• Un train pour la Suisse

    Un parcours mythique à travers la Suisse, deux voyages et entre eux, 150 années et des différences par milliers.

    En juin 1863, une jeune femme anglaise nommée Jemima entreprend le voyage d’une vie pour découvrir la Suisse. Le guide n’est autre que Thomas Cook, inventeur du voyage organisé à cette occasion.

    Plus d’un siècle et demi plus tard, l’écrivain voyageur Diccon Bewes décide de s’aventurer sur leurs traces et de redécouvrir ce qu’ils ont vu. S’aidant du carnet de voyage retrouvé de la jeune femme, il parle de la Suisse d’hier et d’aujourd’hui, des différentes manières de voyager et de ce que le voyage a changé en Jemima et en lui.

    https://mobile.payot.ch/Detail/un_train_pour_la_suisse-diccon_bewes-9782940481101

    Quelques citations :

    « Voici l’un des premiers facteurs de succès des tours organisés par Thomas Cook : les femmes célibataires pouvaient voyager avec un groupe sans craindre pour leur sécurité ou leur réputation »

    (p.24)

    Thomas Cook « apprécie la facilité avec laquelle on voyage dans le ’pays des libertés’ » :

    « Il n’y a pas de passeports, pas de bureaux de douane, pas de péages, pas de gendarmes ; aucune de ces ridicules restrictions visant à protéger les gens de tous les dangers qu’ils peuvent encourir, et qui sont si ennuyeuses en France et en Allemagne »

    (p.63)

    « L’ouvrage The smell of the Continent , au titre tout à fait pertinent, évoque de manière distrayante les voyages et déplacements des Anglais en Europe après la chute de Napoléon, et consacre toute une partie au thème des #toilettes. Il révèle par exemple que de nombreux hôtels avaient une chambre portant le numéro 00 ou 000 : des toilettes communes et, par conséquent, assez dégoûtantes. Certains gérants d’hôtel commencèrent à installer des water closet (ou WC, un terme toujours utilisé dans toute l’Europe et particulièrement en Suisse, où il dépasse la barrière des langues), après y avoir été ’poussés par les plaintes constantes de la clientèle anglaise’, bien que ces toilettes n’aient pas l’air engageantes, en témoigne une critique cinglante datant de 1863 : ’Dans un #hôtel de, disons 60 chambres, il n’était pas inhabituel de ne trouver que quatre WC qui, dans certains cas, était dégoûtants ou ne fonctionnaient pas, tout simplement.’ »

    (p.98)

    « Le gouvernement suisse prit une décision capitale : il commissionna un rapport indépendant sur l’avenir du système de transports suisse, non seulement dans le but d’apporter une solution pratique à un problème politique, mais aussi pour trouver le moyen de faire évoluer l’#économie par le biais de l’unification nationale »

    (p.150)

    Sur le « #lieu_d'origine » (#Heimatort en allemand) en Suisse, et qui est noté sur chaque carte d’identité/passeport suisse :

    « Jusqu’en 2012, la commune était responsable de votre bien-être, même si vous n’y aviez jamais habité, elle devait vous venir en aide si besoin ; aujourd’hui, cette responsabilité revient à la commune de résidence »

    (p.203)

    Sur le #drapeau suisse :

    « Seuls les Suisses pouvaient délibérer pendant des années [de 1847 à 1889] sur un aussi petit détail que les dimensions d’une croix. Pourtant, il aura fallu une décision du Parlement pour régler le différend, spécifiant qu’une croix suisse devait avoir des bras d’égale longueur, mais un sixième plus long que large »

    (p.215)

    Sur Interlaken :

    « En 1870, 244 attelages de chevaux (dont 35 omnibus) effectuaient le court trajet [du port sur le lac de Thoune] jusqu’à Interlaken. La seule alternative à ce mode de transport consistait à longer à pied la même route, c’est-à-dire affronter la tempête de sable générée par les calèches et ’patauger jusqu’aux chevilles dans les excréments de chevaux’. »

    (p.223)

    Ce que apparemment John Ruskin pensait des Suisses :

    « On leur prêtait les traits de héros romantiques ou d’ignobles mercenaires ; en réalité, ils n’étaient ni héroïques ni vils, mais sincères, obstinés, un entêtement que l’on a d’ailleurs pu observer à plusieurs occasions ; fiers, sans qu’ils laissent pour autant leur fierté les entraîner dans des querelles légères ou inutiles ; vous ne trouverez chez eux ni passion ni humour fin, juste une capacité de discernement infaillible et une droiture constante. On ne peut les persuader d’accomplir leurs obligations, mais ils les connaissent ; ils n’expriment pas verbalement leur amitié, mais ne vous font jamais défaut quand vous êtes dans le besoin. »

    (pp. 257-258)

    « Quand on pense que les hommes découpaient 100 tonnes de #glace par jour sur la langue de ce #glacier [mer de glace sous le mont Blanc] et les transportaient jusqu’à Interlaken pour les vendre à des clients situés à Paris ou à Vienne ; un marché qui n’a pas survécu à la Première Guerre mondiale et à l’invention de la glace artificielle »

    (p.275)

    « Depuis le #col_de_Brünig, la route descend tout le temps jusqu’à #Lucerne, passant devant une enfilade de petits lacs. Le premier, le #lac_de_Lungern, était autrefois beaucoup plus grand, mais une solution bien inspirée pour pallier au manque de terres arables et aux vagues d’émigrations rurales, fit baisser le niveau d’eau de 18 mètres. Après cinquante ans de travaux et de discussion (qui divisa les habitants de #Lungern en deux camps : ’les Mouillés’ et ’les Secs’), un tunnel de 420 m vit le jour pour déplacer des milliers de litres d’eau et libérer ainsi des acres de terrains. Il y eut quelques effets secondaires imprévus, comme des glissements de terrain, mais le village gagna ainsi des terres agricoles dans une région demeurée sinon inhospitalière. »

    (p.302)

    Sur le monument du Lion de Lucerne :

    « Selon le consensus général, il s’agit d’un hommage à la lutte des Suisses pour leur indépendance. Si seulement... Tout poignant et majestueux qu’il soit, le monument du Lion est dédié à des hommes qui se sont vendus pour de l’argent et à des républicains morts pour un monarque autocrate. Il rappelle le courage et l’honneur sacrifiés au nom d’une cause perdue et de l’appât du gain, et c’en est d’autant plus triste »

    (p.311).

    « En 1977, le gouvernement helvétique a proposé une nouvelle loi sur l’#heure_d'été, qui prévoyait que la Suisse ferait comme les autres pays européens, en particulier ses voisins comme la France et l’Italie, et passerait à l’heure d’été entre mars et octobre. Les fermiers n’ont pas apprécié (ou du moins leurs vaches) et ils exigèrent un référendum sur la question. Ce furent les vaches qui eurent le dernier mot : en mai 1978, les Suisses votèrent contre l’instauration de l’heure d’été. »

    (pp.336-337)

    « Genève avait été la capitale de l’#horlogerie suisse jusqu’au milieu des années 1600, grâce à Calvin qui avait banni la #bijouterie, obligeant ainsi les artisans de la ville à se tourner vers une nouvelle profession. »

    (p.344)

    « A l’époque où Cook est venu, #Neuchâtel n’était pas suisse depuis longtemps. Célèbre, d’après ce qu’on dit, pour abriter des gens qui y parlaient le plus beau français de Suisse, Neuchâtel était autrefois une anomalie politique, parce qu’elle faisait partie de la Prusse. Pendant des années, elle fut à la fois un canton au sein de la Confédération suisse et une principauté appartenant à la Prusse, une configuration bizarre née de l’enchevêtrement qu’était l’Europe des siècles passés. A la mort de Marie d’Orléans, la princesse de Neuchâtel, en 1707, le peuple dut élire un nouveau souverain parmi les nombreux prétendants au trône. Il choisit Frédéric Ier de Prusse, parce que, pour lui, il était plus important d’être protestant que de parler français. Napoléon prit brièvement le contrôle du canton, avant que celui-ci redevienne une principauté prusienne en 1815, même si Neuchâtel était alors devenu le 21ème canton de Suisse.
    Cette situation helvético-prusienne perdura jusqu’en 1848, à la suite d’une révolte sans effusion de sang, survenue à Neuchâtel, qui donna lieu à une nouvelle république. »

    (pp.346-347)

    « Le #chemin_de_fer a réuni la Suisse en un #marché_unique, psychologiquement et économiquement. Les produits pouvaient à présent parvenir à leurs consommateurs rapidement et à moindre coût, qu’il s’agisse de montres pour l’étranger ou de carottes pour les citadins. Or, c’est le tourisme qui a permis de financer les #voies_ferrées. En dehors des plaines densément peuplées, seules quelques lignes auraient été viables sans les revenus issus du tourisme »

    (p.356)

    « Dès le début, le tourisme a mis de l’huile dans les rouages des trains, et ceux-ci ont assuré l’unité de la Suisse. Ainsi s’amorçait un cercle vertueux : les touristes assuraient la rentabilité des voies ferrées et finançaient de nouvelles lignes, ce qui amenait de nouveaux touristes, ce qui permettait à son tour de lever de nouveaux fonds pour construire de nouvelles lignes, tout en faisant bénéficier l’économie tout entière de l’amélioration des transports et de l’extension des marchés »

    (p.357)

    #livre #Suisse #train #Thomas_Cook #tourisme_de_masse #tourisme #Junior_United_Alpine_Club #guides_de_voyage #John_Murray #Genève #Calvin #Jean_Calvin #Henri_Dunant #Croix-Rouge #Chamonix #mont_Blanc #Henri_Gaze #Louis_Favre #Gothard #iode #Röstigraben #Porrentruy #Interlaken #Trümmelbach #vallée_de_Lauterbrunner #Wengeralp #Kleine_Scheidegg #Jungfraujoch #John_Ruskin #neutralité #mercenaires #Lion_de_Lucerne #Guillaume_Tell #Kulm #histoire #économie

  • Bulgaria : lottare per vivere, lottare per morire

    Di morti insepolti, notti insonni e domande che non avranno risposta

    “ГРАНИЦИТЕ УБИВАТ”, ovvero “I confini uccidono”. Questa scritta campeggia su delle vecchie cisterne arrugginite lungo la statale 79, la strada che collega Elhovo a Burgas, seguendo il confine bulgaro-turco fino al Mar Nero. L’abbiamo fatta noi del Collettivo Rotte Balcaniche (https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078755275162), rossa come il sangue che abbiamo visto scorrere in queste colline. Volevamo imprimere nello spazio fisico un ricordo di chi proprio tra questi boschi ha vissuto i suoi ultimi istanti, lasciare un segno perché la memoria avesse una dimensione materiale. Dall’altra parte, volevamo lanciare un monito, per parlare a chi continua a transitare su questa strada ignorandone la puzza di morte e a chi ne è direttamente responsabile, per dire “noi sappiamo e non dimenticheremo”. Ne è uscita una semplice scritta che forse in pochi noteranno. Racchiude le lacrime che accompagnano i ricordi e un urlo che monta dentro, l’amore e la rabbia.

    Dall’anno passato il confine bulgaro-turco è tornato ad essere la prima porta terrestre d’Europa. I dati diffusi dalla Polizia di frontiera bulgara contano infatti oltre 158 mila tentativi di ingresso illegale nel territorio impediti nei primi nove mesi del 2023, a fronte dei 115 mila nel corrispondente periodo del 2022, anno in cui le medesime statistiche erano già più che triplicate 1. Il movimento delle persone cambia a seconda delle politiche di confine, come un flusso d’acqua alla ricerca di un varco, così la totale militarizzazione del confine di terra greco-turco, che si snoda lungo il fiume Evros, ha spostato le rotte migratorie verso la più porosa frontiera bulgara. Dall’altro lato, la sempre più aggressiva politica di deportazioni di Erdogan – che ha già ricollocato con la forza 600 mila rifugiatə sirianə nel nord-ovest del paese, sotto il controllo turco, e promette di raggiungere presto la soglia del milione – costringe gli oltre tre milioni di sirianə che vivono in Turchia a muoversi verso luoghi più sicuri.

    Abbiamo iniziato a conoscere la violenza della polizia bulgara più di un anno fa, non nelle inchieste giornalistiche ma nei racconti delle persone migranti che incontravamo in Serbia, mentre ci occupavamo di distribuire cibo e docce calde a chi veniva picchiatə e respintə dalle guardie di frontiera ungheresi. Siamo un gruppo di persone solidali che dal 2018 ha cominciato a viaggiare lungo le rotte balcaniche per supportare attivamente lə migrantə in cammino, e da allora non ci siamo più fermatə. Anche se nel tempo siamo cresciutə, rimaniamo un collettivo autorganizzato senza nessun riconoscimento formale. Proprio per questo, abbiamo deciso di muoverci verso i contesti caratterizzati da maggior repressione, laddove i soggetti più istituzionali faticano a trovare agibilità e le pratiche di solidarietà assumono un valore conflittuale e politico. Uno dei nostri obiettivi è quello di essere l’anti-confine, costruendo vie sicure attraverso le frontiere, ferrovie sotterranee. Tuttavia, non avremmo mai pensato di diventare un “rescue team”, un equipaggio di terra, ovvero di occuparci di ricerca e soccorso delle persone disperse – vive e morte – nelle foreste della Bulgaria.

    La prima operazione di salvataggio in cui ci siamo imbattutə risale alle notte tra il 19 e il 20 luglio. Stavo per andare a dormire, verso l’una, quando sento insistentemente suonare il telefono del Collettivo – telefono attraverso cui gestiamo le richieste di aiuto delle persone che vivono nei campi rifugiati della regione meridionale della Bulgaria 2. Era M., un signore siriano residente nel campo di Harmanli, che avevo conosciuto pochi giorni prima. «C’è una donna incinta sulla strada 79, serve un’ambulanza». Con lei, le sue due bambine di tre e sei anni. Chiamiamo il 112, numero unico per le emergenze, dopo averla messa al corrente che probabilmente prima dell’ambulanza sarebbe arrivata la polizia, e non potevamo sapere cosa sarebbe successo. Dopo aver capito che il centralino ci stava mentendo, insinuando che le squadre di soccorso erano uscite senza aver trovato nessuno alle coordinate che avevamo segnalato, decidiamo di muoverci in prima persona. Da allora, si sono alternate settimane più e meno intense di uscite e ricerche. Abbiamo un database che raccoglie la quarantina di casi di cui ci siamo in diversi modi occupatə da fine luglio e metà ottobre: nomi, storie e foto che nessunə vorrebbe vedere. In questi mesi tre mesi si è sviluppata anche una rete di associazioni con cui collaboriamo nella gestione delle emergenze, che comprende in particolare #CRG (#Consolidated_Rescue_Group: https://www.facebook.com/C.R.G.2022), gruppo di volontariə sirianə che fa un incredibile lavoro di raccolta di segnalazioni di “distress” e “missing people” ai confini d’Europa, nonché di relazione con lə familiari.

    Ricostruire questo tipo di situazioni è sempre complicato: le informazioni sono frammentate, la cronologia degli eventi incerta, l’intervento delle autorità poco prevedibile. Spesso ci troviamo ad unire tessere di un puzzle che non combacia. Sono le persone migranti stesse a lanciare l’SOS, oppure, se non hanno un telefono o è scarico, le “guide” 3 che le accompagnano nel viaggio. Le richieste riportano i dati anagrafici, le coordinate, lo stato di salute della persona. Le famiglie contattano poi organizzazioni solidali come CRG, che tra lə migrantə sirianə è un riferimento fidato. L’unica cosa che noi possiamo fare – ma che nessun altro fa – è “metterci il corpo”, frapporci tra la polizia e le persone migranti. Il fatto che ci siano delle persone bianche ed europee nel luogo dell’emergenza obbliga i soccorsi ad arrivare, e scoraggia la polizia dal respingere e torturare. Infatti, è la gerarchia dei corpi che determina quanto una persona è “salvabile”, e le vite migranti valgono meno di zero. Nella notte del 5 agosto, mentre andavamo a recuperare il cadavere di H., siamo fermatə da un furgone scuro, senza insegne della polizia. È una pattuglia del corpo speciale dell’esercito che si occupa di cattura e respingimento. Gli diciamo la verità: stiamo andando a cercare un ragazzo morto nel bosco, abbiamo già avvisato il 112. Uno dei soldati vuole delle prove, gli mostriamo allora la foto scattata dai compagni di viaggio. Vedendo il cadavere, si mette a ridere, “it’s funny”, dice.

    Ogni strada è un vicolo cieco che conduce alla border police, che non ha nessun interesse a salvare le vite ma solo ad incriminare chi le salva. Dobbiamo chiamare subito il 112, accettando il rischio che la polizia possa arrivare prima di noi e respingere le persone in Turchia, lasciandole nude e ferite nel bosco di frontiera, per poi essere costrette a riprovare quel viaggio mortale o imprigionate e deportate in Siria? Oppure non chiamare il 112, perdendo così quel briciolo di possibilità che veramente un’ambulanza possa, prima o poi, arrivare e potenzialmente salvare una vita? Il momento dell’intervento mette ogni volta di fronte a domande impossibili, che rivelano l’asimmetria di potere tra noi e le autorità, di cui non riusciamo a prevedere le mosse. Alcuni cambiamenti, però, li abbiamo osservati con continuità anche nel comportamento della polizia. Se inizialmente le nostre azioni sono riuscite più volte ad evitare l’omissione di soccorso, salvando persone che altrimenti sarebbero state semplicemente lasciate morire, nell’ultimo mese le nostre ricerche sono andate quasi sempre a vuoto. Questo perché la polizia arriva alle coordinate prima di noi, anche quando non avvisiamo, o ci intercetta lungo la strada impedendoci di continuare. Probabilmente non sono fatalità ma stanno controllando i nostri movimenti, per provare a toglierci questo spazio di azione che ci illudevamo di aver conquistato.

    Tuttavia, sappiamo che i casi che abbiamo intercettato sono solo una parte del totale. Le segnalazioni che arrivano attraverso CRG riguardano quasi esclusivamente persone di origini siriane, mentre raramente abbiamo ricevuto richieste di altre nazionalità, che sappiamo però essere presenti. Inoltre, la dottoressa Mileva, capo di dipartimento dell’obitorio di Burgas, racconta che quasi ogni giorno arriva un cadavere, “la maggior parte sono pieni di vermi, alcuni sono stati mangiati da animali selvatici”. Non sanno più dove metterli, le celle frigorifere sono piene di corpi non identificati ma le famiglie non hanno la possibilità di venire in Bulgaria per avviare le pratiche di riconoscimento, rimpatrio e sepoltura. Infatti, è impossibile ottenere un visto per venire in Europa, nemmeno per riconoscere un figlio – e non ci si può muovere nemmeno da altri paesi europei se si è richiedenti asilo. In alternativa, servono i soldi per la delega ad unə avvocatə e per effettuare il test del DNA attraverso l’ambasciata. Le procedure burocratiche non conoscono pietà. Le politiche di confine agiscono tanto sul corpo vivo quanto su quello morto, quindi sulla possibilità di vivere il lutto, di avere semplicemente la certezza di aver perso una sorella, una madre, un fratello. Solo per sapere se piangere. Anche la morte è una conquista sociale.

    «Sono una sorella inquieta da 11 mesi. Non dormo più la notte e passo delle giornate tranquille solo grazie ai sedativi e alle pillole per la depressione. Ovunque abbia chiesto aiuto, sono rimasta senza risposte. Vi chiedo, se è possibile, di prendermi per mano, se c’è bisogno di denaro, sono pronta a indebitarmi per trovare mio fratello e salvare la mia vecchia madre da questa lenta morte». Così ci scrive S., dalla Svezia. Suo fratello aveva 30 anni, era scappato dall’Afghanistan dopo il ritorno dei Talebani, perché lavorava per l’esercito americano. Aveva lasciato la Turchia per dirigersi verso la Bulgaria il 21 settembre 2022, ma il 25 non era più stato in grado di continuare il cammino a causa dei dolori alle gambe. In un video, gli smuggler che guidavano il viaggio spiegano che lo avrebbero lasciato in un determinato punto, nei pressi della strada 79, e che dopo aver riposato si sarebbe dovuto consegnare alla polizia. Da allora di lui si sono perse le tracce. Non è stato ritrovato nella foresta, né nei campi rifugiati, né tra i corpi dell’obitorio. È come se fosse stato inghiottito dalla frontiera. S. ci invia i nomi, le foto e le date di scomparsa di altre 14 persone, quasi tutte afghane, scomparse l’anno scorso. Lei è in contatto con tutte le famiglie. Neanche noi abbiamo risposte: più la segnalazione è datata più è difficile poter fare qualcosa. Sappiamo che la cosa più probabile è che i corpi siano marciti nel sottobosco, ma cosa dire allə familiari che ancora conservano un’irrazionale speranza? Ormai si cammina sulle ossa di chi era venuto prima, e lì era rimasto.

    –—

    1. РЕЗУЛТАТИ ОТ ДЕЙНОСТТА НА МВР ПРЕЗ 2022 г., Противодействие на миграционния натиск и граничен контрол (Risultati delle attività del Ministero dell’Interno nel 2022, Contrasto alla pressione migratoria e controllo delle frontiere), p. 14.
    2. Per quanto riguarda lə richiedenti asilo, il sistema di “accoglienza” bulgaro è gestito dall’agenzia governativa SAR, e si articola nei campi ROC (Registration and reception center) di Voenna Rampa (Sofia), Ovcha Kupel (Sofia), Vrajdebna (Sofia), Banya (Nova Zagora) e Harmanli, oltre al transit centre di Pastrogor (situato nel comune di Svilengrad), dove si effettuano proceduredi asilo accelerate. […] I centri di detenzione sono due: Busmantsi e Lyubimets. Per approfondire, è disponibile il report scritto dal Collettivo.
    3. Anche così sono chiamati gli smuggler che conducono le persone nel viaggio a piedi.

    https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/10/bulgaria-lottare-per-vivere-lottare-per-morire

    #Bulgarie #Turquie #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #décès #mourir_aux_frontières #street-art #art_de_rue #route_des_Balkans #Balkans #mémoire #morts_aux_frontières #murs #barrières_frontalières #Elhovo #Burgas #Evros #Grèce #routes_migratoires #militarisation_des_frontières #violence #violences_policières #solidarité #anti-frontières #voies_sures #route_79 #collettivo_rotte_balcaniche #hiréarchie_des_corps #racisme #Mileva_Galya #Galya_Mileva

    • Bulgaria, lasciar morire è uccidere

      Collettivo Rotte Balcaniche Alto Vicentino: la cronaca di un’omissione di soccorso sulla frontiera bulgaro-turca


      I fatti si riferiscono alla notte tra il 19 e il 20 luglio 2023. Per tutelare le persone coinvolte, diffondiamo questo report dopo alcune settimane. Dopo questo primo intervento, come Collettivo Rotte Balcaniche continuiamo ad affrontare emergenze simili, agendo in prima persona nella ricerca e soccorso delle persone bloccate nei boschi lungo la frontiera bulgaro-turca.

      01.00 di notte, suona il telefono del Collettivo. “We got a pregnant woman on Route 79“, a contattarci è un residente nel campo di Harmanli, amico del marito della donna e da noi conosciuto qualche settimana prima. E’ assistito da un’interprete, anch’esso residente nel campo. Teme di essere accusato di smuggling, chiede se possiamo essere noi a chiamare un’ambulanza. La route 79 è una delle strade più pattugliate dalla border police, in quanto passaggio quasi obbligato per chi ha attraversato il confine turco e si muove verso Sofia. Con l’aiuto dell’interprete chiamiamo la donna: è all’ottavo mese di gravidanza e, con le due figlie piccole, sono sole nella jungle. Stremate, sono state lasciate vicino alla strada dal gruppo con cui stavano camminando, in attesa di soccorsi. Ci dà la sua localizzazione: 42.12.31.6N 27.00.20.9E. Le spieghiamo che il numero dell’ambulanza è lo stesso della polizia: c’è il rischio che venga respinta illegalmente in Turchia. Lei lo sa e ci chiede di farlo ugualmente.

      Ore 02.00, prima chiamata al 112. La registriamo, come tutte le successive. Non ci viene posta nessuna domanda sulle condizioni della donna o delle bambine, ma siamo tenuti 11 minuti al telefono per spiegare come siamo venuti in contatto con la donna, come ha attraversato il confine e da dove viene, chi siamo, cosa facciamo in Bulgaria. Sospettano un caso di trafficking e dobbiamo comunicare loro il numero dell’”intermediario” tra noi e lei. Ci sentiamo sotto interrogatorio. “In a couple of minutes our units are gonna be there to search the woman“, sono le 02.06. Ci rendiamo conto di non aver parlato con dei soccorritori, ma con dei poliziotti.

      Ore 03.21, è passata un’ora e tutto tace: richiamiamo il 112. Chiediamo se hanno chiamato la donna, ci rispondono: “we tried contacting but we can’t reach the phone number“. La donna ci dice che in realtà non l’hanno mai chiamata. Comunichiamo di nuovo la sua localizzazione: 42.12.37.6N 27.00.21.5E. Aggiungiamo che è molto vicino alla strada, ci rispondono: “not exactly, it’s more like inside of the woods“, “it’s exactly like near the border, and it’s inside of a wood region, it’s a forest, not a street“. Per fugare ogni dubbio, chiediamo: “do you confirm that the coordinates are near to route 79?“. Ci tengono in attesa, rispondono: “they are near a main road. Can’t exactly specify if it’s 79“. Diciamo che la donna è svenuta. “Can she dial us? Can she call so we can get a bit more information?“. Non capiamo di che ulteriori informazioni abbiano bisogno, siamo increduli: “She’s not conscious so I don’t think she’ll be able to make the call“. Suggeriscono allora che l’interprete si metta in contatto diretto con loro. Sospettiamo che vogliano tagliarci fuori. Sono passati 18 minuti, la chiamata è stata una farsa. Se prima temevamo le conseguenze dell’arrivo della polizia, ora abbiamo paura che non arrivi nessuno. Decidiamo di metterci in strada, ci aspetta 1h e 40 di viaggio.

      Ore 04.42, terza chiamata. Ci chiedono di nuovo tutte le informazioni, ancora una volta comunichiamo le coordinate gps. Diciamo che stiamo andando in loco ed incalziamo: “Are there any news on the research?“. “I can’t tell this“. Attraverso l’interprete rimaniamo in costante contatto con la donna. Conferma che non è arrivata alcuna searching unit. La farsa sta diventando una tragedia.

      Ore 06.18, quarta chiamata. Siamo sul posto e la strada è deserta. Vogliamo essere irreprensibili ed informarli che siamo arrivati. Ripetiamo per l’ennesima volta che chiamiamo per una donna incinta in gravi condizioni. Il dialogo è allucinante, ricominciano con le domande: “which month?“, “which baby is this? First? Second?“, “how old does she look like?“, “how do you know she’s there? she called you or what?“. Gli comunichiamo che stiamo per iniziare a cercarla, ci rispondono: “we are looking for her also“. Interveniamo: “Well, where are you because there is no one here, we are on the spot and there is no one“. Si giustificano: “you have new information because obviously she is not at the one coordinates you gave“, “the police went three times to the coordinates and they didn’t find the woman, the coordinates are wrong“. Ancora una volta, capiamo che stanno mentendo.

      Faremo una quinta chiamata alle 06.43, quando l’avremo già trovata. Ci richiederanno le coordinate e ci diranno di aspettarli lungo la strada.

      La nostra ricerca dura pochi minuti. La donna ci invia di nuovo la posizione: 42.12.36.3N 27.00.43.3E. Risulta essere a 500 metri dalle coordinate precedenti, ma ancor più vicina alla strada. Gridiamo “hello” e ci facciamo guidare dalle voci: la troviamo letteralmente a due metri dalla strada, su un leggero pendio, accasciata sotto un albero e le bambine al suo fianco. Vengono dalla Siria, le bambine hanno 4 e 7 anni. Lei è troppo debole per alzarsi. Abbiamo per loro sono dell’acqua e del pane. C’è lì anche un ragazzo, probabilmente minorenne, che le ha trovate ed è rimasto ad aiutarle. Lo avvertiamo che arriverà la polizia. Non vuole essere respinto in Turchia, riparte solo e senza zaino. Noi ci guardiamo attorno: la “foresta” si rivela essere una piccola striscia alberata di qualche metro, che separa la strada dai campi agricoli.

      Dopo poco passa una ronda della border police, si fermano e ci avvicinano con la mano sulla pistola. Non erano stati avvertiti: ci aggrediscono con mille domande senza interessarsi alla donna ed alle bambine. Ci prendono i telefoni, ci cancellano le foto fatte all’arrivo delle volanti. Decidiamo di chiamare un’avvocata locale nostra conoscente: lei ci risponde che nei boschi è normale che i soccorsi tardino e ci suggerisce di andarcene per lasciar lavorare la polizia. Nel frattempo arrivano anche la gendarmerie e la local police.

      Manca solo l’unica cosa necessaria e richiesta: l’ambulanza, che non arriverà mai.

      Ore 07.45, la polizia ci scorta nel paese più vicino – Sredets – dove ci ha assicurato esserci un ospedale. Cercano di dividere la donna e le bambine in auto diverse. Chiediamo di portarle noi tutte assieme in macchina. A Sredets, tuttavia, siamo condotti nella centrale della border police. Troviamo decine di guardie di frontiera vestite mimetiche, armate di mitraglie, che escono a turno su mezzi militari, due agenti olandesi di Frontex, un poliziotto bulgaro con la maglia del fascio littorio dei raduni di Predappio. Siamo relegati nel fondo di un corridoio, in piedi, circondati da cinque poliziotti. Il più giovane urla e ci dice che saremo trattenuti “perché stai facendo passare migranti clandestini“. Chiediamo acqua ed un bagno per la donna e le bambine, inizialmente ce li negano. Rimaniamo in attesa, ora ci dicono che non possono andare in ospedale in quanto senza documenti, sono in stato di arresto.

      Ore 09.00, arriva finalmente un medico: parla solamente in bulgaro, visita la donna in corridoio senza alcuna privacy, chiedendole di scoprire la pancia davanti ai 5 poliziotti. Chiamiamo ancora una volta l’avvocata, vogliamo chiedere che la donna sia portata in un ambulatorio e che abbia un interprete. Rimaniamo inascoltati. Dopo a malapena 5 minuti il medico conclude la sua visita, consigliando solamente di bere molta acqua.

      Ore 09.35, ci riportano i nostri documenti e ci invitano ad andarcene. E’ l’ultima volta che vediamo la donna e le bambine. Il telefono le viene sequestrato. Non viene loro permesso di fare la richiesta di asilo e vengono portate nel pre-removal detention centre di Lyubimets. Prima di condurci all’uscita, si presenta un tale ispettore Palov che ci chiede di firmare tre carte. Avrebbero giustificato le ore passate in centrale come conversazione avuta con l’ispettore, previa convocazione ufficiale. Rifiutiamo.

      Sulla via del ritorno ripercorriamo la Route 79, è estremamente pattugliata dalla polizia. Pensiamo alle tante persone che ogni notte muoiono senza nemmeno poter chiedere aiuto, oltre alle poche che lo chiedono invano. Lungo le frontiere di terra come di mare, l’omissione di soccorso è una precisa strategia delle autorità.

      L’indomani incontriamo l’amico del marito della donna. Sa che non potrà più fare qualcosa di simile: sarebbe accusato di smuggling e perderebbe ogni possibilità di ricostruirsi una vita in Europa. Invece noi, attivisti indipendenti, possiamo e dobbiamo continuare: abbiamo molto meno da perdere. Ci è chiara l’urgenza di agire in prima persona e disobbedire a chi uccide lasciando morire.

      Dopo 20 giorni dall’accaduto riusciamo ad incontrare la donna con le bambine, che sono state finalmente trasferite al campo aperto di Harmanli. Sono state trattenute quindi nel centro di detenzione di Lyubimets per ben 19 giorni. La donna ci riferisce che, durante la loro permanenza, non è mai stata portata in ospedale per eseguire accertamenti, necessari soprattutto per quanto riguarda la gravidanza; è stata solamente visitata dal medico del centro, una visita molto superficiale e frettolosa, molto simile a quella ricevuta alla stazione di polizia di Sredets. Ci dà inoltre il suo consenso alla pubblicazione di questo report.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/08/bulgaria-lasciar-morire-e-uccidere

      #laisser_mourir

    • Bulgaria, per tutti i morti di frontiera

      Collettivo Rotte Balcaniche Alto Vicentino: un racconto di come i confini d’Europa uccidono nel silenzio e nell’indifferenza


      Da fine giugno il Collettivo Rotte Balcaniche Alto Vicentino è ripartito per un nuovo progetto di solidarietà attiva e monitoraggio verso la frontiera più esterna dell’Unione Europea, al confine tra Bulgaria e Turchia.
      Pubblichiamo il secondo report delle “operazioni di ricerca e soccorso” che il Collettivo sta portando avanti, in cui si racconta del ritrovamento del corpo senza vita di H., un uomo siriano che aveva deciso di sfidare la fortezza Europa. Come lui moltə altrə tentano il viaggio ogni giorno, e muoiono nelle foreste senza che nessuno lo sappia. Al Collettivo è sembrato importante diffondere questa storia perchè parla anche di tutte le altre storie che non potranno essere raccontate, affinché non rimangano seppellite nel silenzio dei confini.

      Ore 12, circa, al numero del collettivo viene segnalata la presenza del corpo di un ragazzo siriano di trent’anni, H., morto durante un tentativo di game in prossimità della route 79. Abbiamo il contatto di un fratello, che comunica con noi attraverso un cugino che fa da interprete. Chiedono aiuto nel gestire il recupero, il riconoscimento e il rimpatrio del corpo; ci mandano le coordinate e capiamo che il corpo si trova in mezzo ad un bosco ma vicino ad un sentiero: probabilmente i suoi compagni di viaggio lo hanno lasciato lì così che fosse facilmente raggiungibile. Nelle ore successive capiamo insieme come muoverci.

      Ore 15, un’associazione del territorio con cui collaboriamo chiama una prima volta il 112, il numero unico per le emergenze. Ci dice che il caso è stato preso in carico e che le autorità hanno iniziato le ricerche. Alla luce di altri episodi simili, decidiamo di non fidarci e iniziamo a pensare che potrebbe essere necessario metterci in viaggio.

      Ore 16.46, chiamiamo anche noi il 112, per mettere pressione ed assicurarci che effettivamente ci sia una squadra di ricerca in loco: decidiamo di dire all’operatore che c’è una persona in condizioni critiche persa nei boschi e diamo le coordinate precise. Come risposta ci chiede il nome e, prima ancora di informazioni sul suo stato di salute, la sua nazionalità. E’ zona di frontiera: probabilmente, la risposta a questa domanda è fondamentale per capire che priorità dare alla chiamata e chi allertare. Quando diciamo che è siriano, arriva in automatico la domanda: “How did he cross the border? Legally or illegally?“. Diciamo che non lo sappiamo, ribadiamo che H. ha bisogno di soccorso immediato, potrebbe essere morto. L’operatore accetta la nostra segnalazione e ci dice che polizia e assistenza medica sono state allertate. Chiediamo di poter avere aggiornamenti, ma non possono richiamarci. Richiameremo noi.

      Ore 17.54, richiamiamo. L’operatrice ci chiede se il gruppo di emergenza è arrivato in loco, probabilmente pensando che noi siamo insieme ad H. La informiamo che in realtà siamo a un’ora e mezzo di distanza, ma che ci possiamo muovere se necessario. Ci dice che la border police “was there” e che “everything will be okay if you called us“, ma non ha informazioni sulle sorti di H. Le chiediamo, sempre memori delle false informazioni degli altri casi, come può essere sicura che una pattuglia si sia recata in loco; solo a questo punto chiama la border police. “It was my mistake“, ci dice riprendendo la chiamata: gli agenti non lo hanno trovato, “but they are looking for him“. Alle nostre orecchie suona come una conferma del fatto che nessuna pattuglia sia uscita a cercarlo. L’operatrice chiude la chiamata con un: “If you can, go to this place, [to] this GPS coordinates, because they couldn’t find this person yet. If you have any information call us again“. Forti di questo via libera e incazzatə di dover supplire alle mancanze della polizia ci mettiamo in viaggio.

      Ore 18.30, partiamo, chiamando il 112 a intervalli regolari lungo la strada: emerge grande indifferenza, che diventa a tratti strafottenza rispetto alla nostra insistenza: “So what do you want now? We don’t give information, we have the signal, police is informed“. Diciamo che siamo per strada: “Okay“.

      Ore 20.24, parcheggiamo la macchina lungo una strada sterrata in mezzo al bosco. Iniziamo a camminare verso le coordinate mentre il sole dietro di noi inizia a tramontare. Richiamiamo il 112, informando del fatto che non vediamo pattuglie della polizia in giro, nonostante tutte le fantomatiche ricerche già partite. Ci viene risposto che la polizia è stata alle coordinate che noi abbiamo dato e non ha trovato nessuno; gli avvenimenti delle ore successive dimostreranno che questa informazione è falsa.

      “I talked with Border Police, today they have been in this place searching for this guy, they haven’t find anybody, so“

      “So? […] What are they going to do?“

      “What do you want from us [seccato]? They haven’t found anyone […]“

      “They can keep searching.”

      “[aggressivo] They haven’t found anybody on this place. What do you want from us? […] On this location there is no one. […] You give the location and there is no one on this location“.

      Ore 21.30, arriviamo alle coordinate attraverso un bosco segnato da zaini e bottiglie vuote che suggeriscono il passaggio di persone in game. Il corpo di H. è lì, non un metro più avanti, non uno più indietro. I suoi compagni di viaggio, nonostante la situazione di bisogno che la rotta impone, hanno avuto l’accortezza di lasciargli a fianco il suo zaino, il suo telefono e qualche farmaco. E’ evidente come nessuna pattuglia della polizia sia stata sul posto, probabilmente nessuna è neanche mai uscita dalla centrale. Ci siamo mosse insieme a una catena di bugie. Richiamiamo il 112 e l’operatrice allerta la border police. Questa volta, visto il tempo in cui rimaniamo in chiamata in attesa, parrebbe veramente.

      Ore 21.52, nessuno in vista. Richiamiamo insistendo per sapere dove sia l’unità di emergenza, dato che temiamo ancora una volta l’assoluto disinteresse di chi di dovere. Ci viene risposto: “Police crew is on another case, when they finish the case they will come to you. […] There is too many case for police, they have only few car“. Vista la quantità di posti di blocco e di automobili della polizia che abbiamo incrociato lungo la route 79 e i racconti dei suoi interventi continui, capillari e violenti in “protezione” dei confini orientali dell’UE, non ci pare proprio che la polizia non possegga mezzi. Evidentemente, di nuovo, è una questione di priorità dei casi e dei fini di questi: ci si muove per controllare e respingere, non per soccorrere. Insistiamo, ci chiedono informazioni su di noi e sulla macchina:

      “How many people are you?“

      “Three people“

      “Only women?”

      “Yes…”

      “Have patience and stay there, they will come“.

      Abbiamo la forte percezione che il fatto di essere solo ragazze velocizzerà l’intervento e che di certo nessuno si muoverà per H.: il pull factor per l’intervento della polizia siamo diventate noi, le fanciulle italiane in mezzo al bosco da salvare. Esplicitiamo tra di noi la necessità di mettere in chiaro, all’eventuale arrivo della polizia, che la priorità per noi è il recupero del corpo di H. Sentiamo anche lə compagnə che sono rimastə a casa: davanti all’ennesimo aggiornamento di stallo, in tre decidono di partire da Harmanli e di raggiungerci alle coordinate; per loro si prospetta un’ora e mezzo in furgone: lungo la strada, verranno fermati tre volte a posti di blocco, essendo i furgoni uno dei mezzi preferiti dagli smuggler per muovere le persone migranti verso Sofia.

      Ore 22, continuiamo con le chiamate di pressione al 112. E’ una donna a rispondere: la sua voce suona a tratti preoccupata. Anche nella violenza della situazione, registriamo come la socializzazione di genere sia determinante rispetto alla postura di cura. Si connette con la border police: “Police is coming to you in 5…2 minutes“, ci dice in un tentativo di rassicurarci. Purtroppo, sappiamo bene che le pratiche della polizia sono lontane da quelle di cura e non ci illudiamo: l’attesa continuerà. Come previsto, un’ora dopo non è ancora arrivato nessuno. All’ennesima chiamata, il centralinista ci chiede informazioni sulla morfologia del territorio intorno a noi. Questa richiesta conferma quello che ormai già sapevamo: la polizia, lì, non è mai arrivata.

      Ore 23.45, delle luci illuminano il campo in cui siamo sedute ormai da ore vicine al corpo di H. E’ una macchina della polizia di frontiera, con sopra una pattuglia mista di normal police e border police. Nessuna traccia di ambulanza, personale medico o polizia scientifica. Ci chiedono di mostrargli il corpo. Lo illuminano distrattamente, fanno qualche chiamata alla centrale e tornano a noi: ci chiedono come siamo venute a sapere del caso e perchè siamo lì. Gli ribadiamo che è stata un’operatrice del 112 a suggerici ciò: la cosa ci permette di giustificare la nostra presenza in zona di confine, a fianco ad un corpo senza vita ed evitare le accuse di smuggling.

      Ore 23.57, ci propongono di riaccompagnarci alla nostra macchina, neanche 10 minuti dopo essere arrivati. Noi chiediamo cosa ne sarà del corpo di H. e un agente ci risponde che arriverà un’unità di emergenza apposita. Esplicitiamo la nostra volontà di aspettarne l’arrivo, vogliamo tentare di ottenere il maggior numero di informazioni da comunicare alla famiglia e siamo preoccupate che, se noi lasciamo il campo, anche la pattuglia abbandonerà il corpo. Straniti, e forse impreparati alla nostra presenza e insistenza, provano a convincerci ad andare, illustrando una serie farsesca di pericoli che vanno dal fatto che sia zona di frontiera interdetta alla presenza di pericolosi migranti e calabroni giganti. Di base, recepiamo che non hanno una motivazioni valida per impedirci di rimanere.

      Quando il gruppo di Harmanli arriva vicino a noi, la polizia li sente arrivare prima di vederli e pensa che siano un gruppo di migranti; a questo stimolo, risponde con la prontezza che non ha mai dimostrato rispetto alle nostre sollecitazioni. Scatta verso di loro con la mano a pistola e manganello e le torce puntate verso il bosco. Li trova, ma il loro colore della pelle è nello spettro della legittimità. Va tutto bene, possono arrivare da noi. Della pattuglia di sei poliziotti, tre vanno via in macchina, tre si fermano effettivamente per la notte; ci chiediamo se sarebbe andata allo stesso modo se noi con i nostri occhi bianchi ed europei non fossimo stati presenti. Lo stallo continua, sostanzialmente, fino a mattina: la situazione è surreale, con noi sdraiati a pochi metri dalla polizia e dal corpo di H. L’immagine che ne esce parla di negligenza delle istituzioni, della gerarchia di vite che il confine crea e dell’abbandono sistematico dei corpi che vi si muovono intorno, se non per un loro possibile respingimento.

      Ore 8 di mattina, l’indifferenza continua anche quando arriva la scientifica, che si muove sbrigativa e sommaria intorno al corpo di H., vestendo jeans e scattando qualche fotografia simbolica. Il tutto non dura più di 30 minuti, alla fine dei quali il corpo parte nella macchina della border police, senza comunicazione alcuna sulla sua direzione e sulle sue sorti. Dopo la solita strategia di insistenza, riusciamo ad apprendere che verrà portato all’obitorio di Burgas, ma non hanno nulla da dirci su quello che avverrà dopo: l’ipotesi di un rimpatrio della salma o di un possibile funerale pare non sfiorare nemmeno i loro pensieri. Scopriremo solo in seguito, durante una c​hiamata con la famiglia, che H., nella migliore delle ipotesi, verrà seppellito in Bulgaria, solo grazie alla presenza sul territorio bulgaro di un parente di sangue, da poco deportato dalla Germania secondo le direttive di Dublino, che ha potuto riconoscere ufficialmente il corpo. Si rende palese, ancora una volta, l’indifferenza delle autorità nei confronti di H., un corpo ritenuto illegittimo che non merita nemmeno una sepoltura. La morte è normalizzata in questi spazi di confine e l’indifferenza sistemica diventa un’arma, al pari della violenza sui corpi e dei respingimenti, per definire chi ha diritto a una vita degna, o semplicemente a una vita.

      https://www.meltingpot.org/2023/08/bulgaria-per-tutti-i-morti-di-frontiera

  • #Lampedusa : ’Operational emergency,’ not ’migration crisis’

    Thousands of migrants have arrived on Lampedusa from Africa this week, with the EU at odds over what to do with them. DW reports from the Italian island, where locals are showing compassion as conditions worsen.

    Long lines of migrants and refugees, wearing caps and towels to protect themselves from the blistering September sun, sit flanked on either side of a narrow, rocky lane leading to Contrada Imbriacola, the main migrant reception center on the Italian island of Lampedusa.

    Among them are 16-year-old Abubakar Sheriff and his 10-year old brother, Farde, who fled their home in Sierra Leone and reached Lampedusa by boat from Tunisia.

    “We’ve been on this island for four days, have been sleeping outside and not consumed much food or water. We’ve been living on a couple of biscuits,” Abubakar told DW. “There were 48 people on the boat we arrived in from Tunisia on September 13. It was a scary journey and I saw some other boats capsizing. But we got lucky.”

    Together with thousands of other migrants outside the reception center, they’re waiting to be put into police vans headed to the Italian island’s port. They will then be transferred to Sicily and other parts of Italy for their asylum claims to be processed, as authorities in Lampedusa say they have reached “a tipping point” in migration management.
    Not a ’migration crisis for Italy,’ but an ’operational emergency’

    More than 7,000 migrants arrived in Lampedusa on flimsy boats from Tunisia earlier this week, leading the island’s mayor, Filippo Mannino, to declare a state of emergency and tell local media that while migrants have always been welcomed, this time Lampedusa “is in crisis.”

    In a statement released on Friday, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said her government intends to take “immediate extraordinary measures” to deal with the landings. She said this could include a European mission to stop arrivals, “a naval mission if necessary.” But Lampedusa, with a population of just 6,000 and a reception center that has a capacity for only 400 migrants, has more immediate problems.

    Flavio Di Giacomo, spokesperson for the UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM), told DW that while the new arrivals have been overwhelming for the island, this is not a “migration crisis for Italy.”

    “This is mainly an operational emergency for Lampedusa, because in 2015-2016, at the height of Europe’s migration crisis, only 8% of migrants arrived in Lampedusa. The others were rescued at sea and transported to Sicily to many ports there,” he said. “This year, over 70% of arrivals have been in Lampedusa, with people departing from Tunisia, which is very close to the island.”

    Di Giacomo said the Italian government had failed to prepare Lampedusa over the past few years. “The Italian government had time to increase the reception center’s capacity after it was set up in 2008,” he said. “Migration is nothing new for the country.”
    Why the sudden increase?

    One of Italy’s Pelagie Islands in the Mediterranean, Lampedusa has been the first point of entry to Europe for people fleeing conflict, poverty and war in North Africa and the Middle East for years, due to its geographical proximity to those regions. But the past week’s mass arrival of migrants caught local authorities off guard.

    “We have never seen anything like what we saw on Wednesday,” said a local police officer near the asylum reception center.

    Showing a cellphone video of several small boats crammed with people arriving at the Lampedusa port, he added, “2011 was the last time Lampedusa saw something like this.” When the civil war in Libya broke out in 2011, many people fled to Europe through Italy. At the time, Rome declared a “North Africa emergency.”

    Roberto Forin, regional coordinator for Europe at the Mixed Migration Centre, a research center, said the recent spike in arrivals likely had one main driving factor. “According to our research with refugees and migrants in Tunisia, the interceptions by Tunisian coast guards of boats leaving toward Italy seems to have decreased since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in mid-July between the European Union and Tunisia,” he said. “But the commission has not yet disbursed the €100 million ($106.6 million) included in the deal.”

    The EU-Tunisia deal is meant to prevent irregular migration from North Africa and has been welcomed by EU politicians, including Meloni. But rights groups have questioned whether it will protect migrants. Responding to reporters about the delayed disbursement of funds, the European Commission said on Friday that the disbursement was still a “work in progress.”

    IOM’s Giacomo said deals between the EU and North African countries aren’t the answer. “It is a humanitarian emergency right now because migrants are leaving from Tunisia, because many are victims of racial discrimination, assault, and in Libya as well, their rights are being abused,” he said. "Some coming from Tunisia are also saying they are coming to Italy to get medical care because of the economic crisis there.

    “The solution should be to organize more search-and-rescue at sea, to save people and bring them to safety,” he added. “The focus should be on helping Lampedusa save the migrants.”

    A group of young migrants from Mali who were sitting near the migrant reception center, with pink tags on their hands indicating the date of their arrival, had a similar view.

    “We didn’t feel safe in Tunisia,” they told DW. “So we paid around €750 to a smuggler in Sfax, Tunisia, who then gave us a dinghy and told us to control it and cross the sea toward Europe. We got to Italy but we don’t want to stay here. We want to go to France and play football for that country.”
    Are other EU nations helping?

    At a press briefing in Brussels on Wednesday, the European Commission said that 450 staff from Europol, Frontex and the European Union Agency for Asylum have been deployed to the island to assist Italian authorities, and €40 million ($42.6 million) has been provided for transport and other infrastructure needed for to handle the increase in migrant arrivals.

    But Italian authorities have said they’re alone in dealing with the migrants, with Germany restricting Italy from transferring migrants and France tightening its borders with the country.

    Lampedusa Deputy Mayor Attilio Lucia was uncompromising: “The message that has to get through is that Europe has to wake up because the European Union has been absent for 20 years. Today we give this signal: Lampedusa says ’Enough’, the Lampedusians have been suffering for 20 years and we are psychologically destroyed,” he told DW.

    “I understand that this was done mostly for internal politics, whereby governments in France and Germany are afraid of being attacked by far-right parties and therefore preemptively take restrictive measures,” said Forin. “On the other hand, it is a measure of the failure of the EU to mediate a permanent and sustainable mechanism. When solidarity is left to voluntary mechanisms between states there is always a risk that, when the stakes are high, solidarity vanishes.”

    Local help

    As politicians and rights groups argue over the right response, Lampedusa locals like Antonello di Malta and his mother feel helping people should be the heart of any deal.

    On the night more than 7,000 people arrived on the island, di Malta said his mother called him saying some migrants had come to their house begging for food. “I had to go out but I didn’t feel comfortable hearing about them from my mother. So I came home and we started cooking spaghetti for them. There were 10 of them,” he told DW, adding that he was disappointed with how the government was handling the situation.

    “When I saw them I thought about how I would have felt if they were my sons crying and asking for food,” said Antonello’s mother. “So I started cooking for them. We Italians were migrants too. We used to also travel from north to south. So we can’t get scared of people and we need to help.”

    Mohammad still has faith in the Italian locals helping people like him. “I left horrible conditions in Gambia. It is my first time in Europe and local people here have been nice to me, giving me a cracker or sometimes even spaghetti. I don’t know where I will be taken next, but I have not lost hope,” he told DW.

    “I stay strong thinking that one day I will play football for Italy and eventually, my home country Gambia,” he said. “That sport gives me joy through all this hardship.”

    https://www.dw.com/en/lampedusa-operational-emergency-not-migration-crisis/a-66830589

    #débarquements #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Italie #crise #compassion #transferts #urgence_opérationnelle #crise_migratoire #Europol #Frontex #Agence_de_l'Union_européenne_pour_l'asile (#EUEA #EUAA) #solidarité

    ping @isskein @karine4 @_kg_

    • The dance that give life’
      Upon Lampedusa’s rocky shore they came,
      From Sub-Saharan lands, hearts aflame,
      Chasing dreams, fleeing despair,
      In search of a life that’s fair.

      Hunger gnawed, thirst clawed, bodies beat,
      Brutality’s rhythm, a policeman’s merciless feat,
      Yet within their spirits, a melody stirred,
      A refuge in humour where hope’s not deferred.

      Their laughter echoed ’cross the tiny island,
      In music and dance, they made a home,
      In the face of adversity, they sang their songs,
      In unity and rhythm, they proved their wrongs.

      A flood of souls, on Lampedusa’s strand,
      Ignited debates across the land,
      Politicians’ tongues twisted in spite,
      Racist rhetoric veiled as right.

      Yet, the common people, with curious gaze,
      Snared in the web of fear’s daze,
      Chose not to see the human plight,
      But the brainwash of bigotry’s might.

      Yet still, the survivor’s spirit shines bright,
      In the face of inhumanity, they recite,
      Their music, their dance, their undying humour,
      A testament to resilience, amid the rumour and hate.

      For they are not just numbers on a page,
      But humans, life stories, not a stage,
      Their journey not over, their tale still unspun,
      On the horizon, a new day begun.

      Written by @Yambiodavid

      https://twitter.com/RefugeesinLibya/status/1702595772603138331
      #danse #fête

    • L’imbroglio del governo oltre la propaganda

      Le politiche europee e italiane di esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera con il coinvolgimento di paesi terzi, ritenuti a torto “sicuri”, sono definitivamente fallite.

      La tragedia umanitaria in corso a Lampedusa, l’ennesima dalle “primavere arabe” del 2011 ad oggi, dimostra che dopo gli accordi di esternalizzazione, con la cessione di motovedette e con il supporto alle attività di intercettazione in mare, in collaborazione con Frontex, come si è fatto con la Tunisia e con la Libia (o con quello che ne rimane come governo di Tripoli), le partenze non diminuiscono affatto, ed anzi, fino a quando il meteo lo permette, sono in continuo aumento.

      Si sono bloccate con i fermi amministrativi le navi umanitarie più grandi, ma questo ha comportato un aumento degli “arrivi autonomi” e l’impossibilità di assegnare porti di sbarco distribuiti nelle città più grandi della Sicilia e della Calabria, come avveniva fino al 2017, prima del Codice di condotta Minniti e dell’attacco politico-giudiziario contro il soccorso civile.

      La caccia “su scala globale” a trafficanti e scafisti si è rivelata l’ennesimo annuncio propagandistico, anche se si dà molta enfasi alla intensificazione dei controlli di polizia e agli arresti di presunti trafficanti ad opera delle autorità di polizia e di guardia costiera degli Stati con i quali l’Italia ha stipulato accordi bilaterali finalizzati al contrasto dell’immigrazione “clandestina”. Se Salvini ha le prove di una guerra contro l’Italia, deve esibirle, altrimenti pensi al processo di Palermo sul caso Open Arms, per difendersi sui fatti contestati, senza sfruttare il momento per ulteriori sparate propagandistiche.

      Mentre si riaccende lo scontro nella maggioranza, è inutile incolpare l’Unione europea, dopo che la Meloni e Piantedosi hanno vantato di avere imposto un “cambio di passo” nelle politiche migratorie dell’Unione, mente invece hanno solo rafforzato accordi bilaterali già esistenti.

      Le politiche europee e italiane di esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera con il coinvolgimento di paesi terzi, ritenuti a torto “sicuri”, sono definitivamente fallite, gli arrivi delle persone che fuggono da aree geografiche sempre più instabili, per non parlare delle devastazioni ambientali, non sono diminuiti per effetto degli accordi bilaterali o multilaterali con i quali si è cercato di offrire aiuti economici in cambio di una maggiore collaborazione sulle attività di polizia per la sorveglianza delle frontiere. Dove peraltro la corruzione, i controlli mortali, se non gli abusi sulle persone migranti, si sono diffusi in maniera esponenziale, senza che alcuna autorità statale si dimostrasse in grado di fare rispettare i diritti fondamentali e le garanzie che dovrebbe assicurare a qualsiasi persona uno Stato democratico quando negozia con un paese terzo. Ed è per questa ragione che gli aiuti previsti dal Memorandum Tunisia-Ue non sono ancora arrivati e il Piano Mattei per l’Africa, sul quale Meloni e Piantedosi hanno investito tutte le loro energie, appare già fallito.

      Di fronte al fallimento sul piano internazionale è prevedibile una ulteriore stretta repressiva. Si attende un nuovo pacchetto sicurezza, contro i richiedenti asilo provenienti da paesi terzi “sicuri” per i quali, al termine di un sommario esame delle domande di protezione durante le “procedure accelerate in frontiera”, dovrebbero essere previsti “rimpatri veloci”. Come se non fossero certi i dati sul fallimento delle operazioni di espulsione e di rimpatrio di massa.

      Se si vogliono aiutare i paesi colpiti da terremoti e alluvioni, ma anche quelli dilaniati da guerre civili alimentate dalla caccia alle risorse naturali di cui è ricca l’Africa, occorrono visti umanitari, evacuazione dei richiedenti asilo presenti in Libia e Tunisia, ma anche in Niger, e sospensione immediata di tutti gli accordi stipulati per bloccare i migranti in paesi dove non si garantisce il rispetto dei diritti umani. Occorre una politica estera capace di mediare i conflitti e non di aggravarne gli esiti. Vanno aperti canali legali di ingresso senza delegare a paesi terzi improbabili blocchi navali. Per salvare vite, basta con la propaganda elettorale.

      https://ilmanifesto.it/limbroglio-del-governo-oltre-la-propaganda/r/2aUycOowSerL2VxgLCD9N

    • The fall of the Lampedusa Hotspot, people’s freedom and locals’ solidarity

      https://2196af27df.clvaw-cdnwnd.com/1b76f9dfff36cde79df962be70636288/200000912-464e9464ec/DSC09012.webp?ph=2196af27df

      A few weeks ago, the owner of one of the bars in the old port, was talking about human trafficking and money laundering between institutions and NGOs in relation to what had happened during that day. It was the evening of Thursday 24 August and Lampedusa had been touched by yet another ’exceptional’ event: 64 arrivals in one day. Tonight, in that same bar in the old port, a young Tunisian boy was sitting at a table and together with that same owner, albeit in different languages, exchanging life stories.

      What had been shaken in Lampedusa, in addition to the collapse of the Hotspot , is the collapse of the years long segregation system, which had undermined anypotential encounter with newly arrived people. A segregation that also provided fertile ground for conspiracy theories about migration, reducing people on the move to either victims or perpetrators of an alleged ’migration crisis’.

      Over the past two days, however, without police teams in manhunt mode, Lampedusa streets, public spaces, benches and bars, have been filled with encounters, conversations, pizzas and coffees offered by local inhabitants. Without hotspots and segregation mechanisms, Lampedusa becomes a space for enriching encounters and spontaneus acts of solidarity between locals and newly arrived people. Trays of fish ravioli, arancini, pasta, rice and couscous enter the small room next to the church, where volunteers try to guarantee as many meals as possible to people who, taken to the hotspot after disembarkation, had been unable to access food and water for three days. These scenes were unthinkable only a few days before. Since the beginning of the pandemic, which led to the end of the era of the ’hotspot with a hole’, newly-arrived people could not leave the detention centre, and it became almost impossible to imagine an open hotspot, with people walking freely through the city. Last night, 14 September, on Via Roma, groups of people who would never have met last week danced together with joy and complicity.

      These days, practice precedes all rhetoric, and what is happening shows that Lampedusa can be a beautiful island in the Mediterranean Sea rather than a border, that its streets can be a place of welcoming and encounter without a closed centre that stifles any space for self-managed solidarity.

      The problem is not migration but the mechanism used to manage it.

      The situation for the thousands of people who have arrived in recent days remains worrying and precarious. In Contrada Imbriacola, even tonight, people are sleeping on the ground or on cots next to the buses that will take them to the ships for transfers in the morning. Among the people, besides confusion and misinformation, there is a lot of tiredness and fatigue. There are many teenagers and adolescents and many children and pregnant women. There are no showers or sanitary facilities, and people still complain about the inaccessibility of food and water; the competitiveness during food distributions disheartens many because of the tension involved in queuing. The fights that broke out two days ago are an example of this, and since that event most of the workers of all the associations present in the centre have been prevented from entering for reasons of security and guaranteeing their safety.

      If the Red Cross and the Prefecture do not want to admit their responsibilities, these are blatant before our eyes and it is not only the images of 7000 people that prove this, but the way situations are handled due to an absolute lack of personnel and, above all, confusion at organisational moments.

      https://2196af27df.clvaw-cdnwnd.com/1b76f9dfff36cde79df962be70636288/200000932-250b0250b2/DSC08952-8.webp?ph=2196af27df

      A police commissioner tried unsuccessfully to get only a few people into the bus. The number and determination to leave of the newly arrived people is reformulating the very functioning of the transfers.

      A police commissioner tried unsuccessfully to get only a few people into the bus. The number and determination to leave of the newly arrived people is reformulating the very functioning of the transfers.

      During transfers yesterday morning, the carabinieri charged to move people crowded around a departing bus. The latter, at the cost of moving, performed a manoeuvre that squeezed the crowd against a low wall, creating an extremely dangerous situation ( video). All the people who had been standing in line for hours had to move chaotically, creating a commotion from which a brawl began in which at least one person split his eyebrow. Shortly before, one of the police commissioners had tried something different by creating a human caterpillar - people standing in line with their hands on their shoulders - in order to lead them into a bus, but once the doors were opened, other people pounced into it literally jamming it (photo). In other words, people are trudging along at the cost of others’ psycho-physical health.

      In yesterday evening’s transfer on 14 September (photo series with explanation), 300 people remained at the commercial dock from the morning to enter the Galaxy ship at nine o’clock in the evening. Against these 300 people, just as many arrived from the hotspot to board the ship or at least to try to do so.

      The tension, especially among those in control, was palpable; the marshals who remained on the island - the four patrols of the police force were all engaged for the day’s transfers - ’lined up’ between one group and another with the aim of avoiding any attempt to jump on the ship. In reality, people, including teenagers and families with children, hoped until the end to board the ship. No one told them otherwise until all 300 people passed through the only door left open to access the commercial pier. These people were promised that they would leave the next day. Meanwhile, other people from the hotspot have moved to the commercial pier and are spending the night there.

      People are demanding to leave and move freely. Obstructing rather than supporting this freedom of movement will lead people and territories back to the same impasses they have regularly experienced in recent years. The hotspot has collapsed, but other forms of borders remain that obstruct something as simple as personal self-determination. Forcing is the source of all problems, not freedom.

      Against all forms of borders, for freedom of movement for all.

      https://www.maldusa.org/l/the-fall-of-the-lampedusa-hotspot-people-s-freedom-and-locals-solidarity

      –-
      #Video: Lampedusa on the 14th September

      –-> https://vimeo.com/864806349

      –-

      #Lampedusa #hotspot #soilidarity #Maldusa

    • Lampedusa’s Hotspot System: From Failure to Nonexistence

      After a few days of bad weather, with the return of calm seas, people on the move again started to leave and cross the Mediterranean from Tunisia and Libya.

      During the day of 12 September alone, 110 iron, wooden and rubber boats arrived. 110 small boats, for about 5000 people in twenty-four hours. Well over the ’record’ of 60 that had astonished many a few weeks ago. Numbers not seen for years, and which add up to the approximately 120,000 people who have reached Italy since January 2023 alone: already 15,000 more than the entire year 2022.

      It has been a tense few days at the Favaloro pier, where people have been crowded for dozens of hours under the scorching sun.

      Some, having passed the gates and some rocks, jumped into the water in an attempt to find some coolness, reaching some boats at anchor and asking for water to drink.

      It pains and angers us that the police in riot gear are the only real response that seems to have been given.

      On the other hand, hundreds of people, who have arrived in the last two days on the Lampedusa coast, are walking through the streets of the town, crossing and finally reclaiming public space. The hotspot, which could accommodate 389, in front of 7000 people, has simply blown up. That is, it has opened.

      The square in front of the church was transformed, as it was years ago, into a meeting place where locals organised the distribution of food they had prepared, thanks also to the solidarity of bakers and restaurateurs who provided what they could.

      A strong and fast wave of solidarity: it seems incredible to see people on the move again, sharing space, moments and words with Lampedusians, activists from various organisations and tourists. Of course, there is also no shortage of sad and embarrassing situations, in which some tourists - perhaps secretly eager to meet ’the illegal immigrants’ - took pictures of themselves capturing these normally invisible and segregated chimeras.

      In fact, all these people would normally never meet, kept separate and segregated by the hotspot system.

      But these days a hotspot system seems to no longer exist, or to have completely broken down, in Lampedusa. It has literally been occupied by people on the move, sleeping inside and outside the centre, on the road leading from the entrance gate to the large car park, and in the abandoned huts around, and in every nook and cranny.

      Basic goods, such as water and food, are not enough. Due to the high number of people, there is a structural lack of distribution even of the goods that are present, and tensions seem to mount slowly but steadily.

      The Red Cross and workers from other organisations have been prevented from entering the hotspot centre for ’security reasons’ since yesterday morning. This seems an overwhelming situation for everyone. The pre-identification procedures, of course, are completely blown.

      Breaking out of this stalemate it’s very complex due to the continuous flow of arrivals : for today, as many as 2000 people are expected to be transferred between regular ships and military assets. For tomorrow another 2300 or so. Of course, it remains unpredictable how many people will continue to reach the island at the same time.

      In reaction to all this, we are not surprised, but again disappointed, that the city council is declaring a state of emergency still based on the rhetoric of ’invasion’.

      A day of city mourning has also been declared for the death of a 5-month-old baby, who did not survive the crossing and was found two days ago during a rescue.

      We are comforted, however, that a torchlight procession has been called by Lampedusians for tonight at 8pm. Banners read: ’STOP DEAD AT SEA’, ’LEGAL ENTRANCE CHANNELS NOW’.

      The Red Cross, Questura and Prefecture, on the other hand, oscillate between denying the problem - ’we are handling everything pretty well’ - to shouting at the invasion.

      It is not surprising either, but remains a disgrace, that the French government responds by announcing tighter border controls and that the German government announces in these very days - even though the decision stems from agreements already discussed in August regarding the Dublin Convention - that it will suspend the taking in of any refugee who falls under the so-called ’European solidarity mechanism’.

      We are facing a new level of breaking down the European borders and border regime by people on the move in the central Mediterranean area.

      We stand in full solidarity with them and wish them safe arrival in their destination cities.

      But let us remember: every day they continue to die at sea, which proves to be the deadliest border in the world. And this stems from a political choice, which remains intolerable and unacceptable.

      Freedom of movement must be a right for all!

      https://www.maldusa.org/l/lampedusas-hotspot-system-from-failure-to-nonexistence

    • « L’effet Lampedusa », ou comment se fabriquent des politiques migratoires répressives

      En concentrant les migrants dans des hotspots souvent situés sur de petites îles, les Etats européens installent une gestion inhumaine et inefficace des migrations, contradictoire avec certains de leurs objectifs, soulignent les chercheuses #Marie_Bassi et #Camille_Schmoll.

      Depuis quelques jours, la petite île de Lampedusa en Sicile a vu débarquer sur son territoire plus de migrants que son nombre d’habitants. Et comme à chacun de ces épisodes d’urgence migratoire en Europe, des représentants politiques partent en #croisade : pour accroître leur capital électoral, ils utilisent une #rhétorique_guerrière tandis que les annonces de #fermeture_des_frontières se succèdent. Les #élections_européennes approchent, c’est pour eux l’occasion de doubler par la droite de potentiels concurrents.

      Au-delà du cynisme des #opportunismes_politiques, que nous dit l’épisode Lampedusa ? Une fois de plus, que les #politiques_migratoires mises en place par les Etats européens depuis une trentaine d’années, et de manière accélérée depuis 2015, ont contribué à créer les conditions d’une #tragédie_humanitaire. Nous avons fermé les #voies_légales d’accès au territoire européen, contraignant des millions d’exilés à emprunter la périlleuse route maritime. Nous avons laissé les divers gouvernements italiens criminaliser les ONG qui portent secours aux bateaux en détresse, augmentant le degré de létalité de la traversée maritime. Nous avons collaboré avec des gouvernements irrespectueux des droits des migrants : en premier lieu la Libye, que nous avons armée et financée pour enfermer et violenter les populations migrantes afin de les empêcher de rejoindre l’Europe.

      L’épisode Lampedusa n’est donc pas simplement un drame humain : c’est aussi le symptôme d’une politique migratoire de courte vue, qui ne comprend pas qu’elle contribue à créer les conditions de ce qu’elle souhaite éviter, en renforçant l’instabilité et la violence dans les régions de départ ou de transit, et en enrichissant les réseaux criminels de trafic d’êtres humains qu’elle prétend combattre.

      Crise de l’accueil, et non crise migratoire

      Revenons d’abord sur ce que l’on peut appeler l’effet hotspot. On a assisté ces derniers mois à une augmentation importante des traversées de la Méditerranée centrale vers l’Italie, si bien que l’année 2023 pourrait, si la tendance se confirme, se hisser au niveau des années 2016 et 2017 qui avaient battu des records en termes de traversées dans cette zone. C’est bien entendu cette augmentation des départs qui a provoqué la surcharge actuelle de Lampedusa, et la situation de crise que l’on observe.

      Mais en réalité, les épisodes d’urgence se succèdent à Lampedusa depuis que l’île est devenue, au début des années 2000, le principal lieu de débarquement des migrants dans le canal de Sicile. Leur interception et leur confinement dans le hotspot de cette île exiguë de 20 km² renforce la #visibilité du phénomène, et crée un #effet_d’urgence et d’#invasion qui justifie une gestion inhumaine des arrivées. Ce fut déjà le cas en 2011 au moment des printemps arabes, lorsque plus de 60 000 personnes y avaient débarqué en quelques mois. Le gouvernement italien avait stoppé les transferts vers la Sicile, créant volontairement une situation d’#engorgement et de #crise_humanitaire. Les images du centre surpeuplé, de migrants harassés dormant dans la rue et protestant contre cet accueil indigne avaient largement été diffusées par les médias. Elles avaient permis au gouvernement italien d’instaurer un énième #état_d’urgence et de légitimer de nouvelles #politiques_répressives.

      Si l’on fait le tour des hotspots européens, force est de constater la répétition de ces situations, et donc l’échec de la #concentration dans quelques points stratégiques, le plus souvent des #îles du sud de l’Europe. L’#effet_Lampedusa est le même que l’effet #Chios ou l’effet #Moria#Lesbos) : ces #îles-frontières concentrent à elles seules, parce qu’elles sont exiguës, toutes les caractéristiques d’une gestion inhumaine et inefficace des migrations. Pensée en 2015 au niveau communautaire mais appliquée depuis longtemps dans certains pays, cette politique n’est pas parvenue à une gestion plus rationnelle des flux d’arrivées. Elle a en revanche fait peser sur des espaces périphériques et minuscules une énorme responsabilité humaine et une lourde charge financière. Des personnes traumatisées, des survivants, des enfants de plus en plus jeunes, sont accueillis dans des conditions indignes. Crise de l’accueil et non crise migratoire comme l’ont déjà montré de nombreuses personnes.

      Changer de paradigme

      Autre #myopie européenne : considérer qu’on peut, en collaborant avec les Etats de transit et de départ, endiguer les flux. Cette politique, au-delà de la vulnérabilité qu’elle crée vis-à-vis d’Etats qui peuvent user du chantage migratoire à tout moment – ce dont Kadhafi et Erdogan ne s’étaient pas privés – génère les conditions mêmes du départ des personnes en question. Car l’#externalisation dégrade la situation des migrants dans ces pays, y compris ceux qui voudraient y rester. En renforçant la criminalisation de la migration, l’externalisation renforce leur #désir_de_fuite. Depuis de nombreuses années, migrantes et migrants fuient les prisons et la torture libyennes ; ou depuis quelques mois, la violence d’un pouvoir tunisien en plein tournant autoritaire qui les érige en boucs émissaires. L’accord entre l’UE et la Tunisie, un énième du genre qui conditionne l’aide financière à la lutte contre l’immigration, renforce cette dynamique, avec les épisodes tragiques de cet été, à la frontière tuniso-libyenne.

      Lampedusa nous apprend qu’il est nécessaire de changer de #paradigme, tant les solutions proposées par les Etats européens (externalisation, #dissuasion, #criminalisation_des_migrations et de leurs soutiens) ont révélé au mieux leur #inefficacité, au pire leur caractère létal. Ils contribuent notamment à asseoir des régimes autoritaires et des pratiques violentes vis-à-vis des migrants. Et à transformer des êtres humains en sujets humanitaires.

      https://www.liberation.fr/idees-et-debats/tribunes/leffet-lampedusa-ou-comment-se-fabriquent-des-politiques-migratoires-repr

    • Pour remettre les pendules à l’heure :

      Saluti dal Paese del “fenomeno palesemente fuori controllo”.


      https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1703458756728610987

      Et aussi :

      « Les interceptions des migrants aux frontières représentent 1 à 3% des personnes autorisées à entrer avec un visa dans l’espace Schengen »

      Source : Babels, « Méditerranée – Des frontières à la dérive », https://www.lepassagerclandestin.fr/catalogue/bibliotheque-des-frontieres/mediterraneedes-frontieres-a-la-derive

      #statistiques #chiffres #étrangers #Italie

    • Arrivées à Lampedusa - #Solidarité et #résistance face à la crise de l’accueil en Europe.

      Suite à l’arrivée d’un nombre record de personnes migrantes à Lampedusa, la société civile exprime sa profonde inquiétude face à la réponse sécuritaire des Etats européens, la crise de l’accueil et réaffirme sa solidarité avec les personnes qui arrivent en Europe.

      Plus de 5 000 personnes et 112 bateaux : c’est le nombre d’arrivées enregistrées sur l’île italienne de Lampedusa le mardi 12 septembre. Les embarcations, dont la plupart sont arrivées de manière autonome, sont parties de Tunisie ou de Libye. Au total, plus de 118 500 personnes ont atteint les côtes italiennes depuis le début de l’année, soit près du double des 64 529 enregistrées à la même période en 2022 [1]. L’accumulation des chiffres ne nous fait pas oublier que, derrière chaque numéro, il y a un être humain, une histoire individuelle et que des personnes perdent encore la vie en essayant de rejoindre l’Europe.

      Si Lampedusa est depuis longtemps une destination pour les bateaux de centaines de personnes cherchant refuge en Europe, les infrastructures d’accueil de l’île font défaut. Mardi, le sauvetage chaotique d’un bateau a causé la mort d’un bébé de 5 mois. Celui-ci est tombé à l’eau et s’est immédiatement noyé, alors que des dizaines de bateaux continuaient d’accoster dans le port commercial. Pendant plusieurs heures, des centaines de personnes sont restées bloquées sur la jetée, sans eau ni nourriture, avant d’être transférées vers le hotspot de Lampedusa.

      Le hotspot, centre de triage où les personnes nouvellement arrivées sont tenues à l’écart de la population locale et pré-identifiées avant d’être transférées sur le continent, avec ses 389 places, n’a absolument pas la capacité d’accueillir dignement les personnes qui arrivent quotidiennement sur l’île. Depuis mardi, le personnel du centre est complètement débordé par la présence de 6 000 personnes. La Croix-Rouge et le personnel d’autres organisations ont été empêchés d’entrer dans le centre pour des « raisons de sécurité ».

      Jeudi matin, de nombreuses personnes ont commencé à s’échapper du hotspot en sautant les clôtures en raison des conditions inhumaines dans lesquelles elles y étaient détenues. Face à l’incapacité des autorités italiennes à offrir un accueil digne, la solidarité locale a pris le relais. De nombreux habitants et habitantes se sont mobilisés pour organiser des distributions de nourriture aux personnes réfugiées dans la ville [2].

      Différentes organisations dénoncent également la crise politique qui sévit en Tunisie et l’urgence humanitaire dans la ville de Sfax, d’où partent la plupart des bateaux pour l’Italie. Actuellement, environ 500 personnes dorment sur la place Beb Jebli et n’ont pratiquement aucun accès à la nourriture ou à une assistance médicale [3]. La plupart d’entre elles ont été contraintes de fuir le Soudan, l’Éthiopie, la Somalie, le Tchad, l’Érythrée ou le Niger. Depuis les déclarations racistes du président tunisien, Kais Saied, de nombreuses personnes migrantes ont été expulsées de leur domicile et ont perdu leur travail [4]. D’autres ont été déportées dans le désert où certaines sont mortes de soif.

      Alors que ces déportations massives se poursuivent et que la situation à Sfax continue de se détériorer, l’UE a conclu un nouvel accord avec le gouvernement tunisien il y a trois mois afin de coopérer « plus efficacement en matière de migration », de gestion des frontières et de « lutte contre la contrebande », au moyen d’une enveloppe de plus de 100 millions d’euros. L’UE a accepté ce nouvel accord en pleine connaissance des atrocités commises par le gouvernement tunisien ainsi que les attaques perpétrées par les garde-côtes tunisiens sur les bateaux de migrants [5].

      Pendant ce temps, nous observons avec inquiétude comment les différents gouvernements européens ferment leurs frontières et continuent de violer le droit d’asile et les droits humains les plus fondamentaux. Alors que le ministre français de l’Intérieur a annoncé son intention de renforcer les contrôles à la frontière italienne, plusieurs autres États membres de l’UE ont également déclaré qu’ils fermeraient leurs portes. En août, les autorités allemandes ont décidé d’arrêter les processus de relocalisation des demandeurs et demandeuses d’asile arrivant en Allemagne depuis l’Italie dans le cadre du « mécanisme de solidarité volontaire » [6].

      Invitée à Lampedusa dimanche par la première ministre Meloni, la Présidente de la Commission européenne Von der Leyen a annoncé la mise en place d’un plan d’action en 10 points qui vient confirmer cette réponse ultra-sécuritaire [7]. Renforcer les contrôles en mer au détriment de l’obligation de sauvetage, augmenter la cadence des expulsions et accroître le processus d’externalisation des frontières… autant de vieilles recettes que l’Union européenne met en place depuis des dizaines années et qui ont prouvé leur échec, ne faisant qu’aggraver la crise de la solidarité et la situation des personnes migrantes.

      Les organisations soussignées appellent à une Europe ouverte et accueillante et exhortent les États membres de l’UE à fournir des voies d’accès sûres et légales ainsi que des conditions d’accueil dignes. Nous demandons que des mesures urgentes soient prises à Lampedusa et que les lois internationales qui protègent le droit d’asile soient respectées. Nous sommes dévastés par les décès continus en mer causés par les politiques frontalières de l’UE et réaffirmons notre solidarité avec les personnes en mouvement.

      https://migreurop.org/article3203.html?lang_article=fr

    • Che cos’è una crisi migratoria?

      Continuare a considerare il fenomeno migratorio come crisi ci allontana sempre più dalla sua comprensione, mantenendoci ancorati a soluzioni emergenziali che non possono che risultare strumentali e pericolose
      Le immagini della fila di piccole imbarcazioni in attesa di fare ingresso nel porto di Lampedusa resteranno impresse nella nostra memoria collettiva. Oltre cinquemila persone in sole ventiquattrore, che si aggiungono alle oltre centomila giunte in Italia nei mesi precedenti (114.256 al 31 agosto 2023). Nel solo mese di agosto sono sbarcate in Italia più di venticinquemila persone, che si aggiungono alle oltre ventitremila di luglio. Era del resto in previsione di una lunga estate di sbarchi che il Governo aveva in aprile dichiarato lo stato di emergenza, in un momento in cui, secondo i dati forniti dal ministro Piantedosi, nella sola Lampedusa erano concentrate più di tremila persone. Stando alle dichiarazioni ufficiali, l’esigenza era quella di dotarsi degli strumenti tecnici per distribuire più efficacemente chi era in arrivo sul territorio italiano, in strutture gestite dalla Protezione civile, aggirando le ordinarie procedure d’appalto per l’apertura di nuove strutture di accoglienza.

      Tra il 2017 e il 2022, in parallelo con la riduzione del numero di sbarchi, il sistema d’accoglienza per richiedenti protezione internazionale era stato progressivamente contratto, perdendo circa il 240% della sua capacità ricettiva. Gli interventi dei primi mesi del 2023 sembravano tuttavia volerne rivoluzionare la fisionomia. Il cosiddetto “Decreto Cutro” escludeva i richiedenti asilo dalla possibilità di accedere alle strutture di accoglienza che fanno capo alla rete Sai (Sistema accoglienza migrazione), che a fine 2022 vantava una capacità di quasi venticinquemila posti, per riservare loro strutture come i grandi Centri di prima accoglienza o di accoglienza straordinaria, in cui sempre meno servizi alla persona sarebbero stati offerti. Per i richiedenti provenienti dai Paesi considerati “sicuri”, invece, la prospettiva era quella del confinamento in strutture situate nei pressi delle zone di frontiera in attesa dell’esito della procedura d’asilo accelerata e, eventualmente, del rimpatrio immediato.

      L’impennata nel numero di arrivi registrata negli ultimi giorni ha infine indotto il presidente del Consiglio ad annunciare con un videomessaggio trasmesso all’ora di cena nuove misure eccezionali. In particolare, sarà affidato all’Esercito il compito di creare e gestire nuove strutture detentive in cui trattenere “chiunque entri illegalmente in Italia per tutto il tempo necessario alla definizione della sue eventuale richiesta d’asilo e per la sua effettiva espulsione nel caso in cui sia irregolare”, da collocarsi “in località a bassissima densità abitativa e facilmente perimetrabili e sorvegliabili”. Parallelamente, anche i termini massimi di detenzione saranno innalzati fino a diciotto mesi.

      Ciò di cui nessuno sembra dubitare è che l’Italia si trovi a fronteggiare l’ennesima crisi migratoria. Ma esattamente, di cosa si parla quando si usa la parola “crisi” in relazione ai fenomeni migratori?

      Certo c’è la realtà empirica dei movimenti attraverso le frontiere. Oltre centomila arrivi in otto mesi giustificano forse il riferimento al concetto di crisi, ma a ben vedere non sono i numeri il fattore determinante. Alcune situazioni sono state definite come critiche anche in presenza di numeri tutto sommato limitati, per ragioni essenzialmente politico-diplomatiche. Si pensi alla crisi al confine greco-turco nel 2020, o ancora alla crisi ai confini di Polonia e Lituania con la Bielorussia nel 2021. In altri casi il movimento delle persone attraverso i confini non è stato tematizzato come una crisi anche a fronte di numeri molto elevati, si pensi all’accoglienza riservata ai profughi ucraini. Sebbene siano stati attivati strumenti di risposta eccezionali, il loro orientamento è stato prevalentemente umanitario e volto all’accoglienza. L’Italia, ad esempio, ha sì decretato uno stato d’emergenza per implementare un piano di accoglienza straordinaria dei profughi provenienti dall’Ucraina, ma ha offerto accoglienza agli oltre centosettantamila ucraini presenti sul nostro territorio senza pretendere di confinarli in centri chiusi, concedendo inoltre loro un sussidio in denaro.

      Ciò che conta è la rappresentazione del fenomeno migratorio e la risposta politica che di conseguenza segue. Le rappresentazioni e le politiche si alimentano reciprocamente. In breve, non tutti i fenomeni migratori sono interpretati come una crisi, né, quando lo sono, determinano la medesima risposta emergenziale. Ad esempio, all’indomani della tragedia di Lampedusa del 2013 prevalse un paradigma interpretativo chiaramente umanitario, che portò all’intensificazione delle operazioni di ricerca e soccorso nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2014 sbarcarono in Italia oltre centosettantamila migranti, centocinquantamila nel 2015 e ben centottantamila nel 2016. Questo tipo di approccio è stato in seguito definito come un pericoloso fattore di attrazione per le migrazioni non autorizzate e l’area operativa delle missioni di sorveglianza dei confini marittimi progressivamente arretrata, creando quel vuoto nelle attività di ricerca e soccorso che le navi delle Ong hanno cercato negli ultimi anni di colmare.

      Gli arrivi a Lampedusa degli ultimi giorni sono in gran parte l’effetto della riduzione dell’attività di sorveglianza oltre le acque territoriali. Intercettare i migranti in acque internazionali implica l’assunzione di obblighi e ricerca e soccorso che l’attuale governo accetta con una certa riluttanza, ma consente anche di far sbarcare i migranti soccorsi in mare anche in altri porti, evitando eccessive concentrazioni in un unico punto di sbarco.

      I migranti che raggiungono le nostre coste sono rappresentati come invasori, che violando i nostri confini minacciano la nostra integrità territoriale. L’appello insistito all’intervento delle forze armate che abbiamo ascoltato negli ultimi giorni si giustifica proprio attraverso il riferimento alla necessità di proteggere i confini e, in ultima analisi, l’integrità territoriale dell’Italia. Per quanto le immagini di migliaia di persone che sbarcano sulle coste italiane possano impressionare l’opinione pubblica, il riferimento alla necessità di proteggere l’integrità territoriale è frutto di un grave equivoco. Il principio di integrità territoriale è infatti codificato nel diritto internazionale come un corollario del divieto di uso della forza. Da ciò discende che l’integrità territoriale di uno Stato può essere minacciata solo da un’azione militare ostile condotta da forze regolari o irregolari. È dubbio che le migrazioni possano essere considerate una minaccia tale da giustificare, ad esempio, un blocco navale.

      Se i migranti non possono di per sé essere considerati come una minaccia alla integrità territoriale dello Stato, potrebbero però essere utilizzati come strumento da parte di attori politici intenzionati a destabilizzare politicamente i Paesi di destinazione. Non è mancato negli ultimi tempi chi ha occasionalmente evocato l’idea della strumentalizzazione delle migrazioni, fino alla recente, plateale dichiarazione del ministro Salvini. D’altra parte, questo è un tema caro ai Paesi dell’Est Europa, che hanno spinto affinché molte delle misure eccezionali adottate da loro in occasione della crisi del 2021 fossero infine incorporate nel diritto della Ue. Una parte del governo italiano sembra tuttavia più cauta, anche perché si continua a vedere nella collaborazione con i Paesi terzi la chiave di volta per la gestione del fenomeno. Accusare esplicitamente la Tunisia di strumentalizzare le migrazioni avrebbe costi politico-diplomatici troppo elevati.

      Cionondimeno, insistendo sull’elemento del rischio di destabilizzazione interna, plasticamente rappresentato dalle immagini delle migliaia di persone ammassate sul molo o nell’hotspot di Lampedusa, il governo propone una risposta politica molto simile all’approccio utilizzato da Polonia e Lituania nel 2021, centrato su respingimenti di massa e detenzione nelle zone di frontiera. L’obiettivo è quello di disincentivare i potenziali futuri migranti, paventando loro lunghi periodi di detenzione e il ritorno nella loro patria di origine.

      Gran parte di questa strategia dipende dalla collaborazione dei Paesi terzi e dalla loro disponibilità a bloccare le partenze prima che i migranti siano intercettati da autorità Italiane, facendo di conseguenza scattare gli obblighi internazionali di ricerca e soccorso o di asilo. Una strategia simile, definita come del controllo senza contatto, è stata seguita a lungo nella cooperazione con la Guardia costiera libica. Tuttavia, è proprio il tentativo di esternalizzare i controlli migratori a rendere i Paesi della Ue sempre più vulnerabili alla spregiudicata diplomazia delle migrazioni dei Paesi terzi. In definitiva, sono i Paesi europei che offrono loro la possibilità di strumentalizzare le migrazioni a scopi politici.

      Sul piano interno, il successo di una simile strategia dipende dalla capacità di rimpatriare rapidamente i migranti giunti sul territorio italiano. Alla fine del 2021 la percentuale di rimpatri che l’Italia riusciva ad eseguire era del 15% dei provvedimenti di allontanamento adottati. Gran parte delle persone rimpatriate sono tuttavia cittadini tunisini, anche perché in assenza di collaborazione con il Paese d’origine è impossibile rimpatriare. I tunisini rappresentano solo l’8% delle persone sbarcate nel 2023, che vengono in prevalenza da Guinea, Costa d’Avorio, Egitto, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso. L’allungamento dei tempi di detenzione non avrà dunque nessuna incidenza sulla efficacia delle politiche di rimpatrio.

      Uno degli argomenti utilizzati per giustificare l’intervento dell’Esercito è quello della necessità di accrescere la capacità del sistema detentivo, giudicata dal Governo non adeguata a gestire l’attuale crisi migratoria. Stando ai dati inclusi nella relazione sul sistema di accoglienza, alla fine del 2021 il sistema contava 744 posti, a fronte di una capacità ufficiale di 1.395. Come suggerisce la medesima relazione, il sistema funziona da sempre a capacità ridotta, anche perché le strutture sono soggette a ripetuti interventi di manutenzione straordinaria a causa delle devastazioni che seguono alle continue rivolte. Si tratta di strutture ai limiti dell’ingestibilità, che possono essere governate solo esercitando una forma sistemica di violenza istituzionale.

      Il sistema detentivo per stranieri sta tuttavia cambiando pelle progressivamente, ibridandosi con il sistema di accoglienza per richiedenti asilo al fine di contenere i migranti appena giunti via mare in attesa del loro più o meno rapido respingimento. Fino ad oggi, tuttavia, la detenzione ha continuato ad essere utilizzata in maniera più o meno selettiva, riservandola a coloro con ragionevoli prospettive di essere rimpatriati in tempi rapidi. Gli altri sono stati instradati verso il sistema di accoglienza, qualora avessero presentato una domanda d’asilo, o abbandonai al loro destino con in mano un ordine di lasciare l’Italia entro sette giorni.

      Le conseguenze di una politica basata sulla detenzione sistematica e a lungo termine di tutti coloro che giungono alla frontiera sono facili da immaginare. Se l’Italia si limitasse a trattenere per una media di sei mesi (si ricordi che l’intenzione espressa in questi giorni dal Governo italiano è di portare a diciotto mesi i termini massimi di detenzione) anche solo il 50% delle persone che sbarcano, significherebbe approntare un sistema detentivo con una capacità di trentottomila posti. Certo, questo calcolo si basa sulla media mensile degli arrivi registrati nel 2023, un anno di “crisi” appunto. Ma anche tenendo conto della media mensile degli arrivi dei due anni precedenti la prospettiva non sarebbe confortante. Il nostro Paese dovrebbe infatti essere in grado di mantenere una infrastruttura detentiva da ventimila posti. Una simile infrastruttura, dato l’andamento oscillatorio degli arrivi via mare, dovrebbe essere poi potenziata al bisogno per far fronte alle necessità delle fasi in cui il numero di sbarchi cresce.

      Lascio al lettore trarre le conseguenze circa l’impatto materiale e umano che una simile approccio alla gestione degli arrivi avrebbe. Mi limito qui solo ad alcune considerazioni finali sulla maniera in cui sono tematizzate le cosiddette crisi migratorie. Tali crisi continuano ad essere viste come il frutto della carenza di controlli e della incapacità dello Stato di esercitare il suo diritto sovrano di controllare le frontiere. La risposta alle crisi migratorie è dunque sempre identica a sé stessa, alla ricerca di una impossibile chiusura dei confini che riproduce sempre nuove crisi, nuovi morti in mare, nuova violenza di Stato lungo le frontiere fortificate o nelle zone di contenimento militarizzate. Guardare alle migrazioni attraverso la lente del concetto di “crisi” induce tuttavia a pensare le migrazioni come a qualcosa di eccezionale, come a un’anomalia causata da instabilità e catastrofi che si verificano in un altrove geografico e politico. Le migrazioni sono così destoricizzate e decontestualizzate dalle loro cause strutturali e i Paesi di destinazione condannati a replicare politiche destinate a fallire poiché appunto promettono risultati irraggiungibili. Più che insistere ossessivamente sulla rappresentazione delle migrazioni come crisi, si dovrebbe dunque forse cominciare a tematizzare la crisi delle politiche migratorie. Una crisi più profonda e strutturale che non può essere ridotta alle polemiche scatenate dai periodici aumenti nel numero di sbarchi.

      https://www.rivistailmulino.it/a/che-cos-una-crisi-migratoria

    • Spiegazione semplice del perché #Lampedusa va in emergenza.

      2015-2017: 150.000 sbarchi l’anno, di cui 14.000 a Lampedusa (9%).

      Ultimi 12 mesi: 157.000 sbarchi, di cui 104.000 a Lampedusa (66%).

      Soluzione: aumentare soccorsi a #migranti, velocizzare i trasferimenti.
      Fine.

      https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1704751278184685635

    • Interview de M. #Gérald_Darmanin, ministre de l’intérieur et des outre-mer, à Europe 1/CNews le 18 septembre 2023, sur la question migratoire et le travail des forces de l’ordre.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Bonjour à vous Gérald DARMANIN.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Bonjour.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Merci de nous accorder cet entretien, avant votre déplacement cet après-midi à Rome. Lampedusa, Monsieur le Ministre, débordé par l’afflux de milliers de migrants. La présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula VON DER LEYEN, en visite sur place, a appelé les pays européens à accueillir une partie de ces migrants arrivés en Italie. Est-ce que la France s’apprête à le faire, et si oui, pour combien de migrants ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Alors, non, la France ne s’apprête pas à le faire, la France, comme l’a dit le président de la République la Première ministre italienne, va aider l’Italie à tenir sa frontière, pour empêcher les gens d’arriver, et pour ceux qui sont arrivés en Italie, à Lampedusa et dans le reste de l’Italie, nous devons appliquer les règles européennes, que nous avons adoptées voilà quelques mois, qui consistent à faire les demandes d’asile à la frontière. Et donc une fois que l’on fait les demandes d’asile à la frontière, on constate qu’une grande partie de ces demandeurs d’asile ne sont pas éligibles à l’asile et doivent repartir immédiatement dans les pays d’origine. S’il y a des demandeurs d’asile, qui sont éligibles à l’asile, qui sont persécutés pour des raisons évidemment politiques, bien sûr, ce sont des réfugiés, et dans ces cas-là, la France comme d’autres pays, comme elle l’a toujours fait, peut accueillir des personnes. Mais ce serait une erreur d’appréciation que de considérer que les migrants parce qu’ils arrivent en Europe, doivent tout de suite être répartis dans tous les pays d’Europe et dont la France, qui prend déjà largement sa part, et donc ce que nous voulons dire à nos amis italiens, qui je crois sont parfaitement d’accord avec nous, nous devons protéger les frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, les aider à cela, et surtout tout de suite regarder les demandes d’asile, et quand les gens ne sont pas éligibles à l’asile, tout de suite les renvoyer dans leur pays.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Donc, pour être clair ce matin Gérald DARMANIN, vous dites que la politique de relocalisation immédiate, non la France n’en prendra pas sa part.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      S’il s’agit de personnes qui doivent déposer une demande d’asile parce qu’ils sont persécutés dans leur pays, alors ce sont des réfugiés politiques, oui nous avons toujours relocalisé, on a toujours mis dans nos pays si j’ose dire une partie du fardeau qu’avaient les Italiens ou les Grecs. S’il s’agit de prendre les migrants tels qu’ils sont, 60 % d’entre eux viennent de pays comme la Côte d’Ivoire, comme la Guinée, comme la Gambie, il n’y a aucune raison qu’ils viennent…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ça a été le cas lors de l’Ocean Viking.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Il n’y a aucune raison. Pour d’autres raisons, c’est des raisons humanitaires, là il n’y a pas de question humanitaire, sauf qu’à Lampedusa les choses deviennent très difficiles, c’est pour ça qu’il faut que nous aidions nos amis italiens, mais il ne peut pas y avoir comme message donné aux personnes qui viennent sur notre sol, qu’ils sont quoiqu’il arrive dans nos pays accueillis. Ils ne sont accueillis que s’ils respectent les règles de l’asile, s’ils sont persécutés. Mais si c’est une immigration qui est juste irrégulière, non, la France ne peut pas les accueillir, comme d’autres pays. La France est très ferme, vous savez, j’entends souvent que c’est le pays où il y a le plus de demandeurs d’asile, c’est tout à fait faux, nous sommes le 4e pays, derrière l’Allemagne, derrière l’Espagne, derrière l’Autriche, et notre volonté c’est d’accueillir bien sûr ceux qui doivent l’être, les persécutés politiques, mais nous devons absolument renvoyer chez eux, ceux qui n’ont rien à faire en Europe.

      SONIA MABROUK
      On entend ce message ce matin, qui est un peu différent de celui de la ministre des Affaires étrangères, qui semblait parler d’un accueil inconditionnel. Le président de la République a parlé d’un devoir de solidarité. Vous, vous dites : oui, devoir de solidarité, mais nous n’allons pas avoir une politique de répartition des migrants, ce n’est pas le rôle de la France.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Le rôle de la France, d’abord aider l’Italie.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Comment, concrètement ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Eh bien d’abord, nous devons continuer à protéger nos frontières, et ça c’est à l’Europe de le faire.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ça c’est l’enjeu majeur, les frontières extérieures.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Exactement. Nous devons déployer davantage Frontex en Méditerranée…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Avec une efficacité, Monsieur le Ministre, très discutable.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Avec des messages qu’on doit passer à Frontex effectivement, de meilleures actions, pour empêcher les personnes de traverser pour aller à Lampedusa. Il y a eu à Lampedusa, vous l’avez dit, des milliers de personnes, 5000 même en une seule journée, m’a dit le ministre italien, le 12 septembre. Donc il y a manifestement 300, 400 arrivées de bateaux possibles. Nous devons aussi travailler avec la Tunisie, avec peut-être beaucoup plus encore d’actions que nous faisons jusqu’à présent. La Commission européenne vient de négocier un plan, eh bien il faut le mettre en place désormais, il faut arrêter d’en parler, il faut le faire. Vous savez, les bateaux qui sont produits à Sfax pour venir à Lampedusa, ils sont produits en Tunisie. Donc il faut absolument que nous cassons cet écosystème des passeurs, des trafiquants, parce qu’on ne peut pas continuer comme ça.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Quand vous dites « nous », c’est-à-dire en partenariat avec la Tunisie ? Comment vous expliquez Monsieur le Ministre qu’il y a eu un afflux aussi soudain ? Est-ce que la Tunisie n’a pas pu ou n’a pas voulu contenir ces arrivées ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Je ne sais pas. J’imagine que le gouvernement tunisien a fait le maximum…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Vous devez avoir une idée.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      On sait qu’on que tous ces gens sont partis de Sfax, donc d’un endroit extrêmement précis où il y a beaucoup de migrants notamment Africains, Subsahariens qui y sont, donc la Tunisie connaît elle-même une difficulté migratoire très forte. On doit manifestement l’aider, mais on doit aussi très bien coopérer avec elle, je crois que c’est ce que fait en ce moment le gouvernement italien, qui rappelle un certain nombre de choses aux Tunisiens, quoi leur rappelle aussi leurs difficultés. Donc, ce qui est sûr c’est que nous avons désormais beaucoup de plans, on a beaucoup de moyens, on a fait beaucoup de déplacements, maintenant il faut appliquer cela. Vous savez, la France, à la demande du président de la République, c’était d’ailleurs à Tourcoing, a proposé un pacte migratoire, qui consistait très simplement à ce que les demandes d’asile ne se fassent plus dans nos pays, mais à la frontière. Tout le monde l’a adopté, y compris le gouvernement de madame MELONI. C’est extrêmement efficace puisque l’idée c’est qu’on dise que les gens, quand ils rentrent sur le territoire européen, ne sont pas juridiquement sur le territoire européen, que nous regardions leur asile en quelques jours, et nous les renvoyons. Il faut que l’Italie…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ça c’est le principe.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Il faut que l’Italie anticipe, anticipe la mise en place de ce dispositif. Et pourquoi il n’a pas encore été mis en place ? Parce que des députés européens, ceux du Rassemblement national, ont voté contre. C’est-à-dire que l’on est dans une situation politique un peu étonnante, où la France trouve une solution, la demande d’asile aux frontières, beaucoup plus efficace. Le gouvernement de madame MELONI, dans lequel participe monsieur SALVINI, est d’accord avec cette proposition, simplement ceux qui bloquent ça au Parlement européen, c’est le Rassemblement national, qui après va en Italie pour dire que l’Europe ne fait rien.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Sauf que, Monsieur le Ministre…

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Donc on voit bien qu’il y a du tourisme électoral de la part de madame LE PEN…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Vous le dénoncez.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Il faut désormais être ferme, ce que je vous dis, nous n’accueillerons pas les migrants sur le territoire européen…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Mais un migrant, sur le sol européen aujourd’hui, sait qu’il va y rester. La vocation est d’y rester.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Non, c’est tout à fait faux, nous faisons des retours. Nous avons par exemple dans les demandes d’asile, prévu des Ivoiriens. Bon. Nous avons des personnes qui viennent du Cameroun, nous avons des personnes qui viennent de Gambie. Avec ces pays nous avons d’excellentes relations politiques internationales, et nous renvoyons tous les jours dans ces pays des personnes qui n’ont rien à faire pour demander l’asile en France ou en Europe. Donc c’est tout à fait faux, avec certains pays nous avons plus de difficultés, bien sûr, parce qu’ils sont en guerre, comme la Syrie, comme l’Afghanistan bien sûr, mais avec beaucoup de pays, la Tunisie, la Gambie, la Côte d’Ivoire, le Sénégal, le Cameroun, nous sommes capables d’envoyer très rapidement ces personnes chez elles.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Lorsque le patron du Rassemblement national Jordan BARDELLA, ou encore Eric ZEMMOUR, ou encore Marion MARECHAL sur place, dit : aucun migrant de Lampedusa ne doit arriver en France. Est-ce que vous êtes capable de tenir, si je puis dire cette déclaration ? Vous dites : c’est totalement illusoire.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Non mais monsieur BARDELLA il fait de la politique politicienne, et malheureusement sur le dos de ses amis italiens, sur le dos de femmes et d’hommes, puisqu’il ne faut jamais oublier que ces personnes évidemment connaissent des difficultés extrêmement fortes. Il y a un bébé qui est mort à Lampedusa voilà quelques heures, et évidemment sur le dos de l’intelligence politique que les Français ont. Le Front national vote systématiquement contre toutes les mesures que nous proposons au niveau européen, chacun voit que c’est un sujet européen, c’est pour ça d’ailleurs qu’il se déplace, j’imagine, en Italie…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ils ne sont pas d’accord avec votre politique, Monsieur le Ministre, ça ne surprend personne.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Non mais monsieur SALVINI madame MELONI, avec le gouvernement français, ont adopté un texte commun qui prévoit une révolution : la demande d’asile aux frontières. Monsieur BARDELLA, lui il parle beaucoup, mais au Parlement européen il vote contre. Pourquoi ? Parce qu’il vit des problèmes. La vérité c’est que monsieur BARDELLA, comme madame Marion MARECHAL LE PEN, on a compris qu’il y a une sorte de concurrence dans la démagogie à l’extrême droite, eux, ce qu’ils veulent c’est vivre des problèmes. Quand on leur propose de résoudre les problèmes, l’Europe avec le président de la République a essayé de leur proposer de les résoudre. Nous avons un accord avec madame MELONI, nous faisons la demande d’asile aux frontières, nous considérons qu’il n’y a plus d’asile en Europe, tant qu’on n’a pas étudié aux frontières cet asile. Quand le Rassemblement national vote contre, qu’est-ce qui se passe ? Eh bien ils ne veulent pas résoudre les problèmes, ils veulent pouvoir avoir une sorte de carburant électoral, pour pouvoir dire n’importe quoi, comme ils l’ont fait ce week-end encore.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ce matin, sur les 5 000, 6 000 qui sont arrivés à Lampedusa, combien seront raccompagnés, combien n’ont pas vocation et ne resteront pas sur le sol européen ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Alors, c’est difficile. C’est difficile à savoir, parce que moi je ne suis pas les autorités italiennes, c’est pour ça que à la demande, du président je vais à Rome cet après-midi, mais de notre point de vue, de ce que nous en savons des autorités italiennes, beaucoup doivent être accompagnés, puisqu’encore une fois je comprends que sur à peu près 8 000 ou 9 000 personnes qui sont arrivées, il y a beaucoup de gens qui viennent de pays qui ne connaissent pas de persécution politique, ni au Cameroun, ni en Côte d’Ivoire, ni bien sûr en Gambie, ni en Tunisie, et donc ces personnes, bien sûr, doivent repartir dans leur pays et la France doit les aider à repartir.

      SONIA MABROUK
      On note Gérald DARMANIN que vous avez un discours, en tout cas une tonalité très différente à l’égard de madame MELONI, on se souvient tous qu’il y a eu quasiment une crise diplomatique il y a quelques temps, lorsque vous avez dit qu’elle n’était pas capable de gérer ces questions migratoires sur lesquelles elle a été… elle est arrivée au pouvoir avec un discours très ferme, aujourd’hui vous dites « non, je la soutiens madame MELONI », c’est derrière nous toutes ces déclarations, que vous avez tenues ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Je ne suis pas là pour soutenir madame MELONI, non, je dis simplement que lorsqu’on vote pour des gouvernements qui vous promettent tout, c’est le cas aussi de ce qui s’est passé avec le Brexit en Grande-Bretagne, les Français doivent comprendre ça. Lorsqu’on vous dit " pas un migrant ne viendra, on fera un blocus naval, vous allez voir avec nous on rase gratis ", on voit bien que la réalité dépasse largement ces engagements.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Elle a réitéré le blocus naval !

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Le fait est qu’aujourd’hui nous devons gérer une situation où l’Italie est en grande difficulté, et on doit aider l’Italie, parce qu’aider l’Italie, d’abord c’est nos frères et nos soeurs les Italiens, mais en plus c’est la continuité, évidemment, de ce qui va se passer en France, donc moi je suis là pour protéger les Français, je suis là pour protéger les Français parce que le président de la République souhaite que nous le faisions dans un cadre européen, et c’est la seule solution qui vaille, parce que l’Europe doit parler d’une seule voix…

      SONIA MABROUK
      C’est la seule solution qui vaille ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Oui, c’est la seule solution qui vaille…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Vous savez que l’Allemagne a changé, enfin elle n’en voulait pas, finalement là, sur les migrants, elle change d’avis, la Hongrie, la Pologne, je n’en parle même pas, la situation devient quand même intenable.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      La France a un rôle moteur dans cette situation de ce week-end, vous avez vu les contacts diplomatiques que nous avons eus, on est heureux d’avoir réussi à faire bouger nos amis Allemands sur cette situation. Les Allemands connaissent aussi une difficulté forte, ils ont 1 million de personnes réfugiées ukrainiens, ils ont une situation compliquée par rapport à la nôtre aussi, mais je constate que l’Allemagne et la France parlent une nouvelle fois d’une seule voix.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Mais l’Europe est en ordre dispersé, ça on peut le dire, c’est un constat lucide.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      L’Europe est dispersée parce que l’Europe, malheureusement, a des intérêts divergents, mais l’Europe a réussi à se mettre d’accord sur la proposition française, encore une fois, une révolution migratoire qui consiste à faire des demandes d’asile à la frontière. Nous nous sommes mis d’accord entre tous les pays européens, y compris madame MELONI, ceux qui bloquent c’est le Rassemblement national, et leurs amis, au Parlement européen, donc plutôt que de faire du tourisme migratoire à Lampedusa comme madame Marion MARECHAL LE PEN, ou raconter n’importe quoi comme monsieur BARDELLA, ils feraient mieux de faire leur travail de députés européens, de soutenir la France, d’être un peu patriotes pour une fois, de ne pas faire la politique du pire…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Vous leur reprochez un défaut de patriotisme à ce sujet-là ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Quand on ne soutient pas la politique de son gouvernement, lorsque l’on fait l’inverser…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ça s’appelle être dans l’opposition parfois Monsieur le Ministre.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Oui, mais on ne peut pas le faire sur le dos de femmes et d’hommes qui meurent, et moi je vais vous dire, le Rassemblement national aujourd’hui n’est pas dans la responsabilité politique. Qu’il vote ce pacte migratoire très vite, que nous puissions enfin, concrètement, aider nos amis Italiens, c’est sûr qu’il y aura moins d’images dramatiques, du coup il y aura moins de carburant pour le Rassemblement national, mais ils auront fait quelque chose pour leur pays.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Vous les accusez, je vais employer ce mot puisque la ministre Agnès PANNIER-RUNACHER l’a employé elle-même, de « charognards » là, puisque nous parlons de femmes et d’hommes, de difficultés aussi, c’est ce que vous êtes en train de dire ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Moi je ne comprends pas pourquoi on passe son temps à faire des conférences de presse en Italie, à Lampedusa, en direct sur les plateaux de télévision, lorsqu’on n’est pas capable, en tant que parlementaires européens, de voter un texte qui permet concrètement de lutter contre les difficultés migratoires. Encore une fois, la révolution que la France a proposée, et qui a été adoptée, avec le soutien des Italiens, c’est ça qui est paradoxal dans cette situation, peut être résolue si nous mettons en place…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Résolue…

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Bien sûr ; si nous mettons en place les demandes d’asile aux frontières, on n’empêchera jamais les gens de traverser la Méditerranée, par contre on peut très rapidement leur dire qu’ils ne peuvent pas rester sur notre sol, qu’ils ne sont pas des persécutés…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Comment vous appelez ce qui s’est passé, Monsieur le Ministre, est-ce que vous dites c’est un afflux soudain et massif, ou est-ce que vous dites que c’est une submersion migratoire, le diagnostic participe quand même de la résolution des défis et des problèmes ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Non, mais sur Lampedusa, qui est une île évidemment tout au sud de la Méditerranée, qui est même au sud de Malte, il y a 6000 habitants, lorsqu’il y a entre 6 et 8 000 personnes qui viennent en quelques jours évidemment c’est une difficulté immense, et chacun le comprend, pour les habitants de Lampedusa.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Comment vous qualifiez cela ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Mais là manifestement il y a à Sfax une difficulté extrêmement forte, où on a laissé passer des centaines de bateaux, fabriqués d’ailleurs, malheureusement….

      SONIA MABROUK
      Donc vous avez un gros problème avec les pays du Maghreb, en l’occurrence la Tunisie ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Je pense qu’il y a un énorme problème migratoire interne à l’Afrique, encore une fois la Tunisie, parfois même l’Algérie, parfois le Maroc, parfois la Libye, ils subissent eux-mêmes une pression migratoire d’Afrique, on voit bien que la plupart du temps ce sont des nationalités du sud du Sahel, donc les difficultés géopolitiques que nous connaissons ne sont pas pour rien dans cette situation, et nous devons absolument aider l’Afrique à absolument aider les Etats du Maghreb. On peut à la fois les aider, et en même temps être très ferme, on peut à la fois aider ces Etats à lutter contre l’immigration interne à l’Afrique, et en même temps expliquer…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ça n’empêche pas la fermeté.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Que toute personne qui vient en Europe ne sera pas accueillie chez nous.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Encore une question sur ce sujet. Dans les différents reportages effectués à Lampedusa on a entendu certains migrants mettre en avant le système social français, les aides possibles, est-ce que la France, Gérald DARMANIN, est trop attractive, est-ce que notre modèle social est trop généreux et c’est pour cela qu’il y a ces arrivées aussi ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Alors, je ne suis pas sûr qu’on traverse le monde en se disant « chouette, il y a ici une aide sociale particulièrement aidante », mais il se peut…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Mais quand on doit choisir entre différents pays ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Mais il se peut qu’une fois arrivées en Europe, effectivement, un certain nombre de personnes, aidées par des passeurs, aidées parfois par des gens qui ont de bonnes intentions, des associations, se disent « allez dans ce pays-là parce qu’il y a plus de chances de », c’est ce pourquoi nous luttons. Quand je suis arrivé au ministère de l’Intérieur nous étions le deuxième pays d’Europe qui accueille le plus de demandeurs d’asile, aujourd’hui on est le quatrième, on doit pouvoir continuer à faire ce travail, nous faisons l’inverse de certains pays autour de nous, par exemple l’Allemagne qui ouvre plutôt plus de critères, nous on a tendance à les réduire, et le président de la République, dans la loi immigration, a proposé beaucoup de discussions pour fermer un certain nombre d’actions d’accueil. Vous avez la droite, LR, qui propose la transformation de l’AME en Aide Médicale d’Urgence, nous sommes favorables à étudier cette proposition des LR, j’ai moi-même proposé un certain nombre de dispositions extrêmement concrètes pour limiter effectivement ce que nous avons en France et qui parfois est différent des pays qui nous entourent et qui peuvent conduire à cela. Et puis enfin je terminerai par dire, c’est très important, il faut lutter contre les passeurs, la loi immigration que je propose passe de délit a crime, avec le garde des Sceaux on a proposé qu’on passe de quelques années de prison à 20 ans de prison pour ceux qui trafiquent des êtres humains, aujourd’hui quand on arrête des passeurs, on en arrête tous les jours grâce à la police française, ils ne sont condamnés qu’à quelques mois de prison, alors que demain, nous l’espérons, ils seront condamnés bien plus.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Bien. Gérald DARMANIN, sur CNews et Europe 1 notre « Grande interview » s’intéresse aussi à un nouveau refus d’obtempérer qui a dégénéré à Stains, je vais raconter en quelques mots ce qui s’est passé pour nos auditeurs et téléspectateurs, des policiers ont pris en chasse un deux-roues, rapidement un véhicule s’est interposé pour venir en aide aux fuyards, un policier a été violemment pris à partie, c’est son collègue qui est venu pour l’aider, qui a dû tirer en l’air pour stopper une scène de grande violence vis-à-vis de ce policier, comment vous réagissez par rapport à cela ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      D’abord trois choses. Les policiers font leur travail, et partout sur le territoire national, il n’y a pas de territoires perdus de la République, il y a des territoires plus difficiles, mais Stains on sait tous que c’est une ville à la fois populaire et difficile pour la police nationale. La police le samedi soir fait des contrôles, lorsqu’il y a des refus d’obtempérer, je constate que les policiers sont courageux, et effectivement ils ont été violentés, son collègue a été très courageux de venir le secourir, et puis troisièmement force est restée à la loi, il y a eu cinq interpellations, ils sont présentés aujourd’hui…

      SONIA MABROUK
      A quel prix.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Oui, mais c’est le travail…

      SONIA MABROUK
      A quel prix pour le policier.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Malheureusement c’est le travail, dans une société très violente…

      SONIA MABROUK
      D’être tabassé ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Dans une société très violente les policiers, les gendarmes, savent la mission qu’ils ont, qui est une mission extrêmement difficile, je suis le premier à les défendre partout sur les plateaux de télévision, je veux dire qu’ils ont réussi, à la fin, à faire entendre raison à la loi, les Français doivent savoir ce matin que cinq personnes ont été interpellées, présentées devant le juge.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Pour quel résultat, Monsieur le Ministre ?

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Eh bien moi je fais confiance en la justice.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Parfois on va les trouver à l’extérieur.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Non non, je fais confiance en la justice, quand on…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Ça c’est le principe. On fait tous, on aimerait tous faire confiance à la justice.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Non, mais quand on moleste un policier, j’espère que les peines seront les plus dures possible.

      SONIA MABROUK
      On va terminer avec une semaine intense et à risques qui s’annonce, la suite de la Coupe du monde de rugby, la visite du roi Charles III, le pape à Marseille. Vous avez appelé les préfets à une très haute vigilance. C’est un dispositif exceptionnel pour relever ces défis, qui sera mis en oeuvre.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Oui, donc cette semaine la France est au coeur du monde par ces événements, la Coupe du monde de rugby qui continue, et qui se passe bien. Vous savez, parfois ça nous fait sourire. La sécurité ne fait pas de bruit, l’insécurité en fait, mais depuis le début de cette Coupe du monde, les policiers, des gendarmes, les pompiers réussissent à accueillir le monde en de très très bonnes conditions, tant mieux, il faut que ça continue bien sûr. Le pape qui vient deux jours à Marseille, comme vous l’avez dit, et le roi Charles pendant trois jours. Il y aura jusqu’à 30 000 policiers samedi, et puis après il y a quelques événements comme PSG - OM dimanche prochain, c’est une semaine…

      SONIA MABROUK
      Important aussi.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      C’est une semaine horribilis pour le ministre de l’Intérieur et pour les policiers et les gendarmes, et nous le travaillons avec beaucoup de concentration, le RAID, le GIGN est tout à fait aujourd’hui prévu pour tous ces événements, et nous sommes capables d’accueillir ces grands événements mondiaux en une semaine, c’est l’honneur de la police nationale et de la gendarmerie nationale.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Merci Gérald DARMANIN.

      GÉRALD DARMANIN
      Merci à vous.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Vous serez donc cet après-midi…

      GÉRALD DARMANIN
      A Rome.

      SONIA MABROUK
      …à Rome avec votre homologue évidemment de l’Intérieur. Merci encore de nous avoir accordé cet entretien.

      GERALD DARMANIN
      Merci à vous.

      SONIA MABROUK
      Et bonne journée sur Cnews et Europe 1

      https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/291092-gerald-darmanin-18092023-immigration

      #Darmanin #demandes_d'asile_à_la_frontière

    • Darmanin: ’La Francia non accoglierà migranti da Lampedusa’

      Ma con Berlino apre alla missione navale. Il ministro dell’Interno francese a Roma. Tajani: ’Fa fede quello che dice Macron’. Marine Le Pen: ’Dobbianmo riprendere il controllo delle nostre frontiere’

      «La Francia non prenderà nessun migrante da Lampedusa». All’indomani della visita di Ursula von der Leyen e Giorgia Meloni sull’isola a largo della Sicilia, il governo transalpino torna ad alzare la voce sul fronte della solidarietà e lo fa, ancora una volta, con il suo ministro dell’Interno Gerald Darmanin.

      La sortita di Parigi giunge proprio mentre, da Berlino, arriva l’apertura alla richiesta italiana di una missione navale comune per aumentare i controlli nel Mediterraneo, idea sulla quale anche la Francia si dice pronta a collaborare.

      Sullo stesso tenore anche le dichiarazioni Marine Le Pen. «Nessun migrante da Lampedusa deve mettere piede in Francia. Serve assolutamente una moratoria totale sull’immigrazione e dobbiamo riprendere il controllo delle nostre frontiere. Spetta a noi nazioni decidere chi entra e chi resta sul nostro territorio». Lo ha detto questa sera Marine Le Pen, leader dell’estrema destra francese del Rassemblement National, «Quelli che fanno appello all’Unione europea si sbagliano - ha continuato Le Pen - perché è vano e pericoloso. Vano perché l’Unione europea vuole l’immigrazione, pericoloso perché lascia pensare che deleghiamo all’Unione europea la decisione sulla politica di immigrazione che dobbiamo condurre. Spetta al popolo francese decidere e bisogna rispettare la sua decisione».

      La strada per la messa a punto di un’azione Ue, tuttavia, resta tremendamente in salita anche perché è segnata da uno scontro interno alle istituzioni comunitarie sull’intesa con Tunisi: da un lato il Consiglio Ue, per nulla soddisfatto del modus operandi della Commissione, e dall’altro l’esecutivo europeo, che non ha alcuna intenzione di abbandonare la strada tracciata dal Memorandum siglato con Kais Saied. «Sarebbe un errore di giudizio considerare che i migranti, siccome arrivano in Europa, devono essere subito ripartiti in tutta Europa e in Francia, che fa ampiamente la sua parte», sono state le parole con cui Darmamin ha motiva il suo no all’accoglienza. Il ministro lo ha spiegato prima di recarsi a Roma, su richiesta del presidente Emmanuel Macron, per un confronto con il titolare del Viminale Matteo Piantedosi. Ed è proprio a Macron che l’Italia sembra guardare, legando le frasi di Darmanin soprattutto alle vicende politiche interne d’Oltralpe. «Fa fede quello che dice Macron e quello che dice il ministro degli Esteri, mi pare che ci sia voglia di collaborare», ha sottolineato da New York il titolare della Farnesina Antonio Tajani invitando tutti, in Italia e in Ue, a non affrontare il dossier con «slogan da campagna elettorale».

      Eppure la sortita di Darmanin ha innescato l’immediata reazione della maggioranza, soprattutto dalle parti di Matteo Salvini. «Gli italiani si meritano fatti concreti dalla Francia e dall’Europa», ha tuonato la Lega. Nel piano Ue su Lampedusa il punto dell’accoglienza è contenuto nel primo dei dieci punti messi neri su bianco. Ma resta un concetto legato alla volontarietà. Che al di là della Francia, per ora trova anche il no dell’Austria. Il nodo è sempre lo stesso: i Paesi del Nord accusano Roma di non rispettare le regole sui movimenti secondari, mentre l’Italia pretende di non essere l’unico approdo per i migranti in arrivo. Il blocco delle partenze, in questo senso, si presenta come l’unica mediazione politicamente percorribile. Berlino e Parigi si dicono pronte a collaborare su un maggiore controllo aereo e navale delle frontiere esterne. L’Ue sottolinea di essere «disponibile a esplorare l’ipotesi», anche se la «decisione spetta agli Stati».

      Il raggio d’azione di von der Leyen, da qui alle prossime settimane, potrebbe tuttavia restringersi: sull’intesa con Tunisi l’Alto Rappresentante Ue per la Politica Estera Josep Borrell, il servizio giuridico del Consiglio Ue e alcuni Paesi membri - Germania e Lussemburgo in primis - hanno mosso riserve di metodo e di merito. L’accusa è duplice: il Memorandum con Saied non solo non garantisce il rispetto dei diritti dei migranti ma è stato firmato dal cosiddetto ’team Europe’ (von der Leyen, Mark Rutte e Meloni) senza l’adeguata partecipazione del Consiglio. Borrell lo ha messo nero su bianco in una missiva indirizzata al commissario Oliver Varhelyi e a von der Leyen. «Gli Stati membri sono stati informati e c’è stato ampio sostegno», è stata la difesa della Commissione. Invero, al Consiglio europeo di giugno l’intesa incassò l’endorsement dei 27 ma il testo non era stato ancora ultimato. E non è arrivato al tavolo dei rappresentanti permanenti se non dopo essere stato firmato a Cartagine. Ma, spiegano a Palazzo Berlaymont, l’urgenza non permetteva rallentamenti. I fondi per Tunisi, tuttavia, attendono ancora di essere esborsati. La questione - assieme a quella del Patto sulla migrazione e al Piano Lampedusa - è destinata a dominare le prossime riunioni europee: quella dei ministri dell’Interno del 28 settembre e, soprattutto, il vertice informale dei leader previsto a Granada a inizio ottobre.

      https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2023/09/18/darmanin-la-francia-non-accogliera-migranti-da-lampedusa_2f53eae6-e8f7-4b82-9d7

    • Lampedusa : les contrevérités de Gérald Darmanin sur le profil des migrants et leur droit à l’asile

      Le ministre de l’Intérieur persiste à dire, contre la réalité du droit et des chiffres, que la majorité des migrants arrivés en Italie la semaine dernière ne peuvent prétendre à l’asile.

      A en croire Gérald Darmanin, presque aucune des milliers de personnes débarquées sur les rives de l’île italienne de Lampedusa depuis plus d’une semaine ne mériterait d’être accueillie par la France. La raison ? D’un côté, affirme le ministre de l’Intérieur, il y aurait les « réfugiés » fuyant des persécutions politiques ou religieuses, et que la France se ferait un honneur d’accueillir. « Et puis, il y a les migrants », « des personnes irrégulières » qui devraient être renvoyées dans leur pays d’origine le plus rapidement possible, a-t-il distingué, jeudi 22 septembre sur BFMTV.

      « S’il s’agit de prendre les migrants tels qu’ils sont : 60 % d’entre eux viennent de pays tels que la Côte d’Ivoire, comme la Guinée, comme la Gambie, il n’y a aucune raison [qu’ils viennent] », a-t-il en sus tonné sur CNews, lundi 18 septembre. Une affirmation serinée mardi sur TF1 dans des termes semblables : « 60 % des personnes arrivées à Lampedusa sont francophones. Il y a des Ivoiriens et des Sénégalais, qui n’ont pas à demander l’asile en Europe. »
      Contredit par les données statistiques italiennes

      D’après le ministre – qui a expliqué par la suite tenir ses informations de son homologue italien – « l’essentiel » des migrants de Lampedusa sont originaires du Cameroun, du Sénégal, de Côte-d’Ivoire, de Gambie ou de Tunisie. Selon le ministre, leur nationalité les priverait du droit de demander l’asile. « Il n’y aura pas de répartition de manière générale puisque ce ne sont pas des réfugiés », a-t-il prétendu, en confondant par la même occasion les demandeurs d’asiles et les réfugiés, soit les personnes dont la demande d’asile a été acceptée.

      https://twitter.com/BFMTV/status/1704749840133923089

      Interrogé sur le profil des migrants arrivés à Lampedusa, le ministère de l’Intérieur italien renvoie aux statistiques de l’administration du pays. A rebours des propos définitifs de Gérald Darmanin sur la nationalité des personnes débarquées sur les rives italiennes depuis la semaine dernière, on constate, à l’appui de ces données, qu’une grande majorité des migrants n’a pas encore fait l’objet d’une procédure d’identification. Sur les 16 911 personnes arrivées entre le 11 et le 20 septembre, la nationalité n’est précisée que pour 30 % d’entre elles.

      En tout, 12 223 personnes, soit 72 % des personnes arrivées à Lampedusa, apparaissent dans la catégorie « autres » nationalités, qui mélange des ressortissants de pays peu représentés et des migrants dont l’identification est en cours. A titre de comparaison, au 11 septembre, seulement 30 % des personnes étaient classées dans cette catégorie. Même si la part exacte de migrants non identifiés n’est pas précisée, cette catégorie apparaît être un bon indicateur de l’avancée du travail des autorités italiennes.

      Parmi les nationalités relevées entre le 11 et 20 septembre, le ministère de l’Intérieur italien compte effectivement une grande partie de personnes qui pourraient être francophones : 1 600 Tunisiens, 858 Guinéens, 618 Ivoiriens, 372 Burkinabés, presque autant de Maliens, 253 Camerounais, mais aussi des ressortissants moins susceptibles de connaître la langue (222 Syriens, environ 200 Egyptiens, 128 Bangladais et 74 Pakistanais).

      A noter que selon ces statistiques italiennes partielles, il n’est pas fait état de ressortissants sénégalais et gambiens évoqués par Gérald Darmanin. Les données ne disent rien, par ailleurs, du genre ou de l’âge de ces arrivants. « La plupart sont des hommes mais aussi on a aussi vu arriver des familles, des mères seules ou des pères seuls avec des enfants et beaucoup de mineurs non accompagnés, des adolescents de 16 ou 17 ans », décrivait à CheckNews la responsable des migrations de la Croix-Rouge italienne, Francesca Basile, la semaine dernière.

      Légalement, toutes les personnes arrivées à Lampedusa peuvent déposer une demande d’asile, s’ils courent un danger dans leur pays d’origine. « Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’un principe théorique. En vertu du droit communautaire et international, toute personne – quelle que soit sa nationalité – peut demander une protection internationale, et les États membres de l’UE ont l’obligation de procéder à une évaluation individuelle de chaque demande », a ainsi rappelé à CheckNews l’agence de l’union européenne pour l’asile. L’affirmation de Gérald Darmanin selon laquelle des migrants ne seraient pas éligibles à l’asile en raison de leur nationalité est donc fausse.

      Par ailleurs, selon le règlement de Dublin III, la demande d’asile doit être instruite dans le premier pays où la personne est arrivée au sein de l’Union européenne (à l’exception du Danemark), de la Suisse, de la Norvège, de l’Islande et du Liechtenstein. Ce sont donc aux autorités italiennes d’enregistrer et de traiter les demandes des personnes arrivées à Lampedusa. Dans certains cas, des transferts peuvent être opérés vers un pays signataires de l’accord de Dublin III, ainsi du rapprochement familial. Si les demandes d’asile vont être instruites en Italie, les chiffes de l’asile en France montrent tout de même que des ressortissants des pays cités par Gérald Darmanin obtiennent chaque année une protection dans l’Hexagone.

      Pour rappel, il existe deux formes de protections : le statut de réfugié et la protection subsidiaire. Cette dernière peut être accordée à un demandeur qui, aux yeux de l’administration, ne remplit pas les conditions pour être considéré comme un réfugié, mais qui s’expose à des risques grave dans son pays, tels que la torture, des traitements inhumains ou dégradants, ainsi que des « menaces grave et individuelle contre sa vie ou sa personne en raison d’une violence qui peut s’étendre à des personnes sans considération de leur situation personnelle et résultant d’une situation de conflit armé interne ou international », liste sur son site internet la Cour nationale du droit d’asile (CNDA), qui statue en appel sur les demandes de protection.
      Contredit aussi par la réalité des chiffres en France

      Gérald Darmanin cite à plusieurs reprises le cas des migrants originaires de Côte-d’Ivoire comme exemple de personnes n’ayant selon lui « rien à faire » en France. La jurisprudence de la CNDA montre pourtant des ressortissants ivoiriens dont la demande de protection a été acceptée. En 2021, la Cour a ainsi accordé une protection subsidiaire à une femme qui fuyait un mariage forcé décidé par son oncle, qui l’exploitait depuis des années. La Cour avait estimé que les autorités ivoiriennes étaient défaillantes en ce qui concerne la protection des victimes de mariages forcés, malgré de récentes évolutions législatives plus répressives.

      D’après l’Office de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (Ofrpa), qui rend des décisions en première instance, les demandes d’asile de ressortissants ivoiriens (environ 6 000 en 2022) s’appuient très souvent sur des « problématiques d’ordre sociétal […], en particulier les craintes liées à un risque de mariage forcé ou encore l’exposition des jeunes filles à des mutilations sexuelles ». En 2022, le taux de demandes d’Ivoiriens acceptées par l’Ofrpa (avant recours éventuel devant la CNCDA) était de 27,3 % sur 6 727 décisions contre un taux moyen d’admission de 26,4 % pour le continent africain et de 29,2 % tous pays confondus. Les femmes représentaient la majorité des protections accordées aux ressortissants de Côte-d’Ivoire.

      Pour les personnes originaires de Guinée, citées plusieurs fois par Gérald Darmanin, les demandes sont variées. Certaines sont déposées par des militants politiques. « Les demandeurs se réfèrent à leur parcours personnel et à leur participation à des manifestations contre le pouvoir, qu’il s’agisse du gouvernement d’Alpha Condé ou de la junte militaire », décrit l’Ofpra. D’autre part des femmes qui fuient l’excision et le mariage forcé. En 2022, le taux d’admission par l’Ofpra était de 33,4 % pour 5 554 décisions.
      Jurisprudence abondante

      S’il est vrai que ces nationalités (Guinée et Côte-d’Ivoire) ne figurent pas parmi les taux de protections les plus élevées, elles figurent « parmi les principales nationalités des bénéficiaires de la protection internationale » en 2022, aux côtés des personnes venues d’Afghanistan ou de Syrie, selon l’Ofpra. Les ressortissants tunisiens, qui déposent peu de demandes (439 en 2022), présentent un taux d’admission de seulement 10 %.

      La jurisprudence abondante produite par la CNDA montre que, dans certains cas, le demandeur peut obtenir une protection sur la base de son origine géographique, jugée dangereuse pour sa sécurité voire sa vie. C’est le cas notamment du Mali. En février 2023, la Cour avait ainsi accordé la protection subsidiaire à un Malien originaire de Gao, dans le nord du pays. La Cour avait estimé qu’il s’exposait, « en cas de retour dans sa région d’origine du seul fait de sa présence en tant que civil, [à] un risque réel de subir une menace grave contre sa vie ou sa personne sans être en mesure d’obtenir la protection effective des autorités de son pays ».

      « Cette menace est la conséquence d’une situation de violence, résultant d’un conflit armé interne, susceptible de s’étendre indistinctement aux civils », avait-elle expliqué dans un communiqué. Au mois de juin, à la suite des déclarations d’un demandeur possédant la double nationalité malienne et nigérienne, la Cour avait jugé que les régions de Ménaka au Mali et de Tillaberi au Niger étaient en situation de violence aveugle et d’intensité exceptionnelle, « justifiant l’octroi de la protection subsidiaire prévue par le droit européen ».

      D’après le rapport 2023 de l’agence de l’Union européenne pour l’asile, le taux de reconnaissance en première instance pour les demandeurs guinéens avoisinait les 30 %, et un peu plus de 20 % pour ressortissants ivoiriens à l’échelle de l’UE, avec un octroi en majorité, pour les personnes protégées, du statut de réfugié. Concernant le Mali, le taux de reconnaissance dépassait les 60 %, principalement pour de la protection subsidiaire. Ces données européennes qui confirment qu’il est infondé d’affirmer, comme le suggère le ministre de l’Intérieur, que les nationalités qu’il cite ne sont pas éligibles à l’asile.

      En revanche, dans le cadre du mécanisme « de solidarité », qui prévoit que les pays européens prennent en charge une partie des demandeurs, les Etats « restent souverains dans le choix du nombre et de la nationalité des demandeurs accueillis ». « Comme il s’agit d’un mécanisme volontaire, le choix des personnes à transférer est laissé à l’entière discrétion de l’État membre qui effectue le transfert », explique l’agence de l’union européenne pour l’asile, qui précise que les Etats « tendent souvent à donner la priorité aux nationalités qui ont le plus de chances de bénéficier d’un statut de protection », sans plus de précisions sur l’avancée des négociations en cours.

      https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/lampedusa-les-contreverites-de-gerald-darmanin-sur-le-profil-des-migrants

      #fact-checking

    • #Fanélie_Carrey-Conte sur X :

      Comme une tragédie grecque, l’impression de connaître à l’avance la conclusion d’une histoire qui finit mal.
      A chaque fois que l’actualité remet en lumière les drames migratoires, la même mécanique se met en place. D’abord on parle d’"#appel_d'air", de « #submersion », au mépris de la réalité des chiffres, et du fait que derrière les statistiques, il y a des vies, des personnes.
      Puis l’#extrême_droite monte au créneau, de nombreux responsables politiques lui emboîtent le pas. Alors les institutions européennes mettent en scène des « #plans_d'urgence, » des pactes, censés être « solidaires mais fermes », toujours basés en réalité sur la même logique:chercher au maximum à empêcher en Europe les migrations des « indésirables », augmenter la #sécurisation_des_frontières, prétendre que la focalisation sur les #passeurs se fait dans l’intérêt des personnes migrantes, externaliser de plus en plus les politiques migratoires en faisant fi des droits humains.
      Résultat : les migrations, dont on ne cherche d’ailleurs même plus à comprendre les raisons ni les mécanismes qui les sous-tendent, ne diminuent évidemment pas, au contraire ; les drames et les morts augmentent ; l’extrême -droite a toujours autant de leviers pour déployer ses idées nauséabondes et ses récupérations politiques abjectes.
      Et la spirale mortifère continue ... Ce n’est pas juste absurde, c’est avant tout terriblement dramatique. Pourtant ce n’est pas une fatalité : des politiques migratoires réellement fondées sur l’#accueil et l’#hospitalité, le respect des droits et de la #dignité de tout.e.s, cela peut exister, si tant est que l’on en ait la #volonté_politique, que l’on porte cette orientation dans le débat public national et européen, que l’on se mobilise pour faire advenir cet autre possible. A rebours malheureusement de la voie choisie aujourd’hui par l’Europe comme par la France à travers les pactes et projets de loi immigration en cours...

      https://twitter.com/FCarreyConte/status/1703650891268596111

    • Migranti, Oim: “Soluzione non è chiudere le frontiere”

      Il portavoce per l’Italia, Flavio di Giacomo, a LaPresse: «Organizzare diversamente salvataggi per aiutare Lampedusa»

      Per risolvere l’emergenza migranti, secondo l’Oim (Organizzazione internazionale per le migrazioni), la soluzione non è chiudere le frontiere. Lo ha dichiarato a LaPresse il portavoce per l’Italia dell’organizzazione, Flavio di Giacomo. La visita della presidente della Commissione europea Ursula Von der Leyen a Lampedusa insieme alla premier Giorgia Meloni, ha detto, “è un segnale importante, ma non bisogna scambiare un’emergenza di tipo operativo con ‘bisogna chiudere’, perché non c’è nessuna invasione e la soluzione non è quella di creare deterrenti come trattenere i migranti per 18 mesi. In passato non ha ottenuto nessun effetto pratico e comporta tante spese allo Stato”. Von der Leyen ha proposto un piano d’azione in 10 punti che prevede tra le altre cose di intensificare la cooperazione con l’Unhcr e l’Oim per i rimpatri volontari. “È una cosa che in realtà già facciamo ed è importante che venga implementata ulteriormente“, ha sottolineato Di Giacomo.
      “Organizzare diversamente salvataggi per aiutare Lampedusa”

      “Quest’anno i migranti arrivati in Italia sono circa 127mila rispetto ai 115mila dello stesso periodo del 2015-2016, ma niente di paragonabile agli oltre 850mila giunti in Grecia nel 2015. La differenza rispetto ad allora, quando gli arrivi a Lampedusa erano l’8% mentre quest’anno sono oltre il 70%, è che in questo momento i salvataggi ci sono ma sono fatti con piccole motovedette della Guardia costiera che portano i migranti a Lampedusa, mentre servirebbe un tipo diverso di azione con navi più grandi che vengano distribuite negli altri porti. Per questo l’isola è in difficoltà”, spiega Di Giacomo. “Inoltre, con le partenze in prevalenza dalla Tunisia piuttosto che dalla Libia, i barchini puntano tutti direttamente su Lampedusa”.
      “Priorità stabilizzare situazione in Maghreb”

      Per risolvere la questione, ha aggiunto Di Giacomo, “occorre lavorare per la stabilizzazione e il miglioramento delle condizioni nell’area del Maghreb“. E ha precisato: “La stragrande maggioranza dei flussi migratori africani è interno, ovvero dalla zona sub-sahariana a quella del Maghreb, persone che andavano a vivere in Tunisia e che ora decidono di lasciare il Paese perché vittima di furti, vessazioni e discriminazioni razziali. Questo le porta a imbarcarsi a Sfax con qualsiasi mezzo di fortuna per fare rotta verso Lampedusa”.

      https://www.lapresse.it/cronaca/2023/09/18/migranti-oim-soluzione-non-e-chiudere-le-frontiere

    • Da inizio 2023 in Italia sono sbarcati 133.170 migranti.

      La Ong Humanity1, finanziata anche dal Governo tedesco, ne ha sbarcati 753 (lo 0,6% del totale).
      In totale, Ong battenti bandiera tedesca ne hanno sbarcati 2.720 (il 2% del totale).

      Ma di cosa stiamo parlando?

      https://twitter.com/emmevilla/status/1708121850847309960
      #débarquement #arrivées #ONG #sauvetage

  • Unpicking the notion of ‘safe and legal’ routes

    Introduction

    The last ten years have brought a growing recognition of the need to address the issue of mixed and irregular migratory movements through the introduction of pathways that enable people to move from one country and continent to another in a safe and legal manner. As well as averting the need for refugees and migrants to embark on dangerous and expensive journeys involving unscrupulous human smugglers, such routes promise to mitigate the negative perceptions of states with respect to the impact of such movements on their sovereignty, security, and social stability.

    This essay examines the context in which the discourse on safe and legal routes has emerged and identifies the different types of organised pathways that have been proposed by states and other stakeholders. Focusing particularly on population movements from the global South to the global North, it discusses the opportunities, difficulties, and dilemmas associated with this approach to the governance of cross-border mobility. More specifically, it scrutinises the increasingly popular assumption that the introduction of such routes will lead to significant reductions in the scale of mixed and irregular migration.
    The context

    In the mid-1980s, the world’s most prosperous states began to express concern about the growing number of foreign nationals arriving irregularly on their territory, many of whom subsequently submitted applications for refugee status. Regarding such movements as a threat to their sovereignty, and believing that many of those applications were unfounded, over the next two decades those countries introduced a range of restrictive measures designed to place new physical and administrative barriers in the way of unwanted new arrivals, especially those originating from the global South.

    The limitations of these measures were dramatically exposed in 2015-16, when up to a million people, initially from Syria but subsequently from several other countries, made their way in an unauthorised manner to the European Union, many of them travelling via Türkiye. Reacting to this apparent emergency, the EU adopted a strategy pioneered in earlier years by Australia and the United States, known as “externalisation”. This involved the provision of financial and other incentives to low- and middle-income states on the understanding that they would obstruct the outward movement of irregular migrants and readmit those deported from wealthier states.

    At the same time, governments in the developed world were beginning to acknowledge that mixed and irregular movements of people could not be managed by exclusionary measures alone. This recognition was due in no small part to the efforts of human rights advocates, who were concerned about the negative implications of externalisation for refugee and migrant protection. They also wanted to highlight the contribution that foreign nationals could make to destination countries in the global North if they were able to move there in a regular and orderly manner. The common outcome of these different discourses was a growing degree of support for the notion that the establishment of safe and legal routes could minimise the scale and mitigate the adverse consequences of mixed and irregular movements.

    This was not an entirely new approach. As then UN secretary-general Kofi Annan had argued in the early 2000s, international migration, if governed in an appropriate manner, could have “win-win outcomes”, bringing benefits to countries of origin, countries of destination, and migrants alike. But to attain those outcomes, certain conditions had to be met. In the words of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCM), a body established by Mr. Annan:

    It is in the interest of both states and migrants to create a context in which people migrate out of choice and in a safe and legal manner, rather than irregularly and because they feel they have no other option. Regular migration programmes could reinforce public confidence in the ability of states to admit migrants into their territory on the basis of labor market needs. Programmes of this kind would also help to create a more positive image of migrants and foster greater public acceptance of international migration.

    Migration governance initiatives

    In recent years, and especially since the so-called “European migration crisis” of 2015-16, this notion has been taken up by a number of different migration governance initiatives. Focusing primarily on labour migration, the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) cited “enhanced availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration,” as one of its key objectives. Endorsed by the majority of UN member states, the GCM extended this approach to the realm of forced migration, encouraging the international community to “develop or build on existing national and regional practices for admission and stay of appropriate duration based on compassionate, humanitarian or other considerations for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin.”

    At the same time, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), also adopted in 2018 and which was even more widely endorsed by the international community, underlined the necessity for people who were fleeing persecution and armed conflict to have access to safe and legal routes. “There is a need,” it said, “to ensure that such pathways are made available on a more systematic, organised and sustainable basis, that they contain appropriate protection safeguards, and that the number of countries offering these opportunities is expanded overall.”

    Similar approaches have emerged in the context of regional migration governance initiatives. The EU’s 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, for example, acknowledged the importance of “preventing and reducing irregular migration and trafficking in human beings” by “organising and facilitating legal migration and mobility.” The more recent EU Pact on Migration and Asylum also “aims to reduce unsafe and irregular routes and promote sustainable and safe legal pathways for those in need of protection.” “Developing legal pathways,” it says, “should contribute to the reduction of irregular migration.”

    In 2022, the Summit of the Americas, a meeting of states that focussed on the issue of human mobility in the western hemisphere, endorsed the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection. Using language similar to that of the EU Pact, it committed participating states to “a shared approach to reduce and manage irregular migration,” and to “promoting regular pathways for migration and international protection.” Signatories expressed their commitment “to strengthen fair labor migration opportunities in the region,” and “to promote access to protection and complementary pathways for asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons.”

    As indicated by the declaration’s reference to “labor migration opportunities”, the recognition of the need for safe and legal pathways to be established is closely linked to another recent development: a growing and global shortage of workers. In many industrialised states, members of the existing labour force are aging, taking retirement, quitting, or changing their jobs. The Covid-19 pandemic prompted those countries to introduce new border controls and stricter limits on immigration. Taking advantage of these circumstances, employees have been able to demand better wages and working conditions, thereby pushing up the cost of producing goods and providing services. Confronted with these threats to their profitability, the private sector has been placing growing pressure on governments to remove such restrictions and to open the door to foreign labour.
    Safe and legal routes

    As demonstrated by the migration governance initiatives described in the previous section, there is now a broad international consensus on the need to provide safe and legal routes for people who wish or feel obliged to leave their own country. There is also an agreement, supported by a growing volume of academic research, that the provision of such routes has a role to play in reducing the scale of mixed and irregular migration and in boosting the economies of destination states. But what specific forms might those safe and legal routes take? The next section of this essay answers that question by describing the principal proposals made and actions taken in that respect.
    Labour migration programmes

    One such proposal has been labour migration programmes established on a permanent, temporary, or seasonal bases. The rationale for such programmes is that they would allow people from poorer countries who are in need of employment to fill gaps in the labour markets of more prosperous states. As well as boosting the economies of destination countries, such programmes would allow the migrants concerned to enhance their skills and to support their countries of origin by means of remittances.

    Until recently, for example, there have been only limited legal opportunities for the citizens of Central and South American countries, especially those with lower levels of skill, to join the US workforce. At the 2022 Summit of the Americas, however, President Biden indicated that he would introduce a package of measures designed to manage northward migration more effectively, including the establishment of safe and legal routes for Latin Americans. According to one US spokesperson, “we will have announcements related to labor pathways as part of the Los Angeles Declaration, designed to ensure that those pathways meet the highest labor standards and are not used for abuse or for a race to the bottom.”

    Mexico, another signatory to the declaration, has already taken steps in this direction, offering border worker visas to Guatemalans and Belizeans wishing to work in the country’s southernmost states—an initiative intended to meet the labour needs of the area while reducing the number of people from those two countries arriving and working in an irregular manner.

    Turning next to Germany, in 2015-16, at a time when the country was receiving large numbers of new arrivals from the Western Balkan states, most of whom submitted unsuccessful asylum claims, a new employment regulation was introduced. This opened the labour market for nationals of those countries, on condition that they had a valid job offer from a German employer.

    Since that time, EU member states more generally have begun to acknowledge the need to recruit employees from outside the bloc. Thus in April 2022, the European Commission launched what it described as “an ambitious and sustainable legal migration policy,” including “specific actions to facilitate the integration of those fleeing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine into the EU’s labour market.” In the emphatic words of the commissioner for home affairs, “legal migration is essential to our economic recovery […] while reducing irregular migration.”

    A more preemptive approach to the issue has been taken by Australia, whose Pacific Labour Mobility Scheme allows businesses to recruit seasonal and temporary workers from ten Pacific island states. The purpose of the scheme is to meet Australia’s domestic labour market needs, to promote regional cooperation and development, and, in doing so, to avert the kind of instability that might provoke unpredictable and irregular movements of people.
    Refugee-related programmes

    When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, large numbers of people displaced by the hostilities began to make their way to neighbouring and nearby member states of the European Union. While the EU has made vigorous and often inhumane efforts to exclude asylum seekers originating from other parts of the world, even if they had strong claims to refugee status, in the case of Ukraine steps were quickly taken to regularise the situation of the new arrivals. Refugees from Ukraine were allowed to enter the EU without a visa, to enjoy residence and work rights there for up to three years, and to move freely from one member state to another.

    This arrangement, known as “temporary protection”, was based on a number of considerations: the geographical proximity of Ukraine to the EU, the great difficulty that the EU would have had in trying to obstruct the movement, a humanitarian concern for people who had been obliged to flee by the conflict, and a particular readiness to support the citizens of a friendly country that was suffering from the aggression committed by Russia, a state with a long history of enmity to the EU and NATO. While it remains to be seen how effectively the Ukrainians can be absorbed into the economies and societies of EU member states, in the short term at least, the temporary protection system provided a means of channeling a very large and rapid movement of people into routes that were safe and legal.

    Looking beyond the specifics of the Ukrainian situation, UNHCR, the UN’s agency for refugees, has in recent years made regular calls for governments—predominantly but not exclusively in the global North—to establish and expand the scale of state-sponsored refugee resettlement programmes. Such efforts enjoy limited success, however, partly because of the serious cuts made to the US resettlement quota by the Trump administration, and partly because of the restrictions on movement introduced by many other countries as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. In the aftermath of the 2015-16 “migrant crisis”, moreover, European countries were reluctant to consider the admission of additional refugees, even if they were to arrive in an organised manner.

    In a more positive development, the decade since the beginning of the Syrian refugee emergency in 2012 has delivered a new focus on the establishment of privately- sponsored resettlement programmes, enabling families as well as neighbourhood, community, and faith-based groups in the global North to sponsor the reception and initial integration of refugees from countries of asylum in the global South. Canada has taken a particular lead in this respect, establishing private sponsorship programmes for Afghan, Syrian, and Ukrainian refugees, with Australia, the US, and some European countries also experimenting with this particular form of safe and legal route.

    A similar approach can be seen with respect to the notion of “humanitarian corridors”, an initiative taken by Italian church-affiliated groups. Self-funded but closely coordinated with the government in Rome, this programme has enabled religious communities in Italy to welcome hundreds of refugees from Ethiopia, Greece, and Lebanon. Discussions are currently underway with a view to expanding this model to other European states.

    Recent years have seen a growing interest in the notion of labour mobility for refugees, arrangements whereby refugees with specific skills and qualifications are allowed to leave their country of asylum in order to take up pre-arranged employment opportunities in another state. An approach first proposed more than a decade ago but largely unimplemented since that time, the potential of such initiatives has now been recognised by Australia, Canada, and the UK, all of which have recently established pilot programmes of this type.

    In similar vein, humanitarian organisations have promoted the notion that refugees in developing countries of asylum should be able to benefit from scholarship programmes in states that are better equipped to provide them with appropriate education at the secondary and tertiary levels. The implementation of this approach has been boosted considerably by the emergencies in Syria and Ukraine, both of which have prompted universities around the world to make special provisions for refugee students.

    When people move from one country to another in the context of a refugee crisis, a common consequence is for family members to be separated, either because some have been left behind in the country of origin, or because they lose contact with each other during their journey to a safer place. In response to this humanitarian issue, the international community has for many years supported the notion of family reunification programmes, organised with the support of entities such as the International Organization for Migration, UNHCR, and the Red Cross movement. Most recently, there has been a recognition that such programmes also have a role to play in reducing the scale of irregular movements, given the frequency with which people engage in such journeys in an attempt to reunite with their relatives.
    Relocation and evacuation programmes

    Other arrangements have been made to enable refugees and migrants to relocate in a safe and legal manner from countries that are not in a position to provide them with the support that they need. In the EU, efforts—albeit largely unsuccessful—have been made recently to establish redistribution programmes, relocating people from front-line states such as Greece and Italy, which have large refugee and migrant populations, to parts of Europe that are under less pressure in this respect.

    In a more dramatic context, UNHCR has established an evacuation programme for refugees and migrants in Libya, where they are at serious risk of detention and human rights abuses, and where escape from the country by boat also presents them with enormous dangers. A safe and legal alternative has been found in an arrangement whereby the most vulnerable of these people are transferred to emergency transit centres in Niger and Rwanda, pending the time when other countries accept them as permanent residents.

    Finally, proposals have been made with respect to the establishment of arrangements that would allow people who are at risk in their country of origin to move elsewhere in a safe and legal manner. For individuals and families, this objective could be attained by means of humanitarian visas issued by the overseas embassies of states that wish to provide sanctuary to people who are threatened in their homeland.

    On a larger scale, orderly departure programmes might be established for designated categories of people who feel obliged to leave their own country and who might otherwise have no alternative but to move by irregular means. An important—but as yet unreplicated— precedent was set in this respect by a 1980s programme that allowed some 800,000 Vietnamese citizens to relocate to the US and other western countries with the authorisation of the Hanoi government, sparing them from the dangerous journeys that the “boat people” had undertaken in earlier years.
    The potential of regular pathways

    It is not surprising that the notion of safe and legal routes has attracted so much attention in recent years. They are in the interest of refugees and migrants, who would otherwise have to embark on difficult and often dangerous journeys. They are in the interest of states, who have much to gain from the orderly and authorised movement of people. And they are in the interest of international organisations that are struggling to respond to large-scale and unpredicted movements of people, and which are trying to ensure that human mobility is governed in a more effective, human and equitable manner.

    At the same time, there is a need to scrutinise the popular assumption that such measures can substantially reduce the scale of mixed and irregular migratory movements, and to address the many difficulties and dilemmas associated with the establishment of such pathways.
    Scaling up

    Despite all of the rhetorical support given to the notion of regular pathways in recent years, the number of people who are able to access them is still very modest. And there are a number of reasons why they might not be scaled up to any great extent. First, the Covid-19 pandemic, which erupted unexpectedly not long after the GCM and GCR had been negotiated, caused many governments to act with a new degree of caution in relation to the cross-border movement of people. And while the pandemic has subsided, states may well prefer to retain some of the immigration restrictions they introduced in the context of the pandemic.

    Second, and more recently, the need for states in Europe and beyond to admit large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan and Ukraine seems certain to limit their enthusiasm and capacity for the establishment of safe routes for people from other parts of the world. With many thousands of people from those two countries left without jobs and in temporary accommodation, the introduction or expansion of other pathways would simply exacerbate this problem.

    While the admission of overseas workers appears to be a way of addressing the demographic deficits and labour market needs of the industrialised states, are the citizens and politicians of those countries ready to acknowledge the need to admit more foreign nationals, even if they arrive in a managed manner? Immigration has become a toxic issue in many of the world’s more prosperous states, and few governments or opposition parties are willing to run on electoral platforms that advocate an increase in the number of new arrivals from other parts of the world.

    In the context described above, it should come as no surprise that most of the orderly pathway initiatives introduced in recent years (such as privately sponsored resettlement, humanitarian corridors, evacuation, and relocation programmes) have all operated on a modest scale and have often been established on a pilot basis, with no guarantee of them being expanded.

    For example, when in 2021 the British home secretary introduced a new labour mobility programme for refugees, she boldly announced that “those displaced by conflict and violence will now be able to benefit from access to our global points-based immigration system, enabling them to come to the UK safely and legally through established routes”. In fact, only 100 Syrian refugees from Jordan and Lebanon will benefit from the programme over the next two years.

    And the UK is not an isolated case. According to a recent study, in 2019 the OECD countries provided complementary pathways to fewer than 156,000 people from seven major refugee-producing countries. Two-thirds of them were admitted on the basis of family reunion, with the remaining third split equally between people granted visas for work and for educational purposes. That 156,000 constituted just 0.6 percent of the global refugee population.
    Reducing irregular migration

    Even if safe and legal routes could be established and expanded, what impact would that have on the scale of irregular migration? That is a difficult question to answer, partly because the evidence on this issue is so limited, and partly because it is methodologically challenging to establish causal linkages between these two phenomena, as demonstrated by two recent studies.

    With respect to the German labour programme in the Western Balkans, one analyst has suggested that although the number of asylum applications from that region did indeed drop after the new initiative was introduced, “one cannot credibly single out the exact effect the Western Balkan Regulation had on reducing irregular migration from the region to Germany”. The author goes on to say that “the regulation was only one of many policy measures at the time, including many restrictive measures and faster processing times of asylum applications as well as the ‘closure’ of the Western Balkan route.” Consequently, “it is not possible to isolate the exact causal role the Western Balkan Regulation may have played.”

    A case study of Mexico and the US reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting “there is evidence that lawful channels for migration between Mexico and the US have suppressed unlawful migration, but only when combined with robust enforcement efforts,” including the intensification of border controls that facilitated the apprehension and return of migrants crossing the frontier in an irregular manner. This conclusion on the close relationship between safe pathways and enforcement, shared by both studies, is ironic, given that some of the strongest NGO advocates for the former are most vocal in their opposition to the latter!

    A more general review of the evidence on this matter also casts doubt on the notion that an expansion of safe and legal routes will necessarily lead to a reduction in irregular movements. Looking specifically at labour migration programmes, the study says that they are often proposed “on the basis of an assumption of a rerouting effect, whereby migrants who would otherwise arrive and enter the asylum system or stay in a country without legal status will be incentivised to try and access a legal work permit from home rather than migrate illegally.” But the validity of that assumption “will depend on the capacity of legal pathways to accommodate the number of low-skilled workers who want to migrate, but lack permission to enter their desired destination.”

    That statement concerning the number of people who would like to or have been obliged to migrate but who have been unable to do so in a safe and legal manner is readily substantiated in numerical terms. Most estimates suggest that around 15 million irregular migrants are to be found in the US and Europe alone, with millions more in countries such as India, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. According to UNHCR, there are some 30 million refugees worldwide and more than 4.5 million asylum seekers who are waiting for their applications to be processed. A worldwide survey undertaken in 2018 concluded that some 750 million people, 15 percent of all the world’s adults, would move to another country if they had the opportunity to do so.

    Given the growing demand for migration opportunities in poorer regions of the world, coupled with the general reluctance of the industrialised states to facilitate the large-scale admission of people who want to move there, it is difficult to see how this square can be circled. The most likely scenario is that the supply of opportunities for regular migration will be unable to meet the demand, meaning that aspirant migrants who are not selected for regular entry will still have a strong incentive to move in an irregular manner.

    Indeed, it can also be argued that the establishment of safe and legal routes intensifies the social networks linking countries of origin and destination, enabling those migrants who move in a regular manner to inform the compatriots they have left behind of the opportunities that exist in the countries to which they have moved and to send remittances to people at home that can be used to pay the costs of a clandestine journey to the same location. In this respect, instead of reducing levels of irregular migration, the establishment of safe and legal routes might actually contribute to their growth.
    Selection criteria and processes

    In addition to the scale of the routes that might be established and their potential impact on levels of irregular migration, a number of other issues must be considered in the context of this discourse.

    First, the notion of safe and legal pathways is based on the idea that states should control the arrival of foreign nationals on their territory, determining how many should be admitted, what countries they should come from, why they wish or need to move to another country, what their demographic profile is, and what skills they should have. In other words, for safe and legal routes to work effectively, states and other stakeholders have to establish selection criteria and processes that allow the admission of some people who would like to move, while refusing entry to others. This is not a principle accepted by some refugee and migrant advocates, for whom the notion of safe and legal routes has become a disguised proxy for “open borders”.

    Almost inevitably, moreover, different constituencies within receiving states will be pushing for priority to be given to certain categories of people. Humanitarians will want the emphasis to be on refugees. Diaspora families and communities will favour family reunification programmes and community-sponsored resettlement. The private sector will argue the case for the admission of people with the skills and capacity to fill gaps in the labour market in a cost-effective manner. Universities will argue the case for visas to be granted to refugees and other foreign citizens with the necessary qualifications or academic aptitude. The selection process is therefore likely to be a contested and controversial one, potentially limiting governmental enthusiasm for the notion of safe and legal routes.
    Status and rights

    Second, as the attempt to regularise migratory movements proceeds, some important questions will have to be addressed in relation to the status and rights of the new arrivals and the organisation of such programmes. In the context of labour migration programmes, for example, would people be admitted on a temporary or permanent basis, and in the latter case would they eventually be able to acquire permanent resident rights or citizenship? Would they be tied to a single employer or allowed to move freely in the labour market? Would they enjoy the same pay, rights, and working conditions as citizens of the countries in which they are employed?

    A somewhat different set of issues arises in the context of labour mobility initiatives for refugees. Will they be allowed to leave their countries of asylum by the governments of those states and, more importantly, would they be able to return to it if employed abroad on a temporary basis? As some refugee lawyers have mooted, would they be at risk of being deported to their country of origin, and thereby be at risk of persecution, if their country of first asylum refused to readmit them? And if they were readmitted to their country of first asylum, would they have full access to the labour market there, or find themselves returning to a refugee camp or informal urban settlement where only informal and low-income livelihoods opportunities exist?

    With respect to privately sponsored resettlement, there is some evidence, especially from Canada, that refugees who arrive by this route fare better than those who are admitted by means of state-sponsored programmes. But there are also risks involved, especially in emergency situations where the citizens of resettlement countries are, for good humanitarian reasons, eager to welcome refugees into their homes and neighbourhoods, and where the state is only too happy to devolve responsibility for refugees to members of the community.

    A particular case in point is to be found in the UK’s sponsorship scheme for Ukrainian refugees, in which some of the new arrivals have found themselves matched with inappropriate sponsors in isolated rural locations and with few affordable options available with respect to their long-term accommodation.
    State manipulation

    Third, the establishment and expansion of safe and legal routes could have adverse consequences if misused by destination countries. With respect to resettlement, for example, UNHCR has always insisted that refugees should be selected on the basis of their vulnerability, and not in terms of what the organisation describes as their “integration potential”.

    That principle might prove more difficult to uphold in a context where alternative pathways are being discussed, specifically targeted at people on the basis of their skills, qualifications, language abilities, family connections and value to the labour market. Rather than expanding their refugee resettlement programmes, as UNHCR would like them to do, will destination countries prefer to make use of pathways that enable them to cherry-pick new arrivals on the basis of perceived value to the economy and society?

    At the same time, there is a risk that states will use the establishment of organised pathways as a pretext for the exclusion of asylum seekers who arrive in an independent manner and by irregular means. That has long been the approach adopted by Australia, whose policy of interception at sea and relocation to remote offshore processing facilities is justified by the government on the grounds that the country has a substantial refugee resettlement programme. Rather than taking to boats and “ jumping the queue”, the authorities say, refugees should wait their turn to be resettled from their country of asylum, however difficult that might be in practice.

    Taking its cue from Australia, the UK is in the process of establishing a formalised two-tier asylum system. On one hand, “bespoke” admissions programmes will be established for refugees from countries in which the UK has a particular geopolitical interest, most notably Afghanistan and Ukraine. On the other hand, the asylum claims of people arriving in the UK in an irregular manner, such as by boat across the English Channel (including those from Afghanistan and Ukraine) are now deemed inadmissible, and many of those arriving in this way are detained and liable to deportation to Rwanda without the possibility of returning to the UK, even if their refugee claim is recognised by the authorities in Kigali. At the time of writing, however, there is no evidence that this policy will have its intended effect of deterring irregular arrivals, nor indeed whether it will ever be implemented, given the legal challenges to which it is being subjected.
    Regularisation

    Finally, while much of the recent discourse on irregular migration has focused on the extent to which its scale and impact can be minimised by the establishment of safe and legal pathways, it must not be forgotten that many destination countries already have substantial populations of people who are officially not authorised to be there: so-called “illegal immigrants”, unsuccessful asylum seekers, and foreign nationals who have overstayed their visas, to give just three examples.

    No serious attempt to address the issue of irregular migration can avoid the situation and status of such people, although questions relating to their regularisation, whether by means of amnesties or by other measures. have not featured at all prominently in the recent discourse on international mobility.

    Interestingly, the GCM avoids the issue completely, presumably because it is deemed to be a matter that lies within the jurisdiction of sovereign states. If an attempt had been made to include the question of regularisation in the compact, it would almost certainly have been endorsed by fewer states. Nevertheless, any discussion of irregular migration must involve a consideration of those people who are living and working in countries where they do not have a legal status, as countries such as Spain, Ireland, and Italy have started to recognise. It is an issue that warrants much more attention at the national and multilateral levels, irrespective of its controversial nature.
    Conclusion

    A strong case can be made for the introduction and expansion of safe and legal migratory routes, as has been recognised by a plethora of recent initiatives relating to the governance of international mobility. But expectations of them should be modest.

    While such routes may have a limited role to play in reducing the scale and impact of mixed and irregular movements, they appear unlikely to have the transformative effect that some participants in the migration discourse have suggested they might have. Such routes are also likely to be a contentious matter, with some states using the notion of safe and legal routes as a pretext for the introduction of draconian approaches to the issue of irregular migration, and with migrant advocates employing the same concept as a means of avoiding the more controversial slogan of “open borders”.

    As indicated in the introduction, this essay has focused to a large extent on mixed and irregular migration from the global South to the global North, as it is those movements that have prompted much of the recent discourse on safe and legal routes. But it should not be forgotten that most migratory movements currently take place within the global South, and that some 85 percent of the world’s refugees are to be found in low and middle-income countries.

    Looking at the migration and refugee scenario in the developing world, there are perhaps greater grounds for optimism than can be found by focusing on the industrialised states. With some exceptions (South Africa being a prime example), countries in the global South are less exercised by the issue of irregular migration.

    Two regions—South America and West Africa—have established rather successful freedom-of-movement arrangements for their citizens. And despite some restrictive tendencies, encouraged in many instances by the externalisation policies of the global North, developing countries have kept their borders relatively open to refugees, as demonstrated by the presence of so many Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in Bangladesh, South Sudanese in Uganda, Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon, and Venezuelans in a host of neighbouring and nearby states.

    In an ideal world, the cross-border movement of people would indeed take place in an exclusively voluntary, safe, and orderly manner. But that scenario cannot be envisaged in an era that is characterised by failures of global governance, widespread armed conflict, growing regional inequalities, intensifying environmental disasters, and the climate crisis, not to mention the general unwillingness of politicians and the public to countenance large-scale immigration and refugee arrivals. Looking to the future, there is every reason to believe that large numbers of people will have to move out of necessity rather than choice, in an unpredictable and irregular manner.

    https://mixedmigration.org/articles/unpicking-the-notion-of-safe-and-legal-routes

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #voies_sures #voies_légales #frontières #1980s #menace #2015 #externalisation #refugee_compact #pacte_migratoire #global_compact_for_safe_orderly_and_regular_migration #global_compact_on_refugees #global_compact #relocalisation #régularisation #ouverture_des_frontières #Jeff_Crisp #safe_routes #legal_routes

  • More Afghans with protection guaranteed to reach Germany in coming months

    German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has said she expects more Afghans to be brought to Germany in the near future, following a new agreement with Pakistan.

    Annalena Baerbock announced on Thursday (June 23) that a new agreement with Pakistan will create a legal exit route via Pakistan to Germany for thousands of people who have been promised protection in Germany, adding that work on implementing the agreement was proceeding at full speed.

    The foreign minister said that those who had already been promised protection by the German government would be the main beneficiaries of this new exit route. She highlighted that the personal information of those who will benefit from the new arrangement was known to German authorities, which will facilitate their quick transfer to Germany from Pakistan.

    Ambitious action plan

    Baerbock also gave an interim assessment of the government’s “Afghanistan Action Plan,” which she first presented six months ago, shortly after accepting her position as foreign minister.

    She said that about two-thirds of the people who had been granted protection had managed to make their way to Germany. This is equivalent to a total of more than 21,000 Afghan nationals.

    The number of departures from Afghanistan and neighboring countries has almost doubled since the action plan was implemented at beginning of the year. More than 12,000 people have been brought to Germany since then. However according to some reports, help came too late for some, resulting in a series of deaths.

    Afghanistan mission ’not in vain’

    In her statement, Baerbock also welcomed the Bundestag’s planned Afghanistan inquiry committee, which is expected to begin its work on July 7. She said that it was important to learn from the mistakes of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan in the past two decades without blaming anyone. Baerbock emphasized that the Afghanistan mission “was not in vain.”

    Germany’s Bundeswehr withdrew from Afghanistan alongside various other international forces at the end of June 2021, having had a continuous presence in the country for almost 20 years. International forces led by the US had declared war on Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.

    Following the ouster of the militant Islamist Taliban government during that war, whom the US had accused of harboring the mastermind of the attack, Osama bin Laden, thousands of international troops remained in Afghanistan to help the country with its nation-building efforts while also trying to minimize attacks by militants.

    After taking power in August 2021 amid the power vacuum left behind by the withdrawal of international troops, the Taliban have restricted civil liberties, increasingly excluding girls and women in particular from public life. There have also been reports of violence against people who had collaborated with the international forces in the country over the past 20 years.

    https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/41452/more-afghans-with-protection-guaranteed-to-reach-germany-in-coming-mon

    #Allemagne #asile #migrations #réfugiés #corridors_humanitaires #réfugiés_afghans #Afghanistan #Pakistan #voies_légales #Afghanistan_Action_Plan

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • Schengen : de nouvelles règles pour rendre l’espace sans contrôles aux #frontières_intérieures plus résilient

    La Commission propose aujourd’hui des règles actualisées pour renforcer la gouvernance de l’espace Schengen. Les modifications ciblées renforceront la coordination au niveau de l’UE et offriront aux États membres des outils améliorés pour faire face aux difficultés qui surviennent dans la gestion tant des frontières extérieures communes de l’UE que des frontières intérieures au sein de l’espace Schengen. L’actualisation des règles vise à faire en sorte que la réintroduction des #contrôles_aux_frontières_intérieures demeure une mesure de dernier recours. Les nouvelles règles créent également des outils communs pour gérer plus efficacement les frontières extérieures en cas de crise de santé publique, grâce aux enseignements tirés de la pandémie de COVID-19. L’#instrumentalisation des migrants est également prise en compte dans cette mise à jour des règles de Schengen, ainsi que dans une proposition parallèle portant sur les mesures que les États membres pourront prendre dans les domaines de l’asile et du retour dans une telle situation.

    Margaritis Schinas, vice-président chargé de la promotion de notre mode de vie européen, s’est exprimé en ces termes : « La crise des réfugiés de 2015, la vague d’attentats terroristes sur le sol européen et la pandémie de COVID-19 ont mis l’espace Schengen à rude épreuve. Il est de notre responsabilité de renforcer la gouvernance de Schengen et de faire en sorte que les États membres soient équipés pour offrir une réaction rapide, coordonnée et européenne en cas de crise, y compris lorsque des migrants sont instrumentalisés. Grâce aux propositions présentées aujourd’hui, nous fortifierons ce “joyau” si emblématique de notre mode de vie européen. »

    Ylva Johansson, commissaire aux affaires intérieures, a quant à elle déclaré : « La pandémie a montré très clairement que l’espace Schengen est essentiel pour nos économies et nos sociétés. Grâce aux propositions présentées aujourd’hui, nous ferons en sorte que les contrôles aux frontières ne soient rétablis qu’en dernier recours, sur la base d’une évaluation commune et uniquement pour la durée nécessaire. Nous dotons les États membres des outils leur permettant de relever les défis auxquels ils sont confrontés. Et nous veillons également à gérer ensemble les frontières extérieures de l’UE, y compris dans les situations où les migrants sont instrumentalisés à des fins politiques. »

    Réaction coordonnée aux menaces communes

    La proposition de modification du code frontières Schengen vise à tirer les leçons de la pandémie de COVID-19 et à garantir la mise en place de mécanismes de coordination solides pour faire face aux menaces sanitaires. Les règles actualisées permettront au Conseil d’adopter rapidement des règles contraignantes fixant des restrictions temporaires des déplacements aux frontières extérieures en cas de menace pour la santé publique. Des dérogations seront prévues, y compris pour les voyageurs essentiels ainsi que pour les citoyens et résidents de l’Union. L’application uniforme des restrictions en matière de déplacements sera ainsi garantie, en s’appuyant sur l’expérience acquise ces dernières années.

    Les règles comprennent également un nouveau mécanisme de sauvegarde de Schengen destiné à générer une réaction commune aux frontières intérieures en cas de menaces touchant la majorité des États membres, par exemple des menaces sanitaires ou d’autres menaces pour la sécurité intérieure et l’ordre public. Grâce à ce mécanisme, qui complète le mécanisme applicable en cas de manquements aux frontières extérieures, les vérifications aux frontières intérieures dans la majorité des États membres pourraient être autorisées par une décision du Conseil en cas de menace commune. Une telle décision devrait également définir des mesures atténuant les effets négatifs des contrôles.

    De nouvelles règles visant à promouvoir des alternatives effectives aux vérifications aux frontières intérieures

    La proposition vise à promouvoir le recours à d’autres mesures que les contrôles aux frontières intérieures et à faire en sorte que, lorsqu’ils sont nécessaires, les contrôles aux frontières intérieures restent une mesure de dernier recours. Ces mesures sont les suivantes :

    - Une procédure plus structurée pour toute réintroduction des contrôles aux frontières intérieures, comportant davantage de garanties : Actuellement, tout État membre qui décide de réintroduire des contrôles doit évaluer le caractère adéquat de cette réintroduction et son incidence probable sur la libre circulation des personnes. En application des nouvelles règles, il devra en outre évaluer l’impact sur les régions frontalières. Par ailleurs, tout État membre envisageant de prolonger les contrôles en réaction à des menaces prévisibles devrait d’abord évaluer si d’autres mesures, telles que des contrôles de police ciblés et une coopération policière renforcée, pourraient être plus adéquates. Une évaluation des risques devrait être fournie pour ce qui concerne les prolongations de plus de 6 mois. Lorsque des contrôles intérieurs auront été rétablis depuis 18 mois, la Commission devra émettre un avis sur leur caractère proportionné et sur leur nécessité. Dans tous les cas, les contrôles temporaires aux frontières ne devraient pas excéder une durée totale de 2 ans, sauf dans des circonstances très particulières. Il sera ainsi fait en sorte que les contrôles aux frontières intérieures restent une mesure de dernier recours et ne durent que le temps strictement nécessaire.
    – Promouvoir le recours à d’autres mesures : Conformément au nouveau code de coopération policière de l’UE, proposé par la Commission le 8 décembre 2021, les nouvelles règles de Schengen encouragent le recours à des alternatives effectives aux contrôles aux frontières intérieures, sous la forme de contrôles de police renforcés et plus opérationnels dans les régions frontalières, en précisant qu’elles ne sont pas équivalentes aux contrôles aux frontières.
    - Limiter les répercussions des contrôles aux frontières intérieures sur les régions frontalières : Eu égard aux enseignements tirés de la pandémie, qui a grippé les chaînes d’approvisionnement, les États membres rétablissant des contrôles devraient prendre des mesures pour limiter les répercussions négatives sur les régions frontalières et le marché intérieur. Il pourra s’agir notamment de faciliter le franchissement d’une frontière pour les travailleurs frontaliers et d’établir des voies réservées pour garantir un transit fluide des marchandises essentielles.
    - Lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés au sein de l’espace Schengen : Afin de lutter contre le phénomène de faible ampleur mais constant des déplacements non autorisés, les nouvelles règles créeront une nouvelle procédure pour contrer ce phénomène au moyen d’opérations de police conjointes et permettre aux États membres de réviser ou de conclure de nouveaux accords bilatéraux de réadmission entre eux. Ces mesures complètent celles proposées dans le cadre du nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile, en particulier le cadre de solidarité contraignant, et doivent être envisagées en liaison avec elles.

    Aider les États membres à gérer les situations d’instrumentalisation des flux migratoires

    Les règles de Schengen révisées reconnaissent l’importance du rôle que jouent les États membres aux frontières extérieures pour le compte de tous les États membres et de l’Union dans son ensemble. Elles prévoient de nouvelles mesures que les États membres pourront prendre pour gérer efficacement les frontières extérieures de l’UE en cas d’instrumentalisation de migrants à des fins politiques. Ces mesures consistent notamment à limiter le nombre de points de passage frontaliers et à intensifier la surveillance des frontières.

    La Commission propose en outre des mesures supplémentaires dans le cadre des règles de l’UE en matière d’asile et de retour afin de préciser les modalités de réaction des États membres en pareilles situations, dans le strict respect des droits fondamentaux. Ces mesures comprennent notamment la possibilité de prolonger le délai d’enregistrement des demandes d’asile jusqu’à 4 semaines et d’examiner toutes les demandes d’asile à la frontière, sauf en ce qui concerne les cas médicaux. Il convient de continuer à garantir un accès effectif à la procédure d’asile, et les États membres devraient permettre l’accès des organisations humanitaires qui fournissent une aide. Les États membres auront également la possibilité de mettre en place une procédure d’urgence pour la gestion des retours. Enfin, sur demande, les agences de l’UE (Agence de l’UE pour l’asile, Frontex, Europol) devraient apporter en priorité un soutien opérationnel à l’État membre concerné.

    Prochaines étapes

    Il appartient à présent au Parlement européen et au Conseil d’examiner et d’adopter les deux propositions.

    Contexte

    L’espace Schengen compte plus de 420 millions de personnes dans 26 pays. La suppression des contrôles aux frontières intérieures entre les États Schengen fait partie intégrante du mode de vie européen : près de 1,7 million de personnes résident dans un État Schengen et travaillent dans un autre. Les personnes ont bâti leur vie autour des libertés offertes par l’espace Schengen, et 3,5 millions d’entre elles se déplacent chaque jour entre des États Schengen.

    Afin de renforcer la résilience de l’espace Schengen face aux menaces graves et d’adapter les règles de Schengen aux défis en constante évolution, la Commission a annoncé, dans son nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile présenté en septembre 2020, ainsi que dans la stratégie de juin 2021 pour un espace Schengen pleinement opérationnel et résilient, qu’elle proposerait une révision du code frontières Schengen. Dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union de 2021, la présidente von der Leyen a également annoncé de nouvelles mesures pour contrer l’instrumentalisation des migrants à des fins politiques et pour assurer l’unité dans la gestion des frontières extérieures de l’UE.

    Les propositions présentées ce jour viennent s’ajouter aux travaux en cours visant à améliorer le fonctionnement global et la gouvernance de Schengen dans le cadre de la stratégie pour un espace Schengen plus fort et plus résilient. Afin de favoriser le dialogue politique visant à relever les défis communs, la Commission organise régulièrement des forums Schengen réunissant des membres du Parlement européen et les ministres de l’intérieur. À l’appui de ces discussions, la Commission présentera chaque année un rapport sur l’état de Schengen résumant la situation en ce qui concerne l’absence de contrôles aux frontières intérieures, les résultats des évaluations de Schengen et l’état d’avancement de la mise en œuvre des recommandations. Cela contribuera également à aider les États membres à relever tous les défis auxquels ils pourraient être confrontés. La proposition de révision du mécanisme d’évaluation et de contrôle de Schengen, actuellement en cours d’examen au Parlement européen et au Conseil, contribuera à renforcer la confiance commune dans la mise en œuvre des règles de Schengen. Le 8 décembre, la Commission a également proposé un code de coopération policière de l’UE destiné à renforcer la coopération des services répressifs entre les États membres, qui constitue un moyen efficace de faire face aux menaces pesant sur la sécurité dans l’espace Schengen et contribuera à la préservation d’un espace sans contrôles aux frontières intérieures.

    La proposition de révision du code frontières Schengen qui est présentée ce jour fait suite à des consultations étroites auprès des membres du Parlement européen et des ministres de l’intérieur réunis au sein du forum Schengen.

    Pour en savoir plus

    Documents législatifs :

    – Proposition de règlement modifiant le régime de franchissement des frontières par les personnes : https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulation-rules-governing-movement-persons-across-borders-com-20

    – Proposition de règlement visant à faire face aux situations d’instrumentalisation dans le domaine de la migration et de l’asile : https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/proposal-regulation-situations-instrumentalisation-field-migration-and-asy

    – Questions-réponses : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_6822

    – Fiche d’information : https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_21_6838

    https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_21_6821

    #Schengen #Espace_Schengen #frontières #frontières_internes #résilience #contrôles_frontaliers #migrations #réfugiés #asile #crise #pandémie #covid-19 #coronavirus #crise_sanitaire #code_Schengen #code_frontières_Schengen #menace_sanitaire #frontières_extérieures #mobilité #restrictions #déplacements #ordre_public #sécurité #sécurité_intérieure #menace_commune #vérifications #coopération_policière #contrôles_temporaires #temporaire #dernier_recours #régions_frontalières #marchandises #voies_réservées #déplacements_non_autorisés #opérations_de_police_conjointes #pacte #surveillance #surveillance_frontalière #points_de_passage #Frontex #Europol #soutien_opérationnel

    –—

    Ajouté dans la métaliste sur les #patrouilles_mixtes ce paragraphe :

    « Lutter contre les déplacements non autorisés au sein de l’espace Schengen : Afin de lutter contre le phénomène de faible ampleur mais constant des déplacements non autorisés, les nouvelles règles créeront une nouvelle procédure pour contrer ce phénomène au moyen d’opérations de police conjointes et permettre aux États membres de réviser ou de conclure de nouveaux accords bilatéraux de réadmission entre eux. Ces mesures complètent celles proposées dans le cadre du nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile, en particulier le cadre de solidarité contraignant, et doivent être envisagées en liaison avec elles. »

    https://seenthis.net/messages/910352

    • La Commission européenne propose de réformer les règles de Schengen pour préserver la #libre_circulation

      Elle veut favoriser la coordination entre États membres et adapter le code Schengen aux nouveaux défis que sont les crise sanitaires et l’instrumentalisation de la migration par des pays tiers.

      Ces dernières années, les attaques terroristes, les mouvements migratoires et la pandémie de Covid-19 ont ébranlé le principe de libre circulation en vigueur au sein de l’espace Schengen. Pour faire face à ces événements et phénomènes, les pays Schengen (vingt-deux pays de l’Union européenne et la Suisse, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège et l’Islande) ont réintroduit plus souvent qu’à leur tour des contrôles aux frontières internes de la zone, en ordre dispersé, souvent, et, dans le cas de l’Allemagne, de l’Autriche, de la France, du Danemark, de la Norvège et de la Suède, de manière « provisoirement permanente ».
      Consciente des risques qui pèsent sur le principe de libre circulation, grâce à laquelle 3,5 millions de personnes passent quotidiennement d’un État membre à l’autre, sans contrôle, la Commission européenne a proposé mardi de revoir les règles du Code Schengen pour les adapter aux nouveaux défis. « Nous devons faire en sorte que la fermeture des frontières intérieures soit un ultime recours », a déclaré le vice-président de la Commission en charge de la Promotion du mode de vie européen, Margaritis Schinas.
      Plus de coordination entre États membres

      Pour éviter le chaos connu au début de la pandémie, la Commission propose de revoir la procédure en vertu de laquelle un État membre peut réintroduire des contrôles aux frontières internes de Schengen. Pour les événements « imprévisibles », les contrôles aux frontières pourraient être instaurés pour une période de trente jours, extensibles jusqu’à trois mois (contre dix jours et deux mois actuellement) ; pour les événements prévisibles, elle propose des périodes renouvelables de six mois jusqu’à un maximum de deux ans… ou plus si les circonstances l’exigent. Les États membres devraient évaluer l’impact de ces mesures sur les régions frontalières et tenter de le minimiser - pour les travailleurs frontaliers, au nombre de 1,7 million dans l’Union, et le transit de marchandises essentielle, par exemple - et et envisager des mesures alternatives, comme des contrôles de police ciblés ou une coopération policière transfrontalières.
      Au bout de dix-huit mois, la Commission émettrait un avis sur la nécessité et la proportionnalité de ces mesures.
      De nouvelles règles pour empêcher les migrations secondaires

      L’exécutif européen propose aussi d’établir un cadre légal, actuellement inexistant, pour lutter contre les « migrations secondaires ». L’objectif est de faire en sorte qu’une personne en situation irrégulière dans l’UE qui traverse une frontière interne puisse être renvoyée dans l’État d’où elle vient. Une mesure de nature à satisfaire les pays du Nord, dont la Belgique, qui se plaignent de voir arriver ou transiter sur leur territoire des migrants n’ayant pas déposé de demandes d’asile dans leur pays de « première entrée », souvent situé au sud de l’Europe. La procédure réclame des opérations de police conjointes et des accords de réadmission entre États membres. « Notre réponse la plus systémique serait un accord sur le paquet migratoire », proposé par la Commission en septembre 2020, a cependant insisté le vice-président Schengen. Mais les États membres ne sont pas en mesure de trouver de compromis, en raison de positions trop divergentes.
      L’Europe doit se préparer à de nouvelles instrumentalisations de la migration

      La Commission veut aussi apporter une réponse à l’instrumentalisation de la migration telle que celle pratiquée par la Biélorussie, qui a fait venir des migrants sur son sol pour les envoyer vers la Pologne et les États baltes afin de faire pression sur les Vingt-sept. La Commission veut définir la façon dont les États membres peuvent renforcer la surveillance de leur frontière, limiter les points d’accès à leur territoire, faire appel à la solidarité européenne, tout en respectant les droits fondamentaux des migrants.
      Actuellement, « la Commission peut seulement faire des recommandations qui, si elles sont adoptées par le Conseil, ne sont pas toujours suivies d’effet », constate la commissaire aux Affaires intérieures Ylva Johansson.
      Pour faire face à l’afflux migratoire venu de Biélorussie, la Pologne avait notamment pratiqué le refoulement, contraire aux règles européennes en matière d’asile, sans que l’on donne l’impression de s’en émouvoir à Bruxelles et dans les autres capitales de l’Union. Pour éviter que cela se reproduise, la Commission propose des mesures garantissant la possibilité de demander l’asile, notamment en étendant à quatre semaines la période pour qu’une demande soit enregistrée et traitée. Les demandes pourront être examinée à la frontière, ce qui implique que l’État membre concerné devrait donner l’accès aux zones frontalières aux organisations humanitaires.

      La présidence française du Conseil, qui a fait de la réforme de Schengen une de ses priorités, va essayer de faire progresser le paquet législatif dans les six mois qui viennent. « Ces mesures constituent une ensemble nécessaire et robuste, qui devrait permettre de préserver Schengen intact », a assuré le vice-président Schinas. Non sans souligner que la solution systémique et permanente pour assurer un traitement harmonisé de l’asile et de la migration réside dans le pacte migratoire déposé en 2020 par la Commission et sur lequel les États membres sont actuellement incapables de trouver un compromis, en raison de leurs profondes divergences sur ces questions.

      https://www.lalibre.be/international/europe/2021/12/14/face-aux-risques-qui-pesent-sur-la-libre-circulation-la-commission-europeenn
      #réforme

  • La longue agonie du fret ferroviaire
    https://lvsl.fr/la-longue-agonie-du-fret-ferroviaire

    En 1827, la première ligne de chemin de fer ne transportait pas des voyageurs mais des marchandises. Avec seulement 18 kilomètres de voies, la ligne de Saint-Étienne à Andrézieux, tractée par des chevaux, servait à transporter de la houille depuis le port fluvial. Le transport de marchandises par train s’est ensuite développé de manière exponentielle au travers de compagnies privées. En 1882, la France possède alors la plus forte densité de chemin de fer au monde avec 26 000 km de voies. Les marchandises sont échangées dans des halles adjacentes aux gares, avant que le trafic ne soit peu à peu séparé des voyageurs. En 1938, la création de la SNCF unifie le réseau. Il y a alors 6 500 embranchements jusqu’aux entreprises (les ITE) et plus de 42 500 km de voies. Cette situation continue dans l’après-guerre : en 1950 les deux tiers des marchandises sont transportées par le rail et c’est le transport de marchandises qui fait vivre la SNCF. Alors que les frontières entre cheminots du service voyageur et du service fret ne sont pas établies, on estime que 200 000 d’entre eux travaillent directement ou indirectement dans le transport de marchandises. Pourtant, la concurrence avec la route a déjà commencé. Les camions se multiplient et, en 1984, le ferroviaire ne représente déjà plus que 30% du transport de marchandises1. La baisse est brutale : ce chiffre passe à 20% en 1990, puis 17% en 2000 et 9% en 2010. Aujourd’hui, il reste moins de 5 000 cheminots au service de SNCF Fret et seulement 32 milliards de tonnes-kilomètres2 sont transportées sur les voies ferroviaires contre 317,3 milliards de tonnes-kilomètres sur les routes.

    #voies_ferrées #transports #marchandises #fret

  • Libye : Le premier #vol d’#évacuation vers le #Niger depuis plus d’un an permet de mettre en sécurité 172 demandeurs d’asile

    Le HCR, l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, a évacué 172 demandeurs d’asile vulnérables de Libye vers le Niger dans la soirée du 4 novembre. Il s’agissait du premier vol d’évacuation vers le Niger depuis plus d’un an, suite à la levée par les autorités libyennes d’une interdiction des #vols_humanitaires.

    « Le HCR est soulagé de voir la reprise de ces #vols_d’évacuation vitaux », a déclaré le chef de mission du HCR en Libye, Jean-Paul Cavalieri. « Cependant, compte tenu du nombre limité de places, l’évacuation ne peut être une solution que pour des personnes extrêmement vulnérables, ayant un besoin urgent de #sécurité et de #protection ».

    Nombre des personnes évacuées ont été détenues dans des conditions extrêmement difficiles, ont été victimes de traite ou ont subi des violences en Libye. Le groupe comprend des #familles, des #enfants voyageant seuls et un bébé né il y a seulement quelques semaines. Les personnes évacuées ont déclaré qu’elles étaient soulagées de quitter la Libye.

    Le HCR salue l’intervention du Conseil présidentiel libyen, du bureau du Premier ministre, du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du bureau du procureur général, qui ont œuvré pour mettre fin à la suspension des vols humanitaires destinés à sauver des vies.

    Cette évacuation a eu lieu grâce au #mécanisme_de_transit_d’urgence (#Emergency_Transit_Mechanism, #ETM) mis en place en 2017 grâce au gouvernement du Niger. Ce dernier a généreusement accepté d’accueillir temporairement sur son territoire des réfugiés confrontés à des situations de danger de mort en Libye afin que le HCR puisse travailler à l’identification de solutions durables pour chacun d’entre eux.

    Au Niger, le HCR apporte un soutien en matière de soins de santé mentale à ceux qui ont été confrontés à des traumatismes pendant leur séjour en Libye, ainsi qu’un accès à des possibilités de formation professionnelle. A ce jour, 3361 réfugiés et demandeurs d’asile ont été évacués de Libye vers le Niger. Parmi eux, 3213 ont quitté le Niger vers des pays tiers dans le cadre du mécanisme de #réinstallation et de #voies_complémentaires.

    Des images sont disponibles ci-dessous pour les médias : https://media.unhcr.org/Share/u8w3y0436symfomxvm1r45y0vrgyfw32

    https://www.unhcr.org/fr/news/press/2021/11/61854b36a/libye-premier-vol-devacuation-vers-niger-dun-an-permet-mettre-securite.html

    #asile #migrations #réfugiés #Libye #migrerrance #vulnérabilité

    ping @rhoumour @_kg_ @isskein @karine4

  • La servitude de marchepied

    Si tu as envie de te promener le long des cours d’eau, même sur un terrain privé, sais-tu que c’est un droit de passage nommé #servitude_de_marchepied qui n’est que rarement appliqué.

    #communs
    #voies_piétonnes
    #promenades

    Article L2131-2 - Code général de la propriété des personnes publiques - Légifrance
    https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000031065981

    Article L2131-2

    Modifié par LOI n°2015-992 du 17 août 2015 - art. 62

    Les propriétaires riverains d’un cours d’eau ou d’un lac domanial ne peuvent planter d’arbres ni se clore par haies ou autrement qu’à une distance de 3,25 mètres. Leurs propriétés sont grevées sur chaque rive de cette dernière servitude de 3,25 mètres, dite servitude de marchepied.

    Tout propriétaire, locataire, fermier ou titulaire d’un droit réel, riverain d’un cours d’eau ou d’un lac domanial est tenu de laisser les terrains grevés de cette servitude de marchepied à l’usage du gestionnaire de ce cours d’eau ou de ce lac, des pêcheurs et des piétons.

    • Ah oui effectivement @marcimat, cela concerne les cours d’eau du domaine public.

      https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006070299/LEGISCTA000006180812/#LEGISCTA000006180812

      Article L2111-8

      Les cours d’eau et les lacs appartenant au domaine public sont appelés cours d’eau et lacs domaniaux.

      Par exemple ici
      https://www.data.gouv.fr/fr/datasets/domaine-public-fluvial-dpf-cours-deau-a-gestion-domaniale-hautes-pyrenees

      L’article L 2111-7 du code général des propriétés des personnes publiques, énumère les cours d’eau navigables ou flottables.
      Ces cours d’eau appartiennent au domaine public fluvial et sont aussi désignés par le terme de cours d’eau domaniaux.

    • Cours d’eau domaniaux

      Le cours d’eau domanial appartient à l’État. Les propriétaires riverains doivent supporter une servitude de halage et de marchepied de 7,80 m. La berge est habituellement ouverte au public (sous certaines réserves : véhicules non motorisés, etc.). Un propriétaire ne peut planter d’arbres à moins de 9,75 m de la berge côté chemin de halage (s’il existe), et à 3,25 m de l’autre côté. Un cours d’eau est déclaré domanial d’un certain point à son embouchure, incluant les bras, même non navigables ou flottables, de ce cours d’eau.

      La berge et le lit appartiennent à l’État, comme le droit d’usage de l’eau. La gestion de certaines voies navigables du domaine public est confiée à l’établissement public Voies navigables de France (créé en 1991), qui peut obtenir des redevances des usagers qui naviguent sur son domaine. La navigation est libre, dans le respect des réglementations (vitesse limite, interdiction de certaines activités, passages interdits à certaines embarcations, etc.) avec priorité à la navigation commerciale. Un cours d’eau classé non-navigable ou non-flottable peut être maintenu dans le domaine public.
      Cours d’eau non domaniaux
      Chapelets d’étangs créés par des barrages sur petits cours d’eau, du Moyen Âge au XVIIIe siècle (France, d’après la carte de Cassini).

      Les cours d’eau non domaniaux (rivières et ruisseaux) sont les cours d’eau non flottables et non-navigables de l’ancienne réglementation. Ils sont régis par le droit privé. Seuls le fond et les berges appartiennent aux propriétaires qui peuvent en interdire l’accès à autrui, ainsi que la circulation (selon la jurisprudence). Le droit de propriété inhérent aux parcelles cadastrales sises sur la rive s’étend jusqu’à une ligne supposée tracée à l’axe du cours d’eau4. L’eau fait toujours partie du domaine public, sauf droit anterieur acquis tels que les droits en titres. L’article L210-1 modifié par Loi n°2006-1772 du 30 décembre 2006 - art. 1 (JORF 31 décembre 2006) stipule :

      "L’eau fait partie du patrimoine commun de la nation. Sa protection, sa mise en valeur et le développement de la ressource utilisable, dans le respect des équilibres naturels, sont d’intérêt général. Dans le cadre des lois et règlements ainsi que des droits antérieurement établis, l’usage de l’eau appartient à tous et chaque personne physique, pour son alimentation et son hygiène, a le droit d’accéder à l’eau potable dans des conditions économiquement acceptables par tous."5

      Néanmoins, les propriétaires ne pouvent pas diminuer le débit de la rivière au-dessous d’un certain seuil. L’accès aux berges clôturées est interdit sans l’autorisation expresse des propriétaires.6

      Flottables : sur lequel le bois peut flotter pour être transporté.

      https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droit_de_la_gestion_des_cours_d%27eau_en_France#Cours_d'eau_non_domani

  • The Death of Asylum and the Search for Alternatives

    March 2021 saw the announcement of the UK’s new post-Brexit asylum policy. This plan centres ‘criminal smuggling gangs’ who facilitate the cross border movement of people seeking asylum, particularly in this case, across the English Channel. It therefore distinguishes between two groups of people seeking asylum: those who travel themselves to places of potential sanctuary, and those who wait in a refugee camp near the place that they fled for the lottery ticket of UNHCR resettlement. Those who arrive ‘spontaneously’ will never be granted permanent leave to remain in the UK. Those in the privileged group of resettled refugees will gain indefinite leave to remain.

    Resettlement represents a tiny proportion of refugee reception globally. Of the 80 million displaced people globally at the end of 2019, 22,800 were resettled in 2020 and only 3,560 were resettled to the UK. Under the new plans, forms of resettlement are set to increase, which can only be welcomed. But of course, the expansion of resettlement will make no difference to people who are here, and arriving, every year. People who find themselves in a situation of persecution or displacement very rarely have knowledge of any particular national asylum system. Most learn the arbitrary details of access to work, welfare, and asylum itself upon arrival.

    In making smugglers the focus of asylum policy, the UK is inaugurating what Alison Mountz calls the death of asylum. There is of course little difference between people fleeing persecution who make the journey themselves to the UK, or those who wait in a camp with a small chance of resettlement. The two are often, in fact, connected, as men are more likely to go ahead in advance, making perilous journeys, in the hope that safe and legal options will then be opened up for vulnerable family members. And what makes these perilous journeys so dangerous? The lack of safe and legal routes.

    Britain, and other countries across Europe, North America and Australasia, have gone to huge efforts and massive expense in recent decades to close down access to the right to asylum. Examples of this include paying foreign powers to quarantine refugees outside of Europe, criminalising those who help refugees, and carrier sanctions. Carrier sanctions are fines for airlines or ferry companies if someone boards an aeroplane without appropriate travel documents. So you get the airlines to stop people boarding a plane to your country to claim asylum. In this way you don’t break international law, but you are certainly violating the spirit of it. If you’ve ever wondered why people pay 10 times the cost of a plane ticket to cross the Mediterranean or the Channel in a tiny boat, carrier sanctions are the reason.

    So government policy closes down safe and legal routes, forcing people to take more perilous journeys. These are not illegal journeys because under international law one cannot travel illegally if one is seeking asylum. Their only option becomes to pay smugglers for help in crossing borders. At this point criminalising smuggling becomes the focus of asylum policy. In this way, government policy creates the crisis which it then claims to solve. And this extends to people who are seeking asylum themselves.

    Arcane maritime laws have been deployed by the UK in order to criminalise irregular Channel crossers who breach sea defences, and therefore deny them sanctuary. Specifically, if one of the people aboard a given boat touches the tiller, oars, or steering device, they become liable to be arrested under anti-smuggling laws. In 2020, eight people were jailed on such grounds, facing sentences of up to two and a half years, as well as the subsequent threat of deportation. For these people, there are no safe and legal routes left.

    We know from extensive research on the subject, that poverty in a country does not lead to an increase in asylum applications elsewhere from that country. Things like wars, genocide and human rights abuses need to be present in order for nationals of a country to start seeking asylum abroad in any meaningful number. Why then, one might ask, is the UK so obsessed with preventing people who are fleeing wars, genocide and human rights abuses from gaining asylum here? On their own terms there is one central reason: their belief that most people seeking asylum today are not actually refugees, but economic migrants seeking to cheat the asylum system.

    This idea that people who seek asylum are largely ‘bogus’ began in the early 2000s. It came in response to a shift in the nationalities of people seeking asylum. During the Cold War there was little concern with the mix of motivations in relation to fleeing persecution or seeking a ‘better life’. But when people started to seek asylum from formerly colonised countries in the ‘Third World’ they began to be construed as ‘new asylum seekers’ and were assumed to be illegitimate. From David Blunkett’s time in the Home Office onwards, these ‘new asylum seekers’, primarily black and brown people fleeing countries in which refugee producing situations are occurring, asylum has been increasingly closed down.

    The UK government has tended to justify its highly restrictive asylum policies on the basis that it is open to abuse from bogus, cheating, young men. It then makes the lives of people who are awaiting a decision on their asylum application as difficult as possible on the basis that this will deter others. Forcing people who are here to live below the poverty line, then, is imagined to sever ‘pull factors’ for others who have not yet arrived. There is no evidence to support the idea that deterrence strategies work, they simply costs lives.

    Over the past two decades, as we have witnessed the slow death of asylum, it has become increasingly difficult to imagine alternatives. Organisations advocating for people seeking asylum have, with diminishing funds since 2010, tended to focus on challenging specific aspects of the system on legal grounds, such as how asylum support rates are calculated or whether indefinite detention is lawful.

    Scholars of migration studies, myself included, have written countless papers and books debunking the spurious claims made by the government to justify their policies, and criticising the underlying logics of the system. What we have failed to do is offer convincing alternatives. But with his new book, A Modern Migration Theory, Professor of Migration Studies Peo Hansen offers us an example of an alternative strategy. This is not a utopian proposal of open borders, this is the real experience of Sweden, a natural experiment with proven success.

    During 2015, large numbers of people were displaced as the Syrian civil war escalated. Most stayed within the region, with millions of people being hosted in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. A smaller proportion decided to travel onwards from these places to Europe. Because of the fortress like policies adopted by European countries, there were no safe and legal routes aboard aeroplanes or ferries. Horrified by the spontaneous arrival of people seeking sanctuary, most European countries refused to take part in burden sharing and so it fell to Germany and Sweden, the only countries that opened their doors in any meaningful way, to host the new arrivals.

    Hansen documents what happened next in Sweden. First, the Swedish state ended austerity in an emergency response to the challenge of hosting so many refugees. As part of this, and as a country that produces its own currency, the Swedish state distributed funds across the local authorities of the country to help them in receiving the refugees. And third, this money was spent not just on refugees, but on the infrastructure needed to support an increased population in a given area – on schools, hospitals, and housing. This is in the context of Sweden also having a welfare system which is extremely generous compared to Britain’s stripped back welfare regime.

    As in Britain, the Swedish government had up to this point spent some years fetishizing the ‘budget deficit’ and there was an assumption that spending so much money would worsen the fiscal position – that it would lead both to inflation, and a massive national deficit which must later be repaid. That this spending on refugees would cause deficits and hence necessitate borrowing, tax hikes and budget cuts was presented by politicians and the media in Sweden as a foregone conclusion. This foregone conclusion was then used as part of a narrative about refugees’ negative impact on the economy and welfare, and as the basis for closing Sweden’s doors to people seeking asylum in the future.

    And yet, the budget deficit never materialised: ‘Just as the finance minister had buried any hope of surpluses in the near future and repeated the mantra of the need to borrow to “finance” the refugees, a veritable tidal wave of tax revenue had already started to engulf Sweden’ (p.152). The economy grew and tax revenue surged in 2016 and 2017, so much that successive surpluses were created. In 2016 public consumption increased 3.6%, a figure not seen since the 1970s. Growth rates were 4% in 2016 and 2017. Refugees were filling labour shortages in understaffed sectors such as social care, where Sweden’s ageing population is in need of demographic renewal.

    Refugees disproportionately ended up in smaller, poorer, depopulating, rural municipalities who also received a disproportionately large cash injections from the central government. The arrival of refugees thus addressed the triple challenges of depopulation and population ageing; a continuous loss of local tax revenues, which forced cuts in services; and severe staff shortages and recruitment problems (e.g. in the care sector). Rather than responding with hostility, then, municipalities rightly saw the refugee influx as potentially solving these spiralling challenges.

    For two decades now we have been witnessing the slow death of asylum in the UK. Basing policy on prejudice rather than evidence, suspicion rather than generosity, burden rather than opportunity. Every change in the asylum system heralds new and innovative ways of circumventing human rights, detaining, deporting, impoverishing, and excluding. And none of this is cheap – it is not done for the economic benefit of the British population. It costs £15,000 to forcibly deport someone, it costs £95 per day to detain them, with £90 million spent each year on immigration detention. Vast sums of money are given to private companies every year to help in the work of denying people who are seeking sanctuary access to their right to asylum.

    The Swedish case offers a window into what happens when a different approach is taken. The benefit is not simply to refugees, but to the population as a whole. With an economy to rebuild after Covid and huge holes in the health and social care workforce, could we imagine an alternative in which Sweden offered inspiration to do things differently?

    https://discoversociety.org/2021/04/07/the-death-of-asylum-and-the-search-for-alternatives

    #asile #alternatives #migrations #alternative #réfugiés #catégorisation #tri #réinstallation #death_of_asylum #mort_de_l'asile #voies_légales #droit_d'asile #externalisation #passeurs #criminalisation_des_passeurs #UK #Angleterre #colonialisme #colonisation #pull-factors #pull_factors #push-pull_factors #facteurs_pull #dissuasion #Suède #déficit #économie #welfare_state #investissement #travail #impôts #Etat_providence #modèle_suédois

    ping @isskein @karine4

    –-

    ajouté au fil de discussion sur le lien entre économie et réfugiés/migrations :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/705790

    • A Modern Migration Theory. An Alternative Economic Approach to Failed EU Policy

      The widely accepted narrative that refugees admitted to the European Union constitute a fiscal burden is based on a seemingly neutral accounting exercise, in which migrants contribute less in tax than they receive in welfare assistance. A “fact” that justifies increasingly restrictive asylum policies. In this book Peo Hansen shows that this consensual cost-perspective on migration is built on a flawed economic conception of the orthodox “sound finance” doctrine prevalent in migration research and policy. By shifting perspective to examine migration through the macroeconomic lens offered by modern monetary theory, Hansen is able to demonstrate sound finance’s detrimental impact on migration policy and research, including its role in stoking the toxic debate on migration in the EU. Most importantly, Hansen’s undertaking offers the tools with which both migration research and migration policy could be modernized and put on a realistic footing.

      In addition to a searing analysis of EU migration policy and politics, Hansen also investigates the case of Sweden, the country that has received the most refugees in the EU in proportion to population. Hansen demonstrates how Sweden’s increased refugee spending in 2015–17 proved to be fiscally risk-free and how the injection of funds to cash-strapped and depopulating municipalities, which received refugees, boosted economic growth and investment in welfare. Spending on refugees became a way of rediscovering the viability of welfare for all. Given that the Swedish approach to the 2015 refugee crisis has since been discarded and deemed fiscally unsustainable, Hansen’s aim is to reveal its positive effects and its applicability as a model for the EU as a whole.

      https://cup.columbia.edu/book/a-modern-migration-theory/9781788210553
      #livre #Peo_Hansen

  • Beyond gratitude : lessons learned from migrants’ contribution to the Covid-19 response

    This report recognises and values the fundamental contribution of migrant workers to our societies and economies throughout the Covid-19 pandemic. Over the past year we have leaned heavily on ‘key workers’. Migrants account for a large share of these frontline workers and figure heavily amongst the multiple occupations we now classify as essential. Yet their jobs have often been labelled as ‘low-skilled’ and their work undervalued. As a result, many have risked their lives on the Covid-19 frontline while lacking the basic social protections enjoyed by other workers.

    A desire to capture the contribution of migrants during the pandemic inspired us to begin the systematic tracking of events across the globe over the past year. We wanted to make migrants’ essential work more visible, track the innovations and reforms that have enhanced their contribution during the emergency, and draw lessons from these experiences to inform long-term reforms and policies. We have observed many national and local governments relaxing migration regulations and creating new incentives for migrant workers in essential services, demonstrating that migration policies – regardless of today’s increasingly polarised debates – can and do change when necessary. This matters for the post-pandemic recovery, given that countries will continue to rely on migrant workers of all skill levels. We all must ensure that these changes are lasting.

    The following policy recommendations emerge from our research:

    - Enhance routes to regularisation, in recognition of migrants’ vital contribution to essential services.
    - Expand legal migration pathways, ensuring safe working conditions for all, to support post-Covid-19 global recovery, tackle shortages in essential workforces and fill skills gaps.
    - Ensure that migrants, whatever their status, have access to key basic services and social protection.
    - Detach immigration policies from inflexible ‘low’ and ‘high’ skills classifications. Workers of all skill levels will be essential in the long path to recovery.

    https://www.odi.org/publications/17963-beyond-gratitude-lessons-learned-migrants-contribution-covid-19-response

    #travail #covid-19 #coronavirus #travailleurs_étrangers #migrations #apport #bénéfices #économie #essentiel #politique_migratoire #recommandations #pandémie #odi #rapport #voies_légales #conditions_de_travail #accès_aux_droits #protection_sociale

    Pour télécharger le rapport :
    https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/hmi-migrant_key_workers-working_paper-final_0.pdf

    #visualisation :


    https://www.odi.org/migrant-key-workers-covid-19

    ping @isskein @karine4

  • El Supremo reconoce el derecho a pedir asilo en las embajadas en contra del criterio del Gobierno

    Esta posibilidad aparece recogida en la Ley de Asilo, pero ningún gobierno ha aprobado su desarrollo reglamentario por lo que España, salvo escasas excepciones, impide de forma sistemática acceder al procedimiento de asilo a través de esta vía

    El Tribunal Supremo ha reconocido el derecho de potenciales solicitantes de asilo a pedir en embajadas españolas su traslado legal a España para formalizar una petición de protección internacional. Aunque esta posibilidad aparece recogida en la Ley de Asilo de 2009, ningún gobierno ha aprobado su desarrollo reglamentario por lo que, salvo escasas excepciones, habitualmente se impide de forma sistemática acceder al procedimiento de asilo a través de esta vía. Los magistrados también han confirmado la obligación de los embajadores a contestar a dichas peticiones.

    En la sentencia, el Alto Tribunal echa por tierra los argumentos en los que se han apoyado gobiernos de distintos colores para negarse a aplicar el artículo 38 de la normativa de asilo, que permite a los embajadores del país «promover el traslado» de los solicitantes de asilo a España para que estos puedan formalizar su solicitud en territorio español. Para la Sala de lo contencioso administrativo número 5, el enunciado de la legislación española contiene «elementos suficientes» para realizar traslados de solicitantes de asilo por esta vía cuando el demandante «corra peligro» en su país de origen, sin que su aplicación quede supeditada al desarrollo reglamentario al que se aferra el gobierno.

    El fallo sostiene que la normativa «se limita a regular la atención de aquellas solicitudes que se presentan fuera del territorio nacional y en un tercer país», por la que el embajador tiene competencia de valorar «el peligro para la integridad física del solicitante que motive su derivación a España». Para ello, apunta la Sala, debe aplicar «las mismas exigencias» que determinan el reconocimiento de la protección internacional en España.

    Es decir, el Supremo concluye que la normativa ya desarrolla el mecanismo por el que un demandante puede registrar en las embajadas españolas una suerte de petición de asilo, sobre la que los representantes españoles deben valorar si su integridad corre peligro y, en ese caso, promover su traslado a España para tramitar la demanda de manera oficial.

    La sentencia se refiere al caso de una familia kurdo-iraquí que llegó a Grecia en 2016 huyendo del conflicto bélico en Irak, donde solicitó asilo sin respuesta, según Stop Mare Mortum, organización que ha apoyado jurídicamente a los demandantes. Un año después, pidieron ser trasladados a España en el marco del programa europeo de reubicación, pero solo fue aceptada la solicitud de la madre y las hijas. El padre, quien tuvo que permanecer en Grecia, solicitó protección posteriormente junto al resto de su familia en la Embajada española en el país europeo, pero no recibieron respuesta.

    Ante el silencio de la embajada española, explican desde la organización, la familia presentó una demanda ante la Audiencia Nacional que le dio la razón en marzo del 2019. No obstante, la abogacía del Estado interpuso un recurso de casación en el Tribunal Supremo para evitar el traslado del padre de familia en España, alegando la imposibilidad de aplicación del artículo 34 de la Ley de Asilo, debido a su falta de desarrollo reglamentario, entre otras razones expuestas.
    La falta de reglamento no impide su aplicación

    Para el Supremo, la falta de desarrollo reglamentario no impide la aplicación del contenido de la normativa «a las solicitudes de protección internacional formuladas a su amparo». Además, el Tribunal aclara que la valoración del peligro para la integridad física del solicitante se debe realizar en base a la situación que le empuja a salir del país de origen.

    Según Stop Mare Nostrum, es «habitual» la falta de respuesta de las embajadas españolas cuando un potencial solicitante de asilo intenta acceder al procedimiento de protección internacional a través de esta vía. De las 38 peticiones de traslado registradas por la ONG en los consulados de Atenas y Tánger, los representantes españoles «no han respondido a ninguna». En este sentido, la Abogacía del Estado justificó en su recurso que la Ley de Asilo no «les impone la obligación de resolver estas peticiones». Este extremo también ha sido rechazado por el Alto Tribunal, que sí ve en la ausencia de contestación una actuación «susceptible de impugnación».

    Según detalla la sentencia, a la que ha accedido elDiario.es, el abogado del Estado defendía que, ante la falta de desarrollo reglamentario, «no existe como tal un procedimiento administrativo para poder aplicar ese artículo» lo que, consideraba «imprescindible para determinar los órganos competentes y las condiciones en las que un embajador puede promover el traslado a España a los efectos de solicitar asilo así como para determinar las consecuencias prácticas de tal medida».
    Diferente argumento para defender ante Estrasburgo las devoluciones en caliente

    Los argumentos de la Abogacía del Estado evidencian la falta de aplicación por parte del Gobierno de la posibilidad de solicitar el traslado a España desde las embajadas españolas, lo que se contradice con los razonamientos que España presentó ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos para defender la legalidad de las devoluciones en caliente en las vallas de Ceuta y Melilla.

    Según sostenían entonces desde la Abogacía del Estado, España contaba con vías legales de entrada al territorio, entre las que nombraba el artículo 38 de la Ley de Asilo. El mismo que no se podría aplicar debido a la falta de desarrollo reglamentario, según dice el abogado del Estado en el recurso que pretendía evitar el traslado del hombre iraquí para encontrarse con su familia.

    «La sentencia demuestra la incoherencia de los argumentos de la Abogacía del Estado, que los utiliza según su conveniencia en una materia tan sensible como los derechos humanos», dice Stop Mare Mortum. «El pasado mes de febrero, ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, defendía la existencia de este mecanismo para pedir asilo en las embajadas y así demostrar que las personas que saltaron la valla, podían haber solicitado asilo en España vía artículo 38», recuerda la organización. «En los procedimientos judiciales que han terminado en la actual Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo la argumentación de la abogacía del estado era la contraria: que las solicitudes a Embajada no se podían tramitar por falta de reglamento de desarrollo de la ley de asilo».

    El razonamiento desarrollado por la Abogacía del Estado para justificar las devoluciones en caliente de migrantes en Ceuta y Melilla fue clave en la consiguiente sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, que avaló las expulsiones inmediatas de quienes sortean de forma irregular las alambradas de las ciudades autónomas porque, según el concluyó, «se pusieron ellos mismos en una situación de ilegalidad al intentar entrar deliberadamente en España por la valla de Melilla».

    Según el Defensor del Pueblo, la Ley de Asilo de 2009, a diferencia de la normativa anterior, no permite la presentación oficial de solicitudes de asilo en las representaciones diplomáticas, por lo que deja en manos del embajador la posibilidad de promover el traslado a España del solicitante si considera que corre peligro físico. Un informe de la institución de 2016 señaló que «la alta conflictividad existente en la actualidad en muchos países, junto a la limitación de no permitir la presentación de la demanda en las representaciones de España en el exterior, contribuyen a dificultar el acceso al procedimiento». Estos obstáculos, advertía, «pueden menoscabar los compromisos internacionales asumidos por España y la finalidad de dicho instrumento».

    https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/supremo-reconoce-derecho-solicitantes-asilo-pedir-asilo-embajadas-espanolas
    #asile #réfugiés #ambassade #ambassades #Espagne #justice #voies_légales

  • Introduction. Pour une lecture territoriale des #corridors de #transport en Europe — Géoconfluences

    http://geoconfluences.ens-lyon.fr/informations-scientifiques/dossiers-regionaux/territoires-europeens-regions-etats-union/rte-t/introduction

    Les Réseaux transeuropéens de transport (RTE-T) reposent sur l’idée que l’intégration européenne ne peut se faire qu’avec des liaisons efficaces entre les pays membres. Derrière cette apparente évidence se cache une très grande complexité pour connecter entre elles les infrastructures nationales et faire coopérer les acteurs et les opérateurs à toutes les échelles. C’est cette difficulté que notre dossier se propose d’éclairer.

    Mobilité #communications #routes #voies_ferrées

  • Fil de discussion sur le nouveau #pacte_européen_sur_la_migration_et_l’asile

    –—

    Migrants : le règlement de Dublin va être supprimé

    La Commission européenne doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de sa politique migratoire, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée.

    Cinq ans après le début de la crise migratoire, l’Union européenne veut changer de stratégie. La Commission européenne veut “abolir” le règlement de Dublin qui fracture les Etats-membres et qui confie la responsabilité du traitement des demandes d’asile au pays de première entrée des migrants dans l’UE, a annoncé ce mercredi 16 septembre la cheffe de l’exécutif européen Ursula von der Leyen dans son discours sur l’Etat de l’Union.

    La Commission doit présenter le 23 septembre sa proposition de réforme de la politique migratoire européenne, très attendue et plusieurs fois repoussée, alors que le débat sur le manque de solidarité entre pays Européens a été relancé par l’incendie du camp de Moria sur lîle grecque de Lesbos.

    “Au coeur (de la réforme) il y a un engagement pour un système plus européen”, a déclaré Ursula von der Leyen devant le Parlement européen. “Je peux annoncer que nous allons abolir le règlement de Dublin et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration”, a-t-elle poursuivi.
    Nouveau mécanisme de solidarité

    “Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité”, a-t-elle dit, alors que les pays qui sont en première ligne d’arrivée des migrants (Grèce, Malte, Italie notamment) se plaignent de devoir faire face à une charge disproportionnée.

    La proposition de réforme de la Commission devra encore être acceptée par les Etats. Ce qui n’est pas gagné d’avance. Cinq ans après la crise migratoire de 2015, la question de l’accueil des migrants est un sujet qui reste source de profondes divisions en Europe, certains pays de l’Est refusant d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile.

    Sous la pression, le système d’asile européen organisé par le règlement de Dublin a explosé après avoir pesé lourdement sur la Grèce ou l’Italie.

    Le nouveau plan pourrait notamment prévoir davantage de sélection des demandeurs d’asile aux frontières extérieures et un retour des déboutés dans leur pays assuré par Frontex. Egalement à l’étude pour les Etats volontaires : un mécanisme de relocalisation des migrants sauvés en Méditerranée, parfois contraints d’errer en mer pendant des semaines en attente d’un pays d’accueil.

    Ce plan ne résoudrait toutefois pas toutes les failles. Pour le patron de l’Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration, Didier Leschi, “il ne peut pas y avoir de politique européenne commune sans critères communs pour accepter les demandes d’asile.”

    https://www.huffingtonpost.fr/entry/migrants-le-reglement-de-dublin-tres-controverse-va-etre-supprime_fr_

    #migrations #asile #réfugiés #Dublin #règlement_dublin #fin #fin_de_Dublin #suppression #pacte #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration #new_pact #nouveau_pacte #pacte_sur_la_migration_et_l'asile

    –---

    Documents officiels en lien avec le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/879881

    –-

    ajouté à la métaliste sur le pacte :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/1019088

    ping @reka @karine4 @_kg_ @isskein

    • Immigration : le règlement de Dublin, l’impossible #réforme ?

      En voulant abroger le règlement de Dublin, qui impose la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile au premier pays d’entrée dans l’Union européenne, Bruxelles reconnaît des dysfonctionnements dans l’accueil des migrants. Mais les Vingt-Sept, plus que jamais divisés sur cette question, sont-ils prêts à une refonte du texte ? Éléments de réponses.

      Ursula Von der Leyen en a fait une des priorités de son mandat : réformer le règlement de Dublin, qui impose au premier pays de l’UE dans lequel le migrant est arrivé de traiter sa demande d’asile. « Je peux annoncer que nous allons [l’]abolir et le remplacer par un nouveau système européen de gouvernance de la migration », a déclaré la présidente de la Commission européenne mercredi 16 septembre, devant le Parlement.

      Les États dotés de frontières extérieures comme la Grèce, l’Italie ou Malte se sont réjouis de cette annonce. Ils s’estiment lésés par ce règlement en raison de leur situation géographique qui les place en première ligne.

      La présidente de la Commission européenne doit présenter, le 23 septembre, une nouvelle version de la politique migratoire, jusqu’ici maintes fois repoussée. « Il y aura des structures communes pour l’asile et le retour. Et il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a-t-elle poursuivi. Un terme fort à l’heure où l’incendie du camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, plus de 8 000 adultes et 4 000 enfants à la rue, a révélé le manque d’entraide entre pays européens.

      Pour mieux comprendre l’enjeu de cette nouvelle réforme européenne de la politique migratoire, France 24 décrypte le règlement de Dublin qui divise tant les Vingt-Sept, en particulier depuis la crise migratoire de 2015.

      Pourquoi le règlement de Dublin dysfonctionne ?

      Les failles ont toujours existé mais ont été révélées par la crise migratoire de 2015, estiment les experts de politique migratoire. Ce texte signé en 2013 et qu’on appelle « Dublin III » repose sur un accord entre les membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que la Suisse, l’Islande, la Norvège et le Liechtenstein. Il prévoit que l’examen de la demande d’asile d’un exilé incombe au premier pays d’entrée en Europe. Si un migrant passé par l’Italie arrive par exemple en France, les autorités françaises ne sont, en théorie, pas tenu d’enregistrer la demande du Dubliné.
      © Union européenne | Les pays signataires du règlement de Dublin.

      Face à l’afflux de réfugiés ces dernières années, les pays dotés de frontières extérieures, comme la Grèce et l’Italie, se sont estimés abandonnés par le reste de l’Europe. « La charge est trop importante pour ce bloc méditerranéen », estime Matthieu Tardis, chercheur au Centre migrations et citoyennetés de l’Ifri (Institut français des relations internationales). Le texte est pensé « comme un mécanisme de responsabilité des États et non de solidarité », estime-t-il.

      Sa mise en application est aussi difficile à mettre en place. La France et l’Allemagne, qui concentrent la majorité des demandes d’asile depuis le début des années 2000, peinent à renvoyer les Dublinés. Dans l’Hexagone, seulement 11,5 % ont été transférés dans le pays d’entrée. Outre-Rhin, le taux ne dépasse pas les 15 %. Conséquence : nombre d’entre eux restent « bloqués » dans les camps de migrants à Calais ou dans le nord de Paris.

      Le délai d’attente pour les demandeurs d’asile est aussi jugé trop long. Un réfugié passé par l’Italie, qui vient déposer une demande d’asile en France, peut attendre jusqu’à 18 mois avant d’avoir un retour. « Durant cette période, il se retrouve dans une situation d’incertitude très dommageable pour lui mais aussi pour l’Union européenne. C’est un système perdant-perdant », commente Matthieu Tardis.

      Ce règlement n’est pas adapté aux demandeurs d’asile, surenchérit-on à la Cimade (Comité inter-mouvements auprès des évacués). Dans un rapport, l’organisation qualifie ce système de « machine infernale de l’asile européen ». « Il ne tient pas compte des liens familiaux ni des langues parlées par les réfugiés », précise le responsable asile de l’association, Gérard Sadik.

      Sept ans après avoir vu le jour, le règlement s’est vu porter le coup de grâce par le confinement lié aux conditions sanitaires pour lutter contre le Covid-19. « Durant cette période, aucun transfert n’a eu lieu », assure-t-on à la Cimade.

      Le mécanisme de solidarité peut-il le remplacer ?

      « Il y aura un nouveau mécanisme fort de solidarité », a promis Ursula von der Leyen, sans donné plus de précision. Sur ce point, on sait déjà que les positions divergent, voire s’opposent, entre les Vingt-Sept.

      Le bloc du nord-ouest (Allemagne, France, Autriche, Benelux) reste ancré sur le principe actuel de responsabilité, mais accepte de l’accompagner d’un mécanisme de solidarité. Sur quels critères se base la répartition du nombre de demandeurs d’asile ? Comment les sélectionner ? Aucune décision n’est encore actée. « Ils sont prêts à des compromis car ils veulent montrer que l’Union européenne peut avancer et agir sur la question migratoire », assure Matthieu Tardis.

      En revanche, le groupe dit de Visegrad (Hongrie, Pologne, République tchèque, Slovaquie), peu enclin à l’accueil, rejette catégoriquement tout principe de solidarité. « Ils se disent prêts à envoyer des moyens financiers, du personnel pour le contrôle aux frontières mais refusent de recevoir les demandeurs d’asile », détaille le chercheur de l’Ifri.

      Quant au bloc Méditerranée (Grèce, Italie, Malte , Chypre, Espagne), des questions subsistent sur la proposition du bloc nord-ouest : le mécanisme de solidarité sera-t-il activé de façon permanente ou exceptionnelle ? Quelles populations sont éligibles au droit d’asile ? Et qui est responsable du retour ? « Depuis le retrait de la Ligue du Nord de la coalition dans le gouvernement italien, le dialogue est à nouveau possible », avance Matthieu Tardis.

      Un accord semble toutefois indispensable pour montrer que l’Union européenne n’est pas totalement en faillite sur ce dossier. « Mais le bloc de Visegrad n’a pas forcément en tête cet enjeu », nuance-t-il. Seule la situation sanitaire liée au Covid-19, qui place les pays de l’Est dans une situation économique fragile, pourrait faire évoluer leur position, note le chercheur.

      Et le mécanisme par répartition ?

      Le mécanisme par répartition, dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, revient régulièrement sur la table des négociations. Son principe : la capacité d’accueil du pays dépend de ses poids démographique et économique. Elle serait de 30 % pour l’Allemagne, contre un tiers des demandes aujourd’hui, et 20 % pour la France, qui en recense 18 %. « Ce serait une option gagnante pour ces deux pays, mais pas pour le bloc du Visegrad qui s’y oppose », décrypte Gérard Sadik, le responsable asile de la Cimade.

      Cette doctrine reposerait sur un système informatisé, qui recenserait dans une seule base toutes les données des demandeurs d’asile. Mais l’usage de l’intelligence artificielle au profit de la procédure administrative ne présente pas que des avantages, aux yeux de la Cimade : « L’algorithme ne sera pas en mesure de tenir compte des liens familiaux des demandeurs d’asile », juge Gérard Sadik.

      Quelles chances pour une refonte ?

      L’Union européenne a déjà tenté plusieurs fois de réformer ce serpent de mer. Un texte dit « Dublin IV » était déjà dans les tuyaux depuis 2016, en proposant par exemple que la responsabilité du premier État d’accueil soit définitive, mais il a été enterré face aux dissensions internes.

      Reste à savoir quel est le contenu exact de la nouvelle version qui sera présentée le 23 septembre par Ursula Van der Leyen. À la Cimade, on craint un durcissement de la politique migratoire, et notamment un renforcement du contrôle aux frontières.

      Quoi qu’il en soit, les négociations s’annoncent « compliquées et difficiles » car « les intérêts des pays membres ne sont pas les mêmes », a rappelé le ministre grec adjoint des Migrations, Giorgos Koumoutsakos, jeudi 17 septembre. Et surtout, la nouvelle mouture devra obtenir l’accord du Parlement, mais aussi celui des États. La refonte est encore loin.

      https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/27376/immigration-le-reglement-de-dublin-l-impossible-reforme

      #gouvernance #Ursula_Von_der_Leyen #mécanisme_de_solidarité #responsabilité #groupe_de_Visegrad #solidarité #répartition #mécanisme_par_répartition #capacité_d'accueil #intelligence_artificielle #algorithme #Dublin_IV

    • Germany’s #Seehofer cautiously optimistic on EU asylum reform

      For the first time during the German Presidency, EU interior ministers exchanged views on reforms of the EU asylum system. German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) expressed “justified confidence” that a deal can be found. EURACTIV Germany reports.

      The focus of Tuesday’s (7 July) informal video conference of interior ministers was on the expansion of police cooperation and sea rescue, which, according to Seehofer, is one of the “Big Four” topics of the German Council Presidency, integrated into a reform of the #Common_European_Asylum_System (#CEAS).

      Following the meeting, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, spoke of an “excellent start to the Presidency,” and Seehofer also praised the “constructive discussions.” In the field of asylum policy, she said that it had become clear that all member states were “highly interested in positive solutions.”

      The interior ministers were unanimous in their desire to further strengthen police cooperation and expand both the mandates and the financial resources of Europol and Frontex.

      Regarding the question of the distribution of refugees, Seehofer said that he had “heard statements that [he] had not heard in years prior.” He said that almost all member states were “prepared to show solidarity in different ways.”

      While about a dozen member states would like to participate in the distribution of those rescued from distress at the EU’s external borders in the event of a “disproportionate burden” on the states, other states signalled that they wanted to make control vessels, financial means or personnel available to prevent smuggling activities and stem migration across the Mediterranean.

      Seehofer’s final act

      It will probably be Seehofer’s last attempt to initiate CEAS reform. He announced in May that he would withdraw completely from politics after the end of the legislative period in autumn 2021.

      Now it seems that he considers CEAS reform as his last great mission, Seehofer said that he intends to address the migration issue from late summer onwards “with all I have at my disposal.” adding that Tuesday’s (7 July) talks had “once again kindled a real fire” in him. To this end, he plans to leave the official business of the Interior Ministry “in day-to-day matters” largely to the State Secretaries.

      Seehofer’s shift of priorities to the European stage comes at a time when he is being sharply criticised in Germany.

      While his initial handling of a controversial newspaper column about the police published in Berlin’s tageszeitung prompted criticism, Seehofer now faces accusations of concealing structural racism in the police. Seehofer had announced over the weekend that, contrary to the recommendation of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), he would not commission a study on racial profiling in the police force after all.

      Seehofer: “One step is not enough”

      In recent months, Seehofer has made several attempts to set up a distribution mechanism for rescued persons in distress. On several occasions he accused the Commission of letting member states down by not solving the asylum question.

      “I have the ambition to make a great leap. One step would be too little in our presidency,” said Seehofer during Tuesday’s press conference. However, much depends on when the Commission will present its long-awaited migration pact, as its proposals are intended to serve as a basis for negotiations on CEAS reform.

      As Johansson said on Tuesday, this is planned for September. Seehofer thus only has just under four months to get the first Council conclusions through. “There will not be enough time for legislation,” he said.

      Until a permanent solution is found, ad hoc solutions will continue. A “sustainable solution” should include better cooperation with the countries of origin and transit, as the member states agreed on Tuesday.

      To this end, “agreements on the repatriation of refugees” are now to be reached with North African countries. A first step towards this will be taken next Monday (13 July), at a joint conference with North African leaders.

      https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/germany-eyes-breakthrough-in-eu-migration-dispute-this-year

      #Europol #Frontex

    • Relocation, solidarity mandatory for EU migration policy: #Johansson

      In an interview with ANSA and other European media outlets, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs #Ylva_Johansson explained the new migration and asylum pact due to be unveiled on September 23, stressing that nobody will find ideal solutions but rather a well-balanced compromise that will ’’improve the situation’’.

      European Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson has explained in an interview with a group of European journalists, including ANSA, a new pact on asylum and migration to be presented on September 23. She touched on rules for countries of first entry, a new mechanism of mandatory solidarity, fast repatriations and refugee relocation.

      The Swedish commissioner said that no one will find ideal solutions in the European Commission’s new asylum and migration proposal but rather a good compromise that “will improve the situation”.

      She said the debate to change the asylum regulation known as Dublin needs to be played down in order to find an agreement. Johansson said an earlier 2016 reform plan would be withdrawn as it ’’caused the majority’’ of conflicts among countries.

      A new proposal that will replace the current one and amend the existing Dublin regulation will be presented, she explained.

      The current regulation will not be completely abolished but rules regarding frontline countries will change. Under the new proposal, migrants can still be sent back to the country responsible for their asylum request, explained the commissioner, adding that amendments will be made but the country of first entry will ’’remain important’’.

      ’’Voluntary solidarity is not enough," there has to be a “mandatory solidarity mechanism,” Johansson noted.

      Countries will need to help according to their size and possibilities. A member state needs to show solidarity ’’in accordance with the capacity and size’’ of its economy. There will be no easy way out with the possibility of ’’just sending some blankets’’ - efforts must be proportional to the size and capabilities of member states, she said.
      Relocations are a divisive theme

      Relocations will be made in a way that ’’can be possible to accept for all member states’’, the commissioner explained. The issue of mandatory quotas is extremely divisive, she went on to say. ’’The sentence of the European Court of Justice has established that they can be made’’.

      However, the theme is extremely divisive. Many of those who arrive in Europe are not eligible for international protection and must be repatriated, she said, wondering if it is a good idea to relocate those who need to be repatriated.

      “We are looking for a way to bring the necessary aid to countries under pressure.”

      “Relocation is an important part, but also” it must be done “in a way that can be possible to accept for all member states,” she noted.

      Moreover, Johansson said the system will not be too rigid as the union should prepare for different scenarios.
      Faster repatriations

      Repatriations will be a key part of the plan, with faster bureaucratic procedures, she said. The 2016 reform proposal was made following the 2015 migration crisis, when two million people, 90% of whom were refugees, reached the EU irregularly. For this reason, the plan focused on relocations, she explained.

      Now the situation is completely different: last year 2.4 million stay permits were issued, the majority for reasons connected to family, work or education. Just 140,000 people migrated irregularly and only one-third were refugees while two-thirds will need to be repatriated.

      For this reason, stressed the commissioner, the new plan will focus on repatriation. Faster procedures are necessary, she noted. When people stay in a country for years it is very hard to organize repatriations, especially voluntary ones. So the objective is for a negative asylum decision “to come together with a return decision.”

      Also, the permanence in hosting centers should be of short duration. Speaking about a fire at the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos where more than 12,000 asylum seekers have been stranded for years, the commissioner said the situation was the ’’result of lack of European policy on asylum and migration."

      “We shall have no more Morias’’, she noted, calling for well-managed hosting centers along with limits to permanence.

      A win-win collaboration will instead be planned with third countries, she said. ’’The external aspect is very important. We have to work on good partnerships with third countries, supporting them and finding win-win solutions for readmissions and for the fight against traffickers. We have to develop legal pathways to come to the EU, in particular with resettlements, a policy that needs to be strengthened.”

      The commissioner then rejected the idea of opening hosting centers in third countries, an idea for example proposed by Denmark.

      “It is not the direction I intend to take. We will not export the right to asylum.”

      The commissioner said she was very concerned by reports of refoulements. Her objective, she concluded, is to “include in the pact a monitoring mechanism. The right to asylum must be defended.”

      https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27447/relocation-solidarity-mandatory-for-eu-migration-policy-johansson

      #relocalisation #solidarité_obligatoire #solidarité_volontaire #pays_de_première_entrée #renvois #expulsions #réinstallations #voies_légales

    • Droit d’asile : Bruxelles rate son « #pacte »

      La Commission européenne, assurant vouloir « abolir » le règlement de Dublin et son principe du premier pays d’entrée, doit présenter ce mercredi un « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile ». Qui ne bouleverserait rien.

      C’est une belle victoire pour Viktor Orbán, le Premier ministre hongrois, et ses partenaires d’Europe centrale et orientale aussi peu enclins que lui à accueillir des étrangers sur leur sol. La Commission européenne renonce définitivement à leur imposer d’accueillir des demandeurs d’asile en cas d’afflux dans un pays de la « ligne de front » (Grèce, Italie, Malte, Espagne). Certes, le volumineux paquet de textes qu’elle propose ce mercredi (10 projets de règlements et trois recommandations, soit plusieurs centaines de pages), pompeusement baptisé « pacte sur l’immigration et l’asile », prévoit qu’ils devront, par « solidarité », assurer les refoulements vers les pays d’origine des déboutés du droit d’asile, mais cela ne devrait pas les gêner outre mesure. Car, sur le fond, la Commission prend acte de la volonté des Vingt-Sept de transformer l’Europe en forteresse.
      Sale boulot

      La crise de 2015 les a durablement traumatisés. A l’époque, la Turquie, par lassitude d’accueillir sur son sol plusieurs millions de réfugiés syriens et des centaines de milliers de migrants économiques dans l’indifférence de la communauté internationale, ouvre ses frontières. La Grèce est vite submergée et plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes traversent les Balkans afin de trouver refuge, notamment en Allemagne et en Suède, parmi les pays les plus généreux en matière d’asile.

      Passé les premiers moments de panique, les Européens réagissent de plusieurs manières. La Hongrie fait le sale boulot en fermant brutalement sa frontière. L’Allemagne, elle, accepte d’accueillir un million de demandeurs d’asile, mais négocie avec Ankara un accord pour qu’il referme ses frontières, accord ensuite endossé par l’UE qui lui verse en échange 6 milliards d’euros destinés aux camps de réfugiés. Enfin, l’Union adopte un règlement destiné à relocaliser sur une base obligatoire une partie des migrants dans les autres pays européens afin qu’ils instruisent les demandes d’asile, dans le but de soulager la Grèce et l’Italie, pays de premier accueil. Ce dernier volet est un échec, les pays d’Europe de l’Est, qui ont voté contre, refusent d’accueillir le moindre migrant, et leurs partenaires de l’Ouest ne font guère mieux : sur 160 000 personnes qui auraient dû être relocalisées, un objectif rapidement revu à 98 000, moins de 35 000 l’ont été à la fin 2017, date de la fin de ce dispositif.

      Depuis, l’Union a considérablement durci les contrôles, notamment en créant un corps de 10 000 gardes-frontières européens et en renforçant les moyens de Frontex, l’agence chargée de gérer ses frontières extérieures. En février-mars, la tentative d’Ankara de faire pression sur les Européens dans le conflit syrien en rouvrant partiellement ses frontières a fait long feu : la Grèce a employé les grands moyens, y compris violents, pour stopper ce flux sous les applaudissements de ses partenaires… Autant dire que l’ambiance n’est pas à l’ouverture des frontières et à l’accueil des persécutés.
      « Usine à gaz »

      Mais la crise migratoire de 2015 a laissé des « divisions nombreuses et profondes entre les Etats membres - certaines des cicatrices qu’elle a laissées sont toujours visibles aujourd’hui », comme l’a reconnu Ursula von der Leyen, la présidente de la Commission, dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union du 16 septembre. Afin de tourner la page, la Commission propose donc de laisser tomber la réforme de 2016 (dite de Dublin IV) prévoyant de pérenniser la relocalisation autoritaire des migrants, désormais jugée par une haute fonctionnaire de l’exécutif « totalement irréaliste ».

      Mais la réforme qu’elle propose, une véritable « usine à gaz », n’est qu’un « rapiéçage » de l’existant, comme l’explique Yves Pascouau, spécialiste de l’immigration et responsable des programmes européens de l’association Res Publica. Ainsi, alors que Von der Leyen a annoncé sa volonté « d’abolir » le règlement de Dublin III, il n’en est rien : le pays responsable du traitement d’une demande d’asile reste, par principe, comme c’est le cas depuis 1990, le pays de première entrée.

      S’il y a une crise, la Commission pourra déclencher un « mécanisme de solidarité » afin de soulager un pays de la ligne de front : dans ce cas, les Vingt-Sept devront accueillir un certain nombre de migrants (en fonction de leur richesse et de leur population), sauf s’ils préfèrent « parrainer un retour ». En clair, prendre en charge le refoulement des déboutés de l’asile (avec l’aide financière et logistique de l’Union) en sachant que ces personnes resteront à leur charge jusqu’à ce qu’ils y parviennent. Ça, c’est pour faire simple, car il y a plusieurs niveaux de crise, des exceptions, des sanctions, des délais et l’on en passe…

      Autre nouveauté : les demandes d’asile devront être traitées par principe à la frontière, dans des camps de rétention, pour les nationalités dont le taux de reconnaissance du statut de réfugié est inférieur à 20% dans l’Union, et ce, en moins de trois mois, avec refoulement à la clé en cas de refus. « Cette réforme pose un principe clair, explique un eurocrate. Personne ne sera obligé d’accueillir un étranger dont il ne veut pas. »

      Dans cet ensemble très sévère, une bonne nouvelle : les sauvetages en mer ne devraient plus être criminalisés. On peut craindre qu’une fois passés à la moulinette des Etats, qui doivent adopter ce paquet à la majorité qualifiée (55% des Etats représentant 65% de la population), il ne reste que les aspects les plus répressifs. On ne se refait pas.


      https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/09/22/droit-d-asile-bruxelles-rate-son-pacte_1800264

      –—

      Graphique ajouté au fil de discussion sur les statistiques de la #relocalisation :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/605713

    • Le pacte européen sur l’asile et les migrations ne tire aucune leçon de la « crise migratoire »

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la nouvelle Commission européenne a présenté les grandes lignes d’orientation de sa politique migratoire à venir. Alors que cinq ans plutôt, en 2015, se déroulait la mal nommée « crise migratoire » aux frontières européennes, le nouveau Pacte Asile et Migration de l’UE ne tire aucune leçon du passé. Le nouveau pacte de l’Union Européenne nous propose inlassablement les mêmes recettes alors que les preuves de leur inefficacité, leur coût et des violences qu’elles procurent sont nombreuses et irréfutables. Le CNCD-11.11.11, son homologue néerlandophone et les membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à un changement de cap.

      Le nouveau Pacte repose sur des propositions législatives et des recommandations non contraignantes. Ses priorités sont claires mais pas neuves. Freiner les arrivées, limiter l’accueil par le « tri » des personnes et augmenter les retours. Cette stratégie pourtant maintes fois décriée par les ONG et le milieu académique a certes réussi à diminuer les arrivées en Europe, mais n’a offert aucune solution durable pour les personnes migrantes. Depuis les années 2000, l’externalisation de la gestion des questions migratoires a montré son inefficacité (situation humanitaires dans les hotspots, plus de 20.000 décès en Méditerranée depuis 2014 et processus d’encampement aux frontières de l’UE) et son coût exponentiel (coût élevé du contrôle, de la détention-expulsion et de l’aide au développement détournée). Elle a augmenté le taux de violences sur les routes de l’exil et a enfreint le droit international en toute impunité (non accès au droit d’asile notamment via les refoulements).

      "ll est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée"

      La proposition de mettre en place un mécanisme solidaire européen contraignant est à saluer, mais celui-ci doit être au service de l’accueil et non couplé au retour. La possibilité pour les États européens de choisir à la carte soit la relocalisation, le « parrainage » du retour des déboutés ou autre contribution financière n’est pas équitable. La répartition solidaire de l’accueil doit être permanente et ne pas être actionnée uniquement en cas « d’afflux massif » aux frontières d’un État membre comme le recommande la Commission. Il est important que tous les États membres développent des systèmes d’accueil de qualité et que l’UE s’oriente vers une protection plus unifiée. Le changement annoncé du Règlement de Dublin l’est juste de nom, car les premiers pays d’entrée resteront responsables des nouveaux arrivés.

      Le focus doit être mis sur les alternatives à la détention et non sur l’usage systématique de l’enfermement aux frontières, comme le veut la Commission. Le droit de demander l’asile et d’avoir accès à une procédure de qualité doit être accessible à tous et toutes et rester un droit individuel. Or, la proposition de la Commission de détenir (12 semaines maximum) en vue de screener (5 jours de tests divers et de recoupement de données via EURODAC) puis trier les personnes migrantes à la frontière en fonction du taux de reconnaissance de protection accordé en moyenne à leur pays d’origine (en dessous de 20%) ou de leur niveau de vulnérabilité est contraire à la Convention de Genève.

      "La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix."

      La priorité pour les personnes migrantes en situation irrégulière doit être la recherche de solutions durables (comme l’est la régularisation) plutôt que le retour forcé, à tous prix, comme le préconise la Commission.

      La meilleure façon de lutter contre les violences sur les routes de l’exil reste la mise en place de plus de voies légales et sûres de migration (réinstallation, visas de travail, d’études, le regroupement familial…). Les ONG regrettent que la Commission reporte à 2021 les propositions sur la migration légale. Le pacte s’intéresse à juste titre à la criminalisation des ONG de sauvetage et des citoyens qui fournissent une aide humanitaire aux migrants. Toutefois, les propositions visant à y mettre fin sont insuffisantes. Les ONG se réjouissent de l’annonce par la Commission d’un mécanisme de surveillance des droits humains aux frontières extérieures. Au cours de l’année écoulée, on a signalé de plus en plus souvent des retours violents par la Croatie, la Grèce, Malte et Chypre. Toutefois, il n’est pas encore suffisamment clair si les propositions de la Commission peuvent effectivement traiter et sanctionner les refoulements.

      Au lendemain de l’incendie du hotspot à Moria, symbole par excellence de l’échec des politiques migratoires européennes, l’UE s’enfonce dans un déni total, meurtrier, en vue de concilier les divergences entre ses États membres. Les futures discussions autour du Pacte au sein du parlement UE et du Conseil UE seront cruciales. Les ONG membres du groupe de travail pour la justice migratoire appellent le Parlement européen et le gouvernement belge à promouvoir des ajustements fermes allant vers plus de justice migratoire.

      https://www.cncd.be/Le-pacte-europeen-sur-l-asile-et

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Critical ‘First Look’ Analysis

      Where does it come from?

      The New Migration Pact was built on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme that the Commission tried to push in 2016. And the least that one can say, is that it shows! The whole migration plan has been decisively shaped by this initial failure. Though the Pact has some merits, the very fact that it takes as its starting point the radical demands made by the most nationalist governments in Europe leads to sacrificing migrants’ rights on the altar of a cohesive and integrated European migration policy.

      Back in 2016, the vigorous manoeuvring of the Commission to find a way out of the European asylum dead-end resulted in a bittersweet victory for the European institution. Though the Commission was able to find a qualified majority of member states willing to support a fair distribution of the asylum seekers among member states through a relocation scheme, this new regulation remained dead letter. Several eastern European states flatly refused to implement the plan, other member states seized this opportunity to defect on their obligations and the whole migration policy quickly unravelled. Since then, Europe is left with a dysfunctional Dublin agreement exacerbating the tensions between member states and 27 loosely connected national asylum regimes. On the latter point, at least, there is a consensus. Everyone agrees that the EU’s migration regime is broken and urgently needs to be fixed.

      Obviously, the Commission was not keen to go through a new round of political humiliation. Having been accused of “bureaucratic hubris” the first time around, the commissioners Schinas and Johansson decided not to repeat the same mistake. They toured the European capitals and listened to every side of the entrenched migration debate before drafting their Migration Pact. The intention is in the right place and it reflects the complexity of having to accommodate 27 distinct democratic debates in one single political space. Nevertheless, if one peers a bit more extensively through the content of the New Plan, it is complicated not to get the feelings that the Visegrad countries are currently the key players shaping the European migration and asylum policies. After all, their staunch opposition to a collective reception scheme sparked the political process and provided the starting point to the general discussion. As a result, it is no surprise that the New Pact tilts firmly towards an ever more restrictive approach to migration, beefs up the coercive powers of both member states and European agencies and raises many concerns with regards to the respect of the migrants’ fundamental rights.
      What is in this New Pact on Migration and Asylum?

      Does the Pact concede too much ground to the demands of the most xenophobic European governments? To answer that question, let us go back to the bizarre metaphor used by the commissioner Schinas. During his press conference, he insisted on comparing the New Pact on Migration and Asylum to a house built on solid foundations (i.e. the lengthy and inclusive consultation process) and made of 3 floors: first, some renewed partnerships with the sending and transit states, second, some more effective border procedures, and third, a revamped mandatory – but flexible ! – solidarity scheme. It is tempting to carry on with the metaphor and to say that this house may appear comfortable from the inside but that it remains tightly shut to anyone knocking on its door from the outside. For, a careful examination reveals that each of the three “floors” (policy packages, actually) lays the emphasis on a repressive approach to migration aimed at deterring would-be asylum seekers from attempting to reach the European shores.
      The “new partnerships” with sending and transit countries, a “change in paradigm”?

      Let us add that there is little that is actually “new” in this New Migration Pact. For instance, the first policy package, that is, the suggestion that the EU should renew its partnerships with sending and transit countries is, as a matter of fact, an old tune in the Brussels bubble. The Commission may boast that it marks a “change of paradigm”, one fails to see how this would be any different from the previous European diplomatic efforts. Since migration and asylum are increasingly considered as toxic topics (for, they would be the main factors behind the rise of nationalism and its corollary, Euroscepticism), the European Union is willing to externalize this issue, seemingly at all costs. The results, however, have been mixed in the past. To the Commission’s own admission, only a third of the migrants whose asylum claims have been rejected are effectively returned. Besides the facts that returns are costly, extremely coercive, and administratively complicated to organize, the main reason for this low rate of successful returns is that sending countries refuse to cooperate in the readmission procedures. Neighbouring countries have excellent reasons not to respond positively to the Union’s demands. For some, remittances sent by their diaspora are an economic lifeline. Others just do not want to appear complicit of repressive European practices on their domestic political scene. Furthermore, many African countries are growing discontent with the forceful way the European Union uses its asymmetrical relation of power in bilateral negotiations to dictate to those sovereign states the migration policies they should adopt, making for instance its development aid conditional on the implementation of stricter border controls. The Commission may rhetorically claim to foster “mutually beneficial” international relation with its neighbouring countries, the emphasis on the externalization of migration control in the EU’s diplomatic agenda nevertheless bears some of the hallmarks of neo-colonialism. As such, it is a source of deep resentment in sending and transit states. It would therefore be a grave mistake for the EU to overlook the fact that some short-term gains in terms of migration management may result in long-term losses with regards to Europe’s image across the world.

      Furthermore, considering the current political situation, one should not primarily be worried about the failed partnerships with neighbouring countries, it is rather the successful ones that ought to give us pause and raise concerns. For, based on the existing evidence, the EU will sign a deal with any state as long as it effectively restrains and contains migration flows towards the European shores. Being an authoritarian state with a documented history of human right violations (Turkey) or an embattled government fighting a civil war (Lybia) does not disqualify you as a partner of the European Union in its effort to manage migration flows. It is not only morally debatable for the EU to delegate its asylum responsibilities to unreliable third countries, it is also doubtful that an increase in diplomatic pressure on neighbouring countries will bring major political results. It will further damage the perception of the EU in neighbouring countries without bringing significant restriction to migration flows.
      Streamlining border procedures? Or eroding migrants’ rights?

      The second policy package is no more inviting. It tackles the issue of the migrants who, in spite of those partnerships and the hurdles thrown their way by sending and transit countries, would nevertheless reach Europe irregularly. On this issue, the Commission faced the daunting task of having to square a political circle, since it had to find some common ground in a debate bitterly divided between conflicting worldviews (roughly, between liberal and nationalist perspectives on the individual freedom of movement) and competing interests (between overburdened Mediterranean member states and Eastern member states adamant that asylum seekers would endanger their national cohesion). The Commission thus looked for the lowest common denominator in terms of migration management preferences amongst the distinct member states. The result is a two-tier border procedure aiming to fast-track and streamline the processing of asylum claims, allowing for more expeditious returns of irregular migrants. The goal is to prevent any bottleneck in the processing of the claims and to avoid the (currently near constant) overcrowding of reception facilities in the frontline states. Once again, there is little that is actually new in this proposal. It amounts to a generalization of the process currently in place in the infamous hotspots scattered on the Greek isles. According to the Pact, screening procedures would be carried out in reception centres created across Europe. A far cry from the slogan “no more Moria” since one may legitimately suspect that those reception centres will, at the first hiccup in the procedure, turn into tomorrow’s asylum camps.

      According to this procedure, newly arrived migrants would be submitted within 5 days to a pre-screening procedure and subsequently triaged into two categories. Migrants with a low chance of seeing their asylum claim recognized (because they would come from a country with a low recognition rate or a country belonging to the list of the safe third countries, for instance) would be redirected towards an accelerated procedure. The end goal would be to return them, if applicable, within twelve weeks. The other migrants would be subjected to the standard assessment of their asylum claim. It goes without saying that this proposal has been swiftly and unanimously condemned by all human rights organizations. It does not take a specialized lawyer to see that this two-tiered procedure could have devastating consequences for the “fast-tracked” asylum seekers left with no legal recourse against the initial decision to submit them to this sped up procedure (rather than the standard one) as well as reduced opportunities to defend their asylum claim or, if need be, to contest their return. No matter how often the Commission repeats that it will preserve all the legal safeguards required to protect migrants’ rights, it remains wildly unconvincing. Furthermore, the Pact may confuse speed and haste. The schedule is tight on paper (five days for the pre-screening, twelve weeks for the assessment of the asylum claim), it may well prove unrealistic to meet those deadlines in real-life conditions. The Commission also overlooks the fact that accelerated procedures tend to be sloppy, thus leading to juridical appeals and further legal wrangling and eventually amounting to processes far longer than expected.
      Integrating the returns, not the reception

      The Commission talked up the new Pact as being “balanced” and “humane”. Since the two first policy packages focus, first, on preventing would-be migrants from leaving their countries and, second, on facilitating and accelerating their returns, one would expect the third policy package to move away from the restriction of movement and to complement those measures with a reception plan tailored to the needs of refugees. And here comes the major disappointment with the New Pact and, perhaps, the clearest indication that the Pact is first and foremost designed to please the migration hardliners. It does include a solidarity scheme meant to alleviate the burden of frontline countries, to distribute more fairly the responsibilities amongst member states and to ensure that refugees are properly hosted. But this solidarity scheme is far from being robust enough to deliver on those promises. Let us unpack it briefly to understand why it is likely to fail. The solidarity scheme is mandatory. All member states will be under the obligation to take part. But there is a catch! Member states’ contribution to this collective effort can take many shapes and forms and it will be up to the member states to decide how they want to participate. They get to choose whether they want to relocate some refugees on their national soil, to provide some financial and/or logistical assistance, or to “sponsor” (it is the actual term used by the Commission) some returns.

      No one expected the Commission to reintroduce a compulsory relocation scheme in its Pact. Eastern European countries had drawn an obvious red line and it would have been either naïve or foolish to taunt them with that kind of policy proposal. But this so-called “flexible mandatory solidarity” relies on such a watered-down understanding of the solidarity principle that it results in a weak and misguided political instrument unsuited to solve the problem at hand. First, the flexible solidarity mechanism is too indeterminate to prove efficient. According to the current proposal, member states would have to shoulder a fair share of the reception burden (calculated on their respective population and GDP) but would be left to decide for themselves which form this contribution would take. The obvious flaw with the policy proposal is that, if all member states decline to relocate some refugees (which is a plausible scenario), Mediterranean states would still be left alone when it comes to dealing with the most immediate consequences of migration flows. They would receive much more financial, operational, and logistical support than it currently is the case – but they would be managing on their own the overcrowded reception centres. The Commission suggests that it would oversee the national pledges in terms of relocation and that it would impose some corrections if the collective pledges fall short of a predefined target. But it remains to be seen whether the Commission will have the political clout to impose some relocations to member states refusing them. One could not be blamed for being highly sceptical.

      Second, it is noteworthy that the Commission fails to integrate the reception of refugees since member states are de facto granted an opt-out on hosting refugees. What is integrated is rather the return policy, once more a repressive instrument. And it is the member states with the worst record in terms of migrants’ rights violations that are the most likely to be tasked with the delicate mission of returning them home. As a commentator was quipping on Twitter, it would be like asking a bully to walk his victim home (what could possibly go wrong?). The attempt to build an intra-European consensus is obviously pursued at the expense of the refugees. The incentive structure built into the flexible solidarity scheme offers an excellent illustration of this. If a member state declines to relocate any refugee and offers instead to ‘sponsor’ some returns, it has to honour that pledge within a limited period of time (the Pact suggests a six month timeframe). If it fails to do so, it becomes responsible for the relocation and the return of those migrants, leading to a situation in which some migrants may end up in a country where they do not want to be and that does not want them to be there. Hardly an optimal outcome…
      Conclusion

      The Pact represents a genuine attempt to design a multi-faceted and comprehensive migration policy, covering most aspects of a complex issue. The dysfunctions of the Schengen area and the question of the legal pathways to Europe have been relegated to a later discussion and one may wonder whether they should not have been included in the Pact to balance out its restrictive inclination. And, in all fairness, the Pact does throw a few bones to the more cosmopolitan-minded European citizens. For instance, it reminds the member states that maritime search and rescue operations are legal and should not be impeded, or it shortens (from five to three years) the waiting period for refugees to benefit from the freedom of movement. But those few welcome additions are vastly outweighed by the fact that migration hardliners dominated the agenda-setting in the early stage of the policy-making exercise and have thus been able to frame decisively the political discussion. The end result is a policy package leaning heavily towards some repressive instruments and particularly careless when it comes to safeguarding migrants’ rights.

      The New Pact was first drafted on the ashes of the mandatory relocation scheme. Back then, the Commission publicly made amends and revised its approach to the issue. Sadly, the New Pact was presented to the European public when the ashes of the Moria camp were still lukewarm. One can only hope that the member states will learn from that mistake too.

      https://blog.novamigra.eu/2020/09/24/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-a-critical-first-look-analysis

    • #Pacte_européen_sur_la_migration : un “nouveau départ” pour violer les droits humains

      La Commission européenne a publié aujourd’hui son « Nouveau Pacte sur l’Asile et la Migration » qui propose un nouveau cadre règlementaire et législatif. Avec ce plan, l’UE devient de facto un « leader du voyage retour » pour les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s en Méditerranée. EuroMed Droits craint que ce pacte ne détériore encore davantage la situation actuelle pour au moins trois raisons.

      Le pacte se concentre de manière obsessionnelle sur la politique de retours à travers un système de « sponsoring » : des pays européens tels que l’Autriche, la Pologne, la Hongrie ou la République tchèque – qui refusent d’accueillir des réfugié.e.s – pourront « sponsoriser » et organiser la déportation vers les pays de départ de ces réfugié.e.s. Au lieu de favoriser l’intégration, le pacte adopte une politique de retour à tout prix, même lorsque les demandeurs.ses d’asile peuvent être victimes de discrimination, persécution ou torture dans leur pays de retour. A ce jour, il n’existe aucun mécanisme permettant de surveiller ce qui arrive aux migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s une fois déporté.e.s.

      Le pacte proposé renforce la sous-traitance de la gestion des frontières. En termes concrets, l’UE renforce la coopération avec les pays non-européens afin qu’ils ferment leurs frontières et empêchent les personnes de partir. Cette coopération est sujette à l’imposition de conditions par l’UE. Une telle décision européenne se traduit par une hausse du nombre de refoulements dans la région méditerranéenne et une coopération renforcée avec des pays qui ont un piètre bilan en matière de droits humains et qui ne possèdent pas de cadre efficace pour la protection des droits des personnes migrantes et réfugiées.

      Le pacte vise enfin à étendre les mécanismes de tri des demandeurs.ses d’asile et des migrant.e.s dans les pays d’arrivée. Ce modèle de tri – similaire à celui utilisé dans les zones de transit aéroportuaires – accentue les difficultés de pays tels que l’Espagne, l’Italie, Malte, la Grèce ou Chypre qui accueillent déjà la majorité des migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s. Placer ces personnes dans des camps revient à mettre en place un système illégal d’incarcération automatique dès l’arrivée. Cela accroîtra la violence psychologique à laquelle les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s sont déjà soumis. Selon ce nouveau système, ces personnes seront identifié.e.s sous cinq jours et toute demande d’asile devra être traitée en douze semaines. Cette accélération de la procédure risque d’intensifier la détention et de diviser les arrivant.e.s entre demandeurs.ses d’asile et migrant.e.s économiques. Cela s’effectuerait de manière discriminatoire, sans analyse détaillée de chaque demande d’asile ni possibilité réelle de faire appel. Celles et ceux qui seront éligibles à la protection internationale seront relocalisé.e.s au sein des États membres qui acceptent de les recevoir. Les autres risqueront d’être déportés immédiatement.

      « En choisissant de sous-traiter davantage encore la gestion des frontières et d’accentuer la politique de retours, ce nouveau pacte conclut la transformation de la politique européenne en une approche pleinement sécuritaire. Pire encore, le pacte assimile la politique de “retour sponsorisé” à une forme de solidarité. Au-delà des déclarations officielles, cela démontre la volonté de l’Union européenne de criminaliser et de déshumaniser les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s », a déclaré Wadih Al-Asmar, Président d’EuroMed Droits.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-nouveau-depart-pour-violer-les-droits

    • Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum

      This Policy Insight examines the new Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the principles and commitments enshrined in the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees (UN GCR) and the EU Treaties. It finds that from a legal viewpoint the ‘Pact’ is not really a Pact at all, if understood as an agreement concluded between relevant EU institutional parties. Rather, it is the European Commission’s policy guide for the duration of the current 9th legislature.

      The analysis shows that the Pact has intergovernmental aspects, in both name and fundamentals. It does not pursue a genuine Migration and Asylum Union. The Pact encourages an artificial need for consensus building or de facto unanimity among all EU member states’ governments in fields where the EU Treaties call for qualified majority voting (QMV) with the European Parliament as co-legislator. The Pact does not abolish the first irregular entry rule characterising the EU Dublin Regulation. It adopts a notion of interstate solidarity that leads to asymmetric responsibilities, where member states are given the flexibility to evade participating in the relocation of asylum seekers. The Pact also runs the risk of catapulting some contested member states practices’ and priorities about localisation, speed and de-territorialisation into EU policy.

      This Policy Insight argues that the Pact’s priority of setting up an independent monitoring mechanism of border procedures’ compliance with fundamental rights is a welcome step towards the better safeguarding of the rule of law. The EU inter-institutional negotiations on the Pact’s initiatives should be timely and robust in enforcing member states’ obligations under the current EU legal standards relating to asylum and borders, namely the prevention of detention and expedited expulsions, and the effective access by all individuals to dignified treatment and effective remedies. Trust and legitimacy of EU asylum and migration policy can only follow if international (human rights and refugee protection) commitments and EU Treaty principles are put first.

      https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/whose-pact

    • First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals

      This week the EU Commission published its new package of proposals on asylum and (non-EU) migration – consisting of proposals for legislation, some ‘soft law’, attempts to relaunch talks on stalled proposals and plans for future measures. The following is an explanation of the new proposals (not attempting to cover every detail) with some first thoughts. Overall, while it is possible that the new package will lead to agreement on revised asylum laws, this will come at the cost of risking reduced human rights standards.

      Background

      Since 1999, the EU has aimed to create a ‘Common European Asylum System’. A first phase of legislation was passed between 2003 and 2005, followed by a second phase between 2010 and 2013. Currently the legislation consists of: a) the Qualification Directive, which defines when people are entitled to refugee status (based on the UN Refugee Convention) or subsidiary protection status, and what rights they have; b) the Dublin III Regulation, which allocates responsibility for an asylum seeker between Member States; c) the Eurodac Regulation, which facilitates the Dublin system by setting up a database of fingerprints of asylum seekers and people who cross the external border without authorisation; d) the Asylum Procedures Directive, which sets out the procedural rules governing asylum applications, such as personal interviews and appeals; e) the Reception Conditions Directive, which sets out standards on the living conditions of asylum-seekers, such as rules on housing and welfare; and f) the Asylum Agency Regulation, which set up an EU agency (EASO) to support Member States’ processing of asylum applications.

      The EU also has legislation on other aspects of migration: (short-term) visas, border controls, irregular migration, and legal migration – much of which has connections with the asylum legislation, and all of which is covered by this week’s package. For visas, the main legislation is the visa list Regulation (setting out which non-EU countries’ citizens are subject to a short-term visa requirement, or exempt from it) and the visa code (defining the criteria to obtain a short-term Schengen visa, allowing travel between all Schengen states). The visa code was amended last year, as discussed here.

      For border controls, the main legislation is the Schengen Borders Code, setting out the rules on crossing external borders and the circumstances in which Schengen states can reinstate controls on internal borders, along with the Frontex Regulation, setting up an EU border agency to assist Member States. On the most recent version of the Frontex Regulation, see discussion here and here.

      For irregular migration, the main legislation is the Return Directive. The Commission proposed to amend it in 2018 – on which, see analysis here and here.

      For legal migration, the main legislation on admission of non-EU workers is the single permit Directive (setting out a common process and rights for workers, but not regulating admission); the Blue Card Directive (on highly paid migrants, discussed here); the seasonal workers’ Directive (discussed here); and the Directive on intra-corporate transferees (discussed here). The EU also has legislation on: non-EU students, researchers and trainees (overview here); non-EU family reunion (see summary of the legislation and case law here) and on long-term resident non-EU citizens (overview – in the context of UK citizens after Brexit – here). In 2016, the Commission proposed to revise the Blue Card Directive (see discussion here).

      The UK, Ireland and Denmark have opted out of most of these laws, except some asylum law applies to the UK and Ireland, and Denmark is covered by the Schengen and Dublin rules. So are the non-EU countries associated with Schengen and Dublin (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). There are also a number of further databases of non-EU citizens as well as Eurodac: the EU has never met a non-EU migrant who personal data it didn’t want to store and process.

      The Refugee ‘Crisis’

      The EU’s response to the perceived refugee ‘crisis’ was both short-term and long-term. In the short term, in 2015 the EU adopted temporary laws (discussed here) relocating some asylum seekers in principle from Italy and Greece to other Member States. A legal challenge to one of these laws failed (as discussed here), but in practice Member States accepted few relocations anyway. Earlier this year, the CJEU ruled that several Member States had breached their obligations under the laws (discussed here), but by then it was a moot point.

      Longer term, the Commission proposed overhauls of the law in 2016: a) a Qualification Regulation further harmonising the law on refugee and subsidiary protection status; b) a revised Dublin Regulation, which would have set up a system of relocation of asylum seekers for future crises; c) a revised Eurodac Regulation, to take much more data from asylum seekers and other migrants; d) an Asylum Procedures Regulation, further harmonising the procedural law on asylum applications; e) a revised Reception Conditions Directive; f) a revised Asylum Agency Regulation, giving the agency more powers; and g) a new Resettlement Regulation, setting out a framework of admitting refugees directly from non-EU countries. (See my comments on some of these proposals, from back in 2016)

      However, these proposals proved unsuccessful – which is the main reason for this week’s attempt to relaunch the process. In particular, an EU Council note from February 2019 summarises the diverse problems that befell each proposal. While the EU Council Presidency and the European Parliament reached agreement on the proposals on qualification, reception conditions and resettlement in June 2018, Member States refused to support the Presidency’s deal and the European Parliament refused to renegotiate (see, for instance, the Council documents on the proposals on qualification and resettlement; see also my comments on an earlier stage of the talks, when the Council had agreed its negotiation position on the qualification regulation).

      On the asylum agency, the EP and Council agreed on the revised law in 2017, but the Commission proposed an amendment in 2018 to give the agency more powers; the Council could not agree on this. On Eurodac, the EP and Council only partly agreed on a text. On the procedures Regulation, the Council largely agreed its position, except on border procedures; on Dublin there was never much prospect of agreement because of the controversy over relocating asylum seekers. (For either proposal, a difficult negotiation with the European Parliament lay ahead).

      In other areas too, the legislative process was difficult: the Council and EP gave up negotiating amendments to the Blue Card Directive (see the last attempt at a compromise here, and the Council negotiation mandate here), and the EP has not yet agreed a position on the Returns Directive (the Council has a negotiating position, but again it leaves out the difficult issue of border procedures; there is a draft EP position from February). Having said that, the EU has been able to agree legislation giving more powers to Frontex, as well as new laws on EU migration databases, in the last few years.

      The attempted relaunch

      The Commission’s new Pact on asylum and immigration (see also the roadmap on its implementation, the Q and As, and the staff working paper) does not restart the whole process from scratch. On qualification, reception conditions, resettlement, the asylum agency, the returns Directive and the Blue Card Directive, it invites the Council and Parliament to resume negotiations. But it tries to unblock the talks as a whole by tabling two amended legislative proposals and three new legislative proposals, focussing on the issues of border procedures and relocation of asylum seekers.

      Screening at the border

      This revised proposals start with a new proposal for screening asylum seekers at the border, which would apply to all non-EU citizens who cross an external border without authorisation, who apply for asylum while being checked at the border (without meeting the conditions for legal entry), or who are disembarked after a search and rescue operation. During the screening, these non-EU citizens are not allowed to enter the territory of a Member State, unless it becomes clear that they meet the criteria for entry. The screening at the border should take no longer than 5 days, with an extra 5 days in the event of a huge influx. (It would also be possible to apply the proposed law to those on the territory who evaded border checks; for them the deadline to complete the screening is 3 days).

      Screening has six elements, as further detailed in the proposal: a health check, an identity check, registration in a database, a security check, filling out a debriefing form, and deciding on what happens next. At the end of the screening, the migrant is channelled either into the expulsion process (if no asylum claim has been made, and if the migrant does not meet the conditions for entry) or, if an asylum claim is made, into the asylum process – with an indication of whether the claim should be fast-tracked or not. It’s also possible that an asylum seeker would be relocated to another Member State. The screening is carried out by national officials, possibly with support from EU agencies.

      To ensure human rights protection, there must be independent monitoring to address allegations of non-compliance with human rights. These allegations might concern breaches of EU or international law, national law on detention, access to the asylum procedure, or non-refoulement (the ban on sending people to an unsafe country). Migrants must be informed about the process and relevant EU immigration and data protection law. There is no provision for judicial review of the outcome of the screening process, although there would be review as part of the next step (asylum or return).

      Asylum procedures

      The revised proposal for an asylum procedures Regulation would leave in place most of the Commission’s 2016 proposal to amend the law, adding some specific further proposed amendments, which either link back to the screening proposal or aim to fast-track decisions and expulsions more generally.

      On the first point, the usual rules on informing asylum applicants and registering their application would not apply until after the end of the screening. A border procedure may apply following the screening process, but Member States must apply the border procedure in cases where an asylum seeker used false documents, is a perceived national security threat, or falls within the new ground for fast-tracking cases (on which, see below). The latter obligation is subject to exceptions where a Member State has reported that a non-EU country is not cooperating on readmission; the process for dealing with that issue set out under the 2019 amendments to the visa code will then apply. Also, the border process cannot apply to unaccompanied minors or children under 12, unless they are a supposed national security risk. Further exceptions apply where the asylum seeker is vulnerable or has medical needs, the application is not inadmissible or cannot be fast-tracked, or detention conditions cannot be guaranteed. A Member State might apply the Dublin process to determine which Member State is responsible for the asylum claim during the border process. The whole border process (including any appeal) must last no more than 12 weeks, and can only be used to declare applications inadmissible or apply the new ground for fast-tracking them.

      There would also be a new border expulsion procedure, where an asylum application covered by the border procedure was rejected. This is subject to its own 12-week deadline, starting from the point when the migrant is no longer allowed to remain. Much of the Return Directive would apply – but not the provisions on the time period for voluntary departure, remedies and the grounds for detention. Instead, the border expulsion procedure would have its own stricter rules on these issues.

      As regards general fast-tracking, in order to speed up the expulsion process for unsuccessful applications, a rejection of an asylum application would have to either incorporate an expulsion decision or entail a simultaneous separate expulsion decision. Appeals against expulsion decisions would then be subject to the same rules as appeals against asylum decisions. If the asylum seeker comes from a country with a refugee recognition rate below 20%, his or her application must be fast-tracked (this would even apply to unaccompanied minors) – unless circumstances in that country have changed, or the asylum seeker comes from a group for whom the low recognition rate is not representative (for instance, the recognition rate might be higher for LGBT asylum-seekers from that country). Many more appeals would be subject to a one-week time limit for the rejected asylum seeker to appeal, and there could be only one level of appeal against decisions taken within a border procedure.

      Eurodac

      The revised proposal for Eurodac would build upon the 2016 proposal, which was already far-reaching: extending Eurodac to include not only fingerprints, but also photos and other personal data; reducing the age of those covered by Eurodac from 14 to 6; removing the time limits and the limits on use of the fingerprints taken from persons who had crossed the border irregularly; and creating a new obligation to collect data of all irregular migrants over age 6 (currently fingerprint data for this group cannot be stored, but can simply be checked, as an option, against the data on asylum seekers and irregular border crossers). The 2020 proposal additionally provides for interoperability with other EU migration databases, taking of personal data during the screening process, including more data on the migration status of each person, and expressly applying the law to those disembarked after a search and rescue operation.

      Dublin rules on asylum responsibility

      A new proposal for asylum management would replace the Dublin regulation (meaning that the Commission has withdrawn its 2016 proposal to replace that Regulation). The 2016 proposal would have created a ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry, requiring that State to examine first whether many of the grounds for removing an asylum-seeker to a non-EU country apply before considering whether another Member State might be responsible for the application (because the asylum seeker’s family live there, for instance). It would also have imposed obligations directly on asylum-seekers to cooperate with the process, rather than only regulate relations between Member States. These obligations would have been enforced by punishing asylum seekers who disobeyed: removing their reception conditions (apart from emergency health care); fast-tracking their substantive asylum applications; refusing to consider new evidence from them; and continuing the asylum application process in their absence.

      It would no longer be possible for asylum seekers to provide additional evidence of family links, with a view to being in the same country as a family member. Overturning a CJEU judgment (see further discussion here), unaccompanied minors would no longer have been able to make applications in multiple Member States (in the absence of a family member in any of them). However, the definition of family members would have been widened, to include siblings and families formed in a transit country. Responsibility for an asylum seeker based on the first Member State of irregular entry (a commonly applied criterion) would have applied indefinitely, rather than expire one year after entry as it does under the current rules. The ‘Sangatte clause’ (responsibility after five months of living in a second Member State, if the ‘irregular entry’ criterion no longer applies) would be dropped. The ‘sovereignty clause’, which played a key part in the 2015-16 refugee ‘crisis’ (it lets a Member State take responsibility for any application even if the Dublin rules do not require it, cf Germany accepting responsibility for Syrian asylum seekers) would have been sharply curtailed. Time limits for detention during the transfer process would be reduced. Remedies for asylum seekers would have been curtailed: they would only have seven days to appeal against a transfer; courts would have fifteen days to decide (although they could have stayed on the territory throughout); and the grounds of review would have been curtailed.

      Finally, the 2016 proposal would have tackled the vexed issue of disproportionate allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers by setting up an automated system determining how many asylum seekers each Member State ‘should’ have based on their size and GDP. If a Member State were responsible for excessive numbers of applicants, Member States which were receiving fewer numbers would have to take more to help out. If they refused, they would have to pay €250,000 per applicant.

      The 2020 proposal drops some of the controversial proposals from 2016, including the ‘bottleneck’ in the Member State of entry (the current rule, giving Member States an option to decide if a non-EU country is responsible for the application on narrower grounds than in the 2016 proposal, would still apply). Also, the sovereignty clause would now remain unchanged.

      However, the 2020 proposal also retains parts of the 2016 proposal: the redefinition of ‘family member’ (which could be more significant now that the bottleneck is removed, unless Member States choose to apply the relevant rules on non-EU countries’ responsibility during the border procedure already); obligations for asylum seekers (redrafted slightly); some of the punishments for non-compliant asylum-seekers (the cut-off for considering evidence would stay, as would the loss of benefits except for those necessary to ensure a basic standard of living: see the CJEU case law in CIMADE and Haqbin); dropping the provision on evidence of family links; changing the rules on responsibility for unaccompanied minors; retaining part of the changes to the irregular entry criterion (it would now cease to apply after three years; the Sangatte clause would still be dropped; it would apply after search and rescue but not apply in the event of relocation); curtailing judicial review (the grounds would still be limited; the time limit to appeal would be 14 days; courts would not have a strict deadline to decide; suspensive effect would not apply in all cases); and the reduced time limits for detention.

      The wholly new features of the 2020 proposal are: some vague provisions about crisis management; responsibility for an asylum application for the Member State which issued a visa or residence document which expired in the last three years (the current rule is responsibility if the visa expired less than six months ago, and the residence permit expired less than a year ago); responsibility for an asylum application for a Member State in which a non-EU citizen obtained a diploma; and the possibility for refugees or persons with subsidiary protection status to obtain EU long-term resident status after three years, rather than five.

      However, the most significant feature of the new proposal is likely to be its attempt to solve the underlying issue of disproportionate allocation of asylum seekers. Rather than a mechanical approach to reallocating responsibility, the 2020 proposal now provides for a menu of ‘solidarity contributions’: relocation of asylum seekers; relocation of refugees; ‘return sponsorship’; or support for ‘capacity building’ in the Member State (or a non-EU country) facing migratory pressure. There are separate rules for search and rescue disembarkations, on the one hand, and more general migratory pressures on the other. Once the Commission determines that the latter situation exists, other Member States have to choose from the menu to offer some assistance. Ultimately the Commission will adopt a decision deciding what the contributions will be. Note that ‘return sponsorship’ comes with a ticking clock: if the persons concerned are not expelled within eight months, the sponsoring Member State must accept them on its territory.

      Crisis management

      The issue of managing asylum issues in a crisis has been carved out of the Dublin proposal into a separate proposal, which would repeal an EU law from 2001 that set up a framework for offering ‘temporary protection’ in a crisis. Note that Member States have never used the 2001 law in practice.

      Compared to the 2001 law, the new proposal is integrated into the EU asylum legislation that has been adopted or proposed in the meantime. It similarly applies in the event of a ‘mass influx’ that prevents the effective functioning of the asylum system. It would apply the ‘solidarity’ process set out in the proposal to replace the Dublin rules (ie relocation of asylum seekers and other measures), with certain exceptions and shorter time limits to apply that process.

      The proposal focusses on providing for possible exceptions to the usual asylum rules. In particular, during a crisis, the Commission could authorise a Member State to apply temporary derogations from the rules on border asylum procedures (extending the time limit, using the procedure to fast-track more cases), border return procedures (again extending the time limit, more easily justifying detention), or the time limit to register asylum applicants. Member States could also determine that due to force majeure, it was not possible to observe the normal time limits for registering asylum applications, applying the Dublin process for responsibility for asylum applications, or offering ‘solidarity’ to other Member States.

      Finally, the new proposal, like the 2001 law, would create a potential for a form of separate ‘temporary protection’ status for the persons concerned. A Member State could suspend the consideration of asylum applications from people coming from the country facing a crisis for up to a year, in the meantime giving them status equivalent to ‘subsidiary protection’ status in the EU qualification law. After that point it would have to resume consideration of the applications. It would need the Commission’s approval, whereas the 2001 law left it to the Council to determine a situation of ‘mass influx’ and provided for the possible extension of the special rules for up to three years.

      Other measures

      The Commission has also adopted four soft law measures. These comprise: a Recommendation on asylum crisis management; a Recommendation on resettlement and humanitarian admission; a Recommendation on cooperation between Member States on private search and rescue operations; and guidance on the applicability of EU law on smuggling of migrants – notably concluding that it cannot apply where (as in the case of law of the sea) there is an obligation to rescue.

      On other issues, the Commission plan is to use current legislation – in particular the recent amendment to the visa code, which provides for sticks to make visas more difficult to get for citizens of countries which don’t cooperate on readmission of people, and carrots to make visas easier to get for citizens of countries which do cooperate on readmission. In some areas, such as the Schengen system, there will be further strategies and plans in the near future; it is not clear if this will lead to more proposed legislation.

      However, on legal migration, the plan is to go further than relaunching the amendment of the Blue Card Directive, as the Commission is also planning to propose amendments to the single permit and long-term residence laws referred to above – leading respectively to more harmonisation of the law on admission of non-EU workers and enhanced possibilities for long-term resident non-EU citizens to move between Member States (nb the latter plan is separate from this week’s proposal to amend this law as regards refugees and people with subsidiary protection already). Both these plans are relevant to British citizens moving to the EU after the post-Brexit transition period – and the latter is also relevant to British citizens covered by the withdrawal agreement.

      Comments

      This week’s plan is less a complete restart of EU law in this area than an attempt to relaunch discussions on a blocked set of amendments to that law, which moreover focusses on a limited set of issues. Will it ‘work’? There are two different ways to answer that question.

      First, will it unlock the institutional blockage? Here it should be kept in mind that the European Parliament and the Council had largely agreed on several of the 2016 proposals already; they would have been adopted in 2018 already had not the Council treated all the proposals as a package, and not gone back on agreements which the Council Presidency reached with the European Parliament. It is always open to the Council to get at least some of these proposals adopted quickly by reversing these approaches.

      On the blocked proposals, the Commission has targeted the key issues of border procedures and allocation of asylum-seekers. If the former leads to more quick removals of unsuccessful applicants, the latter issue is no longer so pressing. But it is not clear if the Member States will agree to anything on border procedures, or whether such an agreement will result in more expulsions anyway – because the latter depends on the willingness of non-EU countries, which the EU cannot legislate for (and does not even address in this most recent package). And because it is uncertain whether they will result in more expulsions, Member States will be wary of agreeing to anything which either results in more obligations to accept asylum-seekers on their territory, or leaves them with the same number as before.

      The idea of ‘return sponsorship’ – which reads like a grotesque parody of individuals sponsoring children in developing countries via charities – may not be appealing except to those countries like France, which have the capacity to twist arms in developing countries to accept returns. Member States might be able to agree on a replacement for the temporary protection Directive on the basis that they will never use that replacement either. And Commission threats to use infringement proceedings to enforce the law might not worry Member States who recall that the CJEU ruled on their failure to relocate asylum-seekers after the relocation law had already expired, and that the Court will soon rule on Hungary’s expulsion of the Central European University after it has already left.

      As to whether the proposals will ‘work’ in terms of managing asylum flows fairly and compatibly with human rights, it is striking how much they depend upon curtailing appeal rights, even though appeals are often successful. The proposed limitation of appeal rights will also be maintained in the Dublin system; and while the proposed ‘bottleneck’ of deciding on removals to non-EU countries before applying the Dublin system has been removed, a variation on this process may well apply in the border procedures process instead. There is no new review of the assessment of the safety of non-EU countries – which is questionable in light of the many reports of abuse in Libya. While the EU is not proposing, as the wildest headbangers would want, to turn people back or refuse applications without consideration, the question is whether the fast-track consideration of applications and then appeals will constitute merely a Potemkin village of procedural rights that mean nothing in practice.

      Increased detention is already a feature of the amendments proposed earlier: the reception conditions proposal would add a new ground for detention; the return Directive proposal would inevitably increase detention due to curtailing voluntary departure (as discussed here). Unfortunately the Commission’s claim in its new communication that its 2018 proposal is ‘promoting’ voluntary return is therefore simply false. Trump-style falsehoods have no place in the discussion of EU immigration or asylum law.

      The latest Eurodac proposal would not do much compared to the 2016 proposal – but then, the 2016 proposal would already constitute an enormous increase in the amount of data collected and shared by that system.

      Some elements of the package are more positive. The possibility for refugees and people with subsidiary protection to get EU long-term residence status earlier would be an important step toward making asylum ‘valid throughout the Union’, as referred to in the Treaties. The wider definition of family members, and the retention of the full sovereignty clause, may lead to some fairer results under the Dublin system. Future plans to improve the long-term residents’ Directive are long overdue. The Commission’s sound legal assessment that no one should be prosecuted for acting on their obligations to rescue people in distress at sea is welcome. The quasi-agreed text of the reception conditions Directive explicitly rules out Trump-style separate detention of children.

      No proposals from the EU can solve the underlying political issue: a chunk of public opinion is hostile to more migration, whether in frontline Member States, other Member States, or transit countries outside the EU. The politics is bound to affect what Member States and non-EU countries alike are willing to agree to. And for the same reason, even if a set of amendments to the system is ultimately agreed, there will likely be continuing issues of implementation, especially illegal pushbacks and refusals to accept relocation.

      https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/09/first-analysis-of-eus-new-asylum.html?spref=fb

    • Pacte européen sur les migrations et l’asile : Le rendez-vous manqué de l’UE

      Le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile présenté par la Commission ce 23 septembre, loin de tirer les leçons de l’échec et du coût humain intolérable des politiques menées depuis 30 ans, s’inscrit dans la continuité des logiques déjà largement éprouvées, fondées sur une approche répressive et sécuritaire au service de l’endiguement et des expulsions et au détriment d’une politique d’accueil qui s’attache à garantir et à protéger la dignité et les droits fondamentaux.

      Des « nouveaux » camps européens aux frontières pour filtrer les personnes arrivées sur le territoire européen et expulser le plus grand nombre

      En réaction au drame des incendies qui ont ravagé le camp de Moria sur l’île grecque de Lesbos, la commissaire européenne aux affaires intérieures, Ylva Johansson, affirmait le 17 septembre devant les députés européens qu’« il n’y aurait pas d’autres Moria » mais de « véritables centres d’accueil » aux frontières européennes.

      Si le nouveau pacte prévoie effectivement la création de « nouveaux » camps conjuguée à une « nouvelle » procédure accélérée aux frontières, ces derniers s’apparentent largement à l’approche hotspot mise en œuvre par l’Union européenne (UE) depuis 2015 afin d’organiser la sélection des personnes qu’elle souhaite accueillir et l’expulsion, depuis la frontière, de tous celles qu’elle considère « indésirables ».

      Le pacte prévoie ainsi la mise en place « d’un contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire pour toutes les personnes qui se présentent aux frontières extérieures ou après un débarquement, à la suite d’une opération de recherche et de sauvetage ». Il s’agira, pour les pays situés à la frontière extérieure de l’UE, de procéder – dans un délai de 5 jours et avec l’appui des agences européennes (l’agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes – Frontex et le Bureau européen d’appui en matière d’asile – EASO) – à des contrôles d’identité (prise d’empreintes et enregistrement dans les bases de données européennes) doublés de contrôles sécuritaires et sanitaires afin de procéder à un tri préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire, permettant d’orienter ensuite les personne vers :

      Une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière pour celles possédant une nationalité pour laquelle le taux de reconnaissance d’une protection internationale, à l’échelle de l’UE, est inférieure à 20%
      Une procédure d’asile normale pour celles considérées comme éligibles à une protection.
      Une procédure d’expulsion immédiate, depuis la frontière, pour toute celles qui auront été rejetées par ce dispositif de tri, dans un délai de 12 semaines.

      Pendant cette procédure de filtrage à la frontière, les personnes seraient considérées comme n’étant pas encore entrées sur le territoire européen ce qui permettrait aux Etats de déroger aux conventions de droit international qui s’y appliquent.

      Un premier projet pilote est notamment prévu à Lesbos, conjointement avec les autorités grecques, pour installer un nouveau camp sur l’île avec l’appui d’une Task Force européenne, directement placée sous le contrôle de la direction générale des affaires intérieure de la Commission européenne (DG HOME).

      Difficile de voir où se trouve l’innovation dans la proposition présentée par la Commission. Si ce n’est que les États européens souhaitent pousser encore plus loin à la fois la logique de filtrage à ces frontières ainsi que la sous-traitance de leur contrôle. Depuis l’été 2018, l’Union européenne défend la création de « centres contrôlés au sein de l’UE » d’une part et de « plateformes de débarquement dans les pays tiers » d’autre part. L’UE, à travers ce nouveau mécanisme, vise à organiser l’expulsion rapide des migrants qui sont parvenus, souvent au péril de leur vie, à pénétrer sur son territoire. Pour ce faire, la coopération accrue avec les gardes-frontières des États non européens et l’appui opérationnel de l’agence Frontex sont encore et toujours privilégiés.
      Un « nouvel écosystème en matière de retour »

      L’obsession européenne pour l’amélioration du « taux de retour » se retrouve au cœur de ce nouveau pacte, en repoussant toujours plus les limites en matière de coopération extérieure et d’enfermement des personnes étrangères jugées indésirables et en augmentant de façon inédite ses moyens opérationnels.

      Selon l’expression de Margaritis Schinas, commissaire grec en charge de la « promotion du mode de vie européen », la nouvelle procédure accélérée aux frontières s’accompagnera d’« un nouvel écosystème européen en matière de retour ». Il sera piloté par un « nouveau coordinateur de l’UE chargé des retours » ainsi qu’un « réseau de haut niveau coordonnant les actions nationales » avec le soutien de l’agence Frontex, qui devrait devenir « le bras opérationnel de la politique de retour européenne ».

      Rappelons que Frontex a vu ses moyens décuplés ces dernières années, notamment en vue d’expulser plus de personnes migrantes. Celle-ci a encore vu ses moyens renforcés depuis l’entrée en vigueur de son nouveau règlement le 4 décembre 2019 dont la Commission souhaite accélérer la mise en œuvre effective. Au-delà d’une augmentation de ses effectifs et de la possibilité d’acquérir son propre matériel, l’agence bénéficie désormais de pouvoirs étendus pour identifier les personnes « expulsables » du territoire européen, obtenir les documents de voyage nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de leurs expulsions ainsi que pour coordonner des opérations d’expulsion au service des Etats membres.

      La Commission souhaite également faire aboutir, d’ici le second trimestre 2021, le projet de révision de la directive européenne « Retour », qui constitue un recul sans précédent du cadre de protection des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : L’expulsion au cœur des politiques migratoires européennes, 22 mai 2019
      Des « partenariats sur-mesure » avec les pays d’origine et de transit

      La Commission étend encore redoubler d’efforts afin d’inciter les Etats non européens à participer activement à empêcher les départs vers l’Europe ainsi qu’à collaborer davantage en matière de retour et de réadmission en utilisant l’ensemble des instruments politiques à sa disposition. Ces dernières années ont vu se multiplier les instruments européens de coopération formelle (à travers la signature, entre autres, d’accords de réadmission bilatéraux ou multilatéraux) et informelle (à l’instar de la tristement célèbre déclaration entre l’UE et la Turquie de mars 2016) à tel point qu’il est devenu impossible, pour les États ciblés, de coopérer avec l’UE dans un domaine spécifique sans que les objectifs européens en matière migratoire ne soient aussi imposés.

      L’exécutif européen a enfin souligné sa volonté de d’exploiter les possibilités offertes par le nouveau règlement sur les visas Schengen, entré en vigueur en février 2020. Celui-ci prévoie d’évaluer, chaque année, le degré de coopération des Etats non européens en matière de réadmission. Le résultat de cette évaluation permettra d’adopter une décision de facilitation de visa pour les « bon élèves » ou à l’inverse, d’imposer des mesures de restrictions de visas aux « mauvais élèves ». Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Expulsions contre visas : le droit à la mobilité marchandé, 2 février 2020.

      Conduite au seul prisme des intérêts européens, cette politique renforce le caractère historiquement déséquilibré des relations de « coopération » et entraîne en outre des conséquences désastreuses sur les droits des personnes migrantes, notamment celui de quitter tout pays, y compris le leur. Sous couvert d’aider ces pays à « se développer », les mesures « incitatives » européennes ne restent qu’un moyen de poursuivre ses objectifs et d’imposer sa vision des migrations. En coopérant davantage avec les pays d’origine et de transit, parmi lesquelles des dictatures et autres régimes autoritaires, l’UE renforce l’externalisation de ses politiques migratoires, sous-traitant la gestion des exilées aux Etats extérieurs à l’UE, tout en se déresponsabilisant des violations des droits perpétrées hors de ses frontières.
      Solidarité à la carte, entre relocalisation et expulsion

      Le constat d’échec du système Dublin – machine infernale de l’asile européen – conjugué à la volonté de parvenir à trouver un consensus suite aux profonds désaccords qui avaient mené les négociations sur Dublin IV dans l’impasse, la Commission souhaite remplacer l’actuel règlement de Dublin par un nouveau règlement sur la gestion de l’asile et de l’immigration, liant étroitement les procédures d’asile aux procédures d’expulsion.

      Les quotas de relocalisation contraignants utilisés par le passé, à l’instar du mécanisme de relocalisation mis en place entre 2015 et 2017 qui fut un échec tant du point de vue du nombre de relocalisations (seulement 25 000 relocalisations sur les 160 000 prévues) que du refus de plusieurs Etats d’y participer, semblent être abandonnés.

      Le nouveau pacte propose donc un nouveau mécanisme de solidarité, certes obligatoire mais flexible dans ses modalités. Ainsi les Etats membres devront choisir, selon une clé de répartition définie :

      Soit de participer à l’effort de relocalisation des personnes identifiées comme éligibles à la protection internationale depuis les frontières extérieures pour prendre en charge l’examen de leur demande d’asile.
      Soit de participer au nouveau concept de « parrainage des retours » inventé par la Commission européenne. Concrètement, il s’agit d’être « solidaire autrement », en s’engageant activement dans la politique de retour européenne par la mise en œuvre des expulsions des personnes que l’UE et ses Etats membres souhaitent éloigner du territoire, avec la possibilité de concentrer leurs efforts sur les nationalités pour lesquelles leurs perspectives de faire aboutir l’expulsion est la plus élevée.

      De nouvelles règles pour les « situations de crise et de force majeure »

      Le pacte prévoie d’abroger la directive européenne relative à des normes minimales pour l’octroi d’une protection temporaire en cas d’afflux massif de personnes déplacées, au profit d’un nouveau règlement européen relatif aux « situations de crise et de force majeure ». L’UE et ses Etats membres ont régulièrement essuyé les critiques des acteurs de la société civile pour n’avoir jamais activé la procédure prévue par la directive de 2001, notamment dans le cadre de situation exceptionnelle telle que la crise de l’accueil des personnes arrivées aux frontières sud de l’UE en 2015.

      Le nouveau règlement prévoie notamment qu’en cas de « situation de crise ou de force majeure » les Etats membres pourraient déroger aux règles qui s’appliquent en matière d’asile, en suspendant notamment l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant un durée d’un mois maximum. Cette mesure entérine des pratiques contraires au droit international et européen, à l’instar de ce qu’a fait la Grèce début mars 2020 afin de refouler toutes les personnes qui tenteraient de pénétrer le territoire européen depuis la Turquie voisine. Voir notre précédente actualité sur le sujet : Frontière Grèce-Turquie : de l’approche hotspot au scandale de la guerre aux migrant·e ·s, 3 mars 2020

      Cette proposition représente un recul sans précédent du droit d’asile aux frontières et fait craindre de multiples violations du principe de non refoulement consacré par la Convention de Genève.

      Bien loin d’engager un changement de cap des politiques migratoires européennes, le nouveau pacte européen migrations et asile ne semble n’être qu’un nouveau cadre de plus pour poursuivre une approche des mouvements migratoires qui, de longue date, s’est construite autour de la volonté d’empêcher les arrivées aux frontières et d’organiser un tri parmi les personnes qui auraient réussi à braver les obstacles pour atteindre le territoire européen, entre celles considérées éligibles à la demande d’asile et toutes les autres qui devraient être expulsées.

      De notre point de vue, cela signifie surtout que des milliers de personnes continueront à être privées de liberté et à subir les dispositifs répressifs des Etats membres de l’Union européenne. Les conséquences néfastes sur la dignité humaine et les droits fondamentaux de cette approche sont flagrantes, les personnes exilées et leurs soutiens y sont confrontées tous les jours.

      Encore une fois, des moyens très importants sont consacrés à financer l’érection de barrières physiques, juridiques et technologiques ainsi que la construction de camps sur les routes migratoires tandis qu’ils pourraient utilement être redéployés pour accueillir dignement et permettre un accès inconditionnel au territoire européen pour les personnes bloquées à ses frontières extérieures afin d’examiner avec attention et impartialité leurs situations et assurer le respect effectif des droits de tou∙te∙s.

      Nous appelons à un changement radical des politiques migratoires, pour une Europe qui encourage les solidarités, fondée sur la protection des droits humains et la dignité humaine afin d’assurer la protection des personnes et non pas leur exclusion.

      https://www.lacimade.org/pacte-europeen-sur-les-migrations-et-lasile-le-rendez-vous-manque-de-lue

    • EU’s new migrant ‘pact’ is as squalid as its refugee camps

      Governments need to share responsibility for asylum seekers, beyond merely ejecting the unwanted

      One month after fires swept through Europe’s largest, most squalid refugee camp, the EU’s migration policies present a picture as desolate as the blackened ruins of Moria on the Greek island of Lesbos. The latest effort at overhauling these policies is a European Commission “pact on asylum and migration”, which is not a pact at all. Its proposals sharply divide the EU’s 27 governments.

      In an attempt to appease central and eastern European countries hostile to admitting asylum-seekers, the commission suggests, in an Orwellian turn of phrase, that they should operate “relocation and return sponsorships”, dispatching people refused entry to their places of origin. This sort of task is normally reserved for nightclub bouncers.

      The grim irony is that Hungary and Poland, two countries that would presumably be asked to take charge of such expulsions, are the subject of EU disciplinary proceedings due to alleged violations of the rule of law. It remains a mystery how, if the commission proposal moves forward, the EU will succeed in binding Hungary and Poland into a common asylum policy and bend them into accepting EU definitions of the rule of law.

      Perhaps the best thing to be said of the commission’s plan is that, unlike the UK government, EU policymakers are not toying with hare-brained schemes of sending asylum-seekers to Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. Such options are the imagined privilege of a former imperial power not divested of all its far-flung possessions.

      Yet the commission’s initiative still reeks of wishful thinking. It foresees a process in which authorities swiftly check the identities, security status and health of irregular migrants, before returning them home, placing them in the asylum system or putting them in temporary facilities. This will supposedly decongest EU border zones, as governments will agree how to relocate new arrivals. But it is precisely the lack of such agreement since 2015 that led to Moria’s disgraceful conditions.

      The commission should not be held responsible for governments failing to shoulder their responsibilities. It is also justified in emphasising the need for a strong EU frontier. This is a precondition for free movement inside the bloc, vital for a flourishing single market.

      True, the Schengen system of border-free internal travel is curtailed at present because of the pandemic, not to mention restrictions introduced in some countries after the 2015 refugee and migrant crisis. But no government wants to abandon Schengen. Where they fall out with each other is over the housing of refugees and migrants.

      Europe’s overcrowded, unhygienic refugee camps, and the paralysis that grips EU policies, are all the more shameful in that governments no longer face a border emergency. Some 60,800 irregular migrants crossed into the EU between January and August, 14 per cent less than the same period in 2019, according to the EU border agency.

      By contrast, there were 1.8m illegal border crossings in 2015, a different order of magnitude. Refugees from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria made desperate voyages across the Mediterranean, with thousands drowning in ramshackle boats. Some countries, led by Germany and Sweden, were extremely generous in opening their doors to refugees. Others were not.

      The roots of today’s problems lie in the measures devised to address that crisis, above all a 2016 accord with Turkey. Irregular migrants were kept on Moria and other Greek islands, designated “hotspots”, in the expectation that failed asylum applicants would be smoothly returned to Turkey, its coffers replenished by billions of euros in EU assistance. In practice, few went back to Turkey and the understaffed, underfunded “hotspots” became places of tension between refugees and locals.

      Unable to agree on a relocation scheme among themselves, EU governments lapsed into a de facto policy of deterrence of irregular migrants. The pandemic provided an excuse for Italy and Malta to close their ports to people rescued at sea. Visiting the Greek-Turkish border in March, Ursula von der Leyen, the commission president, declared: “I thank Greece for being our European aspida [shield].”

      The legitimacy of EU refugee policies depends on adherence to international law, as well the bloc’s own rules. Its practical success requires all governments to share a responsibility for asylum-seekers that goes beyond ejecting unwanted individuals. Otherwise the EU will fall into the familiar trap of cobbling together unsatisfactory half-measures that guarantee more trouble in the future.

      https://www.ft.com/content/c50c6b9c-75a8-40b1-900d-a228faa382dc?segmentid=acee4131-99c2-09d3-a635-873e61754

    • The EU’s pact against migration, Part One

      The EU Commission’s proposal for a ‘New Pact for Migration and Asylum’ offers no prospect of ending the enduring mobility conflict, opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The ’New Pact for Migration and Asylum’, announced by the European Commission in July 2019, was finally presented on September 23, 2020. The Pact was eagerly anticipated as it was described as a “fresh start on migration in Europe”, acknowledging not only that Dublin had failed, but also that the negotiations between European member states as to what system might replace it had reached a standstill.

      The fire in Moria that left more than 13.000 people stranded in the streets of Lesvos island offered a glaring symbol of the failure of the current EU policy. The public outcry it caused and expressions of solidarity it crystallised across Europe pressured the Commission to respond through the publication of its Pact.

      Considering the trajectory of EU migration policies over the last decades, the particular position of the Commission within the European power structure and the current political conjuncture of strong anti-migration positions in Europe, we did not expect the Commission’s proposal to address the mobility conflict underlying its migration policy crisis in a constructive way. And indeed, the Pact’s main promise is to manage the diverging positions of member states through a new mechanism of “flexible solidarity” between member states in sharing the “burden” of migrants who have arrived on European territory. Perpetuating the trajectory of the last decades, it however remains premised on keeping most migrants from the global South out at all cost. The “New Pact” then is effectively a pact between European states against migrants. The Pact, which will be examined and possibly adopted by the European Parliament and Council in the coming months, confirms the impasse to which three decades of European migration and asylum policy have led, and an absence of any political imagination worthy of the name.
      The EU’s migration regime’s failed architecture

      The current architecture of the European border regime is based on two main and intertwined pillars: the Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC, or Schengen II) and the Dublin Convention, both signed in 1990, and gradually enforced in the following years.[1]

      Created outside the EC/EU context, they became the central rationalities of the emerging European border and migration regime after their incorporation into EU law through the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/99). Schengen instituted the EU’s territory as an area of free movement for its citizens and, as a direct consequence, reinforced the exclusion of citizens of the global South and pushed control towards its external borders.

      However this profound transformation of European borders left unchanged the unbalanced systemic relations between Europe and the Global South, within which migrants’ movements are embedded. As a result, this policy shift did not stop migrants from reaching the EU but rather illegalised their mobility, forcing them to resort to precarious migration strategies and generating an easily exploitable labour force that has become a large-scale and permanent feature of EU economies.

      The more than 40,000 migrant deaths recorded at the EU’s borders by NGOs since the end of the 1980s are the lethal outcomes of this enduring mobility conflict opposing the movements of illegalised migrants to the EU’s restrictive migration policies.

      The second pillar of the EU’s migration architecture, the Dublin Convention, addressed asylum seekers and their allocation between member-states. To prevent them from filing applications in several EU countries – derogatively referred to as “asylum shopping” – the 2003 Dublin regulation states that the asylum seekers’ first country of entry into the EU is responsible for processing their claims. Dublin thus created an uneven European geography of (ir)responsibility that allowed the member states not directly situated at the intersection of European borders and routes of migration to abnegate their responsibility to provide shelter and protection, and placed a heavier “burden” on the shoulders of states located at the EU’s external borders.

      This unbalanced architecture, around which the entire Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was constructed, would begin to wobble as soon as the number of people arriving on the EU’s shores rose, leading to crisis-driven policy responses to prevent the migration regime from collapsing under the pressure of migrants’ refusal to be assigned to a country that was not of their choosing, and conflicts between member states.

      As a result, the development of a European border, migration and asylum policy has been driven by crisis and is inherently reactive. This pattern particularly holds for the last decade, when the large-scale movements of migrants to Europe in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 put the EU migration regime into permanent crisis mode and prompted hasty reforms. As of 2011, Italy allowed Tunisians to move on, leading to the re-introduction of border controls by states such as France, while the same year the 2011 European Court of Human Rights’ judgement brought Dublin deportations to Greece to a halt because of the appalling reception and living conditions there. The increasing refusal by asylum seekers to surrender their fingerprints – the core means of implementing Dublin – as of 2013 further destabilized the migration regime.

      The instability only grew when in April 2015, more then 1,200 people died in two consecutive shipwrecks, forcing the Commission to publish its ‘European Agenda for Migration’ in May 2015. The 2015 agenda announced the creation of the hotspot system in the hope of re-stabilising the European migration regime through a targeted intervention of European agencies at Europe’s borders. Essentially, the hotspot approach offered a deal to EU member states: comprehensive registration in Europeanised structures (the hotspots) by so-called “front-line states” – thus re-imposing Dublin – in exchange for relocation of part of the registered migrants to other EU countries – thereby alleviating front-line states of part of their “burden”.

      This plan however collapsed before it could ever work, as it was immediately followed by the large-scale summer arrivals of 2015 as migrants trekked across Europe’s borders. It was simultaneously boycotted by several member states who refused relocations and continue to lead the charge in fomenting an explicit anti-migration agenda in the EU. While border controls were soon reintroduced, relocations never materialised in a meaningful manner in the years that followed.

      With the Dublin regime effectively paralysed and the EU unable to agree on a new mechanism for the distribution of asylum seekers within Europe, the EU resorted to the decades-old policies that had shaped the European border and migration regime since its inception: keeping migrants out at all cost through border control implemented by member states, European agencies or outsourced to third countries.

      Considering the profound crisis the turbulent movements of migrants had plunged the EU into in the summer of 2015, no measure was deemed excessive in achieving this exclusionary end: neither the tacit acceptance of violent expulsions and push-backs by Spain and Greece, nor the outsourcing of border control to Libyan torturers, nor the shameless collaboration with dictatorial regimes such as Turkey.

      Under the guise of “tackling the root causes of migration”, development aid was diverted and used to impose border externalisation and deportation agreements. But the external dimension of the EU’s migration regime has proven just as unstable as its internal one – as the re-opening of borders by Turkey in March 2020 demonstrates. The movements of illegalised migrants towards the EU could never be entirely contained and those who reached the shores of Europe were increasingly relegated to infrastructures of detention. Even if keeping thousands of migrants stranded in the hell of Moria may not have been part of the initial hotspot plan, it certainly has been the outcome of the EU’s internal blockages and ultimately effective in shoring up the EU’s strategy of deterrence.

      The “New Pact” perpetuating the EU’s failed policy of closure

      Today the “New Pact”, promised for Spring 2020 and apparently forgotten at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, has been revived in a hurry to address the destruction of Moria hotspot. While detailed analysis of the regulations that it proposes are beyond the scope of this article,[2] the broad intentions of the Pact’s rationale are clear.

      Despite all its humane and humanitarian rhetoric and some language critically addressing the manifest absence of the rule of law at the border of Europe, the Commission’s pact is a pact against migration. Taking stock of the continued impasse in terms of internal distribution of migrants, it re-affirms the EU’s central objective of reducing, massively the number of asylum seekers to be admitted to Europe. It promises to do so by continuing to erect chains of externalised border control along migrants’ entire trajectories (what it refers to as the “whole-of-route approach”).

      Those who do arrive should be swiftly screened and sorted in an infrastructure of detention along the borders of Europe. The lucky few who will succeed in fitting their lives into the shrinking boxes of asylum law are to be relocated to other EU countries in function of a mechanism of distribution based on population size and wealth of member states.

      Whether this will indeed undo the imbalances of the Dublin regime remains an open question[3], nevertheless, this relocation key is one of the few positive steps offered by the Pact since it comes closer to migrants’ own “relocation key” but still falls short of granting asylum seekers the freedom to choose their country of protection and residence.[4] The majority of rejected asylum seekers – which may be determined on the basis of an extended understanding of the “safe third country” notion – is to be funnelled towards deportations operated by the EU states refusing relocation. The Commission hopes deportations will be made smoother after a newly appointed “EU Return Coordinator” will have bullied countries of origin into accepting their nationals using the carrot of development aid and the stick of visa sanctions. The Commission seems to believe that with fewer expected arrivals and fewer migrants ending up staying in Europe, and with its mechanism of “flexible solidarity” allowing for a selective participation in relocations or returns depending on the taste of its member states, it can both bridge the gap between member states’ interests and push for a deeper Europeanisation of the policy field in which its own role will become more central.

      Thus, the EU Commission’s attempt to square the circle of member states’ conflicting interests has resulted in a European pact against migration, which perpetuates the promises of the EU’s (anti-)migration policy over the last three decades: externalisation, enhanced borders, accelerated asylum procedures, detention and deportations to prevent and deter migrants from the global South. It seeks to strike yet another deal between European member states, without consulting – and at the expense of – migrants themselves. Because most of the policy means contained in the pact are not new, and have always failed to durably end illegalised migration – instead they have created a large precaritised population at the heart of Europe – we do not see how they would work today. Migrants will continue to arrive, and many will remain stranded in front-line states or other EU states as they await deportation. As such, the outcome of the pact (if it is agreed upon) is likely a perpetuation and generalisation of the hotspot system, the very system whose untenability – glaringly demonstrated by Moria’s fire – prompted the presentation of the New Pact in the first place. Even if the Commission’s “no more Morias” rhetoric would like to persuade us of the opposite,[5] the ruins of Moria point to the past as well as the potential future of the CEAS if the Commission has its way.

      We are dismayed at the loss of yet another opportunity for Europe to fundamentally re-orient its policy of closure, one which is profoundly at odds with the reality of large-scale displacement in an unequal and interconnected world. We are dismayed at the prospect of more suffering and more political crises that can only be the outcome of this continued policy failure. Clearly, an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with the movements of migration is called for. One which actually aims to de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict. One which starts from the reality of the movements of migrants and offers a frame for it to unfold rather than seeks to suppress and deny it.

      Notes and references

      [1] We have offered an extensive analysis of the following argument in previous articles. See in particular : Bernd Kasparek. 2016. “Complementing Schengen: The Dublin System and the European Border and Migration Regime”. In Migration Policy and Practice, edited by Harald Bauder and Christian Matheis, 59–78. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship. Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Charles Heller and Lorenzo Pezzani. 2016. “Ebbing and Flowing: The EU’s Shifting Practices of (Non-)Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis”. Near Futures Online. No 1. Available here.

      [2] For first analyses see Steve Peers. 2020. “First analysis of the EU’s new asylum proposals”, EU Law Analysis, 25 September 2020; Sergio Carrera. 2020. “Whose Pact? The Cognitive Dimensions of the New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum”, CEPS, September 2020.

      [3] Carrera, ibid.

      [4] For a discussion of migration of migrants’ own relocation key, see Philipp Lutz, David Kaufmann and Anna Stütz. 2020. “Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees”, Journal of Common Market Studies 2020 Volume 58. Number 3. pp. 757–775. To compare the actual asylum applications across Europe over the last years with different relocations keys, see the tool developed by Etienne Piguet.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/the-eus-pact-against-migration-part-one

      #whole-of-route_approach #relocalisation #clé_de_relocalisation #relocation_key #pays-tiers_sûrs #EU_Return_Coordinator #solidarité_flexible #externalisation #new_pact

    • Towards a European pact with migrants, Part Two

      We call for a new Pact that addresses the reality of migrants’ movements, the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.

      In Part One, we analysed the EU’s new Pact against migration. Here, we call for an entirely different approach to how Europe engages with migration, one which offers a legal frame for migration to unfold, and addresses the systemic conditions leading people to flee their homes as well as the root causes of Europe’s racism.Let us imagine for a moment that the EU Commission truly wanted, and was in a position, to reorient the EU’s migration policy in a direction that might actually de-escalate and transform the enduring mobility conflict: what might its pact with migrants look like?

      The EU’s pact with migrants might start from three fundamental premises. First, it would recognize that any policy that is entirely at odds with social practices is bound to generate conflict, and ultimately fail. A migration policy must start from the social reality of migration and provide a frame for it to unfold. Second, the pact would acknowledge that no conflict can be brought to an end unilaterally. Any process of conflict transformation must bring together the conflicting parties, and seek to address their needs, interests and values so that they no longer clash with each other. In particular, migrants from the global South must be included in the definition of the policies that concern them. Third, it would recognise, as Tendayi Achiume has put it, that migrants from the global South are no strangers to Europe.[1] They have long been included in the expansive webs of empire. Migration and borders are embedded in these unequal relations, and no end to the mobility conflict can be achieved without fundamentally transforming them. Based on these premises, the EU’s pact with migrants might contain the following four core measures:
      Global justice and conflict prevention

      Instead of claiming to tackle the “root causes” of migration by diverting and instrumentalising development aid towards border control, the EU’s pact with migrants would end all European political and economic relations that contribute to the crises leading to mass displacement. The EU would end all support to dictatorial regimes, would ban all weapon exports, terminate all destabilising military interventions. It would cancel unfair trade agreements and the debts of countries of the global South. It would end its massive carbon emissions that contribute to the climate crisis. Through these means, the EU would not claim to end migration perceived as a “problem” for Europe, but it would contribute to allowing more people to live a dignified life wherever they are and decrease forced migration, which certainly is a problem for migrants. A true commitment to global justice and conflict prevention and resolution is necessary if Europe wishes to limit the factors that lead too many people onto the harsh paths of exile in their countries and regions, a small proportion of whom reach European shores.
      Tackling the “root causes” of European racism

      While the EU’s so-called “global approach” to migration has in fact been one-sided, focused exclusively on migration as “the problem” rather then the processes that drive the EU’s policies of exclusion, the EU’s pact with migrants would boldly tackle the “root causes” of racism and xenophobia in Europe. Bold policies designed to address the EU’s colonial past and present and the racial imaginaries it has unleashed would be proposed, a positive vision for living in common in diverse societies affirmed, and a more inclusive and fair economic system would be established in Europe to decrease the resentment of European populations which has been skilfully channelled against migrants and racialised people.
      Universal freedom of movement

      By tackling the causes of large-scale displacement and of exclusionary migration policies, the EU would be able to de-escalate the mobility conflict, and could thus propose a policy granting all migrants legal pathways to access and stay in Europe. As an immediate outcome of the institution of right to international mobility, migrants would no longer resort to smugglers and risk their lives crossing the sea – and thus no longer be in need of being rescued. Using safe and legal means of travel would also, in the time of Covid-19 pandemic, allow migrants to adopt all sanitary measures that are necessary to protect migrants and those they encounter. No longer policed through military means, migration could appear as a normal process that does not generate fear. Frontex, the European border agency, would be defunded, and concentrate its limited activities on detecting actual threats to the EU rather then constructing vulnerable populations as “risks”. In a world that would be less unequal and in which people would have the possibly to lead a dignified life wherever they are, universal freedom of movement would not lead to an “invasion” of Europe. Circulatory movement rather then permanent settlement would be frequent. Migrants’ legal status would no longer allow employers to push working conditions down. A European asylum system would continue to exist, to grant protection and support to those in need. The vestiges of the EU’s hotspots and detention centres might be turned into ministries of welcome, which would register and redirect people to the place of their choice. Registration would thus be a mere certification of having taken the first step towards European citizenship, transforming the latter into a truly post-national institution, a far horizon which current EU treaties only hint at.
      Democratizing borders

      Considering that all European migration policies to date have been fundamentally undemocratic – in that they were imposed on a group of people – migrants – who had no say in the legislative and political process defining the laws that govern their movement – the pact would instead be the outcome of considerable consultative process with migrants and the organisations that support them, as well the states of the global South. The pact, following from Étienne Balibar’s suggestion, would in turn propose to permanently democratise borders by instituting “a multilateral, negotiated control of their working by the populations themselves (including, of course, migrant populations),” within “new representative institutions” that “are not merely ‘territorial’ and certainly not purely national.”[2] In such a pact, the original promise of Europe as a post-national project would finally be revived.

      Such a policy orientation may of course appear as nothing more then a fantasy. And yet it appears evident to us that the direction we suggest is the only realistic one. European citizens and policy makers alike must realise that the question is not whether migrants will exercise their freedom to cross borders, but at what human and political cost. As a result, it is far more realistic to address the processes within which the mobility conflict is embedded, than seeking to ban human mobility. As the Black Lives Matter’s slogan “No justice no peace!” resonating in the streets of the world over recent months reminds us, without mobility justice, [3] their can be no end to mobility conflict.
      The challenges ahead for migrant solidarity movements

      Our policy proposals are perfectly realistic in relation to migrants’ movements and the processes shaping them, yet we are well aware that they are not on the agenda of neoliberal and nationalist Europe. If the EU Commission has squandered yet another opportunity to reorient the EU’s migration policy, it is simply that this Europe, governed by these member states and politicians, has lost the capacity to offer bold visions of democracy, freedom and justice for itself and the world. As such, we have little hope for a fundamental reorientation of the EU’s policies. The bleak prospect is of the perpetuation of the mobility conflict, and the human suffering and political crises it generates.

      What are those who seek to support migrants to do in this context?

      We must start by a sobering note addressed to the movement we are part of: the fire of Moria is not only a symptom and symbol of the failures of the EU’s migration policies and member states, but also of our own strategies. After all, since the hotspots were proposed in 2015 we have tirelessly denounced them, and documented the horrendous living conditions they have created. NGOs have litigated against them, but efforts have been turned down by a European Court of Human Rights that appears increasingly reluctant to position itself on migration-related issues and is thereby contributing to the perpetuation of grave violations by states.

      And despite the extraordinary mobilisation of civil society in alliance with municipalities across Europe who have declared themselves ready to welcome migrants, relocations never materialised on any significant scale. After five years of tireless mobilization, the hotspots still stand, with thousands of asylum seekers trapped in them.

      While the conditions leading to the fire are still being clarified, it appears that the migrants held hostage in Moria took it into their own hands to try to get rid of the camp through the desperate act of burning it to the ground. As such, while we denounce the EU’s policies, our movements are urgently in need of re-evaluating their own modes of action, and re-imagining them more effectively.

      We have no lessons to give, as we share these shortcomings. But we believe that some of the directions we have suggested in our utopian Pact with migrants can guide migrant solidarity movements as well , as they may be implemented from the bottom-up in the present and help reopen our political imagination.

      The freedom to move is not, or not only, a distant utopia, that may be instituted by states in some distant future. It can also be seen as a right and freedom that illegalised migrants seize on a day-to-day basis as they cross borders without authorisation, and persist in living where they choose.

      Freedom of movement can serve as a useful compass to direct and evaluate our practices of contestation and support. Litigation remains an important tool to counter the multiple forms of violence and violations that migrants face along their trajectories, even as we acknowledge that national and international courts are far from immune to the anti-migrant atmosphere within states. Forging infrastructures of support for migrants in the course of their mobility (such as the WatchTheMed Alarm Phone and the civilian rescue fleet) – and their stay (such as the many citizen platforms for housing )– is and will continue to be essential.

      While states seek to implement what they call an “integrated border management” that seeks to manage migrants’ unruly mobilities before, at, and after borders, we can think of our own networks as forming a fragmented yet interconnected “integrated border solidarity” along the migrants’ entire trajectory. The criminalisation of our acts of solidarity by states is proof that we are effective in disrupting the violence of borders.

      Solidarity cities have formed important nodes in these chains, as municipalities do have the capacity to enable migrants to live in dignity in urban spaces, and limit the reach of their security forces for example. Their dissonant voices of welcome have been important in demonstrating that segments of the European population, which are far from negligible, refuse to be complicit with the EU’s policies of closure and are ready to embody an open relation of solidarity with migrants and beyond. However we must also acknowledge that the prerogative of granting access to European states remains in the hands of central administrations, not in those of municipalities, and thus the readiness to welcome migrants has not allowed the latter to actually seek sanctuary.

      While humanitarian and humanist calls for welcome are important, we too need to locate migration and borders in a broader political and economic context – that of the past and present of empire – so that they can be understood as questions of (in)justice. Echoing the words of the late Edouard Glissant, as activists focusing on illegalised migration we should never forget that “to have to force one’s way across borders as a result of one’s misery is as scandalous as what founds that misery”.[4] As a result of this framing, many more alliances can be forged today between migrant solidarity movements and the global justice and climate justice movements, as well as anti-racist, anti-fascist, feminist and decolonial movements. Through such alliances, we may be better equipped to support migrants throughout their entire trajectories, and transform the conditions that constrain them today.

      Ultimately, to navigate its way out of its own impasses, it seems to us that migrant solidarity movements must address four major questions.

      First, what migration policy do we want? The predictable limits of the EU’s pact against migration may be an opportunity to forge our own alternative agenda.

      Second, how can we not only oppose the implementation of restrictive policies but shape the policy process itself so as to transform the field on which we struggle? Opposing the EU’s anti-migrant pact over the coming months may allow us to conduct new experiments.

      Third, as long as policies that deny basic principles of equality, freedom, justice, and our very common humanity, are still in place, how can we lead actions that disrupt them effectively? For example, what are the forms of nongovernmental evacuations that might support migrants in accessing Europe, and moving across its internal borders?

      Fourth, how can struggles around migration and borders be part of the forging of a more equal, free, just and sustainable world for all?

      The next months during which the EU’s Pact against migration will be discussed in front of the European Parliament and Council will see an uphill battle for all those who still believe in the possibility of a Europe of openness and solidarity. While we have no illusions as to the policy outcome, this is an opportunity we must seize, not only to claim that another Europe and another world is possible, but to start building them from below.

      Notes and references

      [1] Tendayi Achiume. 2019, “The Postcolonial Case for Rethinking Borders.” Dissent 66.3: pp.27-32.

      [2] Etienne Balibar. 2004. We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. Princeton: University Press, p. 108 and 117.

      [3] Mimi Sheller. 2018. Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes. London: Verso.

      [4] Edouard Glissant. 2006. “Il n’est frontière qu’on n’outrepasse”. Le Monde diplomatique, October 2006.

      https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/towards-pact-migrants-part-two

    • Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile : Afin de garantir un nouveau départ et d’éviter de reproduire les erreurs passées, certains éléments à risque doivent être reconsidérés et les aspects positifs étendus.

      L’engagement en faveur d’une approche plus humaine de la protection et l’accent mis sur les aspects positifs et bénéfiques de la migration avec lesquels la Commission européenne a lancé le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile sont les bienvenus. Cependant, les propositions formulées reflètent très peu cette rhétorique et ces ambitions. Au lieu de rompre avec les erreurs de la précédente approche de l’Union européenne (UE) et d’offrir un nouveau départ, le Pacte continue de se focaliser sur l’externalisation, la dissuasion, la rétention et le retour.

      Cette première analyse des propositions, réalisée par la société civile, a été guidée par les questions suivantes :

      Les propositions formulées sont-elles en mesure de garantir, en droit et en pratique, le respect des normes internationales et européennes ?
      Participeront-elles à un partage plus juste des responsabilités en matière d’asile au niveau de l’UE et de l’international ?
      Seront-elles susceptibles de fonctionner en pratique ?

      Au lieu d’un partage automatique des responsabilités, le Pacte introduit un système de Dublin, qui n’en porte pas le nom, plus complexe et un mécanisme de « parrainage au retour »

      Le Pacte sur la migration et l’asile a manqué l’occasion de réformer en profondeur le système de Dublin : le principe de responsabilité du premier pays d’arrivée pour examiner les demandes d’asile est, en pratique, maintenu. De plus, le Pacte propose un système complexe introduisant diverses formes de solidarité.

      Certains ajouts positifs dans les critères de détermination de l’Etat membre responsable de la demande d’asile sont à relever, par exemple, l’élargissement de la définition des membres de famille afin d’inclure les frères et sœurs, ainsi qu’un large éventail de membres de famille dans le cas des mineurs non accompagnés et la délivrance d’un diplôme ou d’une autre qualification par un Etat membre. Cependant, au regard de la pratique actuelle des Etats membres, il sera difficile de s’éloigner du principe du premier pays d’entrée comme l’option de départ en faveur des nouvelles considérations prioritaires, notamment le regroupement familial.

      Dans le cas d’un nombre élevé de personnes arrivées sur le territoire (« pression migratoire ») ou débarquées suite à des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, la solidarité entre Etats membres est requise. Les processus qui en découlent comprennent une série d’évaluations, d’engagements et de rapports devant être rédigés par les États membres. Si la réponse collective est insuffisante, la Commission européenne peut prendre des mesures correctives. Au lieu de promouvoir un mécanisme de soutien pour un partage prévisible des responsabilités, ces dispositions tendent plutôt à créer des formes de négociations entre États membres qui nous sont toutes devenues trop familières. La complexité des propositions soulève des doutes quant à leur application réelle en pratique.

      Les États membres sont autorisés à choisir le « parrainage de retour » à la place de la relocalisation de personnes sur leur territoire, ce qui indique une attention égale portée au retour et à la protection. Au lieu d’apporter un soutien aux Etats membres en charge d’un plus grand nombre de demandes de protection, cette proposition soulève de nombreuses préoccupations juridiques et relatives au respect des droits de l’homme, en particulier si le transfert vers l’Etat dit « parrain » se fait après l’expiration du délai de 8 mois. Qui sera en charge de veiller au traitement des demandeurs d’asile déboutés à leur arrivée dans des Etats qui n’acceptent pas la relocalisation ?

      Le Pacte propose d’étendre l’utilisation de la procédure à la frontière, y compris un recours accru à la rétention

      A défaut de rééquilibrer la responsabilité entre les États membres de l’UE, la proposition de règlement sur les procédures communes exacerbe la pression sur les États situés aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et sur les pays des Balkans occidentaux. La Commission propose de rendre, dans certains cas, les procédures d’asile et de retour à la frontière obligatoires. Cela s’appliquerait notamment aux ressortissants de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 20%. Ces procédures seraient facultatives lorsque les Etats membres appliquent les concepts de pays tiers sûr ou pays d’origine sûr. Toutefois, la Commission a précédemment proposé que ceux-ci deviennent obligatoires pour l’ensemble des Etats membres. Les associations réitèrent leurs inquiétudes quant à l’utilisation de ces deux concepts qui ont été largement débattus entre 2016 et 2019. Leur application obligatoire ne doit plus être proposée.

      La proposition de procédure à la frontière repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – notamment sur le fait que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’est pas éligible à un statut de protection et que l’examen des demandes de protection peut être effectué facilement et rapidement. Ni l’une ni l’autre ne sont correctes. En effet, en prenant en considération à la fois les décisions de première et de seconde instance dans toute l’UE il apparaît que la plupart des demandeurs d’asile dans l’UE au cours des trois dernières années ont obtenu un statut de protection. En outre, le Pacte ne doit pas persévérer dans cette approche erronée selon laquelle les procédures d’asile peuvent être conduites rapidement à travers la réduction de garanties et l’introduction d’un système de tri. La durée moyenne de la procédure d’asile aux Pays-Bas, souvent qualifiée d’ « élève modèle » pour cette pratique, dépasse un an et peut atteindre deux années jusqu’à ce qu’une décision soit prise.

      La proposition engendrerait deux niveaux de standards dans les procédures d’asile, largement déterminés par le pays d’origine de la personne concernée. Cela porte atteinte au droit individuel à l’asile et signifierait qu’un nombre accru de personnes seront soumises à une procédure de deuxième catégorie. Proposer aux Etats membres d’émettre une décision d’asile et d’éloignement de manière simultanée, sans introduire de garanties visant à ce que les principes de non-refoulement, d’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant, et de protection de la vie privée et familiale ne soient examinés, porte atteinte aux obligations qui découlent du droit international. La proposition formulée par la Commission supprime également l’effet suspensif automatique du recours, c’est-à-dire le droit de rester sur le territoire dans l’attente d’une décision finale rendue dans le cadre d’une procédure à la frontière.

      L’idée selon laquelle les personnes soumises à des procédures à la frontière sont considérées comme n’étant pas formellement entrées sur le territoire de l’État membre est trompeuse et contredit la récente jurisprudence de l’UE, sans pour autant modifier les droits de l’individu en vertu du droit européen et international.

      La proposition prive également les personnes de la possibilité d’accéder à des permis de séjour pour des motifs autres que l’asile et impliquera très probablement une privation de liberté pouvant atteindre jusqu’à 6 mois aux frontières de l’UE, c’est-à-dire un maximum de douze semaines dans le cadre de la procédure d’asile à la frontière et douze semaines supplémentaires en cas de procédure de retour à la frontière. En outre, les réformes suppriment le principe selon lequel la rétention ne doit être appliquée qu’en dernier recours dans le cadre des procédures aux frontières. En s’appuyant sur des restrictions plus systématiques des mouvements dans le cadre des procédures à la frontière, la proposition restreindra l’accès de l’individu aux services de base fournis par des acteurs qui ne pourront peut-être pas opérer à la frontière, y compris pour l’assistance et la représentation juridiques. Avec cette approche, on peut s’attendre aux mêmes échecs rencontrés dans la mise en œuvre des « hotspot » sur les îles grecques.

      La reconnaissance de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant comme élément primordial dans toutes les procédures pour les États membres est positive. Cependant, la Commission diminue les garanties de protection des enfants en n’exemptant que les mineurs non accompagnés ou âgés de moins de douze ans des procédures aux frontières. Ceci est en contradiction avec la définition internationale de l’enfant qui concerne toutes les personnes jusqu’à l’âge de dix-huit ans, telle qu’inscrite dans la Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant ratifiée par tous les États membres de l’UE.

      Dans les situations de crise, les États membres sont autorisés à déroger à d’importantes garanties qui soumettront davantage de personnes à des procédures d’asile de qualité inférieure

      La crainte d’iniquité procédurale est d’autant plus visible dans les situations où un État membre peut prétendre être confronté à une « situation exceptionnelle d’afflux massif » ou au risque d’une telle situation.

      Dans ces cas, le champ d’application de la procédure obligatoire aux frontières est considérablement étendu à toutes les personnes en provenance de pays dont le taux moyen de protection de l’UE est inférieur à 75%. La procédure d’asile à la frontière et la procédure de retour à la frontière peuvent être prolongées de huit semaines supplémentaires, soit cinq mois chacune, ce qui porte à dix mois la durée maximale de privation de liberté. En outre, les États membres peuvent suspendre l’enregistrement des demandes d’asile pendant quatre semaines et jusqu’à un maximum de trois mois. Par conséquent, si aucune demande n’est enregistrée pendant plusieurs semaines, les personnes sont susceptibles d’être exposées à un risque accru de rétention et de refoulement, et leurs droits relatifs à un accueil digne et à des services de base peuvent être gravement affectés.

      Cette mesure permet aux États membres de déroger à leur responsabilité de garantir un accès à l’asile et un examen efficace et équitable de l’ensemble des demandes d’asile, ce qui augmente ainsi le risque de refoulement. Dans certains cas extrêmes, notamment lorsque les États membres agissent en violation flagrante et persistante des obligations du droit de l’UE, le processus de demande d’autorisation à la Commission européenne pourrait être considéré comme une amélioration, étant donné qu’actuellement la loi est ignorée, sans consultation et ce malgré les critiques de la Commission européenne. Toutefois, cela ne peut être le point de départ de l’évaluation de cette proposition de la législation européenne. L’impact à grande échelle de cette dérogation offre la possibilité à ce qu’une grande majorité des personnes arrivant dans l’UE soient soumises à une procédure de second ordre.

      Pré-filtrage à la frontière : risques et opportunités

      La Commission propose un processus de « pré-filtrage à l’entrée » pour toutes les personnes qui arrivent de manière irrégulière aux frontières de l’UE, y compris à la suite d’un débarquement dans le cadre des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage. Le processus de pré-filtrage comprend des contrôles de sécurité, de santé et de vulnérabilité, ainsi que l’enregistrement des empreintes digitales, mais il conduit également à des décisions impactant l’accès à l’asile, notamment en déterminant si une personne doit être sujette à une procédure d’asile accélérée à la frontière, de relocalisation ou de retour. Ce processus peut durer jusqu’à 10 jours et doit être effectué au plus près possible de la frontière. Le lieu où les personnes seront placées et l’accès aux conditions matérielles d’accueil demeurent flous. Le filtrage peut également être appliqué aux personnes se trouvant sur le territoire d’un État membre, ce qui pourrait conduire à une augmentation de pratiques discriminatoires. Des questions se posent également concernant les droits des personnes soumises au filtrage, tels que l’accès à l’information, , l’accès à un avocat et au droit de contester la décision prise dans ce contexte ; les motifs de refus d’entrée ; la confidentialité et la protection des données collectées. Etant donné que les États membres peuvent facilement se décharger de leurs responsabilités en matière de dépistage médical et de vulnérabilité, il n’est pas certain que certains besoins seront effectivement détectés et pris en considération.

      Une initiative à saluer est la proposition d’instaurer un mécanisme indépendant des droits fondamentaux à la frontière. Afin qu’il garantisse une véritable responsabilité face aux violations des droits à la frontière, y compris contre les éloignements et les refoulements récurrents dans un grand nombre d’États membres, ce mécanisme doit être étendu au-delà de la procédure de pré-filtrage, être indépendant des autorités nationales et impliquer des organisations telles que les associations non gouvernementales.

      La proposition fait de la question du retour et de l’expulsion une priorité

      L’objectif principal du Pacte est clair : augmenter de façon significative le nombre de personnes renvoyées ou expulsées de l’UE. La création du poste de Coordinateur en charge des retours au sein de la Commission européenne et d’un directeur exécutif adjoint aux retours au sein de Frontex en sont la preuve, tandis qu’aucune nomination n’est prévue au sujet de la protection de garanties ou de la relocalisation. Le retour est considéré comme un élément admis dans la politique migratoire et le soutien pour des retours dignes, en privilégiant les retours volontaires, l’accès à une assistance au retour et l’aide à la réintégration, sont essentiels. Cependant, l’investissement dans le retour n’est pas une réponse adaptée au non-respect systématique des normes d’asile dans les États membres de l’UE.

      Rien de nouveau sur l’action extérieure : des propositions irréalistes qui risquent de continuer d’affaiblir les droits de l’homme

      La tension entre l’engagement rhétorique pour des partenariats mutuellement bénéfiques et la focalisation visant à placer la migration au cœur des relations entre l’UE et les pays tiers se poursuit. Les tentatives d’externaliser la responsabilité de l’asile et de détourner l’aide au développement, les mécanismes de visa et d’autres outils pour inciter les pays tiers à coopérer sur la gestion migratoire et les accords de réadmission sont maintenues. Cela ne représente pas seulement un risque allant à l’encontre de l’engagement de l’UE pour ses principes de développement, mais cela affaiblit également sa posture internationale en générant de la méfiance et de l’hostilité depuis et à l’encontre des pays tiers. De plus, l’usage d’accords informels et la coopération sécuritaire sur la gestion migratoire avec des pays tels que la Libye ou la Turquie risquent de favoriser les violations des droits de l’homme, d’encourager les gouvernements répressifs et de créer une plus grande instabilité.

      Un manque d’ambition pour des voies légales et sûres vers l’Europe

      L’opportunité pour l’UE d’indiquer qu’elle est prête à contribuer au partage des responsabilités pour la protection au niveau international dans un esprit de partenariat avec les pays qui accueillent la plus grande majorité des réfugiés est manquée. Au lieu de proposer un objectif ambitieux de réinstallation de réfugiés, la Commission européenne a seulement invité les Etats membres à faire plus et a converti les engagements de 2020 en un mécanisme biennal, ce qui résulte en la perte d’une année de réinstallation européenne.

      La reconnaissance du besoin de faciliter la migration de main-d’œuvre à travers différents niveaux de compétences est à saluer, mais l’importance de cette migration dans les économies et les sociétés européennes ne se reflète pas dans les ressources, les propositions et les actions allouées.

      Le soutien aux activités de recherche et de sauvetage et aux actions de solidarité doit être renforcé

      La tragédie humanitaire dans la mer Méditerranée nécessite encore une réponse y compris à travers un soutien financier et des capacités de recherches et de sauvetage. Cet enjeu ainsi que celui du débarquement sont pris en compte dans toutes les propositions, reconnaissant ainsi la crise humanitaire actuelle. Cependant, au lieu de répondre aux comportements et aux dispositions règlementaires des gouvernements qui obstruent les activités de secours et le travail des défendeurs des droits, la Commission européenne suggère que les standards de sécurité sur les navires et les niveaux de communication avec les acteurs privés doivent être surveillés. Les acteurs privés sont également requis d’adhérer non seulement aux régimes légaux, mais aussi aux politiques et pratiques relatives à « la gestion migratoire » qui peuvent potentiellement interférer avec les obligations de recherches et de sauvetage.

      Bien que la publication de lignes directrices pour prévenir la criminalisation de l’action humanitaire soit la bienvenue, celles-ci se limitent aux actes mandatés par la loi avec une attention spécifique aux opérations de sauvetage et de secours. Cette approche risque d’omettre les activités humanitaires telles que la distribution de nourriture, d’abris, ou d’information sur le territoire ou assurés par des organisations non mandatées par le cadre légal qui sont également sujettes à ladite criminalisation et à des restrictions.

      Des signes encourageants pour l’inclusion

      Les changements proposés pour permettre aux réfugiés d’accéder à une résidence de long-terme après trois ans et le renforcement du droit de se déplacer et de travailler dans d’autres Etats membres sont positifs. De plus, la révision du Plan d’action pour l’inclusion et l’intégration et la mise en place d’un groupe d’experts pour collecter l’avis des migrants afin de façonner la politique européenne sont les bienvenues.

      La voie à suivre

      La présentation des propositions de la Commission est le commencement de ce qui promet d’être une autre longue période conflictuelle de négociations sur les politiques européennes d’asile et de migration. Alors que ces négociations sont en cours, il est important de rappeler qu’il existe déjà un régime d’asile européen et que les Etats membres ont des obligations dans le cadre du droit européen et international.

      Cela requiert une action immédiate de la part des décideurs politiques européens, y compris de la part des Etats membres, de :

      Mettre en œuvre les standards existants en lien avec les conditions matérielles d’accueil et les procédures d’asile, d’enquêter sur leur non-respect et de prendre les mesures disciplinaires nécessaires ;
      Sauver des vies en mer, et de garantir des capacités de sauvetage et de secours, permettant un débarquement et une relocalisation rapide ;
      Continuer de s’accorder sur des arrangements ad-hoc de solidarité pour alléger la pression sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures de l’UE et encourager les Etats membres à avoir recours à la relocalisation.

      Concernant les prochaines négociations sur le Pacte, nous recommandons aux co-législateurs de :

      Rejeter l’application obligatoire de la procédure d’asile ou de retour à la frontière : ces procédures aux standards abaissés réduisent les garanties des demandeurs d’asile et augmentent le recours à la rétention. Elles exacerbent le manque de solidarité actuel sur l’asile dans l’UE en plaçant plus de responsabilité sur les Etats membres aux frontières extérieures. L’expérience des hotspots et d’autres initiatives similaires démontrent que l’ajout de procédures ou d’étapes dans l’asile peut créer des charges administratives et des coûts significatifs, et entraîner une plus grande inefficacité ;
      Se diriger vers la fin de la privation de liberté de migrants, et interdire la rétention de mineurs conformément à la Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant, et de dédier suffisamment de ressources pour des solutions non privatives de libertés appropriées pour les mineurs et leurs familles ;
      Réajuster les propositions de réforme afin de se concentrer sur le maintien et l’amélioration des standards des droits de l’homme et de l’asile en Europe, plutôt que sur le retour ;
      Œuvrer à ce que les propositions réforment fondamentalement la façon dont la responsabilité des demandeurs d’asile en UE est organisée, en adressant les problèmes liés au principe de pays de première entrée, afin de créer un véritable mécanisme de solidarité ;
      Limiter les possibilités pour les Etats membres de déroger à leurs responsabilités d’enregistrer les demandes d’asile ou d’examiner les demandes, afin d’éviter de créer des incitations à opérer en mode gestion de crise et à diminuer les standards de l’asile ;
      Augmenter les garanties pendant la procédure de pré-filtrage pour assurer le droit à l’information, l’accès à une aide et une représentation juridique, la détection et la prise en charge des vulnérabilités et des besoins de santé, et une réponse aux préoccupations liées à l’enregistrement et à la protection des données ;
      Garantir que le mécanisme de suivi des droits fondamentaux aux frontières dispose d’une portée large afin de couvrir toutes les violations des droits fondamentaux à la frontière, qu’il soit véritablement indépendant des autorités nationales et dispose de ressources adéquates et qu’il contribue à la responsabilisation ;
      S’opposer aux tentatives d’utiliser l’aide au développement, au commerce, aux investissements, aux mécanismes de visas, à la coopération sécuritaire et autres politiques et financements pour faire pression sur les pays tiers dans leur coopération étroitement définie par des objectifs européens de contrôle migratoire ;
      Evaluer l’impact à long-terme des politiques migratoires d’externalisation sur la paix, le respect des droits et le développement durable et garantir que la politique extérieure migratoire ne contribue pas à la violation de droits de l’homme et prenne en compte les enjeux de conflits ;
      Développer significativement les voies légales et sûres vers l’UE en mettant en œuvre rapidement les engagements actuels de réinstallation, en proposant de nouveaux objectifs ambitieux et en augmentant les opportunités de voies d’accès à la protection ainsi qu’à la migration de main-d’œuvre et universitaire en UE ;
      Renforcer les exceptions à la criminalisation lorsqu’il s’agit d’actions humanitaires et autres activités indépendantes de la société civile et enlever les obstacles auxquels font face les acteurs de la société civile fournissant une assistance vitale et humanitaire sur terre et en mer ;
      Mettre en place une opération de recherche et de sauvetage en mer Méditerranée financée et coordonnée par l’UE ;
      S’appuyer sur les propositions prometteuses pour soutenir l’inclusion à travers l’accès à la résidence à long-terme et les droits associés et la mise en œuvre du Plan d’action sur l’intégration et l’inclusion au niveau européen, national et local.

      https://www.forumrefugies.org/s-informer/positions/europe/774-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-l-asile-afin-de-garantir-un-no

    • Nouveau Pacte européen  : les migrant.e.s et réfugié.e.s traité.e.s comme des « # colis à trier  »

      Le jour même de la Conférence des Ministres européens de l’Intérieur, EuroMed Droits présente son analyse détaillée du nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration, publié le 23 septembre dernier (https://euromedrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Analysis-of-Asylum-and-Migration-Pact_Final_Clickable.pdf).

      On peut résumer les plus de 500 pages de documents comme suit  : le nouveau Pacte européen sur l’asile et la migration déshumanise les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s, les traitant comme des «  #colis à trier  » et les empêchant de se déplacer en Europe. Ce Pacte soulève de nombreuses questions en matière de respect des droits humains, dont certaines sont à souligner en particulier  :

      L’UE détourne le concept de solidarité. Le Pacte vise clairement à «  rétablir la confiance mutuelle entre les États membres  », donnant ainsi la priorité à la #cohésion:interne de l’UE au détriment des droits des migrant.e.s et des réfugié.e.s. La proposition laisse le choix aux États membres de contribuer – en les mettant sur un pied d’égalité – à la #réinstallation, au #rapatriement, au soutien à l’accueil ou à l’#externalisation des frontières. La #solidarité envers les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s et leurs droits fondamentaux sont totalement ignorés.

      Le pacte promeut une gestion «  sécuritaire  » de la migration. Selon la nouvelle proposition, les migrant.e.s et les réfugié.e.s seront placé.e.s en #détention et privé.e.s de liberté à leur arrivée. La procédure envisagée pour accélérer la procédure de demande d’asile ne pourra se faire qu’au détriment des lois sur l’asile et des droits des demandeur.se.s. Il est fort probable que la #procédure se déroulera de manière arbitraire et discriminatoire, en fonction de la nationalité du/de la demandeur.se, de son taux de reconnaissance et du fait que le pays dont il/elle provient est «  sûr  », ce qui est un concept douteux.

      L’idée clé qui sous-tend cette vision est simple  : externaliser autant que possible la gestion des frontières en coopérant avec des pays tiers. L’objectif est de faciliter le retour et la réadmission des migrant.e.s dans le pays d’où ils/elles sont parti.es. Pour ce faire, l’Agence européenne de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes (Frontex) verrait ses pouvoirs renforcés et un poste de coordinateur.trice européen.ne pour les retours serait créé. Le pacte risque de facto de fournir un cadre juridique aux pratiques illégales telles que les refoulements, les détentions arbitraires et les mesures visant à réduire davantage la capacité en matière d’asile. Des pratiques déjà en place dans certains États membres.

      Le Pacte présente quelques aspects «  positifs  », par exemple en matière de protection des enfants ou de regroupement familial, qui serait facilité. Mais ces bonnes intentions, qui doivent être mises en pratique, sont noyées dans un océan de mesures répressives et sécuritaires.

      EuroMed Droits appelle les Etats membres de l’UE à réfléchir en termes de mise en œuvre pratique (ou non) de ces mesures. Non seulement elles violent les droits humains, mais elles sont impraticables sur le terrain  : la responsabilité de l’évaluation des demandes d’asile reste au premier pays d’arrivée, sans vraiment remettre en cause le Règlement de Dublin. Cela signifie que des pays comme l’Italie, Malte, l’Espagne, la Grèce et Chypre continueront à subir une «  pression  » excessive, ce qui les encouragera à poursuivre leurs politiques de refoulement et d’expulsion. Enfin, le Pacte ne répond pas à la problématique urgente des «  hotspots  » et des camps de réfugié.e.s comme en Italie ou en Grèce et dans les zones de transit à l’instar de la Hongrie. Au contraire, cela renforce ce modèle dangereux en le présentant comme un exemple à exporter dans toute l’Europe, alors que des exemples récents ont démontré l’impossibilité de gérer ces camps de manière humaine.

      https://euromedrights.org/fr/publication/nouveau-pacte-europeen%e2%80%af-les-migrant-e-s-et-refugie-e-s-traite

      #paquets_de_la_poste #paquets #poste #tri #pays_sûrs

    • A “Fresh Start” or One More Clunker? Dublin and Solidarity in the New Pact

      In ongoing discussions on the reform of the CEAS, solidarity is a key theme. It stands front and center in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum: after reassuring us of the “human and humane approach” taken, the opening quote stresses that Member States must be able to “rely on the solidarity of our whole European Union”.

      In describing the need for reform, the Commission does not mince its words: “[t]here is currently no effective solidarity mechanism in place, and no efficient rule on responsibility”. It’s a remarkable statement: barely one year ago, the Commission maintained that “[t]he EU [had] shown tangible and rapid support to Member States under most pressure” throughout the crisis. Be that as it may, we are promised a “fresh start”. Thus, President Von der Leyen has announced on the occasion of the 2020 State of the Union Address that “we will abolish the Dublin Regulation”, the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal (examined here) has been withdrawn, and the Pact proposes a “new solidarity mechanism” connected to “robust and fair management of the external borders” and capped by a new “governance framework”.

      Before you buy the shiny new package, you are advised to consult the fine print however. Yes, the Commission proposes to abolish the Dublin III Regulation and withdraws the Dublin IV Proposal. But the Proposal for an Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (hereafter “the Migration Management Proposal”) reproduces word-for-word the Dublin III Regulation, subject to amendments drawn … from the Dublin IV Proposal! As for the “governance framework” outlined in Articles 3-7 of the Migration Management Proposal, it’s a hodgepodge of purely declamatory provisions (e.g. Art. 3-4), of restatements of pre-existing obligations (Art. 5), of legal bases authorizing procedures that require none (Art. 7). The one new item is a yearly monitoring exercise centered on an “European Asylum and Migration Management Strategy” (Art. 6), which seems as likely to make a difference as the “Mechanism for Early Warning, Preparedness and Crisis Management”, introduced with much fanfare with the Dublin III Regulation and then left in the drawer before, during and after the 2015/16 crisis.

      Leaving the provisions just mentioned for future commentaries – fearless interpreters might still find legal substance in there – this contribution focuses on four points: the proposed amendments to Dublin, the interface between Dublin and procedures at the border, the new solidarity mechanism, and proposals concerning force majeure. Caveat emptor! It is a jungle of extremely detailed and sometimes obscure provisions. While this post is longer than usual – warm thanks to the lenient editors! – do not expect an exhaustive summary, nor firm conclusions on every point.
      Dublin, the Undying

      To borrow from Mark Twain, reports of the death of the Dublin system have been once more greatly exaggerated. As noted, Part III of the Migration Management Proposal (Articles 8-44) is for all intents and purposes an amended version of the Dublin III Regulation, and most of the amendments are lifted from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal.

      A first group of amendments concerns the responsibility criteria. Some expand the possibilities to allocate applicants based on their “meaningful links” with Member States: Article 2(g) expands the family definition to include siblings, opening new possibilities for reunification; Article 19(4) enlarges the criterion based on previous legal abode (i.e. expired residence documents); in a tip of the hat to the Wikstroem Report, commented here, Article 20 introduces a new criterion based on prior education in a Member State.

      These are welcome changes, but all that glitters is not gold. The Commission advertises “streamlined” evidentiary requirements to facilitate family reunification. These would be necessary indeed: evidentiary issues have long undermined the application of the family criteria. Unfortunately, the Commission is not proposing anything new: Article 30(6) of the Migration Management Proposal corresponds in essence to Article 22(5) of the Dublin III Regulation.

      Besides, while the Commission proposes to expand the general definition of family, the opposite is true of the specific definition of family applicable to “dependent persons”. Under Article 16 of the Dublin III Regulation, applicants who e.g. suffer from severe disabilities are to be kept or brought together with a care-giving parent, child or sibling residing in a Member State. Due to fears of sham marriages, spouses have been excluded and this is legally untenable and inhumane, but instead of tackling the problem the Commission proposes in Article 24 to worsen it by excluding siblings. The end result is paradoxical: persons needing family support the most will be deprived – for no apparent reason other than imaginary fears of “abuses” – of the benefits of enlarged reunification possibilities. “[H]uman and humane”, indeed.

      The fight against secondary movements inspires most of the other amendments to the criteria. In particular, Article 21 of the Proposal maintains and extends the much-contested criterion of irregular entry while clarifying that it applies also to persons disembarked after a search and rescue (SAR) operation. The Commission also proposes that unaccompanied children be transferred to the first Member State where they applied if no family criterion is applicable (Article 15(5)). This would overturn the MA judgment of the ECJ whereby in such cases the asylum claim must be examined in the State where the child last applied and is present. It’s not a technical fine point: while the case-law of the ECJ is calculated to spare children the trauma of a transfer, the proposed amendment would subject them again to the rigours of Dublin.

      Again to discourage secondary movements, the Commission proposes – as in 2016 – a second group of amendments: new obligations for the applicants (Articles 9-10). Applicants must in principle apply in the Member State of first entry, remain in that State for the duration of the Dublin procedure and, post-transfer, remain in the State responsible. Moving to the “wrong” State entails losing the benefits of the Reception Conditions Directive, subject to “the need to ensure a standard of living in accordance with” the Charter. It is debatable whether this is a much lesser standard of reception. More importantly: as reception conditions in line with the Directive are seldom guaranteed in several frontline Member States, the prospect of being treated “in accordance with the Charter” elsewhere will hardly dissuade applicants from moving on.

      The 2016 Proposal foresaw, as further punishment, the mandatory application of accelerated procedures to “secondary movers”. This rule disappears from the Migration Management Proposal, but as Daniel Thym points out in his forthcoming contribution on secondary movements, it remains in Article 40(1)(g) of the 2016 Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation. Furthermore, the Commission proposes deleting Article 18(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, i.e. the guarantee that persons transferred back to a State that has meanwhile discontinued or rejected their application will have their case reopened, or a remedy available. This is a dangerous invitation to Member States to reintroduce “discontinuation” practices that the Commission itself once condemned as incompatible with effective access to status determination.

      To facilitate responsibility-determination, the Proposal further obliges applicants to submit relevant information before or at the Dublin interview. Late submissions are not to be considered. Fairness would demand that justified delays be excused. Besides, it is also proposed to repeal Article 7(3) of the Dublin III Regulation, whereby authorities must take into account evidence of family ties even if produced late in the process. All in all, then, the Proposal would make proof of family ties harder, not easier as the Commission claims.

      A final group of amendments concern the details of the Dublin procedure, and might prove the most important in practice.

      Some “streamline” the process, e.g. with shorter deadlines (e.g. Article 29(1)) and a simplified take back procedure (Article 31). Controversially, the Commission proposes again to reduce the scope of appeals against transfers to issues of ill-treatment and misapplication of the family criteria (Article 33). This may perhaps prove acceptable to the ECJ in light of its old Abdullahi case-law. However, it contravenes Article 13 ECHR, which demands an effective remedy for the violation of any Convention right.
      Other procedural amendments aim to make it harder for applicants to evade transfers. At present, if a transferee absconds for 18 months, the transfer is cancelled and the transferring State becomes responsible. Article 35(2) of the Proposal allows the transferring State to “stop the clock” if the applicant absconds, and to resume the transfer as soon as he reappears.
      A number of amendments make responsibility more “stable” once assigned, although not as “permanent” as the 2016 Proposal would have made it. Under Article 27 of the Proposal, the responsibility of a State will only cease if the applicant has left the Dublin area in compliance with a return decision. More importantly, under Article 26 the responsible State will have to take back even persons to whom it has granted protection. This would be a significant extension of the scope of the Dublin system, and would “lock” applicants in the responsible State even more firmly and more durably. Perhaps by way of compensation, the Commission proposes that beneficiaries of international protection obtain “long-term status” – and thus mobility rights – after three years of residence instead of five. However, given that it is “very difficult in practice” to exercise such rights, the compensation seems more theoretical than effective and a far cry from a system of free movement capable of offsetting the rigidities of Dublin.

      These are, in short, the key amendments foreseen. While it’s easy enough to comment on each individually, it is more difficult to forecast their aggregate impact. Will they – to paraphrase the Commission – “improv[e] the chances of integration” and reduce “unauthorised movements” (recital 13), and help closing “the existing implementation gap”? Probably not, as none of them is a game-changer.

      Taken together, however, they might well aggravate current distributive imbalances. Dublin “locks in” the responsibilities of the States that receive most applications – traditional destinations such as Germany or border States such as Italy – leaving the other Member States undisturbed. Apart from possible distributive impacts of the revised criteria and of the now obligations imposed on applicants, first application States will certainly be disadvantaged combination by shortened deadlines, security screenings (see below), streamlined take backs, and “stable” responsibility extending to beneficiaries of protection. Under the “new Dublin rules” – sorry for the oxymoron! – effective solidarity will become more necessary than ever.
      Border procedures and Dublin

      Building on the current hotspot approach, the Proposals for a Screening Regulation and for an Asylum Procedures Regulation outline a new(ish) “pre-entry” phase. This will be examined in a forthcoming post by Lyra Jakuleviciene, but the interface with infra-EU allocation deserves mention here.

      In a nutshell, persons irregularly crossing the border will be screened for the purpose of identification, health and security checks, and registration in Eurodac. Protection applicants may then be channelled to “border procedures” in a broad range of situations. This will be mandatory if the applicant: (a) attempts to mislead the authorities; (b) can be considered, based on “serious reasons”, “a danger to the national security or public order of the Member States”; (c) comes from a State whose nationals have a low Union-wide recognition rate (Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal).

      The purpose of the border procedure is to assess applications “without authorising the applicant’s entry into the Member State’s territory” (here, p.4). Therefore, it might have seemed logical that applicants subjected to it be excluded from the Dublin system – as is the case, ordinarily, for relocations (see below). Not so: under Article 41(7) of the Proposal, Member States may apply Dublin in the context of border procedures. This weakens the idea of “seamless procedures at the border” somewhat but – from the standpoint of both applicants and border States – it is better than a watertight exclusion: applicants may still benefit from “meaningful link” criteria, and border States are not “stuck with the caseload”. I would normally have qualms about giving Member States discretion in choosing whether Dublin rules apply. But as it happens, Member States who receive an asylum application already enjoy that discretion under the so-called “sovereignty clause”. Nota bene: in exercising that discretion, Member States apply EU Law and must observe the Charter, and the same principle must certainly apply under the proposed Article 41(7).

      The only true exclusion from the Dublin system is set out in Article 8(4) of the Migration Management Proposal. Under this provision, Member States must carry out a security check of all applicants as part of the pre-entry screening and/or after the application is filed. If “there are reasonable grounds to consider the applicant a danger to national security or public order” of the determining State, the other criteria are bypassed and that State becomes responsible. Attentive readers will note that the wording of Article 8(4) differs from that of Article 41(3) of the Asylum Procedure Proposal (e.g. “serious grounds” vs “reasonable grounds”). It is therefore unclear whether the security grounds to “screen out” an applicant from Dublin are coextensive with the security grounds making a border procedure mandatory. Be that as it may, a broad application of Article 8(4) would be undesirable, as it would entail a large-scale exclusion from the guarantees that applicants derive from the Dublin system. The risk is moderate however: by applying Article 8(4) widely, Member States would be increasing their own share of responsibilities under the system. As twenty-five years of Dublin practice indicate, this is unlikely to happen.
      “Mandatory” and “flexible” solidarity under the new mechanism

      So far, the Migration Management Proposal does not look significantly different from the 2016 Dublin IV Proposal, which did not itself fundamentally alter existing rules, and which went down in flames in inter- and intra-institutional negotiations. Any hopes of a “fresh start”, then, are left for the new solidarity mechanism.

      Unfortunately, solidarity is a difficult subject for the EU: financial support has hitherto been a mere fraction of Member State expenditure in the field; operational cooperation has proved useful but cannot tackle all the relevant aspects of the unequal distribution of responsibilities among Member States; relocations have proved extremely beneficial for thousands of applicants, but are intrinsically complex operations and have also proven politically divisive – an aspect which has severely undermined their application and further condemned them to be small scale affairs relative to the needs on the ground. The same goes a fortiori for ad hoc initiatives – such as those that followed SAR operations over the last two years– which furthermore lack the predictability that is necessary for sharing responsibilities effectively. To reiterate what the Commission stated, there is currently “no effective solidarity mechanism in place”.

      Perhaps most importantly, the EU has hitherto been incapable of accurately gauging the distributive asymmetries on the ground, to articulate a clear doctrine guiding the key determinations of “how much solidarity” and “what kind(s) of solidarity”, and to define commensurate redistributive targets on this basis (see here, p.34 and 116).

      Alas, the opportunity to elaborate a solidarity doctrine for the EU has been completely missed. Conceptually, the New Pact does not go much farther than platitudes such as “[s]olidarity implies that all Member States should contribute”. As Daniel Thym aptly observed, “pragmatism” is the driving force behind the Proposal: the Commission starts from a familiar basis – relocations – and tweaks it in ways designed to convince stakeholders that solidarity becomes both “compulsory” and “flexible”. It’s a complicated arrangement and I will only describe it in broad strokes, leaving the crucial dimensions of financial solidarity and operational cooperation to forthcoming posts by Iris Goldner Lang and Lilian Tsourdi.

      The mechanism operates according to three “modes”. In its basic mode, it is to replace ad hoc solidarity initiatives following SAR disembarkations (Articles 47-49 of the Migration Management Proposal):

      The Commission determines, in its yearly Migration Management Report, whether a State is faced with “recurring arrivals” following SAR operations and determines the needs in terms of relocations and other contributions (capacity building, operational support proper, cooperation with third States).
      The Member States are “invited” to notify the “contributions they intend to make”. If offers are sufficient, the Commission combines them and formally adopts a “solidarity pool”. If not, it adopts an implementing act summarizing relocation targets for each Member State and other contributions as offered by them. Member States may react by offering other contributions instead of relocations, provided that this is “proportional” – one wonders how the Commission will tally e.g. training programs for Libyan coastguards with relocation places.
      If the relocations offered fall 30% short of the target indicated by the Commission, a “critical mass correction mechanism” will apply: each Member States will be obliged to meet at least 50% of the quota of relocations indicated by the Commission. However, and this is the new idea offered by the Commission to bring relocation-skeptics onboard, Member States may discharge their duties by offering “return sponsorships” instead of relocations: the “sponsor” Member State commits to support the benefitting Member State to return a person and, if the return is not carried out within eight months, to accept her on its territory.

      If I understand correctly the fuzzy provision I have just summarized – Article 48(2) – it all boils down to “half-compulsory” solidarity: Member States are obliged to cover at least 50% of the relocation needs set by the Commission through relocations or sponsorships, and the rest with other contributions.

      After the “solidarity pool” is established and the benefitting Member State requests its activation, relocations can start:

      The eligible persons are those who applied for protection in the benefitting State, with the exclusion of those that are subject to border procedures (Article 45(1)(a)).Also excluded are those whom Dublin criteria based on “meaningful links” – family, abode, diplomas – assign to the benefitting State (Article 57(3)). These rules suggest that the benefitting State must carry out identification, screening for border procedures and a first (reduced?) Dublin procedure before it can declare an applicant eligible for relocation.
      Persons eligible for return sponsorship are “illegally staying third-country nationals” (Article 45(1)(b)).
      The eligible persons are identified, placed on a list, and matched to Member States based on “meaningful links”. The transfer can only be refused by the State of relocation on security grounds (Article 57(2)(6) and (7)), and otherwise follows the modalities of Dublin transfers in almost all respects (e.g. deadlines, notification, appeals). However, contrary to what happens under Dublin, missing the deadline for transfer does not entail that the relocation is cancelled it (see Article 57(10)).
      After the transfer, applicants will be directly admitted to the asylum procedure in the State of relocation only if it has been previously established that the benefitting State would have been responsible under criteria other than those based on “meaningful links” (Article 58(3)). In all the other cases, the State of relocation will run a Dublin procedure and, if necessary, transfer again the applicant to the State responsible (see Article 58(2)). As for persons subjected to return sponsorship, the State of relocation will pick up the application of the Return Directive where the benefitting State left off (or so I read Article 58(5)!).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is under “migratory pressure”, at the request of the concerned State or of its own motion (Article 50), the mechanism operates as described above except for one main point: beneficiaries of protection also become eligible for relocation (Article 51(3)). Thankfully, they must consent thereto and are automatically granted the same status in the relocation State (see Articles 57(3) and 58(4)).

      If the Commission concludes that a Member State is confronted to a “crisis”, rules change further (see Article 2 of the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation):

      Applicants subject to the border procedure and persons “having entered irregularly” also become eligible for relocation. These persons may then undergo a border procedure post-relocation (see Article 41(1) and (8) of the Proposal for an Asylum Procedures Regulation).
      Persons subject to return sponsorship are transferred to the sponsor State if their removal does not occur within four – instead of eight – months.
      Other contributions are excluded from the palette of contributions available to the other Member States (Article 2(1)): it has to be relocation or return sponsorship.
      The procedure is faster, with shorter deadlines.

      It is an understatement to say that the mechanism is complex, and your faithful scribe still has much to digest. For the time being, I would make four general comments.

      First, it is not self-evident that this is a good “insurance scheme” for its intended beneficiaries. As noted, the system only guarantees that 50% of the relocation needs of a State will be met. Furthermore, there are hidden costs: in “SAR” and “pressure” modes, the benefitting State has to screen the applicant, register the application, and assess whether border procedures or (some) Dublin criteria apply before it can channel the applicant to relocation. It is unclear whether a 500 lump sum is enough to offset the costs (see Article 79 of the Migration Management Proposal). Besides, in a crisis situation, these preliminary steps might make relocation impractical – think of the Greek registration backlog in 2015/6. Perhaps, extending relocation to persons “having entered irregularly” when the mechanism is in “crisis mode” is meant precisely to take care of this. Similar observations apply to return sponsorship. Under Article 55(4) of the Migration Management Proposal, the support offered by the sponsor to the benefitting State can be rather low key (e.g. “counselling”) and there seems to be no guarantee that the benefitting State will be effectively relieved of the political, administrative and financial costs associated to return. Moving from costs to risks, it is clear that the benefitting State bears all the risks of non implementation – in other words, if the system grinds to a halt or breaks down, it will be Moria all over again. In light of past experience, one can only agree with Thomas Gammelthoft-Hansen that it’s a “big gamble”. Other aspects examined below – the vast margins of discretion left to the Commission, and the easy backdoor opened by the force majeure provisions – do not help either to create predictability.
      Second, as just noted the mechanism gives the Commission practically unlimited discretion at all critical junctures. The Commission will determine whether a Member States is confronted to “recurring arrivals”, “pressure” or a “crisis”. It will do so under definitions so open-textured, and criteria so numerous, that it will be basically the master of its determinations (Article 50 of the Migration Management Proposal). The Commission will determine unilaterally relocation and operational solidarity needs. Finally, the Commission will determine – we do not know how – if “other contributions” are proportional to relocation needs. Other than in the most clear-cut situations, there is no way that anyone can predict how the system will be applied.
      Third: the mechanism reflects a powerful fixation with and unshakable faith in heavy bureaucracy. Protection applicants may undergo up to three “responsibility determination” procedures and two transfers before finally landing in an asylum procedure: Dublin “screening” in the first State, matching, relocation, full Dublin procedure in the relocation State, then transfer. And this is a system that should not “compromise the objective of the rapid processing of applications”(recital 34)! Decidedly, the idea that in order to improve the CEAS it is above all necessary to suppress unnecessary delays and coercion (see here, p.9) has not made a strong impression on the minds of the drafters. The same remark applies mutatis mutandis to return sponsorships: whatever the benefits in terms of solidarity, one wonders if it is very cost-effective or humane to drag a person from State to State so that they can each try their hand at expelling her.
      Lastly and relatedly, applicants and other persons otherwise concerned by the relocation system are given no voice. They can be “matched”, transferred, re-transferred, but subject to few exceptions their aspirations and intentions remain legally irrelevant. In this regard, the “New Pact” is as old school as it gets: it sticks strictly to the “no choice” taboo on which Dublin is built. What little recognition of applicants’ actorness had been made in the Wikstroem Report is gone. Objectifying migrants is not only incompatible with the claim that the approach taken is “human and humane”. It might prove fatal to the administrative efficiency so cherished by the Commission. Indeed, failure to engage applicants is arguably the key factor in the dismal performance of the Dublin system (here, p.112). Why should it be any different under this solidarity mechanism?

      Framing Force Majeure (or inviting defection?)

      In addition to addressing “crisis” situations, the Proposal for a Migration and Asylum Crisis Regulation includes separate provisions on force majeure.

      Thereunder, any Member State may unilaterally declare that it is faced with a situation making it “impossible” to comply with selected CEAS rules, and thus obtain the right – subject to a mere notification – to derogate from them. Member States may obtain in this way longer Dublin deadlines, or even be exempted from the obligation to accept transfers and be liberated from responsibilities if the suspension goes on more than a year (Article 8). Furthermore, States may obtain a six-months suspension of their duties under the solidarity mechanism (Article 9).

      The inclusion of this proposal in the Pact – possibly an attempt to further placate Member States averse to European solidarity? – beggars belief. Legally speaking, the whole idea is redundant: under the case-law of the ECJ, Member States may derogate from any rule of EU Law if confronted to force majeure. However, putting this black on white amounts to inviting (and legalizing) defection. The only conceivable object of rules of this kind would have been to subject force majeure derogations to prior authorization by the Commission – but there is nothing of the kind in the Proposal. The end result is paradoxical: while Member States are (in theory!) subject to Commission supervision when they conclude arrangements facilitating the implementation of Dublin rules, a mere notification will be enough to authorize them to unilaterally tear a hole in the fabric of “solidarity” and “responsibility” so painstakingly – if not felicitously – woven in the Pact.
      Concluding comments

      We should have taken Commissioner Ylva Johansson at her word when she said that there would be no “Hoorays” for the new proposals. Past the avalanche of adjectives, promises and fancy administrative monikers hurled at the reader – “faster, seamless migration processes”; “prevent the recurrence of events such as those seen in Moria”; “critical mass correction mechanism” – one cannot fail to see that the “fresh start” is essentially an exercise in repackaging.

      On responsibility-allocation and solidarity, the basic idea is one that the Commission incessantly returns to since 2007 (here, p. 10): keep Dublin and “correct” it through solidarity schemes. I do sympathize to an extent: realizing a fair balance of responsibilities by “sharing people” has always seemed to me impracticable and undesirable. Still, one would have expected that the abject failure of the Dublin system, the collapse of mutual trust in the CEAS, the meagre results obtained in the field of solidarity – per the Commission’s own appraisal – would have pushed it to bring something new to the table.

      Instead, what we have is a slightly milder version of the Dublin IV Proposal – the ultimate “clunker” in the history of Commission proposals – and an ultra-bureaucratic mechanism for relocation, with the dubious addition of return sponsorships and force majeure provisions. The basic tenets of infra-EU allocation remain the same – “no choice”, first entry – and none of the structural flaws that doomed current schemes to failure is fundamentally tackled (here, p.107): solidarity is beefed-up but appears too unreliable and fuzzy to generate trust; there are interesting steps on “genuine links”, but otherwise no sustained attempt to positively engage applicants; administrative complexity and coercive transfers reign on.

      Pragmatism, to quote again Daniel Thym’s excellent introductory post, is no sin. It is even expected of the Commission. This, however, is a study in path-dependency. By defending the status quo, wrapping it in shiny new paper, and making limited concessions to key policy actors, the Commission may perhaps carry its proposals through. However, without substantial corrections, the “new” Pact is unlikely to save the CEAS or even to prevent new Morias.

      http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/a-fresh-start-or-one-more-clunker-dublin-and-solidarity-in-the-ne

      #Francesco_Maiani

      #force_majeure

    • European Refugee Policy: What’s Gone Wrong and How to Make It Better

      In 2015 and 2016, more than 1 million refugees made their way to the European Union, the largest number of them originating from Syria. Since that time, refugee arrivals have continued, although at a much slower pace and involving people from a wider range of countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

      The EU’s response to these developments has had five main characteristics.

      First, a serious lack of preparedness and long-term planning. Despite the massive material and intelligence resources at its disposal, the EU was caught completely unaware by the mass influx of refugees five years ago and has been playing catch-up ever since. While the emergency is now well and truly over, EU member states continue to talk as if still in the grip of an unmanageable “refugee crisis.”

      Second, the EU’s refugee policy has become progressively based on a strategy known as “externalization,” whereby responsibility for migration control is shifted to unstable states outside Europe. This has been epitomized by the deals that the EU has done with countries such as Libya, Niger, Sudan, and Turkey, all of which have agreed to halt the onward movement of refugees in exchange for aid and other rewards, including support to the security services.

      Third, asylum has become increasingly criminalized, as demonstrated by the growing number of EU citizens and civil society groups that have been prosecuted for their roles in aiding refugees. At the same time, some frontline member states have engaged in a systematic attempt to delegitimize the NGO search-and-rescue organizations operating in the Mediterranean and to obstruct their life-saving activities.

      The fourth characteristic of EU countries’ recent policies has been a readiness to inflict or be complicit in a range of abuses that challenge the principles of both human rights and international refugee law. This can be seen in the violence perpetrated against asylum seekers by the military and militia groups in Croatia and Hungary, the terrible conditions found in Greek refugee camps such as Moria on the island of Lesvos, and, most egregiously of all, EU support to the Libyan Coastguard that enables it to intercept refugees at sea and to return them to abusive detention centers on land.

      Fifth and finally, the past five years have witnessed a serious absence of solidarity within the EU. Frontline states such as Greece and Italy have been left to bear a disproportionate share of the responsibility for new refugee arrivals. Efforts to relocate asylum seekers and resettle refugees throughout the EU have had disappointing results. And countries in the eastern part of the EU have consistently fought against the European Commission in its efforts to forge a more cooperative and coordinated approach to the refugee issue.

      The most recent attempt to formulate such an approach is to be found in the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which the Commission proposed in September 2020.

      It would be wrong to entirely dismiss the Pact, as it contains some positive elements. These include, for example, a commitment to establish legal pathways to asylum in Europe for people who are in need of protection, and EU support for member states that wish to establish community-sponsored refugee resettlement programs.

      In other respects, however, the Pact has a number of important, serious flaws. It has already been questioned by those countries that are least willing to admit refugees and continue to resist the role of Brussels in this policy domain. The Pact also makes hardly any reference to the Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration—a strange omission given the enormous amount of time and effort that the UN has devoted to those initiatives, both of which were triggered by the European emergency of 2015-16.

      At an operational level, the Pact endorses and reinforces the EU’s externalization agenda and envisages a much more aggressive role for Frontex, the EU’s border control agency. At the same time, it empowers member states to refuse entry to asylum seekers on the basis of very vague criteria. As a result, individuals may be more vulnerable to human smugglers and traffickers. There is also a strong likelihood that new refugee camps will spring up on the fringes of Europe, with their residents living in substandard conditions.

      Finally, the Pact places enormous emphasis on the involuntary return of asylum seekers to their countries of origin. It even envisages that a hardline state such as Hungary could contribute to the implementation of the Pact by organizing and funding such deportations. This constitutes an extremely dangerous new twist on the notions of solidarity and responsibility sharing, which form the basis of the international refugee regime.

      If the proposed Pact is not fit for purpose, then what might a more constructive EU refugee policy look like?

      It would in the first instance focus on the restoration of both EU and NGO search-and-rescue efforts in the Mediterranean and establish more predictable disembarkation and refugee distribution mechanisms. It would also mean the withdrawal of EU support for the Libyan Coastguard, the closure of that country’s detention centers, and a substantial improvement of the living conditions experienced by refugees in Europe’s frontline states—changes that should take place with or without a Pact.

      Indeed, the EU should redeploy the massive amount of resources that it currently devotes to the externalization process, so as to strengthen the protection capacity of asylum and transit countries on the periphery of Europe. A progressive approach on the part of the EU would involve the establishment of not only faster but also fair asylum procedures, with appropriate long-term solutions being found for new arrivals, whether or not they qualify for refugee status.

      These changes would help to ensure that those searching for safety have timely and adequate opportunities to access their most basic rights.

      https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/11/5/european-refugee-policy-whats-gone-wrong-and-how-to-make-it-b

    • The New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Turning European Union Territory into a non-Territory

      Externalization policies in 2020: where is the European Union territory?

      In spite of the Commission’s rhetoric stressing the novel elements of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (hereinafter: the Pact – summarized and discussed in general here), there are good reasons to argue that the Pact develops and consolidates, among others, the existing trends on externalization policies of migration control (see Guild et al). Furthermore, it tries to create new avenues for a ‘smarter’ system of management of immigration, by additionally controlling access to the European Union territory for third country nationals (TCNs), and by creating different categories of migrants, which are then subject to different legal regimes which find application in the European Union territory.

      The consolidation of existing trends concerns the externalization of migration management practices, resort to technologies in developing migration control systems (further development of Eurodac, completion of the path toward full interoperability between IT systems), and also the strengthening of the role of the European Union executive level, via increased joint management involving European Union agencies: these are all policies that find in the Pact’s consolidation.

      This brief will focus on externalization (practices), a concept which is finding a new declination in the Pact: indeed, the Pact and several of the measures proposed, read together, are aiming at ‘disentangling’ the territory of the EU, from a set of rights which are related with the presence of the migrant or of the asylum seeker on the territory of a Member State of the EU, and from the relation between territory and access to a jurisdiction, which is necessary to enforce rights which otherwise remain on paper.

      Interestingly, this process of separation, of splitting between territory-law/rights-jurisdiction takes place not outside, but within the EU, and this is the new declination of externalization which one can find in the measures proposed in the Pact, namely with the proposal for a Screening Regulation and the amended proposal for a Procedure Regulation. It is no accident that other commentators have interpreted it as a consolidation of ‘fortress Europe’. In other words, this externalization process takes place within the EU and aims at making the external borders more effective also for the TCNs who are already in the territory of the EU.

      The proposal for a pre-entry screening regulation

      A first instrument which has a pivotal role in the consolidation of the externalization trend is the proposed Regulation for a screening of third country nationals (hereinafter: Proposal Screening Regulation), which will be applicable to migrants crossing the external borders without authorization. The aim of the screening, according to the Commission, is to ‘accelerate the process of determining the status of a person and what type of procedure should apply’. More precisely, the screening ‘should help ensure that the third country nationals concerned are referred to the appropriate procedures at the earliest stage possible’ and also to avoid absconding after entrance in the territory in order to reach a different state than the one of arrival (recital 8, preamble of proposal). The screening should contribute as well to curb secondary movements, which is a policy target highly relevant for many northern and central European Union states.

      In the new design, the screening procedure becomes the ‘standard’ for all TCNs who crossed the border in irregular manner, and also for persons who are disembarked following a search and rescue (SAR) operation, and for those who apply for international protection at the external border crossing points or in transit zones. With the screening Regulation, all these categories of persons shall not be allowed to enter the territory of the State during the screening (Arts 3 and 4 of the proposal).

      Consequently, different categories of migrants, including asylum seekers which are by definition vulnerable persons, are to be kept in locations situated at or in proximity to the external borders, for a time (up to 5 days, which can become 10 at maximum), defined in the Regulation, but which must be respected by national administrations. There is here an implicit equation between all these categories, and the common denominator of this operation is that all these persons have crossed the border in an unauthorized manner.

      It is yet unclear how the situation of migrants during the screening is to be organized in practical terms, transit zones, hotspot or others, and if this can qualify as detention, in legal terms. The Court of Justice has ruled recently on Hungarian transit zones (see analysis by Luisa Marin), by deciding that Röszke transit zone qualified as ‘detention’, and it can be argued that the parameters clarified in that decision could find application also to the case of migrants during the screening phase. If the situation of TCNs during the screening can be considered detention, which is then the legal basis? The Reception Conditions Directive or the Return Directive? If the national administrations struggle to meet the tight deadlines provided for the screening system, these questions will become more urgent, next to the very practical issue of the actual accommodation for this procedure, which in general does not allow for access to the territory.

      On the one side, Article 14(7) of the proposal provides a guarantee, indicating that the screening should end also if the checks are not completed within the deadlines; on the other side, the remaining question is: to which procedure is the applicant sent and how is the next phase then determined? The relevant procedure following the screening here seems to be determined in a very approximate way, and this begs the question on the extent to which rights can be protected in this context. Furthermore, the right to have access to a lawyer is not provided for in the screening phase. Given the relevance of this screening phase, also fundamental rights should be monitored, and the mechanism put in place at Article 7, leaves much to the discretion of the Member States, and the involvement of the Fundamental Rights Agency, with guidance and support upon request of the MS can be too little to ensure fundamental rights are not jeopardized by national administrations.

      This screening phase, which has the purpose to make sure, among other things, that states ‘do their job’ as to collecting information and consequently feeding the EU information systems, might therefore have important effects on the merits of the individual case, since border procedures are to be seen as fast-track, time is limited and procedural guarantees are also sacrificed in this context. In the case the screening ends with a refusal of entry, there is a substantive effect of the screening, which is conducted without legal assistance and without access to a legal remedy. And if this is not a decision in itself, but it ends up in a de-briefing form, this form might give substance to the next stage of the procedure, which, in the case of asylum, should be an individualized and accurate assessment of one’s individual circumstances.

      Overall, it should be stressed that the screening itself does not end up in a formal decision, it nevertheless represents an important phase since it defines what comes after, i.e., the type of procedure following the screening. It must be observed therefore, that the respect of some procedural rights is of paramount importance. At the same time, it is important that communication in a language TCNs can understand is effective, since the screening might end in a de-briefing form, where one or more nationalities are indicated. Considering that one of the options is the refusal of entry (Art. 14(1) screening proposal; confirmed by the recital 40 of the Proposal Procedure Regulation, as amended in 2020), and the others are either access to asylum or expulsion, one should require that the screening provides for procedural guarantees.

      Furthermore, the screening should point to any element which might be relevant to refer the TCNs into the accelerated examination procedure or the border procedure. In other words, the screening must indicate in the de-briefing form the options that protect asylum applicants less than others (Article 14(3) of the proposal). It does not operate in the other way: a TCN who has applied for asylum and comes from a country with a high recognition rate is not excluded from the screening (see blog post by Jakuleviciene).

      The legislation creates therefore avenues for disentangling, splitting the relation between physical presence of an asylum applicant on a territory and the set of laws and fundamental rights associated to it, namely a protective legal order, access to rights and to a jurisdiction enforcing those rights. It creates a sort of ‘lighter’ legal order, a lower density system, which facilitates the exit of the applicant from the territory of the EU, creating a sort of shift from a Europe of rights to the Europe of borders, confinement and expulsions.

      The proposal for new border procedures: an attempt to create a lower density territory?

      Another crucial piece in this process of establishing a stronger border fence and streamline procedures at the border, creating a ‘seamless link between asylum and return’, in the words of the Commission, is constituted by the reform of the border procedures, with an amendment of the 2016 proposal for the Regulation procedure (hereinafter: Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation).

      Though border procedures are already present in the current Regulation of 2013, they are now developed into a “border procedure for asylum and return”, and a more developed accelerated procedure, which, next to the normal asylum procedure, comes after the screening phase.

      The new border procedure becomes obligatory (according to Art. 41(3) of the Amended Proposal Procedure Regulation) for applicants who arrive irregularly at the external border or after disembarkation and another of these grounds apply:

      – they represent a risk to national security or public order;

      – the applicant has provided false information or documents or by withholding relevant information or document;

      – the applicant comes from a non-EU country for which the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum decisions is below 20 percent.

      This last criterion is especially problematic, since it transcends the criterion of the safe third country and it undermines the principle that every asylum application requires a complex and individualized assessment of the particular personal circumstances of the applicant, by introducing presumptive elements in a procedure which gives fewer guarantees.

      During the border procedure, the TCN is not granted access to the EU. The expansion of the new border procedures poses also the problem of the organization of the facilities necessary for the new procedures, which must be a location at or close to the external borders, in other words, where migrants are apprehended or disembarked.

      Tellingly enough, the Commission’s explanatory memorandum describes as guarantees in the asylum border procedure all the situations in which the border procedure shall not be applied, for example, because the necessary support cannot be provided or for medical reasons, or where the ‘conditions for detention (…) cannot be met and the border procedure cannot be applied without detention’.

      Also here the question remains on how to qualify their stay during the procedure, because the Commission aims at limiting resort to detention. The situation could be considered de facto a detention, and its compatibility with the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in the Hungarian transit zones case is questionable.

      Another aspect which must be analyzed is the system of guarantees after the decision in a border procedure. If an application is rejected in an asylum border procedure, the “return procedure” applies immediately. Member States must limit to one instance the right to effective remedy against the decision, as posited in Article 53(9). The right to an effective remedy is therefore limited, according to Art. 53 of the Proposed Regulation, and the right to remain, a ‘light’ right to remain one could say, is also narrowly constructed, in the case of border procedures, to the first remedy against the negative decision (Art. 54(3) read together with Art. 54(4) and 54(5)). Furthermore, EU law allows Member States to limit the right to remain in case of subsequent applications and provides that there is no right to remain in the case of subsequent appeals (Art. 54(6) and (7)). More in general, this proposal extends the circumstances where the applicant does not have an automatic right to remain and this represents an aspect which affects significantly and in a factual manner the capacity to challenge a negative decision in a border procedure.

      Overall, it can be argued that the asylum border procedure is a procedure where guarantees are limited, because the access to the jurisdiction is taking place in fast-track procedures, access to legal remedies is also reduced to the very minimum. Access to the territory of the Member State is therefore deprived of its typical meaning, in the sense that it does not imply access to a system which is protecting rights with procedures which offer guarantees and are therefore also time-consuming. Here, efficiency should govern a process where the access to a jurisdiction is lighter, is ‘less dense’ than otherwise. To conclude, this externalization of migration control policies takes place ‘inside’ the European Union territory, and it aims at prolonging the effects of containment policies because they make access to the EU territory less meaningful, in legal terms: the presence of the person in the territory of the EU does not entail full access to the rights related to the presence on the territory.

      Solidarity in cooperating with third countries? The “return sponsorship” and its territorial puzzle

      Chapter 6 of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum proposes, among other things, to create a conditionality between cooperation on readmission with third countries and the issuance of visas to their nationals. This conditionality was legally established in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code Regulation. The revision (discussed here) states that, given their “politically sensitive nature and their horizontal implications for the Member States and the Union”, such provisions will be triggered once implementing powers are conferred to the Council (following a proposal from the Commission).

      What do these measures entail? We know that they can be applied in bulk or separately. Firstly, EU consulates in third countries will not have the usual leeway to waive some documents required to apply for visas (Art. 14(6), visa code). Secondly, visa applicants from uncooperative third countries will pay higher visa fees (Art. 16(1) visa code). Thirdly, visa fees to diplomatic and service passports will not be waived (Art. 16(5)b visa code). Fourthly, time to take a decision on the visa application will be longer than 15 days (Art. 23(1) visa code). Fifthly, the issuance of multi-entry visas (MEVs) from 6 months to 5 years is suspended (Art. 24(2) visa code). In other words, these coercive measures are not aimed at suspending visas. They are designed to make the procedure for obtaining a visa more lengthy, more costly, and limited in terms of access to MEVs.

      Moreover, it is important to stress that the revision of the Visa Code Regulation mentions that the Union will strike a balance between “migration and security concerns, economic considerations and general external relations”. Consequently, measures (be they restrictive or not) will result from an assessment that goes well beyond migration management issues. The assessment will not be based exclusively on the so-called “return rate” that has been presented as a compass used to reward or blame third countries’ cooperation on readmission. Other indicators or criteria, based on data provided by the Member States, will be equally examined by the Commission. These other indicators pertain to “the overall relations” between the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and a given third country, on the other. This broad category is not defined in the 2019 revision of the Visa Code, nor do we know what it precisely refers to.

      What do we know about this linkage? The idea of linking cooperation on readmission with visa policy is not new. It was first introduced at a bilateral level by some member states. For example, fifteen years ago, cooperation on redocumentation, including the swift delivery of laissez-passers by the consular authorities of countries of origin, was at the centre of bilateral talks between France and North African countries. In September 2005, the French Ministry of the Interior proposed to “sanction uncooperative countries [especially Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria] by limiting the number of short-term visas that France delivers to their nationals.” Sanctions turned out to be unsuccessful not only because of the diplomatic tensions they generated – they were met with strong criticisms and reaction on the part of North African countries – but also because the ratio between the number of laissez-passers requested by the French authorities and the number of laissez-passers delivered by North African countries’ authorities remained unchanged.

      At the EU level, the idea to link readmission with visa policy has been in the pipeline for many years. Let’s remember that, in October 2002, in its Community Return Policy, the European Commission reflected on the positive incentives that could be used in order to ensure third countries’ constant cooperation on readmission. The Commission observed in its communication that, actually, “there is little that can be offered in return. In particular visa concessions or the lifting of visa requirements can be a realistic option in exceptional cases only; in most cases it is not.” Therefore, the Commission set out to propose additional incentives (e.g. trade expansion, technical/financial assistance, additional development aid).

      In a similar vein, in September 2015, after years of negotiations and failed attempt to cooperate on readmission with Southern countries, the Commission remarked that the possibility to use Visa Facilitation Agreements as an incentive to cooperate on readmission is limited in the South “as the EU is unlikely to offer visa facilitation to certain third countries which generate many irregular migrants and thus pose a migratory risk. And even when the EU does offer the parallel negotiation of a visa facilitation agreement, this may not be sufficient if the facilitations offered are not sufficiently attractive.”

      More recently, in March 2018, in its Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for an amendment of the Common Visa Code, the Commission itself recognised that “better cooperation on readmission with reluctant third countries cannot be obtained through visa policy measures alone.” It also added that “there is no hard evidence on how visa leverage can translate into better cooperation of third countries on readmission.”

      Against this backdrop, why has so much emphasis been put on the link between cooperation on readmission and visa policy in the revised Visa Code Regulation and later in the New Pact? The Commission itself recognised that this conditionality might not constitute a sufficient incentive to ensure the cooperation on readmission.

      To reply to this question, we need first to question the oft-cited reference to third countries’ “reluctance”[n1] to cooperate on readmission in order to understand that, cooperation on readmission is inextricably based on unbalanced reciprocities. Moreover, migration, be it regular or irregular, continues to be viewed as a safety valve to relieve pressure on unemployment and poverty in countries of origin. Readmission has asymmetric costs and benefits having economic social and political implications for countries of origin. Apart from being unpopular in Southern countries, readmission is humiliating, stigmatizing, violent and traumatic for migrants,[n2] making their process of reintegration extremely difficult, if not impossible, especially when countries of origin have often no interest in promoting reintegration programmes addressed to their nationals expelled from Europe.

      Importantly, the conclusion of a bilateral agreement does not automatically lead to its full implementation in the field of readmission, for the latter is contingent on an array of factors that codify the bilateral interactions between two contracting parties. Today, more than 320 bilateral agreements linked to readmission have been concluded between the 27 EU Member States and third countries at a global level. Using an oxymoron, it is possible to argue that, over the past decades, various EU member states have learned that, if bilateral cooperation on readmission constitutes a central priority in their external relations (this is the official rhetoric), readmission remains peripheral to other strategic issue-areas which are detailed below. Finally, unlike some third countries in the Balkans or Eastern Europe, Southern third countries have no prospect of acceding to the EU bloc, let alone having a visa-free regime, at least in the foreseeable future. This basic difference makes any attempt to compare the responsiveness of the Balkan countries to cooperation on readmission with Southern non-EU countries’ impossible, if not spurious.

      Today, patterns of interdependence between the North and the South of the Mediterranean are very much consolidated. Over the last decades, Member States, especially Spain, France, Italy and Greece, have learned that bringing pressure to bear on uncooperative third countries needs to be evaluated cautiously lest other issues of high politics be jeopardized. Readmission cannot be isolated from a broader framework of interactions including other strategic, if not more crucial, issue-areas, such as police cooperation on the fight against international terrorism, border control, energy security and other diplomatic and geopolitical concerns. Nor can bilateral cooperation on readmission be viewed as an end in itself, for it has often been grafted onto a broader framework of interactions.

      This point leads to a final remark regarding “return sponsorship” which is detailed in Art. 55 of the proposal for a regulation on asylum and migration management. In a nutshell, the idea of the European Commission consists in a commitment from a “sponsoring Member State” to assist another Member State (the benefitting Member State) in the readmission of a third-country national. This mechanism foresees that each Member State is expected to indicate the nationalities for which they are willing to provide support in the field of readmission. The sponsoring Member State offers an assistance by mobilizing its network of bilateral cooperation on readmission, or by opening a dialogue with the authorities of a given third country where the third-country national will be deported. If, after eight months, attempts are unsuccessful, the third-country national is transferred to the sponsoring Member State. Note that, in application of Council Directive 2001/40 on mutual recognition of expulsion decisions, the sponsoring Member State may or may not recognize the expulsion decision of the benefitting Member State, just because Member States continue to interpret the Geneva Convention in different ways and also because they have different grounds for subsidiary protection.

      Viewed from a non-EU perspective, namely from the point of view of third countries, this mechanism might raise some questions of competence and relevance. Which consular authorities will undertake the identification process of the third country national with a view to eventually delivering a travel document? Are we talking about the third country’s consular authorities located in the territory of the benefitting Member State or in the sponsoring Member State’s? In a similar vein, why would a bilateral agreement linked to readmission – concluded with a given ‘sponsoring’ Member State – be applicable to a ‘benefitting’ Member State (with which no bilateral agreement or arrangement has been signed)? Such territorially bounded contingencies will invariably be problematic, at a certain stage, from the viewpoint of third countries. Additionally, in acting as a sponsoring Member State, one is entitled to wonder why an EU Member State might decide to expose itself to increased tensions with a given third country while putting at risk a broader framework of interactions.

      As the graph shows, not all the EU Member States are equally engaged in bilateral cooperation on readmission with third countries. Moreover, a geographical distribution of available data demonstrates that more than 70 per cent of the total number of bilateral agreements linked to readmission (be they formal or informal[n3]) concluded with African countries are covered by France, Italy and Spain. Over the last decades, these three Member States have developed their respective networks of cooperation on readmission with a number of countries in Africa and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

      Given the existence of these consolidated networks, the extent to which the “return sponsorship” proposed in the Pact will add value to their current undertakings is objectively questionable. Rather, if the “return sponsorship” mechanism is adopted, these three Member States might be deemed to act as sponsoring Member States when it comes to the expulsion of irregular migrants (located in other EU Member States) to Africa and the MENA region. More concretely, the propensity of, for example, Austria to sponsor Italy in expelling from Italy a foreign national coming from the MENA region or from Africa is predictably low. Austria’s current networks of cooperation on readmission with MENA and African countries would never add value to Italy’s consolidated networks of cooperation on readmission with these third countries. Moreover, it is unlikely that Italy will be proactively “sponsoring” other Member States’ expulsion decisions, without jeopardising its bilateral relations with other strategic third countries located in the MENA region or in Africa, to use the same example. These considerations concretely demonstrate that the European Commission’s call for “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility”, on which its “return sponsorship” mechanism is premised, is contingent on the existence of a federative Union able to act as a unitary supranational body in domestic and foreign affairs. This federation does not exist in political terms.

      Beyond these practical aspects, it is important to realise that the cobweb of bilateral agreements linked to readmission has expanded as a result of tremendously complex bilateral dynamics that go well beyond the mere management of international migration. These remarks are crucial to understanding that we need to reflect properly on the conditionality pattern that has driven the external action of the EU, especially in a regional context where patterns of interdependence among state actors have gained so much relevance over the last two decades. Moreover, given the clear consensus on the weak correlation between cooperation on readmission and visa policy (the European Commission being no exception to this consensus), linking the two might not be the adequate response to ensure third countries’ cooperation on readmission, especially when the latter are in position to capitalize on their strategic position with regard to some EU Member States.

      Conclusions

      This brief reflection has highlighted a trend which is taking shape in the Pact and in some of the measures proposed by the Commission in its 2020 package of reforms. It has been shown that the proposals for a pre-entry screening and the 2020 amended proposal for enhanced border procedures are creating something we could label as a ‘lower density’ European Union territory, because the new procedures and arrangements have the purpose of restricting and limiting access to rights and to jurisdiction. This would happen on the territory of a Member State, but in a place at or close to the external borders, with a view to confining migration and third country nationals to an area where the territory of a state, and therefore, the European territory, is less … ‘territorial’ than it should be: legally speaking, it is a ‘lower density’ territory.

      The “seamless link between asylum and return” the Commission aims to create with the new border procedures can be described as sliding doors through which the third country national can enter or leave immediately, depending on how the established fast-track system qualifies her situation.

      However, the paradox highlighted with the “return sponsorship” mechanism shows that readmission agreements or arrangements are no panacea, for the vested interests of third countries must also be taken into consideration when it comes to cooperation on readmission. In this respect, it is telling that the Commission never consulted third states on the new return sponsorship mechanism, as if their territories were not concerned by this mechanism, which is far from being the case. For this reason, it is legitimate to imagine that the main rationale for the return sponsorship mechanism may be another one, and it may be merely domestic. In other words, the return sponsorship, which transforms itself into a form of relocation after eight months if the third country national is not expelled from the EU territory, subtly takes non-frontline European Union states out of their comfort-zone and engage them in cooperating on expulsions. If they fail to do so, namely if the third-country national is not expelled after eight months, non-frontline European Union states are as it were ‘forcibly’ engaged in a ‘solidarity practice’ that is conducive to relocation.

      Given the disappointing past experience of the 2015 relocations, it is impossible to predict whether this mechanism will work or not. However, once one enters sliding doors, the danger is to remain stuck in uncertainty, in a European Union ‘no man’s land’ which is nothing but another by-product of the fortress Europe machinery.

      http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum.html

    • Le nouveau Pacte européen sur la migration et l’asile

      Ce 23 septembre 2020, la Commission européenne a présenté son très attendu nouveau Pacte sur la migration et l’asile.

      Alors que l’Union européenne (UE) traverse une crise politique majeure depuis 2015 et que les solutions apportées ont démontré leur insuffisance en matière de solidarité entre États membres, leur violence à l’égard des exilés et leur coût exorbitant, la Commission européenne ne semble pas tirer les leçons du passé.

      Au menu du Pacte : un renforcement toujours accru des contrôles aux frontières, des procédures expéditives aux frontières de l’UE avec, à la clé, la détention généralisée pour les nouveaux arrivants, la poursuite de l’externalisation et un focus sur les expulsions. Il n’y a donc pas de changement de stratégie.

      Le Règlement Dublin, injuste et inefficace, est loin d’être aboli. Le nouveau système mis en place changera certes de nom, mais reprendra le critère tant décrié du “premier pays d’entrée” dans l’UE pour déterminer le pays responsable du traitement de la demande d’asile. Quant à un mécanisme permanent de solidarité pour les États davantage confrontés à l’arrivée des exilés, à l’instar des quotas de relocalisations de 2015-2017 – relocalisations qui furent un échec complet -, la Commission propose une solidarité permanente et obligatoire mais… à la carte, où les États qui ne veulent pas accueillir de migrants peuvent choisir à la place de “parrainer” leur retour, ou de fournir un soutien opérationnel aux États en difficulté. La solidarité n’est donc cyniquement pas envisagée pour l’accueil, mais bien pour le renvoi des migrants.

      Pourtant, l’UE fait face à beaucoup moins d’arrivées de migrants sur son territoire qu’en 2015 (1,5 million d’arrivées en 2015, 140.00 en 2019)

      Fin 2019, l’UE accueillait 2,6 millions de réfugiés, soit l’équivalent de 0,6% de sa population. À défaut de voies légales et sûres, les personnes exilées continuent de fuir la guerre, la violence, ou de rechercher une vie meilleure et doivent emprunter des routes périlleuses pour rejoindre le territoire de l’UE : on dénombre plus de 20.000 décès depuis 2014. Une fois arrivées ici, elles peuvent encore être détenues et subir des mauvais traitements, comme c’était le cas dans le camp qui a brûlé à Moria. Lorsqu’elles poursuivent leur route migratoire au sein de l’UE, elles ne peuvent choisir le pays où elles demanderont l’asile et elles font face à la loterie de l’asile…

      Loin d’un “nouveau départ” avec ce nouveau Pacte, la Commission propose les mêmes recettes et rate une opportunité de mettre en œuvre une tout autre politique, qui soit réellement solidaire, équitable pour les États membres et respectueuse des droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes, avec l’établissement de voies légales et sûres, des procédures d’asile harmonisées et un accueil de qualité, ou encore la recherche de solutions durables pour les personnes en situation irrégulière.

      Dans cette brève analyse, nous revenons sur certaines des mesures phares telles qu’elles ont été présentées par la Commission européenne et qui feront l’objet de discussions dans les prochains mois avec le Parlement européen et le Conseil européen. Nous expliquerons également en quoi ces mesures n’ont rien d’innovant, sont un échec de la politique migratoire européenne, et pourquoi elles sont dangereuses pour les personnes migrantes.

      https://www.cire.be/publication/le-nouveau-pacte-europeen-sur-la-migration-et-lasile

      Pour télécharger l’analyse :
      https://www.cire.be/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?juwpfisadmin=false&action=wpfd&task=file.download&wpfd_category_

    • New pact on migration and asylum. Perspective on the ’other side’ of the EU border

      At the end of September 2020, and after camp Moria on Lesvos burned down leaving over 13,000 people in an even more precarious situation than they were before, the European Commission (EC) introduced a proposal for the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. So far, the proposal has not been met with enthusiasm by neither member states or human rights organisations.

      Based on first-hand field research interviews with civil society and other experts in the Balkan region, this report provides a unique perspective of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum from ‘the other side’ of the EU’s borders.

      #Balkans #route_des_Balkans #rapport #Refugee_rights #militarisation

    • Impakter | Un « nouveau » pacte sur l’asile et les migrations ?

      Le média en ligne Impakter propose un article d’analyse du Pacte sur l’asile et les migrations de l’Union européenne. Publié le 23 septembre 2020, le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions. L’article pointe l’aspect critique du projet, et notamment des concepts clés tels que : « processus de pré-selection », « le processus accélérée » et le « pacte de retour ». L’article donne la parole à plusieurs expertises et offre ainsi une meilleure compréhension de ce que concrètement ce pacte implique pour les personnes migrantes.

      L’article de #Charlie_Westbrook “A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?” a été publié le 11 février dans le magazine en ligne Impakter (sous licence Creative Commons). Nous vous en proposons un court résumé traduisant les lignes directrices de l’argumentaire, en français ci-dessous. Pour lire l’intégralité du texte en anglais, vous pouvez vous rendre sur le site de Impakter.

      –---

      Le “Nouveau pacte sur la migration et l’asile”, a été publié le 23 septembre, faisant suite à l’incendie du camp surpeuplé de Moria. Le pacte a été annoncé comme un “nouveau départ”. En réalité, le pacte n’est pas du tout un nouveau départ, mais la même politique avec un ensemble de nouvelles propositions sur lesquelles les États membres de l’UE devront maintenant se mettre d’accord – une entreprise qui a déjà connu des difficultés.

      Les universitaires, les militants et les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme de l’UE soulignent les préoccupations éthiques et pratiques que suscitent nombre des propositions suggérées par la Commission, ainsi que la rhétorique axée sur le retour qui les anime. Charlie Westbrook la journaliste, a contacté Kirsty Evans, coordinatrice de terrain et des campagnes pour Europe Must Act, qui m’a fait part de ses réactions au nouveau Pacte.

      Cet essai vise à présenter le plus clairement possible les problèmes liés à ce nouveau pacte, en mettant en évidence les principales préoccupations des experts et des ONG. Ces préoccupations concernent les problèmes potentiels liés au processus de présélection, au processus accéléré (ou “fast-track”) et au mécanisme de parrainage des retours.

      Le processus de présélection

      La nouvelle proposition est d’instaurer une procédure de contrôle préalable à l’entrée sur le territoire européen. L’ONG Human Rights Watch, dénonce la suggestion trompeuse du pacte selon laquelle les personnes soumises à la procédure frontalière ne sont pas considérées comme ayant formellement pénétré sur le territoire. Ce processus concerne toute personne extra-européenne qui franchirait la frontière de manière irrégulière. Ce manque de différenciation du type de besoin inquiète l’affirme l’avocate et professeur Lyra Jakulevičienė, car cela signifie que la politique d’externalisation sera plus forte que jamais. Ce nouveau règlement brouille la distinction entre les personnes demandant une protection internationale et les autres migrants “en plaçant les deux groupes de personnes sous le même régime juridique au lieu de les différencier clairement, car leurs chances de rester dans l’UE sont très différentes”. Ce processus d’externalisation, cependant, “se déroule “à l’intérieur” du territoire de l’Union européenne, et vise à prolonger les effets des politiques d’endiguement parce qu’elles rendent l’accès au territoire de l’UE moins significatif”, comme l’expliquent Jean-Pierre Cassarino, chercheur principal à la chaire de la politique européenne de voisinage du Collège d’Europe, et Luisa Marin, professeur adjoint de droit européen. En d’autres termes, les personnes en quête de protection n’auront pas pleinement accès aux droits européens en arrivant sur le territoire de l’UE. Il faudra d’abord déterminer ce qu’elles “sont”. En outre, les recherches universitaires montrent que les processus d’externalisation “entraînent le contournement des normes fondamentales, vont à l’encontre de la bonne gouvernance, créent l’immobilité et contribuent à la crise du régime mondial des réfugiés, qui ne parvient pas à assurer la protection”. Les principales inquiétudes de ces deux expert·es sont les suivantes : la rapidité de prise de décision (pas plus de 5 jours), l’absence d’assistance juridique, Etat membre est le seul garant du respect des droits fondamentaux et si cette période de pré-sélection sera mise en œuvre comme une détention.

      Selon Jakulevičienė, la proposition apporte “un grand potentiel” pour créer davantage de camps de style “Moria”. Il est difficile de voir en quoi cela profiterait à qui que ce soit.

      Procédure accélérée

      Si un demandeur est orienté vers le système accéléré, une décision sera prise dans un délai de 12 semaines – une durée qui fait craindre que le système accéléré n’aboutisse à un retour injuste des demandeurs. En 2010, Human Rights Watch a publié un rapport de fond détaillant comment les procédures d’asile accélérées étaient inadaptées aux demandes complexes et comment elles affectaient négativement les femmes demandeurs d’asile en particulier.
      Les personnes seront dirigées vers la procédure accélérée si : l’identité a été cachée ou que de faux documents ont été utilisés, si elle représente un danger pour la sécurité nationale, ou si elle est ressortissante d’un pays pour lesquels moins de 20% des demandes ont abouti à l’octroi d’une protection internationale.

      Comme l’exprime le rapport de Human Rights Watch (HRW), “la procédure à la frontière proposée repose sur deux hypothèses erronées – que la majorité des personnes arrivant en Europe n’ont pas besoin de protection et que l’évaluation des demandes d’asile peut être faite facilement et rapidement”.

      Essentiellement, comme l’écrivent Cassarino et Marin, “elle porte atteinte au principe selon lequel toute demande d’asile nécessite une évaluation complexe et individualisée de la situation personnelle particulière du demandeur”.

      Tout comme Jakulevičienė, Kirsty Evans s’inquiète de la manière dont le pacte va alimenter une rhétorique préjudiciable, en faisant valoir que “le langage de l’accélération fait appel à la “protection” de la rhétorique nationale évidente dans la politique et les médias en se concentrant sur le retour des personnes sur leur propre territoire”.

      Un pacte pour le retour

      Désormais, lorsqu’une demande d’asile est rejetée, la décision de retour sera rendue en même temps.

      Le raisonnement présenté par la Commission pour proposer des procédures plus rapides et plus intégrées est que des procédures inefficaces causent des difficultés excessives – y compris pour ceux qui ont obtenu le droit de rester.

      Les procédures restructurées peuvent en effet profiter à certains. Cependant, il existe un risque sérieux qu’elles aient un impact négatif sur le droit d’asile des personnes soumises à la procédure accélérée – sachant qu’en cas de rejet, il n’existe qu’un seul droit de recours.

      La proposition selon laquelle l’UE traitera désormais les retours dans leur ensemble, et non plus seulement dans un seul État membre, illustre bien l’importance que l’UE accorde aux retours. À cette fin, l’UE propose la création d’un nouveau poste de coordinateur européen des retours qui s’occupera des retours et des réadmissions.

      Décrite comme “la plus sinistre des nouvelles propositions”, et assimilée à “une grotesque parodie de personnes parrainant des enfants dans les pays en développement par l’intermédiaire d’organisations caritatives”, l’option du parrainage de retour est également un signe fort de l’approche par concession de la Commission.

      Pour M. Evans, le fait d’autoriser les pays à opter pour le “retour” comme moyen de “gérer la migration” semble être une validation du comportement illégal des États membres, comme les récentes expulsions massives en Grèce. Alors, qu’est-ce que le parrainage de retour ? Eh bien, selon les termes de l’UE, le parrainage du retour est une option de solidarité dans laquelle l’État membre “s’engage à renvoyer les migrants en situation irrégulière sans droit de séjour au nom d’un autre État membre, en le faisant directement à partir du territoire de l’État membre bénéficiaire”.

      Les États membres préciseront les nationalités qu’ils “parraineront” en fonction, vraisemblablement, des relations préexistantes de l’État membre de l’UE avec un État non membre de l’UE. Lorsque la demande d’un individu est rejetée, l’État membre qui en est responsable s’appuiera sur ses relations avec le pays tiers pour négocier le retour du demandeur.

      En outre, en supposant que les réadmissions soient réussies, le parrainage des retours fonctionne sur la base de l’hypothèse qu’il existe un pays tiers sûr. C’est sur cette base que les demandes sont rejetées. La manière dont cela affectera le principe de non-refoulement est la principale préoccupation des organisations des droits de l’homme et des experts politiques, et c’est une préoccupation qui découle d’expériences antérieures. Après tout, la coopération avec des pays tiers jusqu’à présent – à savoir l’accord Turquie-UE et l’accord Espagne-Maroc – a suscité de nombreuses critiques sur le coût des droits de l’homme.

      Mais en plus des préoccupations relatives aux droits de l’homme, des questions sont soulevées sur les implications ou même les aspects pratiques de l’”incitation” des pays tiers à se conformer, l’image de l’UE en tant que champion des droits de l’homme étant déjà corrodée aux yeux de la communauté internationale.

      Il s’agira notamment d’utiliser la délivrance du code des visas comme méthode d’incitation. Pour les pays qui ne coopèrent pas à la réadmission, les visas seront plus difficiles à obtenir. La proposition visant à pénaliser les pays qui appliquent des restrictions en matière de visas n’est pas nouvelle et n’a pas conduit à une amélioration des relations diplomatiques. Guild fait valoir que cette approche est injuste pour les demandeurs de visa des pays “non coopérants” et qu’elle risque également de susciter des sentiments d’injustice chez les voisins du pays tiers.

      L’analyse de Guild est que le nouveau pacte est diplomatiquement faible. Au-delà du financement, il offre “peu d’attention aux intérêts des pays tiers”. Il faut reconnaître, après tout, que la réadmission a des coûts et des avantages asymétriques pour les pays qui les acceptent, surtout si l’on considère que la migration, comme le soulignent Cassarino et Marin, “continue d’être considérée comme une soupape de sécurité pour soulager la pression sur le chômage et la pauvreté dans les pays d’origine”.

      https://asile.ch/2021/03/02/impakter-un-nouveau-pacte-sur-lasile-et-les-migrations

      L’article original :
      A “New” Pact on Migration and Asylum ?
      https://impakter.com/a-new-pact-on-migration-and-asylum

    • The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees. International Experiences on Containment and Mobility and their Impacts on Trust and Rights

      In September 2020, the European Commission published what it described as a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (emphasis added) that lays down a multi-annual policy agenda on issues that have been central to debate about the future of European integration. This book critically examines the new Pact as part of a Forum organized by the Horizon 2020 project ASILE – Global Asylum Governance and the EU’s Role.

      ASILE studies interactions between emerging international protection systems and the United Nations Global Compact for Refugees (UN GCR), with particular focus on the European Union’s role and the UN GCR’s implementation dynamics. It brings together a new international network of scholars from 13 institutions examining the characteristics of international and country specific asylum governance instruments and arrangements applicable to people seeking international protection. It studies the compatibility of these governance instruments’ with international protection and human rights, and the UN GCR’s call for global solidarity and responsibility sharing.

      https://www.asileproject.eu/the-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-in-light-of-the-united-nations-glob

  • Refugee protection at risk

    Two of the words that we should try to avoid when writing about refugees are “unprecedented” and “crisis.” They are used far too often and with far too little thought by many people working in the humanitarian sector. Even so, and without using those words, there is evidence to suggest that the risks confronting refugees are perhaps greater today than at any other time in the past three decades.

    First, as the UN Secretary-General has pointed out on many occasions, we are currently witnessing a failure of global governance. When Antonio Guterres took office in 2017, he promised to launch what he called “a surge in diplomacy for peace.” But over the past three years, the UN Security Council has become increasingly dysfunctional and deadlocked, and as a result is unable to play its intended role of preventing the armed conflicts that force people to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. Nor can the Security Council bring such conflicts to an end, thereby allowing refugees to return to their country of origin.

    It is alarming to note, for example, that four of the five Permanent Members of that body, which has a mandate to uphold international peace and security, have been militarily involved in the Syrian armed conflict, a war that has displaced more people than any other in recent years. Similarly, and largely as a result of the blocking tactics employed by Russia and the US, the Secretary-General struggled to get Security Council backing for a global ceasefire that would support the international community’s efforts to fight the Coronavirus pandemic

    Second, the humanitarian principles that are supposed to regulate the behavior of states and other parties to armed conflicts, thereby minimizing the harm done to civilian populations, are under attack from a variety of different actors. In countries such as Burkina Faso, Iraq, Nigeria and Somalia, those principles have been flouted by extremist groups who make deliberate use of death and destruction to displace populations and extend the areas under their control.

    In states such as Myanmar and Syria, the armed forces have acted without any kind of constraint, persecuting and expelling anyone who is deemed to be insufficiently loyal to the regime or who come from an unwanted part of society. And in Central America, violent gangs and ruthless cartels are acting with growing impunity, making life so hazardous for other citizens that they feel obliged to move and look for safety elsewhere.

    Third, there is mounting evidence to suggest that governments are prepared to disregard international refugee law and have a respect a declining commitment to the principle of asylum. It is now common practice for states to refuse entry to refugees, whether by building new walls, deploying military and militia forces, or intercepting and returning asylum seekers who are travelling by sea.

    In the Global North, the refugee policies of the industrialized increasingly take the form of ‘externalization’, whereby the task of obstructing the movement of refugees is outsourced to transit states in the Global South. The EU has been especially active in the use of this strategy, forging dodgy deals with countries such as Libya, Niger, Sudan and Turkey. Similarly, the US has increasingly sought to contain northward-bound refugees in Mexico, and to return asylum seekers there should they succeed in reaching America’s southern border.

    In developing countries themselves, where some 85 per cent of the world’s refugees are to be found, governments are increasingly prepared to flout the principle that refugee repatriation should only take place in a voluntary manner. While they rarely use overt force to induce premature returns, they have many other tools at their disposal: confining refugees to inhospitable camps, limiting the food that they receive, denying them access to the internet, and placing restrictions on humanitarian organizations that are trying to meet their needs.

    Fourth, the COVID-19 pandemic of the past nine months constitutes a very direct threat to the lives of refugees, and at the same time seems certain to divert scarce resources from other humanitarian programmes, including those that support displaced people. The Coronavirus has also provided a very convenient alibi for governments that wish to close their borders to people who are seeking safety on their territory.

    Responding to this problem, UNHCR has provided governments with recommendations as to how they might uphold the principle of asylum while managing their borders effectively and minimizing any health risks associated with the cross-border movement of people. But it does not seem likely that states will be ready to adopt such an approach, and will prefer instead to introduce more restrictive refugee and migration policies.

    Even if the virus is brought under some kind of control, it may prove difficult to convince states to remove the restrictions that they have introduced during the COVD-19 emergency. And the likelihood of that outcome is reinforced by the fear that the climate crisis will in the years to come prompt very large numbers of people to look for a future beyond the borders of their own state.

    Fifth, the state-based international refugee regime does not appear well placed to resist these negative trends. At the broadest level, the very notions of multilateralism, international cooperation and the rule of law are being challenged by a variety of powerful states in different parts of the world: Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey and the USA, to name just five. Such countries also share a common disdain for human rights and the protection of minorities – indigenous people, Uyghur Muslims, members of the LGBT community, the Kurds and African-Americans respectively.

    The USA, which has traditionally acted as a mainstay of the international refugee regime, has in recent years set a particularly negative example to the rest of the world by slashing its refugee resettlement quota, by making it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers to claim refugee status on American territory, by entirely defunding the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency and by refusing to endorse the Global Compact on Refugees. Indeed, while many commentators predicted that the election of President Trump would not be good news for refugees, the speed at which he has dismantled America’s commitment to the refugee regime has taken many by surprise.

    In this toxic international environment, UNHCR appears to have become an increasingly self-protective organization, as indicated by the enormous amount of effort it devotes to marketing, branding and celebrity endorsement. For reasons that remain somewhat unclear, rather than stressing its internationally recognized mandate for refugee protection and solutions, UNHCR increasingly presents itself as an all-purpose humanitarian agency, delivering emergency assistance to many different groups of needy people, both outside and within their own country. Perhaps this relief-oriented approach is thought to win the favour of the organization’s key donors, an impression reinforced by the cautious tone of the advocacy that UNHCR undertakes in relation to the restrictive asylum policies of the EU and USA.

    UNHCR has, to its credit, made a concerted effort to revitalize the international refugee regime, most notably through the Global Compact on Refugees, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and the Global Refugee Forum. But will these initiatives really have the ‘game-changing’ impact that UNHCR has prematurely attributed to them?

    The Global Compact on Refugees, for example, has a number of important limitations. It is non-binding and does not impose any specific obligations on the countries that have endorsed it, especially in the domain of responsibility-sharing. The Compact makes numerous references to the need for long-term and developmental approaches to the refugee problem that also bring benefits to host states and communities. But it is much more reticent on fundamental protection principles such as the right to seek asylum and the notion of non-refoulement. The Compact also makes hardly any reference to the issue of internal displacement, despite the fact that there are twice as many IDPs as there are refugees under UNHCR’s mandate.

    So far, the picture painted by this article has been unremittingly bleak. But just as one can identify five very negative trends in relation to refugee protection, a similar number of positive developments also warrant recognition.

    First, the refugee policies pursued by states are not uniformly bad. Countries such as Canada, Germany and Uganda, for example, have all contributed, in their own way, to the task of providing refugees with the security that they need and the rights to which they are entitled. In their initial stages at least, the countries of South America and the Middle East responded very generously to the massive movements of refugees out of Venezuela and Syria.

    And while some analysts, including the current author, have felt that there was a very real risk of large-scale refugee expulsions from countries such as Bangladesh, Kenya and Lebanon, those fears have so far proved to be unfounded. While there is certainly a need for abusive states to be named and shamed, recognition should also be given to those that seek to uphold the principles of refugee protection.

    Second, the humanitarian response to refugee situations has become steadily more effective and equitable. Twenty years ago, it was the norm for refugees to be confined to camps, dependent on the distribution of food and other emergency relief items and unable to establish their own livelihoods. Today, it is far more common for refugees to be found in cities, towns or informal settlements, earning their own living and/or receiving support in the more useful, dignified and efficient form of cash transfers. Much greater attention is now given to the issues of age, gender and diversity in refugee contexts, and there is a growing recognition of the role that locally-based and refugee-led organizations can play in humanitarian programmes.

    Third, after decades of discussion, recent years have witnessed a much greater engagement with refugee and displacement issues by development and financial actors, especially the World Bank. While there are certainly some risks associated with this engagement (namely a lack of attention to protection issues and an excessive focus on market-led solutions) a more developmental approach promises to allow better long-term planning for refugee populations, while also addressing more systematically the needs of host populations.

    Fourth, there has been a surge of civil society interest in the refugee issue, compensating to some extent for the failings of states and the large international humanitarian agencies. Volunteer groups, for example, have played a critical role in responding to the refugee situation in the Mediterranean. The Refugees Welcome movement, a largely spontaneous and unstructured phenomenon, has captured the attention and allegiance of many people, especially but not exclusively the younger generation.

    And as has been seen in the UK this year, when governments attempt to demonize refugees, question their need for protection and violate their rights, there are many concerned citizens, community associations, solidarity groups and faith-based organizations that are ready to make their voice heard. Indeed, while the national asylum policies pursued by the UK and other countries have been deeply disappointing, local activism on behalf of refugees has never been stronger.

    Finally, recent events in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Europe have raised the question as to whether refugees could be spared the trauma and hardship of making dangerous journeys from one country and continent to another by providing them with safe and legal routes. These might include initiatives such as Canada’s community-sponsored refugee resettlement programme, the ‘humanitarian corridors’ programme established by the Italian churches, family reunion projects of the type championed in the UK and France by Lord Alf Dubs, and the notion of labour mobility programmes for skilled refugee such as that promoted by the NGO Talent Beyond Boundaries.

    Such initiatives do not provide a panacea to the refugee issue, and in their early stages at least, might not provide a solution for large numbers of displaced people. But in a world where refugee protection is at such serious risk, they deserve our full support.

    http://www.against-inhumanity.org/2020/09/08/refugee-protection-at-risk

    #réfugiés #asile #migrations #protection #Jeff_Crisp #crise #crise_migratoire #crise_des_réfugiés #gouvernance #gouvernance_globale #paix #Nations_unies #ONU #conflits #guerres #conseil_de_sécurité #principes_humanitaires #géopolitique #externalisation #sanctuarisation #rapatriement #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières #fermeture_des_frontières #liberté_de_mouvement #liberté_de_circulation #droits_humains #Global_Compact_on_Refugees #Comprehensive_Refugee_Response_Framework #Global_Refugee_Forum #camps_de_réfugiés #urban_refugees #réfugiés_urbains #banque_mondiale #société_civile #refugees_welcome #solidarité #voies_légales #corridors_humanitaires #Talent_Beyond_Boundaries #Alf_Dubs

    via @isskein
    ping @karine4 @thomas_lacroix @_kg_ @rhoumour

    –—
    Ajouté à la métaliste sur le global compact :
    https://seenthis.net/messages/739556

  • #University_corridors and the role of academia in opening safe and legal pathways for refugees to Europe

    In this blog I discuss the potential contribution of EU universities to opening safe and legal pathways for refugees to Europe. I describe the example of a recent project in Italy called ‘University Corridors for Refugees’ and argue that the expansion and scaling up of this initiative can save lives and partially remedy the inequality of opportunity that many refugees face.

    What can universities do for refugees?

    Since the ‘long summer of migration’ in 2015, universities across the EU started various refugee-related initiatives. Many contributed in the conventional way through research on topics like reception and integration. Some developed more practice-oriented solutions and opened their doors to forced migrants. Recognized refugees were given access to full-time study programs and asylum seekers were allowed to enroll in single university courses. In the majority of cases this was accompanied by softening rigorous intake procedures and removing financial barriers. One example here is the Incluusion program of Utrecht University, which in the last years has provided free access to a wide range of courses for hundreds of students with a refugee background. While attempts for large-scale and coordinated cross-national initiatives were not absent, solutions usually emerged bottom-up, driven by the active engagement of university management, academic staff and student communities.

    These attempts, however, have an important limitation – they have been focused on the access to higher education for forced migrants who have already made their journey to the EU. A recent estimation by Amnesty International showed that about 80% of all refugees live in developing regions, while one third of the global refugee population resides in the world’s poorest countries. Even the most brilliant refugee students among these approximately 20 million people face disproportionate and unjustified burdens in their attempts to pursue higher education at EU universities. Rather than limited to lack of finances, as many would correctly suggest, these burdens often involve bureaucratic issues, which eventually deprive refugees from the equality of opportunity they deserve based on their own efforts, knowledge and skills.

    How could EU universities, or at least those who have already demonstrated their commitment to assisting refugees, provide a remedy to this problem? My argument is that they can do so by extending their engagement beyond the EU borders and by opening university corridors for refugee students residing in third countries. Initially, universities can be the protagonists in creating coalitions of local civil society and private sector actors ready to provide material and social support to refugee students who want to continue their education in Europe. Subsequently, they can collaborate with international organizations and national authorities for the removal of bureaucratic obstacles that disproportionately affect refugees.

    The evidence upon which I build my argument comes from a recent initiative called University Corridors for Refugees. It started as a small pilot project at the University of Bologna in 2019, and within just a year expanded to ten other higher education institutions across Italy. In brief, it is a wide partnership between public institutions, civil society and private sector actors that supports refugees to pursue a post-graduate degree in Italy in the following way. Each of the participating universities prepares a call for applications for a range of Master’s programmes for refugees residing in Ethiopia. UNHCR, with the assistance of NGOs, helps disseminate the calls among refugees who have recently graduated at Ethiopian universities and who live either in camps or in urban areas across the country. After a merit-based selection procedure conducted by the host universities, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation issues a study visa to the successful applicants. Once they have arrived on campus, the refugee students are welcomed and supported by a network of local partners. NGOs, regional/local authorities and churches provide study equipment, a public transport subscription, language classes and integration assistance. Universities award a tuition fee waiver and support the beneficiaries of the project with accommodation, while tutors selected among the local students help the newcomers adapt to the new environment. Finally, private sector partners facilitate the access to internships and training programs during their studies, with the potential for permanent employment after graduation. While the University of Bologna has already welcomed its first refugee students arriving through the University Corridors, the rest of the Italian universities participating in the project expect their successful candidates to join them in the following months.

    Opening university corridors for refugees is not a novel idea. In fact, the Student Refugee Program in Canada has been operating for more than 40 years and has helped more than 2000 refugee students pursue higher education in nearly 100 Canadian universities. The Canadian model, however, makes part of the country’s private-sponsorship-program, which means that the arriving refugee students are at the same time permanently resettled. On the contrary, the Italian model described above allows refugees to continue their education in Italy on a study visa. In any case, and especially given the participation of private sector actors in the University Corridors project, it is very likely that the fresh refugee graduates will be able to transfer their visas into work permits and therefore remain in the country after their studies. In this way, the participating universities de facto contribute to opening safe and legal pathways for refugees to Europe.
    The birth of University Corridors for Refugees

    Why is the University Corridors for Refugees project so important and why should it be expanded and scaled up? My answer here is twofold. Firstly, because university corridors can potentially save lives. Secondly, because they can also, at least partially, remedy the inequality of opportunity that even the most devoted, hardworking and gifted refugee students face. The best way to demonstrate the added value of opening more university corridors to Europe is by sharing the little-known story behind the birth of the project in Italy.

    In 2004, a young Italian PhD student named Stefania visited Ethiopia for a course in tropical medicine. One day, while traveling to the Blue Nile Falls, she met a twelve year old local Ethiopian boy, who eventually helped her cross the river. The two exchanged contacts and stayed in touch, while the family of Stefania decided to start sponsoring the education of the boy. This helped him complete high school and then enroll into a graduate program at the University of Addis Ababa.

    At the university the Ethiopian boy met his two best friends. Both of them were refugees, who had recently fled the dictatorship in nearby Eritrea in quest for realizing their dream – to study journalism. Ethiopia’s open policy towards refugees allowed the two young men to follow courses along with their new Ethiopian friend. All three of them excelled in their studies and graduated together in 2014.

    By that time, the young Italian PhD student had become an assistant professor at the University of Bologna. With her support, her Ethiopian friend prepared his documents and applied for a Master’s programme at the same institution. Eventually, he got accepted. Despite all bureaucratic obstacles faced, he received his study visa and arrived on time for the start of the semester. Exactly ten years after the boy had helped Stefania cross the Blue Nile, she returned the favor by helping him to safely and legally cross the Mediterranean and continue his education.

    His two Eritrean refugee friends, however, were not so fortunate. They did not lag behind in terms of knowledge or skills and they were perfectly qualified for enrolling into a post-graduate program at an Italian university too. What they lacked was a valid passport. The only travel document they could obtain by the Ethiopian authorities was the Geneva passport, which is issued to recognized refugees. However, the Italian authorities repeatedly refused granting them study visas in these circumstances. It should be noted, that the Geneva passport is a valid travel document issued by all countries that have signed the Refugee Convention. In theory, therefore, there is no legal obstacle preventing refugees who have such passports to apply for and eventually obtain a visa to travel to Europe. After a long period of negotiations and with the immense efforts of Stefania and the intervention of UNHCR, one of the two Eritrean refugees was issued a study visa and flew to Italy where he started his Masters. By that time, the other refugee graduate had already chosen to take an alternative journey. He had already moved to Sudan on his way to Libya and then Italy. Fortunately, and again with the assistance of UNHCR, the Italian embassy in Khartoum provided him the necessary study visa and in September 2016 he arrived in Bologna. Following the steps of his two friends he obtained a merit-based scholarship, passed all his exams and graduated exactly two years later.

    In the meanwhile, the persistence and personal engagement of Stefania had created the foundations of a wide network that supported the two Eritrean refugee students all the way from Ethiopia to their graduation at the University of Bologna. Local NGOs and individuals provided financial, material and social support. A crowdfunding campaign and a small concert helped cover the tuition fees. UNHCR, as already noted, took care of the legal issues and the communication with the Italian authorities.

    Inspired by the positive experience, the university management decided to build upon this personal initiative and launched the UNI-CO-RE (University Corridors for Refugees) pilot project. The already existing partnership was further expanded and strengthened. The Catholic church and an international NGO supported the selected students during the preparation of their documents in Ethiopia, covering also the cost of their flight to Italy. The University of Bologna provided full tuition fee waivers and scholarships (again with the support of the Catholic church), while the Regional Agency for the Right to Higher Education in Emilia-Romagna offered accommodation in a student house. Local civil society organizations took over the integration of the beneficiaries, providing also psychological support. In addition, two associations of managers operating in the industrial, trade and service sectors agreed to provide internships and eventually employment to prospective refugee students. Ultimately, after a selection procedure with merit-based criteria, five more Eritrean refugees arrived in 2019 in Bologna to pursue their Master’s degrees in Engineering and Economics, while one more joined LUISS University in Rome. Few months later, with the support of UNHCR and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation the project was extended to 10 more universities and 20 new refugee students are expected to arrive in Italy in the autumn semester of 2020.
    No need to passively wait

    Returning to the question on the importance of expanding the university corridors, one can now ask what would have happened if Stefania’s efforts had not resulted in removing the barriers that the two refugee students faced in their attempts to continue their education in Europe? It would be a speculation to claim that the Eritrean refugee who had started his journey to Libya would end up in the depths of the sea. It is a fact though that since 2014 more than 20,000 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean. Some probably remember the boy from Mali, who drowned on April 18, 2015 with his school report card sewn into his pocket. His story became widely known when an Italian newspaper published a cartoon depicting the boy under water, showing his report to fish and mollusks who replied “Wow…All tens! What a rare pearl!”. Few years after his death five schools in Rome put stumbling stones in memory of the boy stating “To the young man from Mali, who died with a report card on his heart. This school would have welcomed him and other people who drowned while trying to cross the sea." Schools in other Italian cities also developed similar initiatives.

    As I have argued above, some solutions already exist and there is no need to passively wait for similar unnecessary tragedies to occur. Universities across Europe have a unique chance to provide at least a partial remedy to the problem, by opening university corridors for refugees. They can demonstrate their leadership, unite efforts with local civil society, private sector partners and international organizations, and work together towards the removal of the various barriers depriving refugee students from equal opportunities. Importantly, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation eventually recognized the added value of university corridors and became one of the leading partners in the project. This shows that national authorities can be responsive to bottom-up solutions that improve migration governance in general and facilitate safe and legal pathways to Europe in particular. In the same way in which the persistence of a single person gave birth to the university corridors in Italy, the protagonism of European universities can help expand the initiative and build new bridges for refugee students that will provide them the chance to access higher education.

    https://www.uu.nl/en/opinion/blog-university-corridors-and-the-role-of-academia-in-opening-safe-and-legal-path

    #université #réfugiés #asile #migrations #solidarité #voies_légales #corridors

    Ajouté à cette métaliste générale sur les villes-refuge:
    https://seenthis.net/messages/759145#message766829

  • Why ’stronger borders’ don’t work

    Thousands of people die annually trying to cross borders. It’s often argued stronger borders and more checks would deter people from making dangerous crossings. But how accurate is this? Maya Goodfellow explores what the current border regime means for people seeking asylum

    https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/video/2020/jan/21/why-stronger-borders-dont-work
    #fermeture_des_frontières #asile #migrations #réfugiés #walls_don't_work #dissuasion #frontières #problème #solution #vidéo #externalisation #vulnérabilité #danger #péril #militarisation_des_frontières #ressources_pédagogiques #pull_factor #facteur_pull #stéréotypes #préjugés #pull-factor #audition #voies_légales #réinstallation

    Cette carte


    #cartographie #visualisation #frontières_intérieures #Schengen (fin de -)
    ping @karine4 @isskein

  • Question concernant les #statistiques reçue via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 29.11.2019 et que je mets ici pour archivage, car la question des #chiffres autour des #migrations, de l’#asile, des #réfugiés et des #frontières revient souvent...

    La question concerne le pourcentage d’#entrées_irrégulières des personnes ayant obtenu une protection en Europe .

    Je n’arrive pas à trouver d’infos fiables sur le sujet.
    Ici en France nos politiques rivalisent de chiffres hasardeux...
    Il y a quelques mois une étude visant à promouvoir la mise en place de visas humanitaires avancait le chiffre de 90% de réfugiés étant entrés irrégulièrement en Europe.
    https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621823/EPRS_STU(2018)621823_EN.pdf
    "Currently, up to 90% of the total population of subsequently recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection reach the territory of Member States irregularly."

    Comme source de cette info, ils indiquent ce document :
    https://www.fluechtlingshilfe.ch/assets/asylrecht/rechtsgrundlagen/exploring-avenues-for-protected-entry-in-europe.pdf
    ...qui date de 2012, et c’est une « estimation », sans citer de sources.
    "According to estimates, approximately 90% of all asylum seekers enter Europe in an irregular manner, since legal entry has become more and more difficult and in most cases impossible. »

    Est-ce quelqu’un saurait ou il est possible de trouver cette info, c’est à dire le pourcentage d’entrée irrégulière ou via un visa, parmi les demandeurs d’asile d’une part, et ceux qui obtiennent un statut de réfugié, en Europe ?

    ping @simplicissimus @reka

    • Je n’ai pas su répondre à cette question, mais il y a un commentaire à faire par rapport à ce que les deux citations mettent en avant (pas la même chose, à mon avis, même si les deux donnent le même chiffre... ce qui montre qu’il y a un problème). Et des information à donner en complément, d’autres statistiques (et leur #manipulation) dans d’autres contextes, mais toujours sur la question du passage irrégulier des frontières...

      Voici ma réponse :

      J’envoie à toi et aux autres abonné·es de la liste le graphique ci-dessous :


      tiré du livre « Méditerranée : des frontières à la dérive »

      https://lepassagerclandestin.fr/catalogue/bibliotheque-des-frontieres/mediterranee-des-frontieres-a-la-derive.html

      On y voit que les « interception des migrants à la frontière » (donc sans visa, qui entre « irrégulièrement ») représentent 1 à 3% des entrées sur le territoire européen...

      ça ne répond pas à ta question, mais c’est intéressant de l’avoir en tête... pour montrer que la très très très grande majorité des personnes non-européennes entrent de manière régulière sur le territoire, avec des visas.

      Mais là, il ne s’agit pas de ce que tu cherches.

      Ce qui est sûr c’est que tes deux citations se contredisent :
      1. « Currently, up to 90% of the total population of subsequently recognised refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection reach the territory of Member States irregularly. »
      –-> % des personnes entrées irrégulièrement sur les personnes reconnues réfugiées ou qui ont obtenu une protection subsidiaire, après être entrées sur le territoire européen.

      Ce qui n’est pas la même chose de dire que

      2. « According to estimates, approximately 90% of all asylum seekers enter Europe in an irregular manner »
      –-> car là la base de calcul sont les demandeurs d’asile, ce qui comportent d’y intégrer aussi des personnes qui seront après examen de la demande déboutées de l’asile.

      Une des deux affirmations est donc fausse, car étant la base différente, on ne peut pas avoir le même pourcentage...

      –------------

      Je pense que je n’ai jamais vu passer les chiffres des entrées irrégulières sur la base de ceux qui après sont reconnus réfugiés... Mais je suis preneuse si jamais des personnes de la liste ont cette info, en effet.

      Je vous rappelle par contre ci-dessous d’autres contextes dans lesquels on a pu démontré que les entrées (irrégulières) ont été gonflées :
      ... les chiffres publiés par Frontex des entrées irrégulières dans les Balkans : https://theconversation.com/seeing-double-how-the-eu-miscounts-migrants-arriving-at-its-borders
      ... et la Suisse gonflait ceux des passages à la frontière depuis l’Italie : https://asile.ch/2016/08/12/parlant-de-personnes-lieu-de-cas-medias-surestiment-nombre-de-passages-a-front
      ... et puis ceux des passages entre la Grèce et l’Albanie : https://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/2675

      Tout cela, avec plus de documents, vous le trouvez dans ce fil de discussion sur seenthis.net :
      https://seenthis.net/messages/705957

      Je n’ai pas vraiment répondu à ta question, mais cette réponse peut peut-être être utile à des personnes sur la liste qui se posent des questions sur les statistiques des entrées sur le territoire européen...

    • A priori, seul l’OFPRA, et lui seul, serait en mesure de fournir ce chiffre et il ne le fait pas.
      https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/fr/l-ofpra/nos-publications/rapports-d-activite

      Par ailleurs, il me semble que le chiffre de 90% d’illégaux parmi les bénéficiaires de protection signifierait qu’une (très ?) forte proportion des immigrants irréguliers demanderaient la protection. Mais je n’y connais pas grand chose.

      Je trouve quelques éléments autour de l’estimation, par construction problématique, des entrées irrégulières dans les échanges rapportés par le rapport sénatorial de 2006 (oui, ça fait loin…)
      https://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-300-1/r05-300-111.html

    • @simplicissimus :

      Par ailleurs, il me semble que le chiffre de 90% d’illégaux parmi les bénéficiaires de protection signifierait qu’une (très ?) forte proportion des immigrants irréguliers demanderaient la protection. Mais je n’y connais pas grand chose.

      –-> ça absolument, oui, car malheureusement les #voies_légales sont bouchées (politique de #visas très restrictive pour des questions liées à l’asile mais aussi pour le travail, les études, etc.), du coup, les personnes prennent la route quand même et la seule manière pour laquelle on peut traverser la frontière SANS les « bons » documents. Les frontières fermées, d’une certaine manière, pousse les personnes à passer les frontières irrégulièrement et la seule manière de ne pas être refoulé c’est en demandant l’asile (en théorie, car en pratique les Etats bafouent souvent ce droit et refoulent quand même).
      J’espère avoir été claire...

      #merci en tout cas pour le lien du Sénat...

    • Le document signalé par @simplicissimus, in extenso (pour archivage, ça date de 2006 :

      Immigration clandestine : une réalité inacceptable, une réponse ferme, juste et humaine (rapport)

      B. DES CHIFFRES SUJETS À CAUTION

      Rares sont les personnes entendues par la commission d’enquête qui se sont aventurées à fournir une évaluation chiffrée de l’immigration irrégulière. Les chiffres communiqués semblent vraisemblables mais restent sujets à caution compte tenu des lacunes du dispositif d’évaluation statistique.
      1. Les chiffres nationaux

      En juin 1998, dans son rapport au nom de la commission d’enquête du Sénat sur les régularisations d’étrangers en situation irrégulière présidée par notre ancien collègue M. Paul Masson, notre collègue M. José Balarello écrivait qu’« une estimation du nombre des clandestins entre 350.000 et 400.000 ne paraît pas éloignée de la réalité20(). »

      Selon M. Nicolas Sarkozy, ministre d’Etat, ministre de l’intérieur et de l’aménagement du territoire, entre 200.000 et 400.000 étrangers en situation irrégulière seraient aujourd’hui présents sur le territoire national et entre 80.000 et 100.000 migrants illégaux supplémentaires y entreraient chaque année.

      La direction des affaires juridiques et des libertés publiques du ministère explique que cette estimation des « flux » « résulte notamment du nombre de demandeurs d’asile, diminué du nombre de personnes ayant obtenu le statut de réfugié, du nombre de personnes ayant été régularisées et du nombre d’arrêtés de reconduite à la frontière pris et exécutés à l’encontre des demandeurs d’asile déboutés. » Quant à celle du « stock », « elle prend pour base minimale le nombre (150.000) d’étrangers en situation irrégulière qui bénéficient de l’aide médicale d’Etat. Sur cette base, et en y ajustant un pourcentage du flux annuel (pour tenir compte, d’une part, des régularisations « au fil de l’eau » et, d’autre part, des départs volontaires), on peut raisonnablement estimer ce stock à environ 400.000 personnes. »

      La controverse, par auditions devant la commission d’enquête interposées, entre le ministre d’Etat et M. François Héran, directeur de l’Institut national des études démographiques, montre combien la question est sensible et complexe.

      Le premier a reproché à l’INED d’avoir, en janvier 2004, sous-évalué le flux annuel d’immigration illégale, en l’estimant à 13.000 par an sur la base d’une analyse de la régularisation pratiquée en 1997-1998.

      Le second a observé que ces déclarations reposaient sur plusieurs méprises : d’abord, la migration illégale nette évoquée valait pour la décennie 1989-1998 ; ensuite l’INED a proposé une évaluation des flux nets ou encore du solde migratoire, c’est-à-dire du nombre d’immigrants irréguliers qui demeurent sur notre sol une fois défalquées les sorties, alors que M. Nicolas Sarkozy a évoqué les seuls flux bruts d’entrées irrégulières.

      Il a en outre jugé incompatibles les chiffres avancés par le ministre d’Etat : dans la mesure où les régularisations menées en France et en Europe montrent que la durée de séjour des immigrants illégaux s’étale sur au moins une dizaine d’années, l’arrivée de 90.000 immigrants irréguliers supplémentaires en moyenne par an devrait porter le « stock » d’immigrants illégaux présents sur notre territoire à environ 800.000 personnes ; si l’on considère en revanche que 300.000 immigrants irréguliers séjournent sur notre territoire, alors le flux annuel d’entrées se situe entre 30.000 et 40.000 personnes, évaluation tout à fait compatible avec celle de l’INED.

      La divergence porte donc davantage sur l’évaluation des flux que sur celle du stock qui, si elle reste sujette à caution, semble vraisemblable.

      Par ailleurs -et c’est l’un des rares chiffres qu’elle a accepté de communiquer à la commission d’enquête- Mme Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, membre du Haut conseil à l’intégration et directrice de l’Observatoire statistique de l’immigration et de l’intégration, a fait état d’estimations selon lesquelles le nombre d’enfants scolarisés dont les parents sont en situation irrégulière serait compris entre 15.000 et 20.000. Mme Armelle Gardien, représentante du Réseau éducation sans frontières, a pour sa part estimé à plus de 10.000 le nombre des jeunes étrangers sans papiers scolarisés, tout en soulignant la difficulté de disposer d’évaluations fiables.

      Enfin, environ 3.000 mineurs étrangers isolés sont pris en charge par les services de l’Etat (protection judiciaire de la jeunesse) ou des départements (aide sociale à l’enfance).

      Dans un rapport21() paru au moins de janvier 2005, l’inspection générale des affaires sociales note, sur la base d’une enquête auprès des départements à laquelle 64 conseils généraux ont répondu qu’« environ 3.100 mineurs auraient été admis à l’aide sociale à l’enfance en 2003 ; 2.300 sur les neuf premiers mois de 2004. Près de 2.500 mineurs étaient présents au 30 septembre 2004 dans les mêmes départements. (...). Des origines et des trajectoires de migration diverses sont perceptibles, qui laissent néanmoins apparaître des dominantes. 5 nationalités dominent les flux depuis plusieurs années : Roumanie, Chine, Maroc, Albanie, Congo, avec une apparition plus récente de l’Angola. L’enquête commanditée par la direction des populations et des migrations en 2001 distinguait cinq grands types qui demeurent pertinents : les exilés (souvent africains) ; les mandatés (chinois, indiens...) ; les exploités -catégorie qui peut recouper les précédentes- (Europe de l’Est et Balkans) ; les fugueurs (Afrique du Nord) ; les errants. »

      Le rapport relève également que « la réalité de l’isolement n’est pas toujours aisée à établir, dans la mesure où ces jeunes sont parfois venus rejoindre un parent plus ou moins éloigné » mais que « le caractère relatif de cet isolement ne minimise pas le danger auquel ces jeunes sont exposés car les adultes auxquels ils ont été confiés sont inégalement désireux de les accueillir et les conditions d’accueil se dégradent parfois rapidement sans compter les situations extrêmes d’exploitation (esclavage domestique ou prostitution par exemple). »

      20 Rapport n° 470 (Sénat, 1997-1998), page 22.

      21 Mission d’analyse et de proposition sur les conditions d’accueil des mineurs étrangers isolés en France - Rapport n° 2005 010, présenté par Jean Blocquaux, Anne Burstin et Dominique Giorgi, membres de l’inspection générale des affaires sociales - janvier 2005.

      https://www.senat.fr/rap/r05-300-1/r05-300-111.html

      Source : Rapport de commission d’enquête n° 300 (2005-2006) de MM. #Georges_OTHILY et #François-Noël_BUFFET, fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, déposé le 6 avril 2006

    • Intéressant de voir le vocabulaire, qui n’a guère changé depuis, autour de #fermeté et #humanité
      voir notamment cet article de Véronique Albanel :
      Humanité et fermeté

      https://www.cairn.info/revue-etudes-2018-4-page-4.htm

      En #France, mais aussi en #Belgique...
      #Asile et #immigration en #Belgique (I) : la Méthode #De_Block, ou la #fermeté_déshumanisante

      Au plus haut dans les sondages et cajolée par les médias, la Secrétaire d’Etat à l’Asile et à l’Immigration #Maggie_De_Block voit sa gestion restrictive des flux migratoires couronnée de succès politique. Son secret ? Une #communication habile sur un dosage présenté comme équilibré entre #fermeté et #humanité. Une formule dont les deux éléments présentent tous les traits d’un #oxymore aux conséquences humaines désastreuses.

      https://seenthis.net/messages/213382

      #terminologie #vocabulaire #mots

    • C’est vrai qu’il s’agit de celles et ceux qui se sont fait intercepter et qu’ils n’ont plus guère d’options…

      Reste, comme toujours, à estimer celles et ceux qui sont passés à travers les mailles des filets…

      a parte, je vais pouvoir tester ces jours-ci la gare de Champel flambant neuve, inaugurée ce week-end…

    • Vous le savez, on est plusieurs à se poser pas mal de questions sur les statistiques françaises sur l’asile.
      Les chiffres officiels de la DGEF sont souvent très différents des statisques officielles européenne d’#Eurostat.
      C’est assez « pratique » pour le gouvernement, qui justifie sa politique migratoire selon les chiffres qui l’arrange…

      Gérard Sadik, de la Cimade, l’a évoqué il y a déjà plusieurs mois : la France ne comptabilisait pas les #dublinés.
      Afin de vérifier, j’avais contacté les journalistes du service « CheckNews » du journal Libération, fin novembre.
      Ils ont enquêté, et diffusé leurs résultats aujourd’hui :
      https://www.liberation.fr/checknews/2020/01/20/demandes-d-asile-eurostat-epingle-la-france-pour-avoir-tronque-des-statis

      L’article est réservé aux abonnés, je copie/colle en fin de message l’article complet, mais à ne pas rediffuser publiquement par respect pour leur travail.

      En résumé ils confirment que la France ne respecte pas les consignes statistiques européennes... en ne prenant pas en compte les demandeurs d’asile dublinés, notre pays fausse les comparaisons.
      Bilan : il est très difficile d’avoir une vision précise des statistiques sur l’asile, à cause de l’incompétence française.
      Ce qui n’empêche pas le gouvernement français de s’appuyer sur ces chiffres tronqués pour justifier le durcissement de sa politique…

      Le Ministère de l’intérieur doit justement diffuser demain les premiers chiffres de 2019… qui ne seront donc vraisemblablement pas conformes !

      Message de David Torondel reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop, le 20.01.2020.

    • Selon nos informations, Eurostat a récemment pris contact avec les autorités françaises, en raison de statistiques tronquées fournies par Paris quant au nombre de demandeurs d’asile. L’office statistique européen s’est en effet rendu compte que la France, depuis plusieurs années, ne comptabilisait pas dans ses chiffres les demandeurs sous procédure de Dublin (personnes demandant l’asile mais qui doivent en théorie être prises en charge par le pays dans lequel elles sont entrées dans l’UE). Ce qui a pour effet de minorer chaque mois de plusieurs milliers de demandeurs, et de biaiser toute comparaison. Ce qui est pourtant l’objet d’Eurostat.

      #paywall

  • Négocier des voies de passage sûres : comment les acteurs non étatiques participent à la gestion des frontières

    Alors que les #frontières européennes sont de plus en plus sécurisées, l’accès au territoire de personnes ayant besoin de protection est devenu un enjeu humanitaire sur lequel intervient une diversité d’acteurs citoyens, d’ONG, d’associations. Cet article examine la participation de ces acteurs à un « travail humanitaire de la frontière ». Il s’appuie pour cela sur l’étude de dispositifs promus en #Italie et au #Royaume-Uni pour soutenir des voies de passage légales. Formulés dans des contextes d’#urgence, ces « corridors humanitaires » et voies sûres se sont appuyés sur la notion de vulnérabilité pour défendre une ouverture mesurée et sélective de la frontière. Quel rôle peut alors être accordé à ces acteurs non étatiques humanitaires dans la gestion de ces frontières ? Quelles sont les limites à leur action dans un contexte de politiques migratoires restrictives ?

    https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/lsp/2019-n83-lsp04994/1066085ar
    #vulnérabilité #corridors_humanitaires #asile #migrations #réfugiés #frontières #ONG #gestion_des_frontières #voies_sures #corridor_humanitaire

    ping @karine4 @isskein