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Programmes de #Radio_Libertaire du 15 au 21 avril 2024
▻https://www.partage-noir.fr/programmes-de-radio-libertaire-du-15-au-21-avril-2024

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Demandez le programme de #RadioLibertaire 89.4 MHz Paris - #podcasts #RSS #Stream ---> ▻https://buff.ly/3Uic02r Partages

/ Radio Libertaire

#Partages_

How the Vatican helped legitimise the autocracy in #Azerbaijan
▻https://irpimedia.irpi.eu/en-how-the-vatican-helped-legitimize-the-autocracy-in-azerbaijanen

Relations with Baku are emblematic of how the Holy See is trying to gain credit in the Caucasus as a peace mediator. With some privileged relations L’articolo How the Vatican helped legitimise the autocracy in Azerbaijan proviene da IrpiMedia.

#Mondo #Armenia #Politica #Religione #Vaticano

Khrys’presso du lundi 15 avril 2024
▻https://framablog.org/2024/04/15/khryspresso-du-lundi-15-avril-2024

Comme chaque lundi, un coup d’œil dans le rétroviseur pour découvrir les informations que vous avez peut-être ratées la semaine dernière. Tous les liens listés ci-dessous sont a priori accessibles librement. Si ce n’est pas le cas, pensez à activer … Lire la suite­­

#Veille #Claviers_invités #GAFAM #Internet #Revue_de_web #Revue_hebdo #Surveillance #veille #webrevue

De la statistique au terrain
▻https://metropolitiques.eu/De-la-statistique-au-terrain.html

Comment anticiper la #vacance des logements et comment lutter contre ? À partir d’une étude de terrain à Montluçon, Charline Sowa et Hugo Bruyant montrent la complexité de cette question et les difficultés des élus pour y répondre. Le #logement vacant, un objet à étudier au-delà des chiffres La vacance dans les parcs de logements n’est pas un phénomène nouveau. Pour autant, l’analyse de ce phénomène très répandu reste un exercice complexe, dont les résultats peuvent rester partiels (Arab et Miot 2021 ; #Terrains

/ #habitat, vacance, ruralité, #villes_moyennes, #décroissance_urbaine, #élus_locaux, logement

#ruralité
▻https://metropolitiques.eu/IMG/pdf/met_sowa-bruyant.pdf

Ces sociétés proches des Biden liées au financement des crimes de l’Ukraine (Ir-press.ru)
▻https://www.crashdebug.fr/ces-societes-proches-des-biden-liees-au-financement-des-crimes-de-lukrain

https://crashdebugzone-15d1a.kxcdn.com/images/2024/Fevrier/Blackrock_ukraine.png

Valérie Bugault règle son compte à la FDNL (RI)
▻https://www.crashdebug.fr/valerie-bugault-regle-son-compte-a-la-fdnl-ri

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Inchiesta su #Ousmane_Sylla, morto d’accoglienza

https://www.monitor-italia.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/cpr-roma-1-e1710760515480.jpeg

A distanza di un mese dal suicidio di Ousmane Sylla nel #Cpr di #Ponte_Galeria, il 4 febbraio 2024, sono emersi nuovi elementi sulla sua triste vicenda, non raccontati nelle prime settimane. La prima cosa che sappiamo ora per certo è che Ousmane voleva vivere. Lo dimostrano i video e le foto che ho avuto da persone che lo hanno conosciuto, che lo ritraggono mentre balla, gioca, canta, sorride e scherza con il suo compagno di stanza. La sua vita però è stata stravolta da una violenza ingiustificabile, che scaturisce dalle dinamiche perverse su cui si basa il nostro sistema di accoglienza (ma non solo) e che impongono di farsi delle domande.

Già nei primi giorni dopo la morte si venne a sapere che Ousmane aveva denunciato maltrattamenti nella casa famiglia di cui era stato ospite, prima di essere trasferito al Cpr di Trapani. Gli avvocati che si stanno occupando del caso e alcune attiviste della rete LasciateCIEntrare hanno rintracciato la relazione psico-sociale redatta dalla psicologa A.C. del Cpr di Trapani Milo il 14 novembre 2023. Era passato un mese dal suo ingresso nella struttura, a seguito del decreto di espulsione emesso dalla prefettura di Frosinone in data 13 ottobre 2023.

La relazione dice che Ousmane “racconta di essere arrivato in Italia sei anni fa; inizialmente ha vissuto in una comunità per minori a Ventimiglia in Liguria, poi una volta raggiunta la maggiore età è stato trasferito presso la casa famiglia di Sant’Angelo in Theodice (Cassino). Racconta che all’interno della struttura era solito cantare, ma questo hobby non era ben visto dal resto degli ospiti. Così, un giorno, la direttrice del centro decide di farlo picchiare da un ospite tunisino. In conseguenza delle percosse subite, Sylla si reca al consiglio comunale di Cassino, convinto di trovarsi in Questura, per denunciare la violenza di cui si dichiara vittima”.

La casa famiglia di Sant’Angelo in Theodice è menzionata anche sulla scritta lasciata da Ousmane – sembrerebbe con un mozzicone di sigaretta – su una parete del Cpr di Roma, prima di impiccarsi a un lenzuolo, la notte tra il 3 e il 4 febbraio 2024.

“LASCIATEMI PARLARE”
Sulle cronache locali della Ciociaria, l’8 ottobre 2023 venne pubblicata la notizia di un giovane profugo africano presentatosi in consiglio comunale venerdì 6 ottobre (due giorni prima) per denunciare di aver subito violenze fisiche e maltrattamenti nella casa famiglia di cui era ospite, in questa frazione di Cassino di circa cinquecento abitanti. “Lasciatemi parlare o mi ammazzo”, avrebbe gridato, secondo Ciociaria oggi, che riferiva inoltre che “il giovane adesso ha paura di tornare nella casa famiglia”. La struttura era stata inaugurata sei mesi prima, il 3 aprile 2023, dal sindaco di Cassino Enzo Salera, originario proprio di Sant’Angelo, e dall’assessore con delega alle politiche sociali Luigi Maccaro, alla presenza del funzionario dei servizi sociali, Aldo Pasqualino Matera. Si trovano diversi articoli datati 4 aprile 2023, corredati di foto della cerimonia e della targa con il nome della casa famiglia. La struttura si chiamava Revenge, che significa rivincita ma anche vendetta.

La casa famiglia è stata chiusa tra dicembre e gennaio per “irregolarità”; le indagini sono ancora in corso. Era gestita dalla società Erregi Progress s.r.l.s. con sede in Spigno Saturnia, in provincia di Latina; la titolare della società e responsabile della casa famiglia è Rossella Compagna (non Campagna, come riportato in alcune cronache), affiancata nella gestione dall’avvocato Michelangiolo Soli, con studio legale a Minturno. Oggi sappiamo che mancavano le autorizzazioni della Asl locale all’apertura, e altri adempimenti; e che la maggior parte degli operatori che si sono succeduti nel corso dei circa nove mesi di apertura non ha mai percepito lo stipendio, né la malattia: almeno quelli che non erano vicini alla responsabile. Alcuni di essi hanno fatto causa alla società e sono in attesa di risarcimento. Altri non avevano neanche le qualifiche per operare in una struttura per minori stranieri non accompagnati.

Sono stata a Sant’Angelo in Theodice e ho incontrato diverse persone che hanno conosciuto Ousmane, che lo hanno seguito e aiutato durante il mese e mezzo circa della sua permanenza in paese. Grazie a loro ho potuto capire chi era Ousmane e ciò che ha vissuto in quel periodo. Ousmane è arrivato a Sant’Angelo tra la fine di agosto e l’inizio di settembre, insieme a un ragazzo marocchino, oggi maggiorenne. Provenivano da Ventimiglia, dove avevano trascorso insieme circa un mese in un campo della Croce Rossa Italiana, prima di essere trasferiti nella casa famiglia di Cassino. Ousmane non era però “da sei anni in Italia”, come trascritto dalla psicologa del Cpr di Trapani nella sua relazione. Sembrerebbe che fosse arrivato l’estate prima, nel 2023, a Lampedusa, come si intuisce anche dalla sua pagina Fb (“Fouki Fouki”). Il 3 agosto ha pubblicato un video in cui canta sulla banchina di un porto, quasi certamente siciliano. Forse era arrivato nella fase di sovraffollamento, caos e ritardi nei trasferimenti che spesso si verificano sull’isola in questa stagione. Avrebbe poi raggiunto Roma e successivamente Ventimiglia.

Il suo “progetto migratorio” era quello di arrivare in Francia, dove ha un fratello, cantante rap e animatore d’infanzia, Djibril Sylla, che ho incontrato di recente: è venuto a Roma per riconoscere il corpo di Ousmane e consentirne il ritorno in Africa. Ousmane parlava bene il francese e lo sapeva anche scrivere, come dimostra la scritta che ha lasciato sul muro prima di uccidersi. Con ogni probabilità è stato respinto al confine francese, verso l’Italia. Ousmane non era minorenne; si era dichiarato minorenne probabilmente perché né allo sbarco né al confine con la Francia ha potuto beneficiare di un orientamento legale adeguato che lo informasse dei suoi diritti e delle possibilità che aveva. Il regolamento “Dublino”, in vigore da decenni, prevede che i migranti restino o vengano rinviati nel primo paese in cui risultano le loro impronte (ci sono delle apposite banche dati europee), impedendo loro di raggiungere i luoghi dove hanno legami e comunità di riferimento o semplicemente dove desiderano proseguire la loro vita.

Una volta respinto, però, anziché fare domanda di protezione internazionale in Italia, Ousmane si è dichiarato minore, pur essendo ventunenne. Non sarà facile ricostruire chi possa averlo consigliato, guidato o influenzato in queste scelte e nei suoi rapporti con le autorità, dal suo arrivo in Italia in poi. Sappiamo, tuttavia, che dichiarandosi “minore” ha determinato l’inizio, incolpevole e inconsapevole, della fine della sua breve vita, non più in mano a lui da quel momento in poi.

Dichiarandosi maggiorenne, Ousmane avrebbe potuto presentare una domanda di protezione. Nel paese da cui proveniva, la Guinea Conakry, vige una dittatura militare dal 2021. I migranti possono chiedere protezione internazionale se manifestano il timore, ritenuto fondato da chi esamina il loro caso, di poter subire “trattamenti inumani e degradanti”, ovvero un danno grave, nel proprio paese di provenienza, laddove lo Stato di cui sono cittadini non fornisca loro adeguate protezioni. A Ousmane è accaduto l’inverso: i trattamenti inumani e degradanti li ha subiti in Italia.

Sin dal suo arrivo nella casa famiglia di Cassino, Ousmane ha patito uno stillicidio di vessazioni, minacce e deprivazioni, come ci riferiscono tutte le persone che lo hanno assistito e accompagnato in quel mese e mezzo, che testimoniano delle modalità inqualificabili con cui veniva gestita quella struttura, della brutalità con cui venivano trattati gli ospiti, del clima di squallore e terrore che vigeva internamente. Abbiamo ascoltato i messaggi vocali aggressivi che la responsabile inoltrava ai suoi operatori, sia ai danni degli operatori che degli ospiti, scarsamente nutriti e abbandonati a sé stessi, come appare anche dalle foto. Ousmane, a causa del suo atteggiamento ribelle e “resistente”, sarebbe stato punito ripetutamente con botte, privazione di cibo, scarpe, coperte e indumenti, e di servizi cui aveva diritto, non solo in quanto “minore”, ma in quanto migrante in accoglienza: per esempio, l’accesso ai dispositivi di comunicazione (telefono e scheda per poter contattare i familiari), la scuola di italiano, il pocket money.

Tutte le persone con cui ho parlato sono concordi nel descrivere Ousmane come un ragazzo rispettoso, intelligente, altruista e sensibile; sano, dinamico, grintoso, si ispirava alla cultura rasta e cantava canzoni di rivolta e di libertà in slang giamaicano e in sousou, la sua lingua madre. La sua unica “colpa” è stata opporsi a quello che vedeva lì, riprendendo con foto e video le ingiustizie che subiva e vedeva intorno a sé. A causa di questo suo comportamento è stato discriminato dalla responsabile e da alcuni personaggi, come un ragazzo tunisino di forse vent’anni. Dopo un mese di detenzione lo stesso Ousmane raccontò alla psicologa del Cpr di Trapani che la responsabile della casa famiglia l’avrebbe fatto picchiare da un “ospite tunisino”.

Il 6 ottobre 2023, forse indirizzato da qualche abitante del luogo, Ousmane raggiunse il consiglio comunale di Cassino, nella speranza che le autorità italiane potessero proteggerlo. Una consigliera comunale con cui ho parlato mi ha descritto lo stato di agitazione e sofferenza in cui appariva il ragazzo: con ai piedi delle ciabatte malridotte, si alzava la maglietta per mostrare i segni di percosse sul torace. Ousmane non fu ascoltato dal sindaco Salera, tutore legale dei minori non accompagnati della casa famiglia. Ousmane fu ascoltato solo dalla consigliera che comprendeva il francese, in presenza di poche persone, dopo che il sindaco e la giunta si erano allontanati. A quanto pare quel giorno si presentò in consiglio anche una delegazione di abitanti per chiedere la chiusura della struttura, ritenuta mal gestita e causa di tensioni in paese.

Una settimana dopo, il 13 ottobre, Ousmane tornò al consiglio comunale, dichiarando di essere maggiorenne. Pare che prima avesse provato a rivolgersi alla caserma dei carabinieri – chiedeva dove fosse la “gendarmerie” – per mostrare i video che aveva nel telefono: la sua denuncia non fu raccolta, perché in quel momento mancava il maresciallo. Di nuovo, forse non sapremo mai da chi Ousmane sia stato consigliato, guidato e influenzato, nella sua scelta di rivelare la sua maggiore età. Perché non gli fu mai consentito di esporre denuncia e di ottenere un permesso di soggiorno provvisorio, per esempio per cure mediche, o per protezione speciale, visto che aveva subito danni psicofisici nella struttura di accoglienza, e che voleva contribuire a sventare dei crimini?

Come in molte strutture per minori migranti, la responsabile era consapevole della possibilità che molti dei suoi ospiti fossero in realtà maggiorenni. “Una volta che scoprono che sono maggiorenni, devono tornare a casa loro, perché le strutture non li vogliono”, spiega in un messaggio audio ai suoi operatori. In un altro dei messaggi che ho sentito, questa consapevolezza assume toni intimidatori: “Quindi abbassassero le orecchie, perché io li faccio neri a tutti quanti”, diceva. “Io chiudo la casa, e poi riapro, con altra gente. Dopo un mese. Ma loro se ne devono andare affanculo. Tutti! Ne salvo due o tre forse. Chiudiamo, facciamo finta di chiudere. Loro se ne vanno in mezzo alla strada, via, e io faccio tutto daccapo, con gente che voglio io. Quindi abbassassero le orecchie perché mi hanno rotto i coglioni”. Nello stesso messaggio, la responsabile aggiunge: “Tu devi essere educato con me; e io forse ti ricarico il telefono; sennò prendi solo calci in culo, e io ti butto affanculo nel tuo paese di merda”.

La minore età può essere usata come arma di ricatto. I migranti che si dichiarano minori, infatti, entrano nel circuito delle strutture per minori stranieri non accompagnati, e ottengono un permesso di soggiorno per minore età appena nominano un tutore (solitamente il sindaco). In caso di dubbio sulla minore età questi vengono sottoposti ad accertamenti psico-fisici, che consistono nella radiografia del polso e in una serie di visite specialistiche presso una struttura sanitaria.

Per l’accoglienza di un minore straniero non accompagnato, il ministero dell’interno eroga ai comuni che ne fanno richiesta (tramite le prefetture) dai novanta ai centoventi euro al giorno, che finiscono in buona parte nelle tasche degli enti gestori (che per guadagnare possono risparmiare su cibo, servizi, personale, in quanto non sono previsti controlli davvero efficaci sulla gestione dei contributi statali). Ma anche i comuni hanno da guadagnare sull’accoglienza ai minori. A questo proposito, vale la pena richiamare le parole pronunciate dall’assessore ai servizi sociali Maccaro in occasione dell’apertura della casa famiglia e riportate in un articolo di Radio Cassino Stereo, presente in rete: “Una nuova realtà sociale al servizio del territorio è una ricchezza per tutto il sistema dei servizi sociali che vive della collaborazione tra pubblico e privato sociale. Siamo certi che questa nuova realtà potrà integrarsi in una rete sociale che in questi anni sta mostrando grande attenzione al tema dei minori”.

Le autorità possono in qualsiasi momento sottoporre i giovani stranieri non accompagnati ad accertamento dell’età. È così che questi ragazzi divengono vulnerabili e costretti a sottostare a qualsiasi condizione venga loro imposta, poiché rischiano di perdere l’accoglienza e finire nei Cpr. Molti migranti ventenni con un viso da adolescente, come Ousmane, vengono incoraggiati a dichiararsi minori: più ce ne sono, più saranno necessarie strutture e servizi ben sovvenzionati (molto più dei servizi per maggiorenni).

NEL LIMBO DEI CPR
Dopo la seconda apparizione in consiglio comunale, il 13 ottobre, anziché essere supportato, tutelato e orientato ai suoi diritti, Ousmane è stato immediatamente colpito da decreto di espulsione, e subito trasferito (il 14 ottobre) nel Cpr di Trapani Milo, dove trascorrerà tre mesi. Inutile il tentativo dell’avvocato del Cpr Giuseppe Caradonna di chiederne dopo un mese il trasferimento, con una missiva indirizzata alla questura di Trapani, in cui scriveva “continua purtroppo a mantenere una condotta del tutto incompatibile con le condizioni del Centro [Cpr] (probabilmente per via di disturbi psichici derivanti da esperienze traumatiche) al punto da mettere a serio rischio la propria e l’altrui incolumità. A supporto della presente, allego una relazione psico-sociale, redatta in data odierna dalla dottoressa A.C., psicologa che opera all’interno della struttura, la quale ha evidenziato dettagliatamente la condizione in cui versa Ousmane Sylla. Pertanto, mi permetto di sollecitare un Suo intervento per far sì che quest’ultimo venga trasferito al più presto in una struttura più idonea e compatibile con il suo stato di salute mentale”.

La psicologa aveva scritto: “Ritengo che l’utente possa trarre beneficio dal trasferimento presso un’altra struttura più idonea a rispondere ai suoi bisogni, in cui siano previsti maggiori spazi per interventi supportivi e una maggiore supervisione delle problematiche esposte”. Richiesta alla quale la questura di Trapani risponderà negativamente, con la motivazione che “lo straniero aveva fatto ingresso nella struttura munito di adeguata certificazione sanitaria che attesta l’idoneità alla vita in comunità ristretta e che costituisce condicio sine qua non per l’accesso all’interno dei Cpr”.

Chi aveva redatto quella “adeguata certificazione sanitaria” di cui Ousmane era munito all’ingresso nel Cpr di Trapani, se ancora portava addosso i segni delle violenze subite, come testimoniato dalla consigliera cassinese che lo aveva ascoltato nella settimana precedente, rilevandone anche lo stato di estremo disagio psicologico?

Ousmane affermava, ripetutamente, di voler tornare in Africa. Lo diceva anche alle operatrici della casa famiglia con cui abbiamo parlato: “Gli mancava la mamma”, hanno riferito, con la quale non poteva neanche comunicare, perché privato del telefono. Un’operatrice ricorda che una volta la disegnò, perché Ousmane amava anche disegnare, oltre che cantare e giocare a pallone. Studiava l’italiano con lei ed “era molto bravo”, dice, apprendeva rapidamente.

Voleva tornare in Africa, non perché volesse rinunciare al sogno di una vita migliore in Europa, in Francia o in Italia, anche per poter aiutare la famiglia che vive in povertà in un sobborgo di Conakry (madre, sorelle e fratelli più piccoli), ma perché non aveva trovato qui alcuna forma di accoglienza degna di chiamarsi tale, se non nelle persone che lo hanno assistito, ascoltato e che testimoniano oggi in suo favore; persone che hanno fatto il possibile per lui, tuttavia non sono “bastate” a salvargli la vita; non per loro responsabilità, ma perché ignorate o sovrastate dalle istituzioni e dalle autorità che avrebbero potuto e dovuto tutelare Ousmane.

Dopo tre mesi trascorsi nel Cpr di Trapani, Ousmane verrà trasferito a fine gennaio nel Cpr di Roma, per continuare a restare in un assurdo limbo, in condizioni “inumane e degradanti” nelle quali è ben noto versino i Cpr. L’Italia non ha accordi bilaterali con la Guinea Conakry, come con tanti altri paesi di provenienza dei migranti detenuti nei Cpr.

Il 19 settembre 2023, il sito istituzionale integrazionemigranti.gov.it, informava che il giorno prima il Consiglio dei ministri aveva varato nuove norme contro l’immigrazione irregolare: “Si estende – come consentito dalla normativa euro-unitaria – a diciotto mesi (sei mesi iniziali, seguiti da proroghe trimestrali) il limite massimo di permanenza nei centri per il rimpatrio degli stranieri non richiedenti asilo, per i quali sussistano esigenze specifiche (se lo straniero non collabora al suo allontanamento o per i ritardi nell’ottenimento della necessaria documentazione da parte dei paesi terzi). Il limite attuale è di tre mesi, con una possibile proroga di quarantacinque giorni. […] Inoltre, si prevede l’approvazione, con decreto del presidente del Consiglio dei ministri, su proposta del ministro della difesa, di un piano per la costruzione, da parte del Genio militare, di ulteriori Cpr, da realizzare in zone scarsamente popolate e facilmente sorvegliabili”. È il cosiddetto Decreto Cutro.

Secondo la relazione del Garante nazionale per le persone private della libertà personale, sono transitate nei Cpr 6.383 persone, di cui 3.154 sono state rimpatriate. Quelle provenienti da Tunisia (2.308), Egitto (329), Marocco (189) e Albania (58), rappresentano il 49,4%. In base allo scopo dichiarato per cui esistono i Cpr, la maggioranza è stata trattenuta inutilmente.

Come riporta il Dossier statistico sull’immigrazione 2023, “il governo si ripromette di aprire altri dodici centri, uno per ogni regione, in luoghi lontani dai centri abitati […]. Nei dieci centri attivi in Italia possono essere ospitate 1.378 persone. Tuttavia, complici la fatiscenza delle strutture e le continue sommosse, la cifra reale si dimezza. […] Dal 2019 al 2022, otto persone sono morte nei Cpr, in circostanze diverse. Infiniti sono i casi di autolesionismo e di violenza. Numerose sono le inchieste che confermano come in questi luoghi si pratichi abuso di psicofarmaci a scopo sedativo”.

Il caso più noto è quello del ventiseienne tunisino Wissem Ben Abdel Latif, deceduto nel novembre 2021, ancora in circostante sospette, dopo essere rimasto legato a un letto per cento ore consecutive nel reparto psichiatrico del San Camillo di Roma. La detenzione amministrativa di Ousmane si sarebbe potuta protrarre molto a lungo, inutilmente. Sono pochissimi i migranti che a oggi beneficiano dei programmi di “rimpatrio assistito”, che prevedono anch’essi accordi e progetti con i paesi di origine per la loro effettiva attuazione. Con la Guinea Conakry non ci risultano accordi neanche sui rimpatri assistiti.
Ousmane, trovato impiccato a un lenzuolo la mattina del 4 febbraio, non vedeva forse vie di uscita e ha scelto di morire per “liberarsi”, chiedendo, nel messaggio lasciato sul muro prima di togliersi la vita, che il suo corpo venisse riportato in Africa “affinché riposi in pace” e sua madre non pianga per lui. Alcuni migranti che hanno condiviso con lui la detenzione nel Cpr di Trapani, dicono fosse stato “imbottito di psicofarmaci”. A oggi, sono ancora tanti i lati oscuri di questa vicenda, ma sono in molti a invocare verità e giustizia per Ousmane Sylla, come per tutte le persone schiacciate dall’insostenibile peso del “sistema”, al quale alcune di esse – come Ousmane – hanno provato a ribellarsi, con coraggio e dignità.

▻https://www.monitor-italia.it/inchiesta-su-ousmane-sylla-morto-daccoglienza
#migrations #asile #réfugiés #Italie #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #morts_aux_frontières #Trapani #détention_administrative #rétention

–-

Vu que Ousmane a été arrêté à Vintimille pour l’amener dans un centre de détention administrative dans le Sud de l’Italie et que, selon les informations que j’ai récolté à la frontière Vintimille-Menton, il avait l’intention de se rendre en France, j’ai décidé de l’inclure dans les cas des personnes décédées à la #frontière_sud-alpine.
Ajouté donc à cette métaliste des morts à la frontière #Italie-#France (frontière basse, donc #Vintimille / #Alpes_Maritimes) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/784767

La réalité d’une apparition : Un mot flotte à l’intérieur d’un autre. La mécanique du réel. Garder la cicatrice mais effacer son empreinte.

▻https://liminaire.fr/entre-les-lignes/article/la-realite-d-une-apparition

https://liminaire.fr/local/cache-vignettes/L500xH334/53637784693_1982c23c8e_k-a0473.jpg?1712656137 https://liminaire.fr/local/cache-vignettes/L500xH334/9786319835_daba5a6a9b_k-6e529.jpg?1712656138

#Récit, #Poésie, #Photographie, #ContactsSuccessifs

La société ingouvernable – Une généalogie du libéralisme autoritaire
▻https://bascules.blog/2024/04/14/la-societe-ingouvernable-une-genealogie-du-liberalisme-autoritaire

« La société ingouvernable – Une généalogie du libéralisme autoritaire » de Grégoire Chamayou, publié en 2018 aux éditions La Fabrique, est un ouvrage qui plonge profondément dans les racines et les ramifications du libéralisme autoritaire. Chamayou offre une analyse perspicace de ce phénomène complexe, explorant ses origines historiques et son impact contemporain sur la société. L’auteur […]

#Recensions_d'ouvrages #Autoritarisme #Capitalisme
▻https://bascules.blog/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/la-societe-ingouvernable-une-genealogie-du-liberalisme-autoritaire.webp
►https://2.gravatar.com/avatar/2cef04a2923b4b5ffd87d36fa9b79bc27ee5b22c4478d785c3a3b7ef8ab60424?s=96&d=

L’Occident perdu dans le désordre mondial ? – Alain Juillet dans Le Samedi Politique (TVL)
▻https://www.crashdebug.fr/loccident-perdu-dans-le-desordre-mondial-alain-juillet-dans-le-samedi-pol

https://crashdebugzone-15d1a.kxcdn.com/images/2024/Fevrier/Bascule_mondiale_LSP.png

Fermo Mare Jonio: il Ministro Piantedosi ha mentito al Parlamento
▻https://www.meltingpot.org/2024/04/fermo-mare-jonio-il-ministro-piantedosi-ha-mentito-al-parlamento

Giovedì pomeriggio in Senato, il Ministro dell’interno Piantedosi ha risposto all’interrogazione urgente presentata dal senatore Antonio Nicita in merito all’attacco armato da parte della motovedetta libica 658 “Fezzan”, avvenuto lo scorso 4 aprile in acque internazionali, contro naufraghi in acqua e i soccorritori della nave Mare Jonio di Mediterranea Saving Humans. Il titolare del Viminale ha affermato che la nave italiana è intervenuta in un “momento successivo, avvicinandosi alla motovedetta Fezzan quando questa aveva già assolto gli obblighi di salvataggio #In_mare”. Secondo Mediterranea, quando detto da Piantedosi, «è clamorosamente falso». Queste affermazioni sono confermate dal nuovo #Video diffuso (...)

#Notizie #Accordo_Italia_-_Libia #Decreto_Piantedosi #Italia #Libia #Mediterraneo_centrale #Operazioni_SAR #Redazione #Violazioni_e_abusi

Policing migration: when “harm reduction” means “multipurpose aerial surveillance”

The EU’s latest “#operational_action_plan” on migrant smuggling gives a central role to #Europol, which will receive data resulting from more than two dozen joint police operations launched by EU member states, EU agencies and a range of non-EU states. The UK is heavily involved in the plan, and is leading one activity. One objective is for harm reduction and assistance to victims, but the only activity foreseen is for Frontex to increase use of its “#EUROSUR_Fusion_Services, including the #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance aircraft service.”

https://www.statewatch.org/media/4219/eu-smuggling-surveillance.jpg

Police against people smuggling

The action plan (pdf) covers the 2024-25 period and contains an outline of 25 activities listed under eight strategic goals, but offers no insight into the causes of human smuggling, and none of the activities are framed at addressing causes.

The overall aim is to control migration flows both into the EU and within the EU, and to enhance police cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, EU agencies (Europol, #Frontex and the #EU_police_database_agency, #eu-LISA) and with countries outside the EU, through joint operations and the exchange of information and intelligence.

Many of the activities include targets for arrests: one led by Poland, for example, foresees the arrest of 200 facilitators of irregular migration per year; another, led by Cyprus, expects at least 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”.

In 2015, Statewatch exposed a planned EU-wide police operation against irregular migrants called ‘Mos Maiorum’, which led to significant media coverage and political controversy, as well as numerous actions to inform people of their rights and to try to map police activities. Since then, the number of such operations has skyrocketed, but attention has dwindled.

European plan

The 2024-25 plan is part of the #European_Multidisciplinary_Platform_Against_Criminal Threats, a now-permanent initiative (▻https://www.statewatch.org/statewatch-database/eu-joint-police-operations-target-irregular-migrants-by-chris-jones) through which joint police operations are coordinated. It is managed by Europol, with political control exercised by the member states in the Council of the EU.

A “leader” is assigned to each activity in the action plan, responsible for initiating and reporting on the relevant activity, with “key performance indicators” often indicated in respect of each one.

The leaders include nine EU member states (Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain), the UK, as well Frontex, Europol, eu-LISA and the European Police College (CEPOL).

Europol will provide overall support across all the different activities and is specifically responsible for leading four activities.

In many activities led by national police forces, it is specified that a goal is also to participate in other Europol initiatives, such as the “Europol Cyberpatrol to target and identify targets” and Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre. The Operational Action Plan stipulates that other, unspecified, “Europol tools” may be used “where appropriate”.

The action plan specifies that the operational data emanating from the activities is to be shared with Europol to be processed through its Analysis Projects, further swelling the databases at its headquarters in The Hague.

The first version of the action plan was circulated amongst member states two weeks before the European Commission published a proposal to reinforce Europol’s powers in relation to migrant smuggling, arguing that they were urgently needed – though this assessment was not shared by the member states.

Strategic goals

The 26 activities outlined in the plan are designed to contribute to eight strategic goals:

- Criminal intelligence picture. The activities under this heading are for Europol to provide a “situational picture of migrant smuggling” including threat assessments, updates on migratory routes, “modi operandi” and future trends, which will be made available to member states and third countries. It will involve sharing information with Frontex. Europol also aims to “strengthen the strategic and tactical intelligence picture on the use/abuse of legal business structures by criminal networks” not only in respect of migrant smuggling, but throughout “all main crime areas affecting the EU”.
- Investigations and judicial response. There are 11 activities planned in relation to this goal. The objective is to prepare and conduct investigations and prosecutions. Police forces of different member states lead the activities and set out specific targets by reference to the numbers of arrests, initiated investigations and identified networks. Each planned activity appears to reflect specific national or local police force priorities. Germany for instance aims to “detect 5,000 irregular migrants” per year, and arrest 500 “facilitators”, whilst France focuses on seizing 100 small boats crossing the Channel to the UK. Spain focuses on air routes, including links between human smuggling and drug trafficking; and Portugal’s aim is to disrupt “marriages of convenience abuse and associated threats” (400 cases specifically). Europol also leads an activity aimed at the development of “intelligence products in support of MS investigations” (50 per year) and Frontex aims to focus on border checks and surveillance measures on the EU external borders (with 1,000 “apprehensions/arrests”).
- Coordinated controls and operations targeting the online and offline trade in illicit goods and services. The only activity planned in relation to this goal is by the French police forces, to improve law enforcement response against “those utilising the Dark Web and other internet messenger applications to enable illegal immigration and document fraud”. The dark web is identified as an “intelligence gap” in this context.
- Criminal finances, money laundering and asset recovery. Led by the UK, the activity planned under this goal heading is to disrupt money flows specifically within hawaladar networks.
- Document fraud. Frontex, as well as French and German police forces each lead activities under this goal aimed at “targeting networks or individuals” involved in document fraud. In this respect, Frontex’s “Centre of Excellence for Combating Document Fraud” has a key role.
– Capacity building through training, networking and innovation. This involves activities aimed at improving the skills, knowledge and expertise of law enforcement and judicial authorities, led by CEPOL, eu-LISA (on the use of SIS and Eurodac databases) and German police forces.
- Prevention, awareness raising and harm reduction, as well as early identification and assistance to victims. The only goal that is expressed as being aimed at improving the safety of people is led by Frontex, and is focused on the detection of migrant smuggling through the “use of EUROSUR Fusion Services, including the Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance aircraft service, for [member states] and stakeholders to support more effective detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and migrant smuggling.” No mention is made of identification, assistance or victims.
- Cooperation with non EU partners: under this last goal, one activity is led by Austrian police forces, aimed at expanding the geographical focus of the Task Force Western Balkans to Turkey and “other relevant countries of origin and transit”. The work is already based on intelligence information provided by Europol and Frontex and aims to “enhance mobile phone extractions” (the link here is not clear). The second activity listed under this last goal is led by Europol, and aims to provide a “common platform for EU agencies, military, law enforcement and other stakeholders to exchange intelligence on criminal networks operating along the migration corridors”, creating a broad and focal role for itself in information exchange with a wide range of stakeholders, including private companies.

For the purposes of the Operational Action Plan, “migrant smuggling” is broadly defined as:

“…the process of facilitating the unlawful entry, transit or residence of an individual in a country with or without obtaining financial or other benefits. Migrant smuggling entails the facilitation of illegal entry to the EU and of secondary movements within the EU. It can also involve facilitating the fraudulent acquisition of a residence status in the EU.”

It therefore does not require the involvement of any benefit and includes movements within the EU.

▻https://www.statewatch.org/news/2024/april/policing-migration-when-harm-reduction-means-multipurpose-aerial-surveil
#surveillance #surveillance_aérienne #migrations #réfugiés #données #coopération_policière #European_Police_College (#CEPOL) #European_Migrant_Smuggling_Centre #Europol_Cyberpatrol

Makhno contre l’antisémitisme (3)
►http://anarlivres.free.fr/pages/nouveau.html#makhno3

A la mort de Makhno, à 46 ans, « Le Libertaire » consacra la presque totalité de son numéro du 3 août 1934 pour lui rendre hommage, revenant sur les épisodes de sa vie, ses combats et ses apports... Un article de Voline, « Aux calomniateurs », revenait sur les accusations de pogroms, apportant de nouveaux éléments. Il est à noter que l’auteur, lui-même d’origine juive et ayant participé à la Makhnovchtchina, a depuis le début soutenu Makhno malgré leurs différends personnels et leurs choix organisationnels opposés...

#libertaire #Makhno #Ukraine #pogrom #antisémitisme #Russie #Voline #anarchisme #juif

German colonial genocide in Namibia the #Hornkranz massacre

Introduction

On 12 April 1893, German colonial troops attacked the Nama settlement of ||Nâ‡gâs, known today as Hornkranz. Their intent was to destroy the settlement and its people, after its leader, Hendrik Witbooi, refused to sign so-called ‘protection’ treaties—tools of the German colonial administration for controlling sovereign indigenous nations and their lands. As their presence in what they declared in 1885 as ‘German Southwest Africa’ grew, the German regime was increasingly unwilling to tolerate the independence and agency exercised by Hendrik Witbooi and his clan in the face of the encroaching German empire.

In their attack on Hornkranz, the Germans wanted to both make an example of the Witbooi clan and to punish them for their defiant rejection of German rule. Curt von Francois, who led the attack, made his objective clear: ‘to exterminate the Witbooi tribe’ (Bundesarchiv, R 1001/1483, p. 46). In this premeditated act of erasure, his troops massacred almost eighty women and children before capturing another hundred, burned what remained of the settlement to the ground, and established a garrison, rendering it impossible for survivors to return.

Though the genocide of the Nama, Ovaherero and other peoples indigenous to what is now modern-day Namibia is widely recognised to have taken place between 1904 and 1908, the Nama people remember this massacre as the true first act in the genocide against them. This is substantiated not only by the clarity of the German objective to destroy the |Khowesin as a people, but also by the retrospective reading of Hornkranz as a clear precedent of the systemic tactics of dispossession and destruction that would be used by the Germans against the Nama, the Ovaherero, the San, and others in the years to come.

Outside of the descendant communities, the events at Hornkranz have until now been overlooked and underrepresented, as has the cultural significance of the settlement itself within the dominant historiography, broadly based on the German visual and narrative record. The site of the former Witbooi settlement was expropriated and today constitutes a private farm, access to which is possible only with special permission from its owner. The descendants of Hornkranz are rarely able to visit their own cultural heritage sites and commemorate the struggle of their ancestors.

The faint extant traces of the Witbooi settlement at Hornkranz can be identified today only with the guidance of the descendants and the historians that learned from them. Two plaques on the site are the only indications of the Nama presence on that land. One plaque was inaugurated by the community in 1997, the only occasion on which they were able to gather to commemorate the massacre at the site where it took place. The other plaque (date unknown) glorifies the German troops, even going so far as to include an offensive slur for the Nama; the massacre is described as a ‘battle’, conveying little of the atrocities perpetrated there.

The descendants of Hornkranz and the wider Nama community continue to struggle for justice and for opportunities to correct the historical record and tell the story of Hornkranz on their own terms. In support of their efforts to resist this erasure, we worked with descendants, who have inherited knowledge of their community’s history through oral transmission over multiple generations, to reconstruct the lost settlement and produce a new body of visual evidence about the massacre and its aftermath. Led by their testimonies, we used modelling and mapping techniques along with our own field research and a very limited archival record to situate their accounts and rematerialize Hornkranz.

Our reconstruction of the Witbooi settlement at Hornkranz aims to underscore the vitality of oral tradition in the act of reconstituting the colonial archive and testifies to the oral transmission of inherited knowledge as an ongoing act of resistance in itself.
Background

The |Khowesin (Witbooi) people, a semi-nomadic subtribe of the wider Nama peoples, settled around the perennial spring at Hornkranz in 1884-1885, the very period during which the Berlin Conference, formalising the fragmentation of Africa into colonies and protectorates, was taking place. The chief of the Witbooi clan, Hendrik Witbooi, later went on to become one of the most prominent figures of anti-colonial resistance in Southwest Africa, uniting all Nama clans and later forming a coalition with the Ovaherero to fight against the German colonial regime.

Following the establishment of their settlement in Hornkranz, the Witbooi Nama lived relatively undisturbed until 1892, when first attempts to compel Hendrik Witbooi into signing a protection treaty began. Hendrik Witbooi, aware that the true objective of the so-called ‘protection treaties’ was nothing short of subjugation, was the last leader to refuse to comply:

What are we being protected against? From what danger or difficulty, or suffering can one chief be protected by another? […] I see no truth or sense, in the suggestion that a chief who has surrendered may keep his autonomy and do as he likes.

The German attempt to secure control over the peoples inhabiting the colony and their land is manifested in their mapping efforts. The first map we found featuring Hornkranz dates to 1892, the same year that the Germans began demanding the Witbooi sign such treaties. Despite Witbooi’s refusal to sign, Hornkranz is labelled in these German maps as ‘proposed Crown Land’ already six months before the attack—the very act of cartographic representation prefiguring the expulsion and massacre to follow less than a year later.

After the Germans attacked Hornkranz, the Witboois were finally forced to concede and sign one of the protection treaties they had so long been resisting.

A decade later, in 1904, the Nama joined the Ovaherero in an anti-colonial struggle against German rule. In response, the Germans issued an extermination order against the Ovaherero and later, another against the Nama. Hendrik Witbooi died in battle on 29 October 1905. Following his death, the Nama tribes surrendered. The extermination order against the Nama was never revoked.
12 April 1893: The Attack and Aftermath

The German troops approached the settlement in the early hours of 12 April, planning to attack under the cover of night without any warning. They then split into three contingents—a recounting of this strategy is recorded in the diary of Kurd Schwabe, one of the perpetrators of the attack. Von Francois led the attack from the northern side, entering the village first, while Schwabe approached from the east.

Hendrik Witbooi, who was allegedly sitting outside of his house when he noticed the approaching troops, ordered all Nama fighters to retreat and take up defensive positions along the riverbed, where he expected the ensuing battle to take place. Instead, the German troops stopped when they reached the sleeping village and proceeded to target the defenceless population that had stayed behind. The brutality of the onslaught came as a shock to Hendrik Witbooi, who had not expected the Germans to unleash such ‘uncivilised’ tactics upon another sovereign nation.

Sixteen thousand rounds of bullets were reportedly discharged by the Germans in the span of just thirty minutes. According to the testimony of descendants and corroborated by Schwabe’s diary, some victims were burned alive in their homes.

The canisters recovered from the site during our fieldwork in September 2023 indicate where some exchange of fire may have taken place while the Witbooi fighters were retreating. While the found bullets were identified as those used by the Witbooi Nama, their location and distribution also corroborates written descriptions of the massacre unfolding in the inhabited area of the settlement, with stored ammunition exploding from inside the burning houses.

The massacre yielded 88 victims: ten men, including one of Hendrik Witbooi’s sons, and 78 women and children.

The following day, the German troops returned to raze what remained of the settlement to the ground. Promptly after, a garrison was established on the ashes of the Witbooi settlement, reinforcing the Germans’ clear intention to claim the land and prevent the Witboois from ever returning.

Over the next year, the Witbooi Nama made several attempts to return to Hornkranz, resulting in four more skirmishes on the site. Eventually, they were forced to sign a protection treaty in Naukluft in August 1894, which cemented the dispossession of their land.

The treaty meant that the Witbooi Nama were now obliged to assist the Schutztruppen in their battles against other tribes, most devastatingly at the Battle of Waterberg in August 1904 (see our Phase 1 investigation of this event). Once the Nama realised the true genocidal intent of the Schutztruppen, they united with the Ovaherero against colonial rule. The extermination order against the Nama was issued on 22 April 1905.

After the genocidal war ended in 1908, Hornkranz was sold off to a private owner and a police station was established on its premises. Today, the police station building is the main farmhouse.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/22_Hornkranz_Map-of-German-Attack_12-April-1893-768x320.png

Nama descendants are seeking to establish the 1893 massacre as the first act of genocide against the Nama, and 12 April as the official Genocide Remembrance Day in Namibia.

This investigation—part of a larger collaboration between Forensic Architecture, Forensis, Nama Traditional Leaders Association (NTLA) and Ovaherero Traditional Authority (OTA)—seeks to support the community’s broader efforts to make the site accessible for commemoration and preservation.

Methodology
What Remains

Little material evidence of Hornkranz survives today. This is in part due to the scale and totality of destruction by the Germans; but it is also a testament to the Witbooi’s steadfast resistance to being documented by the colonial regime, as well as to the light footprint the Nama exerted on the land through their semi-nomadic inhabitation and subsistence. The archival record about the Witbooi and Hornkranz is also sparse and skewed. Alongside an incomplete and biased colonial description of the massacre and the settlement, the only visual representation of Hornkranz on record is a soldier’s crude sketch showing its houses set alight by the German troops on the night of the massacre. The memory of Hornkranz as it was at the time of the attack lives on instead through the descendant communities who have inherited the testimonies of their forebearers about its material culture, rituals, life and environmental practices; our reconstruction and understanding of Hornkranz is possible only insofar as we are led by their testimonies.

Around the rectangular patch where Hendrik Witbooi’s house once stood, Maboss Ortman and Lazarus Kairabeb, NTLA advisors, identified stones they said are the ruins of the house. Right next to it is the only stone foundation in the settlement, that of a church still under construction at the time of the German assault. These two traces anchored us spatially when we began the 3D reconstruction. We were told by Zak Dirkse, a Nama historian, that Hendrik Witbooi’s house was located higher up in the settlement, with the other houses further down toward the river.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/13_Chiefs-House-768x320.png

The other remains and known landmarks of the original Hornkranz settlement help us to navigate it and determine its approximate boundaries. During our visit to the site, the farm owner pointed us to a long strip of clustered stones he explained were the remains of the settlement’s defensive walls, some 300 metres north-west of the church ruins. To the south, by the river, the settlement’s former cemetery is marked by the spread of small rectangular cut stones marking each grave. Further along the river, Maboss and Lazarus showed us the remains of two defensive ramparts, guard outposts downhill from the settlement on its outer edges. They recounted that these ramparts were identifiable to the Witbooi from a distance by a white cornerstone that stands out among the brown stones the rest of the rampart is made of. The ramparts are placed along the hill leading down to the river and would have had a wide lookout view. A few steps to the west of one of the ramparts, we found what brought the Witbooi to this area, a rare perennial spring, which acted not only as a fresh water source for the village, but as a lifeline to the fauna and flora on which the Witbooi relied to survive. Since the early 20th century, this spring has been surrounded to its north by a concrete dam. By establishing this constellation of remains and landmarks, we were able to clarify the approximate outer edges of the settlement.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/18_Hornkranz-Remains-01-768x320.png

Reconstruction

To reconstruct the Hornkranz settlement, departing from the few architectural landmarks at our disposal, we replicated the architecture of each house and the elements of family life around it, estimated the area of inhabitation within the settlement, and constructed possible layouts of house distribution within the settlement. This reconstruction was led by the close guidance of descendants of the Witbooi we met with in Gibeon, the expertise of Nama historian Zak Dirkse, and the feedback of the Witbooi Royal House council, the representative body of the Witbooi Nama. Our model represents the most comprehensive visual reconstruction of the Witbooi settlement to date.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/17_Hornkranz-Reconstruction-with-Descendant-768x320.png

Architecture of the Settlement

Houses in Hornkranz consisted mostly of round domed huts, between four and five metres in diameter, and constructed with cladding made out of reed mat or a mix of animal dung and clay. Zak explained that these huts would have been constructed on a light foundation made up of the same dung and clay mixture spread on the ground. A central pole would act as the main structural pillar on which the reed mats would rest. According to members of the Witbooi descendants, alongside these huts there would have been other houses built of stone, like that of Hendrik Witbooi. Descendants also explained that houses typically had two entrances opposite one another and positioned on an east-west axis with the main entrance facing east.

Working with the community descendants and Zak, we used 3D modelling software to reconstruct what a typical family home would have looked like. We were told that outside the houses, many families would have had a round kraal lined with a light wooden fence where they kept smaller livestock. Close to the main entrance, they would also have had a fireplace and a simple wooden rack to hang and dry meat. The main kraal of the settlement was near the chief’s house, where a separate storage hut also stood.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/16_Hornkranz-House-Assembly-768x320.png

The light environmental trace of the Nama, the German colonial army’s obliteration of the settlement, the failure of subsequent administrations to engage in preservation efforts, and the conversion of the land into a private farm all make it difficult to locate definitive traces of the layout and location of homes based on what little remains at the modern-day site. Nevertheless, by closely reading the texture of the ground, we found possible traces of cleared, round areas surrounded by larger rocks, and noted areas of sparse vegetation growth, a potential indicator of the impact of the huts’ clay-dung foundations. We marked five possible sites where Witbooi homes might have stood.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/20_House-Traces-768x320.png

Zak explained that a defensive wall would have flanked the settlement along its more vulnerable northern and eastern fronts. We studied the contours of the landscape to estimate, based on the presence of limited remains, how the wall might have cut through the landscape. We estimate that the eastern wall may have been constructed along the peak of the hill to the settlement’s east, given its optical reach and defensive position.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/21_Wall-Estimate-768x320.png

Area of Inhabitation

To estimate the area of inhabitation and the settlement’s population, we studied the remaining ruins of the settlement, the terrain of the landscape, and the land’s geological features.

Houses, we were told, would have been built on flatter ground. We used a 12.5 metre resolution digital elevation model (DEM) to build the terrain in our 3D model and further analysed it in geographic information system (GIS) software. From the DEM, we extracted the contour lines of the landscape and conducted a slope analysis, which calculates the percentage of slope change in the settlement. Analysis of the contours and the areas of low slope help to define the curvature of the settlement’s inhabitation.
Contour Analysis - 1 metre contours of the site of Hornkranz derived from a digital elevation model (DEM). (Forensic Architecture/Forensis)

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/15_Hornkranz-Contours-768x320.png

We then traced and excluded uninhabitable geological features from the area of potential inhabitation, including bodies of water and large embedded rock formations. Together, the land’s features, its topography, and our estimated location of the defensive wall help establish where people may have lived.

https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/19_Hornkranz-Rock-Formations-768x320.png https://content.forensic-architecture.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/14_Hornkranz-Area-of-Inhabitation-768x320.png

Layout of Hornkranz

Building on the traces of potential houses we previously identified within the landscape and the descendant’s description of the settlement, we were able to algorithmically model potential layouts of the settlement. We used the 3D procedural modelling software application Houdini to design an algorithm that would generate possible layouts of the settlement according to a set of rules, including our defined area of potential inhabitation and the approximate space each household would need for its family life (which we approximate to be a radius of 10 metres). The rules fed to the algorithm were that the houses had to be at least 20 metres apart, each house was approximately 5 metres in size, and there were sixty houses in total with a deviation of +/- ten houses.

According to the Hornkranz descendants, there would have been around four to six people per household. With an average of five people per household, we estimate the population to be around 300 people per household.
Number of inhabitants

The exact population size of Hornkranz at the time of the attack is not known. Sources provide estimates ranging from 250 up to nearly one thousand inhabitants.

In addition to the members of the |Khowesin Nama clan, Hendrik Witbooi also gathered followers from other clans at Hornkranz, including the ǀAixaǀaen (Afrikaner Oorlams), ǁKhauǀgoan (Swartbooi Nama), Khaiǁkhaun (Red Nation Nama) and ǂAonin (Topnaar Nama). Indeed, the various Nama subtribes were elastic social entities.

We estimated the 1893 population of Hornkranz by referencing the reported number of individuals killed and captured. Hendrik Witbooi wrote in his diary that 88 people were killed by the Germans that day, 78 of them women and children and ten of them men, with one hundred women and children captured by German colonial forces. Other sources indicate a similar number of casualties: 85 women and children, and ten men (Missonary Olpp, cited in Steinmetz 2009). Descendant narratives also mention the successful escape of some women and children during the German assault. Assuming that before the attack, women and children totalled at least 178 (according to Hendrik Witbooi’s figures), and that women and children made up around three out of five family members in an average household, we estimate there could have been around sixty households and three hundred people in Hornkranz on the dawn of the German attack.

►https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/restituting-evidence-genocide-and-reparations-in-german-colon

#Allemagne #colonialisme #massacre #génocide #Namibie #architecture_forensique #histoire #histoire_coloniale #témoignage #Nama #Hendrik_Witbooi #Witbooi #Curt_von_Francois #Ovaherero #San

ping @reka

Albania Builds Migrant Centre and Camp as Criticism Continues

https://pixelfed.zoo-logique.org/storage/m/_v2/578583396227231930/c6a394f69-21cf85/0Drd3cNhEFQn/5UtleJVl3ux85PvjNB8yh7extu7IPAnzKinTVTQd.png

Work has started in Albania to build a reception centre and camp to receive migrants from Italy – but activists and locals in both countries remain highly critical of the plan.

Construction is ongoing at Shengjin Port of a migrant reception centre which, under a controversial deal between Albania and Italy, will receive up to 3,000 migrants from Italy.

The centre will process the migrants’ applications for asylum in Italy. They may then be sent to Gjader – an air base around 30 kilometers from the port – to a camp which is also being built.

The ambition is for construction to finish by May 20, for the agreement to be applicable by then.

The agreement, made public during a joint press conference between Albania Prime Minister Edi Rama and Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni in November last year, drew criticism from international human rights organisations and opposition groups in both countries.

(#paywall)
▻https://balkaninsight.com/2024/04/12/albania-builds-migrant-centre-and-camp-as-criticism-continues

–-

ajouté à la métaliste sur l’#accord entre #Italie et #Albanie pour la construction de #centres d’accueil (sic) et identification des migrants/#réfugiés sur le territoire albanais...
►https://seenthis.net/messages/1043873

Border Regimes, Shifting Temporalities and Migrant Responses. An Analysis of the Route Between the Eastern Mediterranean and the North-Western French-Italian Border
▻https://onborders.altervista.org/border-regimes-shifting-temporalities-and-migrant-responses-an

Nicola Montagna, Piero Gorza, Rita Moschella, Maria Perino The North-western French-Italian border is an important cross point for people coming from the Balkans and the Central Mediterranean routes aiming to reach Northern-continental European countries and the United Kingdom. According to the data we collected, in 2021 some 10,369 people, including 400 unaccompanied minors and 412 […] L’articolo Border Regimes, Shifting Temporalities and Migrant Responses. An Analysis of the Route Between the Eastern Mediterranean and the North-Western French-Italian Border proviene da ON BORDERS.

#RICERCA

Fin de vie : Entretien avec François Guillemot et Bertrand Riff sur Radio Campus Lille !

Ce Samedi 13 Avril, une heure avec l’AMD. Pour écouter l’émission en mp3, LE LIEN : ▻https://www-radio-campus.univ-lille1.fr/ArchivesN/LibrePensee/LP240413.mp3

La fin de vie. C’est un sujet qui fait débat en France en ce moment. La convention citoyenne sur la fin de vie a rendu ses conclusions après 27 jours de débats et d’entretiens avec une soixantaine spécialistes. Dans leur rapport, les citoyens tirés au sort déclarent : « Après en avoir largement débattu, la majorité de la Convention s’est prononcée en faveur d’une ouverture à l’aide active à mourir. »

http://federations.fnlp.fr/IMG/jpg/lp240414.jpg

Si en France l’aide active à mourir n’est pas encore possible, elle l’est par contre dans un pays tout proche : la Belgique. Pour aider les Français qui souhaitent en bénéficier, l’Association pour le Droit de Mourir dans la Dignité (ADMD) propose son aide. Elle dispose d’un local à Lille (Nord), à moins d’une heure de la Belgique. A Lille, c’est Monique et le docteur François Guillemot qui s’occupent des personnes et les accompagnent.

La suite : ▻https://actu.fr/hauts-de-france/lille_59350/depuis-lille-ils-accompagnent-des-patients-en-belgique-pour-leur-fin-de-vie_589

Source : ▻http://federations.fnlp.fr/spip.php?article2296

#AMD #mort #fin_de_vie #aide_à_mourir #aide_active_à_mourir #handicap #Belgique #Santé #liberté #décès #santé #mort #mort_choisie #acharnement_thérapeutique #AMM #souffrances #femmes #radio #Hôpital #soins_palliatifs

Russie. « Soutenir les prisonniers politiques de gauche est un acte de solidarité pratique »

Depuis une prison russe, le sociologue Boris Kagarlitsky a écrit la lettre ouverte qui suit afin de soutenir une large campagne de solidarité avec les prisonniers politiques russes de gauche.
Boris Kagarlitsky a lui-même été emprisonné pour cinq ans le 13 février 2024 sur la base d’accusations – forgées de toutes pièces – de « justification du terrorisme ». En réalité, son seul crime a été de s’élever contre la guerre menée par la Russie en Ukraine.
Une pétition mondiale appelant à sa libération et à celle de tous les autres prisonniers politiques opposés à la guerre peut être signée ici.
La lettre a été traduite par Renfrey Clarke à partir de la version russe originale. Renfrey Clarke a également traduit le dernier livre de Boris Kagarlitsky, The Long Retreat : Strategies to Reverse the Decline of the Left, à paraître chez Pluto Press.

▻https://entreleslignesentrelesmots.wordpress.com/2024/04/12/russie-soutenir-les-prisonniers-politiques-de-

#international #russie

Les réfractaires depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie (13ème partie • avril 2024)
▻https://www.obsarm.info/spip.php?article648

Depuis octobre 2022, Guy Dechesne recense longuement les actes de désertion, d’insoumission, de désobéissance et d’exil posés pour refuser de combattre, les actions de désobéissance civiles pour entraver la guerre et les appuis que les réfractaires reçoivent tant dans les pays concernés qu’à l’étranger dans le prolongement d’un dossier paru dans le numéro 164-165 de « Damoclès ». Cette rubrique est rédigée à partir d’un suivi méticuleux des médias. 13ème épisode, avril 2024. Retrouvez (...) #Résistances

/ #Guerres, #Actions_contre_la_guerre, #Antimilitarisme, #La_deux

« Les pays membres de l’UE suivent l’agenda de l’extrême droite en dépeignant les migrants et les réfugiés comme des ennemis dont il faudrait se défendre »
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2024/04/11/les-vingt-sept-suivent-l-agenda-de-l-extreme-droite-en-depeignant-les-migran

https://img.lemde.fr/2024/04/10/0/0/8032/5354/1440/960/60/0/62c6f3f_1712740253564-2023-09-19t081750z-1695111465-dpaf230919x99x247619-rtrfipp-4-migration-corruption-poland-europe.JPG

« Les pays membres de l’UE suivent l’agenda de l’extrême droite en dépeignant les migrants et les réfugiés comme des ennemis dont il faudrait se défendre »
Le chercheur Sergio Carrera, du groupe de réflexion Centre for European Policy Studies, décrypte l’évolution du débat politique sur l’immigration après l’adoption du pacte asile et migration.
Sergio Carrera, chercheur chargé de la politique migratoire et des droits de l’homme au Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), un groupe de réflexion de Bruxelles, revient sur l’évolution du débat public, en Europe, sur les politiques liées à l’immigration, sous l’influence croissante des partis d’extrême droite.
Lire aussi | Article réservé à nos abonnés Le Parlement européen valide le pacte sur la migration et l’asile
Le thème de l’immigration est-il présent dans la campagne électorale européenne qui commence ?
De longue date, le pacte asile et migration a été présenté comme une solution pour régler la question de l’immigration irrégulière en Europe et ainsi couper l’herbe sous le pied de l’extrême droite, qui a fait de ce thème son étendard. Mais, en dramatisant ces enjeux, les Etats et les gouvernements ont progressivement incorporé les idées de l’extrême droite et ils suivent son agenda en dépeignant les migrants et les réfugiés comme des ennemis dont il faudrait se défendre. Aujourd’hui, les grands partis historiques de la droite et du centre voire, dans certains pays, de gauche, comme dans le nord de l’Europe, ont été aspirés par la rhétorique de l’extrême droite.
L’arrivée de centaines de milliers de personnes sur les côtes européennes de manière irrégulière pose question à beaucoup d’électeurs…
En 2023, l’agence Frontex de l’Union européenne [UE] a décompté quelque 380 000 personnes arrivant, selon elle, de manière irrégulière. Sur un continent de 450 millions d’habitants, cela reste modéré. Cela représente moins de 1 % de tous les franchissements de frontières extérieures de l’UE pour l’année 2021. De plus, une partie de ces personnes peuvent bénéficier du statut de réfugié ou d’une protection temporaire. Parler d’invasion comme l’extrême droite le fait est tout simplement faux. Enfin, rappelons que l’essentiel des réfugiés dans le monde ne viennent pas en Europe. Ils sont généralement déplacés dans leur propre pays ou dans les pays voisins. Remettons un peu de rationalité dans ce sujet. En deux ans, l’Europe a su accueillir 4,5 millions de réfugiés ukrainiens.
Dans certains pays, ces arrivées ont créé une pression supplémentaire sur les logements, comme en Irlande, aux Pays-Bas, ou commencent à peser dans les pays d’Europe centrale.
On peut accueillir des Ukrainiens, mais pas des réfugiés d’Afrique… Il y a des sujets bien plus profonds en jeu, comme une institutionnalisation du racisme, aujourd’hui ancrée dans nos sociétés.
Selon une étude du Conseil européen pour les relations internationales (ECFR), la question migratoire n’est pas centrale pour l’opinion dans la campagne actuelle. Est-ce votre point de vue ?
Le sujet est en débat mais pas nécessairement sur les termes exposés par les grands partis. Toutes les recherches sur l’opinion publique démontrent une vision généralement positive de l’immigration. Les Européens ne sont pas opposés à l’idée d’offrir une protection aux migrants et d’aborder la question migratoire d’une façon humaine. Personne n’est favorable à l’emprisonnement des migrants dans des centres de détention. C’est pourtant ce que le pacte prévoit. Quand vous montrez les conséquences de ce type de politique, vous voyez une réaction très éloignée des débats politiques traditionnels.
Le Parti populaire européen (conservateurs) propose de développer l’externalisation des demandeurs d’asiles…
C’est la preuve de ce que j’avance. Fin 2023, l’Italie de la première ministre d’extrême droite, Giorgia Meloni, a présenté un protocole d’accord entre l’Italie et l’Albanie pour que les migrants sauvés en mer soient envoyés, contre leur gré, dans ce pays, avec lequel ils n’ont aucun lien et où il y a fort à parier qu’ils ne voudront pas aller. Une fois là-bas, ils seront enfermés dans un camp. Face à ce projet, la Commission n’a pas fait de commentaire. Et désormais, la droite propose le même type d’externalisation dans des Etats tiers dit « sûrs ». Toutes nos recherches sur les exemples existants montrent que l’externalisation conduit à des traitements inhumains et dégradants, à la détention arbitraire de personnes, à d’énormes souffrances.
Le groupe des sociaux-démocrates souhaite développer les voies légales pour venir en Europe, qui est en plein vieillissement démographique. Comment jugez-vous cette idée ?
Nous en avons absolument besoin. Que ce soit pour l’emploi, pour les demandeurs d’asile, pour les réinstallations pour raison humanitaire. Pour les étudiants, les chercheurs, tout cela est très bien. Néanmoins, l’Europe développe aujourd’hui une vision très utilitariste des voies légales de travail avec sa « carte bleue » et ses programmes de recrutement dans les pays tiers. Très sélective, l’Europe ne veut prendre que des personnes dont elle a besoin pour combler les pénuries et les lacunes du marché du travail, et uniquement ceux qui disposent d’assez des compétences. Les personnes hautement qualifiées peuvent venir. Il s’agit d’une approche très discriminatoire, qui laisse de côté certaines personnes qui n’ont pas accès à ces canaux de recrutement. En particulier les personnes originaires d’Afrique et du Moyen-Orient.

#Covid-19#migrant#migration#UE#immigration#economie#vieillissement#sante#refugie#frontex

Les territoires des émeutes
▻https://laviedesidees.fr/Les-territoires-des-emeutes

Le haut niveau de #ségrégation urbaine constitue le meilleur prédicteur des violences. La différence la plus marquante entre 2023 et 2005 est l’entrée en scène des villes petites et moyennes, où les adolescents de cités d’habitat social s’identifient aux jeunes des banlieues de grandes métropoles.

#Société #jeunesse #banlieue #révolte #urbanisme #gilets_jaunes
▻https://laviedesidees.fr/IMG/pdf/20240412_emeutes.pdf

Lecture d’un extrait du livre « Cent portraits vagues » de Milène Tournier, paru aux Éditions Lurlure en 2024.

▻https://liminaire.fr/radio-marelle/article/cent-portraits-vagues-de-milene-tournier

En une ou deux pages, parfois quelques lignes seulement, Milène Tournier parvient à dresser le portrait de femmes, d’hommes, d’âges et d’origines diverses, solitaires souvent, à un tournant de leur existence, avec une sensibilité bouleversante. Elle saisit l’essentielle d’une vie, d’un parcours, d’un moment, d’une personnalité, en allant droit au cœur de celle-ci, sans jamais les caricaturer, mais en rendant leur caractère au plus juste. On retrouve dans ce texte la maîtrise envoûtante de ses œuvres précédentes, entre poésie et théâtre, une voix singulière, un regard aiguisé sur le monde, à l’écoute de ses blessures, de son absurdité.

(...) #Radio_Marelle, #Écriture, #Livre, #Lecture, #En_lisant_en_écrivant, #Podcast, #Sensation, #Biographie, #Littérature, #Édition, #Récit, #Portrait (...)

▻https://liminaire.fr/IMG/mp4/en_lisant_cent_portraits_vagues_mile_ne_tournier.mp4

▻https://lurlure.net/cent-portraits-vagues

Derrière le succès de Blablacar, un contrat secret et des économies d’énergie surévaluées
▻https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2024/04/06/derriere-le-succes-de-blablacar-un-contrat-secret-et-des-economies-d-energie

https://img.lemde.fr/2017/08/24/0/46/4944/3296/1440/960/60/0/4d5883e_11251-1mrvj2s.0vleze61or.jpg

L’entreprise de #covoiturage a engrangé plusieurs dizaines de millions d’euros depuis 2012 dans le cadre d’un mécanisme d’obligations environnementales approuvé par l’Etat. Une manne longtemps restée opaque, et qui s’appuie sur des calculs parfois fantaisistes.

Pratique, écologique et même depuis peu rentable : #Blablacar, qui revendique plus de vingt millions d’inscrits en France, est érigé en modèle de start-up innovante. « Le leader mondial du covoiturage est Français : c’est une fierté ! », s’émerveillait Emmanuel Macron en 2022. Mais, pour en arriver là, la #start-up a profité d’un discret soutien avalisé par l’#Etat, à hauteur de plusieurs dizaines de millions d’euros par an, selon les informations du Monde. Une #rente opaque dont Blablacar a été le bénéficiaire quasi exclusif pendant une décennie et continue de profiter aujourd’hui.
L’histoire remonte à 2012. La plate-forme, alors baptisée Covoiturage.fr, cherche encore son modèle économique après six ans d’existence. Une manne inespérée lui est alors proposée par un grand groupe français : Total.
La compagnie, devenue depuis TotalEnergies, doit se conformer à une obligation environnementale imposée par l’Etat à tous les fournisseurs d’énergie. Le pétrolier doit financer chaque année un certain nombre d’actions favorisant la sobriété énergétique, dont l’efficacité est mesurée par des #certificats_d’économies_d’énergie (CEE). Ce système de #pollueur-payeur l’oblige à rechercher auprès de structures agréées par l’Etat des « gisements » de CEE potentiels, comme des travaux d’isolation, des installations de chaudières performantes, des dispositifs de fret ferroviaire…

▻https://justpaste.it/c0ouj

Tout ça pour des trajets couteux où sous la bienveillance obligée des « évaluations » la marchandisation règne.

#voiture #entreprise #capitalisme_de_plateforme

Série d’attaques de drones Ukrainiens sur la centrale nucléaire de Zaporojié (Claude Janvier)
▻https://www.crashdebug.fr/serie-dattaques-de-drones-ukrainiens-sur-la-centrale-nucleaire-de-zaporoj

https://crashdebugzone-15d1a.kxcdn.com/images/2024/Fevrier/attaque_centrale_ukraine.png

Les États-Unis "envisagent" d’abandonner les poursuites contre M. Assange, selon M. Biden (Zerohedge.com)
▻https://www.crashdebug.fr/les-etats-unis-envisagent-dabandonner-les-poursuites-contre-m-assange-sel

https://crashdebugzone-15d1a.kxcdn.com/images/2024/Fevrier/assange_biden.png