collected with the Italian military ‘Predator’ drones.

      Reconnaissance generated with unmanned aerial surveillance is also given to the MRCC in Turkey. This was seen in a pilot project last summer, when the border agency tested an unmanned aerostat with the Greek coast guard off the island of Samos.[20] Attached to a 1,000 metre-long cable, the airship was used in the Frontex operation ‘Poseidon’ in the eastern Mediterranean. The 35-meter-long zeppelin comes from the French manufacturer A-NSE.[21] The company specializes in civil and military aerial observation. According to the Greek Marine Ministry, the equipment included a radar, a thermal imaging camera and an Automatic Identification System (AIS) for the tracking of larger ships. The recorded videos were received and evaluated by a situation centre supplied by the Portuguese National Guard. If a detected refugee boat was still in Turkish territorial waters, the Greek coast guard informed the Turkish authorities. This pilot project in the Aegean Sea was the first use of an airship by Frontex. The participants deployed comparatively large numbers of personnel for the short mission. Pictures taken by the Greek coastguard show more than 40 people.

      Drones enable ‘pull-backs’

      Human rights organisations accuse EUNAVFOR MED and Frontex of passing on information to neighbouring countries leading to rejections (so-called ‘push-backs’) in violation of international law. People must not be returned to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Frontex does not itself return refugees in distress who were discovered at sea via aerial surveillance, but leaves the task to the Libyan or Turkish authorities. Regarding Libya, the Agency since 2017 provided notice of at least 42 vessels in distress to Libyan authorities.[22]

      Private rescue organisations therefore speak of so-called ‘pull-backs’, but these are also prohibited, as the Israeli human rights lawyer Omer Shatz argues: “Communicating the location of civilians fleeing war to a consortium of militias and instructing them to intercept and forcibly transfer them back to the place they fled from, trigger both state responsibility of all EU members and individual criminal liability of hundreds involved.” Together with his colleague Juan Branco, Shatz is suing those responsible for the European Union and its agencies before the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Soon they intend to publish individual cases and the names of the people accused.

      Matthias Monroy

      An earlier version of this article first appeared in the German edition of Le Monde Diplomatique: ‘Drohnen für Frontex Statt sich auf die Rettung von Bootsflüchtlingen im Mittelmeer zu konzentrieren, baut die EU die Luftüberwachung’.

      Note: this article was corrected on 6 March to clarify a point regarding cooperation between Frontex and non-EU states.

      Endnotes

      [1] Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-33-2019-INIT/en/pdf

      [2] European Commission, ‘A strengthened and fully equipped European Border and Coast Guard’, 12 September 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-factsheet-coast-guard_en.pdf

      [3] ‘Poland-Warsaw: Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for Medium Altitude Long Endurance Maritime Aerial Surveillance’, https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:490010-2019:TEXT:EN:HTML&tabId=1

      [4] IAI, ‘IAI AND AIRBUS MARITIME HERON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 200 FLIGHT HOURS IN CIVILIAN EUROPEAN AIRSPACE FOR FRONTEX’, 24 October 2018, https://www.iai.co.il/iai-and-airbus-maritime-heron-unmanned-aerial-system-uas-successfully-complet

      [5] ‘ European Maritime Flight Demonstrations’, General Atomics, http://www.ga-asi.com/european-maritime-demo

      [6] ‘EU agrees to deploy warships to enforce Libya arms embargo’, The Guardian, 17 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/17/eu-agrees-deploy-warships-enforce-libya-arms-embargo

      [7] EMSA, ‘Heads of EMSA and Frontex meet to discuss cooperation on European coast guard functions’, 3 April 2019, http://www.emsa.europa.eu/news-a-press-centre/external-news/item/3499-heads-of-emsa-and-frontex-meet-to-discuss-cooperation-on-european-c

      [8] Frontex, ‘Frontex, EMSA and EFCA strengthen cooperation on coast guard functions’, 23 March 2017, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-emsa-and-efca-strengthen-cooperation-on-coast-guard-functions

      [9] Elbit Systems, ‘Elbit Systems Commenced the Operation of the Maritime UAS Patrol Service to European Union Countries’, 18 June 2019, https://elbitsystems.com/pr-new/elbit-systems-commenced-the-operation-of-the-maritime-uas-patrol-servi

      [10] ‘Elbit wins drone contract for up to $68m to help monitor Europe coast’, The Times of Israel, 1 November 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/elbit-wins-drone-contract-for-up-to-68m-to-help-monitor-europe-coast

      [11] ‘Answer given by Ms Bulc on behalf of the European Commission’, https://netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/12/E-2946_191_Finalised_reply_Annex1_EN_V1.pdf

      [12] ‘Το drone της FRONTEX έπεσε, οι μετανάστες έρχονται’, Proto Thema, 27 January 2020, https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/968869/to-drone-tis-frontex-epese-oi-metanastes-erhodai

      [13] Morgan Meaker, ‘Here’s proof the UK is using drones to patrol the English Channel’, Wired, 10 January 2020, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uk-drones-migrants-english-channel

      [14] ‘Littoral: Les drones pour lutter contre les traversées de migrants sont opérationnels’, La Voix du Nord, 26 March 2019, https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/557951/article/2019-03-26/les-drones-pour-lutter-contre-les-traversees-de-migrants-sont-operation

      [15] ‘Frontex report on the functioning of Eurosur – Part I’, Council document 6215/18, 15 February 2018, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6215-2018-INIT/en/pdf

      [16] European Commission, ‘Eurosur’, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/border-crossing/eurosur_en

      [17] Legal reforms have also given Frontex the power to operate on the territory of non-EU states, subject to the conclusion of a status agreement between the EU and the country in question. The 2016 Frontex Regulation allowed such cooperation with states that share a border with the EU; the 2019 Frontex Regulation extends this to any non-EU state.

      [18] ‘Helping the Libyan Coast Guard to establish a Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre’, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-000547_EN.html

      [19] Matthias Monroy, ‘EU funds the sacking of rescue ships in the Mediterranean’, 7 July 2018, https://digit.site36.net/2018/07/03/eu-funds-the-sacking-of-rescue-ships-in-the-mediterranean

      [20] Frontex, ‘Frontex begins testing use of aerostat for border surveillance’, 31 July 2019, https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-begins-testing-use-of-aerostat-for-border-surveillance-ur33N8

      [21] ‘Answer given by Ms Johansson on behalf of the European Commission’, 7 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002529-ASW_EN.html

      [22] ‘Answer given by Vice-President Borrell on behalf of the European Commission’, 8 January 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2019-002654-ASW_EN.html

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2020/drones-for-frontex-unmanned-migration-control-at-europe-s-borders

      #drones

    • Monitoring “secondary movements” and “hotspots”: Frontex is now an internal surveillance agency (16.12.2019)

      The EU’s border agency, Frontex, now has powers to gather data on “secondary movements” and the “hotspots” within the EU. The intention is to ensure “situational awareness” and produce risk analyses on the migratory situation within the EU, in order to inform possible operational action by national authorities. This brings with it increased risks for the fundamental rights of both non-EU nationals and ethnic minority EU citizens.

      The establishment of a new ’standing corps’ of 10,000 border guards to be commanded by EU border agency Frontex has generated significant public and press attention in recent months. However, the new rules governing Frontex[1] include a number of other significant developments - including a mandate for the surveillance of migratory movements and migration “hotspots” within the EU.

      Previously, the agency’s surveillance role has been restricted to the external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or “selected third-country ports.”[2] New legal provisions mean it will now be able to gather data on the movement of people within the EU. While this is only supposed to deal with “trends, volumes and routes,” rather than personal data, it is intended to inform operational activity within the EU.

      This may mean an increase in operations against ‘unauthorised’ migrants, bringing with it risks for fundamental rights such as the possibility of racial profiling, detention, violence and the denial of access to asylum procedures. At the same time, in a context where internal borders have been reintroduced by numerous Schengen states over the last five years due to increased migration, it may be that he agency’s new role contributes to a further prolongation of internal border controls.

      From external to internal surveillance

      Frontex was initially established with the primary goals of assisting in the surveillance and control of the external borders of the EU. Over the years it has obtained increasing powers to conduct surveillance of those borders in order to identify potential ’threats’.

      The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) has a key role in this task, taking data from a variety of sources, including satellites, sensors, drones, ships, vehicles and other means operated both by national authorities and the agency itself. EUROSUR was formally established by legislation approved in 2013, although the system was developed and in use long before it was subject to a legal framework.[3]

      The new Frontex Regulation incorporates and updates the provisions of the 2013 EUROSUR Regulation. It maintains existing requirements for the agency to establish a “situational picture” of the EU’s external borders and the “pre-frontier area” – for example, the high seas or the ports of non-EU states – which is then distributed to the EU’s member states in order to inform operational activities.[4]

      The new rules also provide a mandate for reporting on “unauthorised secondary movements” and goings-on in the “hotspots”. The Commission’s proposal for the new Frontex Regulation was not accompanied by an impact assessment, which would have set out the reasoning and justifications for these new powers. The proposal merely pointed out that the new rules would “evolve” the scope of EUROSUR, to make it possible to “prevent secondary movements”.[5] As the European Data Protection Supervisor remarked, the lack of an impact assessment made it impossible: “to fully assess and verify its attended benefits and impact, notably on fundamental rights and freedoms, including the right to privacy and to the protection of personal data.”[6]

      The term “secondary movements” is not defined in the Regulation, but is generally used to refer to journeys between EU member states undertaken without permission, in particular by undocumented migrants and applicants for internal protection. Regarding the “hotspots” – established and operated by EU and national authorities in Italy and Greece – the Regulation provides a definition,[7] but little clarity on precisely what information will be gathered.

      Legal provisions

      A quick glance at Section 3 of the new Regulation, dealing with EUROSUR, gives little indication that the system will now be used for internal surveillance. The formal scope of EUROSUR is concerned with the external borders and border crossing points:

      “EUROSUR shall be used for border checks at authorised border crossing points and for external land, sea and air border surveillance, including the monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime and contributing to ensuring the protection and saving the lives of migrants.”

      However, the subsequent section of the Regulation (on ‘situational awareness’) makes clear the agency’s new internal role. Article 24 sets out the components of the “situational pictures” that will be visible in EUROSUR. There are three types – national situational pictures, the European situational picture and specific situational pictures. All of these should consist of an events layer, an operational layer and an analysis layer. The first of these layers should contain (emphasis added in all quotes):

      “…events and incidents related to unauthorised border crossings and cross-border crime and, where available, information on unauthorised secondary movements, for the purpose of understanding migratory trends, volume and routes.”

      Article 26, dealing with the European situational picture, states:

      “The Agency shall establish and maintain a European situational picture in order to provide the national coordination centres and the Commission with effective, accurate and timely information and analysis, covering the external borders, the pre-frontier area and unauthorised secondary movements.”

      The events layer of that picture should include “information relating to… incidents in the operational area of a joint operation or rapid intervention coordinated by the Agency, or in a hotspot.”[8] In a similar vein:

      “The operational layer of the European situational picture shall contain information on the joint operations and rapid interventions coordinated by the Agency and on hotspots, and shall include the mission statements, locations, status, duration, information on the Member States and other actors involved, daily and weekly situational reports, statistical data and information packages for the media.”[9]

      Article 28, dealing with ‘EUROSUR Fusion Services’, says that Frontex will provide national authorities with information on the external borders and pre-frontier area that may be derived from, amongst other things, the monitoring of “migratory flows towards and within the Union in terms of trends, volume and routes.”

      Sources of data

      The “situational pictures” compiled by Frontex and distributed via EUROSUR are made up of data gathered from a host of different sources. For the national situational picture, these are:

      national border surveillance systems;
      stationary and mobile sensors operated by national border agencies;
      border surveillance patrols and “other monitoring missions”;
      local, regional and other coordination centres;
      other national authorities and systems, such as immigration liaison officers, operational centres and contact points;
      border checks;
      Frontex;
      other member states’ national coordination centres;
      third countries’ authorities;
      ship reporting systems;
      other relevant European and international organisations; and
      other sources.[10]

      For the European situational picture, the sources of data are:

      national coordination centres;
      national situational pictures;
      immigration liaison officers;
      Frontex, including reports form its liaison officers;
      Union delegations and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions;
      other relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies and international organisations; and
      third countries’ authorities.[11]

      The EUROSUR handbook – which will presumably be redrafted to take into account the new legislation – provides more detail about what each of these categories may include.[12]

      Exactly how this melange of different data will be used to report on secondary movements is currently unknown. However, in accordance with Article 24 of the new Regulation:

      “The Commission shall adopt an implementing act laying down the details of the information layers of the situational pictures and the rules for the establishment of specific situational pictures. The implementing act shall specify the type of information to be provided, the entities responsible for collecting, processing, archiving and transmitting specific information, the maximum time limits for reporting, the data security and data protection rules and related quality control mechanisms.” [13]

      This implementing act will specify precisely how EUROSUR will report on “secondary movements”.[14] According to a ‘roadmap’ setting out plans for the implementation of the new Regulation, this implementing act should have been drawn up in the last quarter of 2020 by a newly-established European Border and Coast Guard Committee sitting within the Commission. However, that Committee does not yet appear to have held any meetings.[15]

      Operational activities at the internal borders

      Boosting Frontex’s operational role is one of the major purposes of the new Regulation, although it makes clear that the internal surveillance role “should not lead to operational activities of the Agency at the internal borders of the Member States.” Rather, internal surveillance should “contribute to the monitoring by the Agency of migratory flows towards and within the Union for the purpose of risk analysis and situational awareness.” The purpose is to inform operational activity by national authorities.

      In recent years Schengen member states have reintroduced border controls for significant periods in the name of ensuring internal security and combating irregular migration. An article in Deutsche Welle recently highlighted:

      “When increasing numbers of refugees started arriving in the European Union in 2015, Austria, Germany, Slovenia and Hungary quickly reintroduced controls, citing a “continuous big influx of persons seeking international protection.” This was the first time that migration had been mentioned as a reason for reintroducing border controls.

      Soon after, six Schengen members reintroduced controls for extended periods. Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway cited migration as a reason. France, as the sixth country, first introduced border checks after the November 2015 attacks in Paris, citing terrorist threats. Now, four years later, all six countries still have controls in place. On November 12, they are scheduled to extend them for another six months.”[16]

      These long-term extensions of internal border controls are illegal (the upper limit is supposed to be two years; discussions on changes to the rules governing the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area are ongoing).[17] A European Parliament resolution from May 2018 stated that “many of the prolongations are not in line with the existing rules as to their extensions, necessity or proportionality and are therefore unlawful.”[18] Yves Pascou, a researcher for the European Policy Centre, told Deutsche Welle that: “"We are in an entirely political situation now, not a legal one, and not one grounded in facts.”

      A European Parliament study published in 2016 highlighted that:

      “there has been a noticeable lack of detail and evidence given by the concerned EU Member States [those which reintroduced internal border controls]. For example, there have been no statistics on the numbers of people crossing borders and seeking asylum, or assessment of the extent to which reintroducing border checks complies with the principles of proportionality and necessity.”[19]

      One purpose of Frontex’s new internal surveillance powers is to provide such evidence (albeit in the ideologically-skewed form of ‘risk analysis’) on the situation within the EU. Whether the information provided will be of interest to national authorities is another question. Nevertheless, it would be a significant irony if the provision of that information were to contribute to the further maintenance of internal borders in the Schengen area.

      At the same time, there is a more pressing concern related to these new powers. Many discussions on the reintroduction of internal borders revolve around the fact that it is contrary to the idea, spirit (and in these cases, the law) of the Schengen area. What appears to have been totally overlooked is the effect the reintroduction of internal borders may have on non-EU nationals or ethnic minority citizens of the EU. One does not have to cross an internal Schengen frontier too many times to notice patterns in the appearance of the people who are hauled off trains and buses by border guards, but personal anecdotes are not the same thing as empirical investigation. If Frontex’s new powers are intended to inform operational activity by the member states at the internal borders of the EU, then the potential effects on fundamental rights must be taken into consideration and should be the subject of investigation by journalists, officials, politicians and researchers.

      Chris Jones

      Endnotes

      [1] The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal of the EU in mid-November: Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896

      [2] Article 12, ‘Common application of surveillance tools’, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R1052

      [3] According to Frontex, the Eurosur Network first came into use in December 2011 and in March 2012 was first used to “exchange operational information”. The Regulation governing the system came into force in October 2013 (see footnote 2). See: Charles Heller and Chris Jones, ‘Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders?’, Statewatch Journal, vol. 23 no. 3/4, February 2014, http://database.statewatch.org/article.asp?aid=33156

      [4] Recital 34, 2019 Regulation: “EUROSUR should provide an exhaustive situational picture not only at the external borders but also within the Schengen area and in the pre-frontier area. It should cover land, sea and air border surveillance and border checks.”

      [5] European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action no 98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no 1052/2013 and Regulation (EU) no 2016/1624’, COM(2018) 631 final, 12 September 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/sep/eu-com-frontex-proposal-regulation-com-18-631.pdf

      [6] EDPS, ‘Formal comments on the Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard’, 30 November 2018, p. p.2, https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-11-30_comments_proposal_regulation_european_border_coast_guard_en.pdf

      [7] Article 2(23): “‘hotspot area’ means an area created at the request of the host Member State in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant Union agencies and participating Member States cooperate, with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterised by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external borders”

      [8] Article 26(3)(c), 2019 Regulation

      [9] Article 26(4), 2019 Regulation

      [10] Article 25, 2019 Regulation

      [11] Article 26, 2019 Regulation

      [12] European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical Handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, C(2015) 9206 final, 15 December 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/eurosur_handbook_annex_en.pdf

      [13] Article 24(3), 2019 Regulation

      [14] ‘’Roadmap’ for implementing new Frontex Regulation: full steam ahead’, Statewatch News, 25 November 2019, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2019/nov/eu-frontex-roadmap.htm

      [15] Documents related to meetings of committees operating under the auspices of the European Commission can be found in the Comitology Register: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=Search.Search&NewSearch=1

      [16] Kira Schacht, ‘Border checks in EU countries challenge Schengen Agreement’, DW, 12 November 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/border-checks-in-eu-countries-challenge-schengen-agreement/a-51033603

      [17] European Parliament, ‘Temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders’, https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2017/0245(COD)&l=en

      [18] ‘Report on the annual report on the functioning of the Schengen area’, 3 May 2018, para.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0160_EN.html

      [19] Elpseth Guild et al, ‘Internal border controls in the Schengen area: is Schengen crisis-proof?’, European Parliament, June 2016, p.9, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571356/IPOL_STU(2016)571356_EN.pdf

      https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2019/monitoring-secondary-movements-and-hotspots-frontex-is-now-an-internal-s

      #mouvements_secondaires #hotspot #hotspots

  • #CANZONIERE_GRECANICO_SALENTINO « #SOLO_ANDATA »

    «Solo andata» è un brano dedicato alle migliaia di persone che tentano di raggiungere l’Europa affrontando dei viaggi pericolosissimi, nato dalla collaborazione tra #Erri_De_Luca e il Canzoniere Grecanico Salentino. Il videoclip è diretto da Alessandro Gassmann e prodotto da OH!PEN

    –-> Extrait :

    La terra ferma Italia, è terra chiusa.
    Vi lasciamo annegare. Per negare

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3637irO8V9Y

    #musique #musique_et_politique #migrations #réfugiés #Méditerrannée

    ping @sinehebdo @isskein