#acc

¡Qué guay!

 :-)
c’était à New-York, il y a quelques (!) années…

(c’était la séquence #accent_vénézuélien …)

Texte issu du numéro 19 de la revue Variations autour de la critique des humanités numériques.
▻https://journals.openedition.org/variations/670

Alors que le printemps arrive en Europe, Variations refleurit aussi, avec une nouvelle livraison. Le dix-neuvième numéro de la revue est celui d’une relance éditoriale autour d’un dossier thématique visant à nommer les impensés de la transformation numérique des sciences humaines et sociales. Dans le fourmillement actuel des travaux sur la question, il nous a semblé nécessaire de présenter les enjeux d’une approche critique des humanités numériques...

La #science_ouverte doit être interrogée bien au-delà de ce premier discours consensuel sur l’ouverture des données et des publications (soit un mouvement contre les éditeurs privés et l’appropriation commerciale du savoir - mouvement qui, soit dit au passage, est en phase d’institutionnalisation depuis quelques années).
Plusieurs points sont systématiquement refoulés : le coût écologique de l’ouverture des données, la gouvernance économique (volonté de réduire les coûts), la transformation (voir la destruction) des métiers d’éditeur et de bibliothécaire...
Les politiques scientifiques d’évaluation sont également systématiquement passés sous silence (le fameux #publish_or_perish). Je vous invite à lire ce très bon texte de #Peter_Sloterdijk (▻https://seenthis.net/messages/54405) sur l’augmentation du plagiat comme conséquence du publish or perish (ou publier pour publier à défaut d’être lu : le pacte de non-lecture).
Ce que l’ouverture des données va également permettre, c’est le recours massif aux robots (#machine_learning), seuls capables de rechercher les mots clefs souhaités dans un corpus numérique monstrueux. Cela pose et posera des questions épistémologiques qui ne sont pour le moment jamais évoqués dans cet appel à une science 2.0 (ou e-science) jamais nommée.

P.-S. Je parle essentiellement ici des SHS.

#informatisation #accès_ouvert #open_access

#chimie #pollution #accident_industriel #Inde

Hundreds exposed to gas after deadly leak at Indian chemical factory
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/852020
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/851567
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L221fCEC9jI

#coronavirus #solidarité #migrants

Voir aussi la compile des effets délétères indirects de la pandémie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/832147

Rappel de Sara Prestianni sur l’utilisation des #hotspots_mobiles en #Italie (via mailing-list Migreurop, 01.05.2020) :

The “hotspot boat” is the same system , used by Italy from April 17 , only for migrants have been intercepted by ships flying foreign flags, as decided in the inter-ministerial decree of 7 April.
On board of the ship “hotspot” Rubattino - positioned in front of Palermo - there are at this moment almost 200 migrants, of the two rescues carried out by the ships Alan Kurdi and Aita Mari. All of them were negative to the Covid test, but it is not clear how long they will have to stay on the ship and where they will be transferred (at the beginning of the procedure there was talk of a relocation to Germany).
Yesterday the Guarantor for the Rights of Italian Prisoners, in his bulletin, expressed concern about the establishment of these “floating” hotspots.
▻http://www.garantenazionaleprivatiliberta.it/gnpl

“The implementation of quarantine measures in extraordinary and exceptional places cannot lead to a situation of ’limbo’: migrant people are under the jurisdiction of the Italian State for the purposes of the health measures imposed on them, but at the same time they do not have the possibility - and for a period of time not indifferent - to exercise the rights that our country recognizes and protects. They cannot apply for asylum, they are not de facto - and at least temporarily - protected as victims of trafficking or unaccompanied foreign minors, nor can they have timely access to procedures for family reunification under the Dublin Regulation. - procedures which, moreover, have their own intrinsic deadlines.”
The Guarantor also indicated that the experience of the ship “Rubattino” would not seem to remain an isolated case as the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport launched on 19 April a procedure for the chartering of vessels to be used for the assistance and health surveillance of migrants rescued at sea or arrived on the national territory as a result of autonomous boats.

–---

–-> sur les hotspots mobiles, voir aussi : ▻https://seenthis.net/tag/hotspot_mobile

voir aussi
The faces and names of a migration tragedy

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/849641

Abela admits coordinating private boats that returned migrants to Libya

PM says Easter manoeuvre was a ’rescue’ not a pushback.

Prime Minister Robert Abela has admitted commissioning a boat that returned migrants to war-torn Libya on Easter weekend but has insisted it was a rescue mission and not a pushback.

A boat commissioned by Maltese authorities picked up a group of migrants in the search and rescue area earlier this month and returned them to the North African country.

It is a crime under international law for states to return asylum seekers to a country where they are likely to face persecution.

Speaking publicly about the controversy for the first time on Friday, Abela admitted the manoeuvre and defended the government’s actions.

"There was no pushback,"he said.

"There was a rescue of migrants. Had the Maltese government not coordinated, tens of lives would have died, because a [EU coastguard] Frontex plane just flew overhead and kept on going.

“Malta’s ports are closed but it coordinated this rescue and ensured that the irregular migrants were taken to the port that was open.”

The country, along with Italy, closed its ports, citing concerns about the spread of coronavirus.

Former OPM official Neville Gafa claimed under oath this week that he had coordinated the pushback.

Asked Gafa’s involvement, Abela said his only involvement was liaising with a contact he was claiming to have in Libya so that the rescue could be facilitated. He said Gafa was not paid or promised anything.

Abela defended using a private boat, saying that a Search and Rescue convention stipulates the legal obligations of individual states that are not obliged to carry out the actual rescues but to coordinate such rescues.

The obligations also state that countries can use their own assets or else send private assets to rescue boats in distress, he said.

This week, Malta has commissioned a Captain Morgan tourist boat Europa II, to house migrants until a solution for their disembarkation is found.

“We are ready to do anything to save lives. We have nothing to be ashamed of,” Abela said, adding that the cost for the Captain Morgan boat being used to temporarily house migrants outside Maltese waters will come from aid by the EU.

“Malta’s position is clear and we know what our obligations are. We are going to remain firm on this. We are not a safe port and we cannot guarantee our resources for rescues.

"We are duty bound to stick to this position. It is counterproductive to close port and airports to tourists but then open ports for irregular migrants. There are hundreds of thousands of people on the Libyan coast wanting to leave there and come to Lampedusa and Malta. We are obeying international rules,” he insisted.

He said the migration problem should not be “Malta’s alone” and called for the EU to intervene.

Earlier on Friday, Foreign Minister Evarist Bartolo told Times of Malta that “the EU was responsible for a huge push back of migrants to Malta”.

He said its failure to set up an effective and fair solidarity mechanism to share the burden of welcoming irregular migrants means that Malta had borne a huge burden over the years.

He quoted a letter from a United Nations official to him in which he admitted that Europe needed to adopt a more principled migration policy that will serve European needs, that does not penalise those seeking to cross, and that does not leave countries like Malta, which are trying to do the right thing, on their own.

“If we continue to fail, more people, Libyans and non-Libyans, will be compelled to seek safety on the European side” because of the ongoing war and the economic consequences of Covid-19.

Bartolo said that in the first three months of the year, 3,600 irregular migrants left the Libyan coast through the Central Mediterranean route. This is over 400 per cent more than in the same period in 2019. Some 1,200 came to Malta.

He said Malta’s centres were “overflowing” and there is no room for more migrants.

▻https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/abela-admits-coordinating-private-boats-that-returned-migrants-to.7893

Malte a affrété des navires privés pour renvoyer les embarcations de migrants vers la Libye

Une enquête du New York Times révèle que les autorités maltaises ont affrété, depuis le mois d’avril, une flotte de navires privés afin d’empêcher les migrants d ’atteindre l’île et les renvoyer en Libye. Selon plusieurs experts, cette action est illégale.

En pleine pandémie de coronavirus, Malte fait tout pour empêcher les embarcations de migrants d’atteindre l’île. A tel point que le gouvernement a discrètement dépêché en avril une flotte de navires marchands privés pour intercepter les migrants et les renvoyer en Libye, a révélé une enquête du New York Times publiée jeudi 30 avril.

Selon le quotidien américain - qui s’appuie sur les témoignages d’un capitaine de l’un de ces bateaux, commandant en chef des garde-côtes libyens, et d’un ancien responsable maltais impliqué dans l’opération - les trois chalutiers de pêche affrétés appartiennent à des particuliers mais ont agi sur les instructions des forces armées maltaises.
Une opération sur ordre du Premier ministre maltais

L’opération a été documentée pour la première fois dans la soirée du 12 avril, écrit le New York Times, quand trois chalutiers ont quitté le port de la Valette, la capitale maltaise, sur ordre des autorités. Un ancien responsable maltais, Neville Gafa, a déclaré qu’il avait été enrôlé par le gouvernement le soir même pour utiliser ses relations en Libye et assurer le passage en toute sécurité des deux premiers chalutiers vers les ports libyens.

Le Dar As Salam 1 et le Tremar, ont ainsi été envoyés pour intercepter une embarcation de migrants présente dans les eaux maltaises - qui avait émis des appels de détresse depuis deux jours - afin de les renvoyer en Libye, a précisé Neville Gafa. A bord du canot, se trouvait cinq cadavres.

Le 15 avril, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) avait pourtant affirmé que les migrants avaient été interceptés par un navire marchand puis remis à des garde-côtes qui les avaient alors amenés au port de Tripoli.

Le troisième chalutier, le Salve Regina, a quant à lui navigué vers Tripoli le 15 avril, transportant plusieurs tonnes de nourriture et d’eau, en guise de remerciement au gouvernement libyen, assure au quotidien américain le capitaine du Tremar, Amer Abdelrazek.

Devant la justice maltaise, à la suite de la plainte lancée par plusieurs ONG contre le Premier ministre sur sa responsabilité dans la mort des cinq migrants, Neville Gafa a déclaré sous serment qu’il avait agi sur ordre du cabinet du Premier ministre.

Une opération illégale

« Dans une tendance à l’augmentation des abus contre les demandeurs d’asile ces dernières années, cette nouvelle approche se démarque », déclare au New York Times Itamar Mann, expert en droit maritime et des réfugiés à l’université de Haïfa, en Israël. « Ces méthodes ressemblent de façon effrayante au crime organisé, aux opérations de passeurs, que les décideurs européens dénoncent avec tant de fermeté », continue le chercheur pour qui cette opération est illégale eu égard au droit international.

En effet, comme écrit le quotidien américain, une flotte de navires privées, basée dans un port européen, qui intercepte et expulse des demandeurs d’asile des eaux internationales relèvent de la responsabilité des garde-côtes européens.

Cette opération « pourrait mettre les fonctionnaires de l’Etat maltais en danger de responsabilité pénale, dans le pays ou à l’étranger », signale encore Itamar Mann.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/24485/malte-a-affrete-des-navires-prives-pour-renvoyer-les-embarcations-de-m

After disembarking, the migrants were taken to a notorious detention center run by a pro-government militia, where migrants are routinely tortured, held for ransom or sold to other militias.

et aussi : ▻https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/world/europe/malta-migrant-boat.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article

#Malte

Malta-Libya #deal sets up centres ’against illegal migration’

Coastguard, UN centres, EU help among items discussed

Malta and Libya will be setting up units to coordinate operations against illegal migration, the government said on Thursday.

These centres are expected to start operating within the coming weeks, however, the government provided no additional information.

The announcement followed an unannounced trip by Prime Minister Robert Abela, Home Affairs Minister Byron Camilleri and Foreign Affairs Minister Evarist Bartolo to Tripoli, where they discussed migration with the Libyan government.

The three met Fayez al-Sarraj who heads the UN-backed Government of National Accord as well as Mohammed Sheibani, deputy minister responsible for migration at the meeting in Tripoli.

It was Abela’s first trip to war-torn Libya as prime minister.

Sources said the meeting was held on the back of a new wave of Malta-Libya relations, and a change in approach.

Discussions revolved around the need to push the EU to help Libya to train its coastguard, obtain funding for reception camps manned by the UN, as well as to build a realistic strategy to slow down the flow of migrants into Libya.

“It was a positive meeting, though of course that doesn’t mean we’ve resolved the migration issue,” a source told Times of Malta.

“Malta could be Libya’s bridge to the EU. We need to stop human trafficking as well as save lives at sea,” the source said.

Valletta, diplomatic sources say, has been trying to build new bridges with the Libyan authorities to stem the tide of migrants leaving the North African coast.
800,000 migrants in Libya

In a statement issued later on Thursday, the government said that during the meeting Abela reiterated Malta’s position on the need to address and stop human trafficking. Malta, he added, was facing unprecedented and disproportionate flows and burdens.

Meanwhile, al-Sarraj said that 800,000 migrants were currently in Libya and the country needed an effective long-term and holistic approach.

Both leaders spoke about the need to strengthen cooperation to ensure that lives are not lost at sea and to combat human traffickers on the ground and at sea.

According to Abela, the solution lies in concrete action on Libyan shores and its southern border. This would be done through addressing and stopping human trafficking, rather than focusing just on relocation of migrants to other countries.

Signing a #memorandum_of_understanding, Malta and Libya agreed to set up a coordination unit in each country to assist in operations against illegal migration.

The agreement also stipulates that Malta supports Libya when it comes to financial assistance through the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework.

►https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/abela-ministers-return-from-libya-after-positive-migration-talks.79484

#accord #centres

Mer méditerranée : Malte renforce sa coopération avec la Libye pour lutter contre « l’immigration illégale »

Malte a signé un accord avec le gouvernement d’union nationale (GNA) libyen dans le but de renforcer « la lutte contre l’immigration illégale » en mer Méditerranée. Le texte prévoit la création de « centres de coordination » à Tripoli et La Valette qui seront opérationnels dès le mois de juillet.

Malte tente par tous les moyens de limiter le flux de migrants qui débarquent sur ses côtes. Pour ce faire, les autorités maltaises et libyennes viennent d’acter la création de « centres de coordination » à Tripoli et à La Valette.

Ces deux centres « offriront le soutien nécessaire à la lutte contre l’immigration illégale en Libye et dans la région méditerranéenne », selon un protocole d’accord entre Malte et le gouvernement d’union nationale (GNA) de Fayez al-Sarraj, et présenté au Parlement maltais mercredi 3 juin (▻https://www.independent.com.mt/file.aspx?f=206640).

Financé par le gouvernement maltais, ces structures seront chacune dirigées par trois fonctionnaires et limiteront leur travail « au soutien et à la coordination », indique cet accord valable pour trois ans. Les centres devraient voir le jour dès le mois de juillet.
« L’UE a la responsabilité de parvenir à un accord global avec la Libye »

Malte, le plus petit État de l’Union européenne (UE), de par sa taille et sa population, se plaint depuis longtemps d’être obligé d’assumer à lui seul l’arrivée des migrants en provenance de la Libye, pays en guerre.

Actuellement, plus de 400 migrants secourus en Méditerranée sont bloqués sur quatre navires touristiques affrétés par Malte juste à la limite de ses eaux territoriales, La Valette exigeant qu’ils soient ensuite pris en charge par d’autres pays européens.

Le ministre maltais des Affaires étrangères, Evarist Bartolo, a déclaré au Parlement mercredi que « l’UE a la responsabilité de parvenir à un accord global avec la Libye afin de limiter l’immigration clandestine ».

« Le nombre d’immigrants arrivant à Malte est disproportionné par rapport aux autres pays européens », a insisté le ministre. Selon lui, depuis 2005 l’Europe n’a accueilli que 1 700 migrants, tandis que 22 000 sont arrivés à Malte - seuls 8% des migrants en situation irrégulière sur l’île ont été relocalisés dans d’autres pays européens.

Selon le protocole d’accord, Malte proposera à la Commission européenne une augmentation du soutien financier pour aider le GNA à sécuriser ses frontières sud et à démanteler les réseaux de trafiquants d’êtres humains.

La Valette proposera également le financement de « moyens maritimes supplémentaires nécessaires » pour contrôler et intercepter les passeurs de migrants en Méditerranée.

▻https://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/25175/mer-mediterranee-malte-renforce-sa-cooperation-avec-la-libye-pour-lutt

Accordo Malta-Libia: insieme daranno la caccia ai migranti. Con i soldi Ue

Centrali operative e pattugliamenti congiunti. Fonti Onu: è una regolazione dei respingimenti illegali. Intanto Frontex smentisce l’inchiesta di Malta sulla “#Strage_di_Pasquetta”

https://www.avvenire.it/c/2020/PublishingImages/673d40d74a7d4fd084fc5c524e3d8e1f/malta_69641934.jpg?width=1024#.jpg

Dopo la scoperta degli accordi segreti con Tripoli, siglati tre anni fa, Malta ha deciso di uscire allo scoperto negoziando un memorandum siglato dal premier Robert Abela, fresco di archiviazione per le accuse di respingimento, e il presidente libico Fayez al Sarraj.

I due Paesi daranno insieme la caccia ai migranti nel Mediterraneo, ma con nuovi fondi Ue da destinare a Tripoli.

SCARICA QUI IL DOCUMENTO COMPLETO: ▻https://www.avvenire.it/c/attualita/Documents/MOU%20with%20Libya.pdf

E’ prevista la creazione di «centri di coordinamento» nel porto di Tripoli e a La Valletta che saranno operativi da luglio. In realtà le operazioni congiunte andavano avanti da anni, ma adesso sono state ufficializzate. Le strutture congiunte «forniranno il sostegno necessario alla lotta contro l’immigrazione clandestina in Libia e nella regione del Mediterraneo», si legge. Inizialmente Malta finanzierà interamente l’attivazione delle centrali operative, ognuna delle quali sarà guidata da tre funzionari dei rispettivi governi. Fin da subito, però, il premier Abela si impegna a ottenere dall’Ue fondi aggiuntivi da destinare alla cosiddetta Guardia costiera libica, che verrà ulteriormente equipaggiata.

Nessuna menzione si fa riguardo alla necessità di ristabilire il rispetto dei diritti umani nei campi di prigionia libici. L’unico scopo, come del resto è sempre stato in questi anni anche per Italia e Ue, è quello di trattenere i profughi in cattività, a qualunque costo. «L’UE ha la responsabilità di raggiungere un accordo globale con la Libia», c’è scritto nell’accordo che, di fatto, appalta a Malta e Libia il controllo dell’intero Canale di Sicilia, ad esclusione delle ultime 12 miglia territoriali dalla costa di Lampedusa. Malta, lo stato più piccolo dell’Unione Europea (Ue) per dimensioni e popolazione, si è lamentato da tempo di essere costretto ad assumere da solo la responsabilità dell’arrivo dei migranti dalla Libia, un paese in guerra che secondo l’Onu in alcun modo può essere ritenuto un “porto sicuro”.

Nelle settimane scorse una nuova serie di inchieste giornalistiche internazionali ha permesso di accertare che non solo Malta ha messo in mare da tempo una flottiglia di “pescherecci fantasma” incaricati di intercettare i barconi e ricondurli in Libia, ma che spesso le Forze armate dell’isola equipaggiano i gommoni, anche con motori nuovi, affinché raggiungano le coste siciliane.

Nei giorni scorsi il Tribunale dell’isola aveva archiviato il procedimento contro il premier laburista Robert Abela e il capo delle forze armate, accusati della morte di 12 migranti nella “strage di Pasquetta”. Forte di questa “assoluzione”, Abela si è recato a Tripoli per sigillare l’intesa con il presidente al-Sarraj. Ma proprio uno dei punti chiave utilizzati dal giudice Joe Mifsud per cestinare le accuse, ieri è stato categoricamente smentito dall’agenzia Ue Frontex che ha risposto per iscritto alle domande di Avvenire. Secondo il magistrato, infatti, il coordinamento dei soccorsi in qualche misura era attribuibile non a Malta ma a Frontex che aveva individuato con un suo aereo i barconi. Da Varsavia, rispondendo con una nota ad “Avvenire”, l’agenzia ha precisato che “è il centro di salvataggio appropriato, non Frontex, a decidere se chiedere assistenza a qualsiasi nave della zona. E Frontex non aveva navi vicino a quest’area”. La responsabilità di intervenire, dunque, era di innanzitutto di Malta che invece per giorni ha ignorato gli Sos e ha poi inviato un motopesca quando oramai 7 persone erano affogate e altre 5 sono morte di stenti durante il respingimento dalle acque maltesi verso la Libia.

Nel fine settimana di Pasqua l’aeroobile Eagle 1, tracciato e segnalato dal giornalista Sergio Scandura di Radio Radicale “stava svolgendo - spiegano da Frontex - una missione di sorveglianza ben al di fuori dell’area operativa dell’Operazione Themis di Frontex”. Nella nota un portavoce dell’agenzia Ue precisa poi che “Frontex gestisce operazioni congiunte, nonché la sorveglianza pre-frontaliera, che veniva eseguita dall’aereo in questione”. Secondo questa ricostruzione, che avrebbe meritato maggiore puntiglio investigativo anche per accertare eventuali responsabilità esterne a Malta, “in linea con il diritto internazionale, Frontex ha avvisato i centri di soccorso competenti dell’avvistamento di una nave che riteneva necessitasse di assistenza”, si legge ancora. Parole che hanno un significato preciso e costituiscono un’accusa verso chi era stato informato e doveva prestare quell’assistenza negata per giorni. Le autorità italiane hanno apposto il segreto alle comunicazioni intercorse. Silenzio che potrebbe essere presto scardinato da indagini giudiziarie. Lo stesso per Malta, che neanche nell’atto conclusivo dell’inchiesta ha voluto rendere pubbliche le comunicazioni con Roma e con Frontex che a sua volta ribadisce ad Avvenire che “è il centro di salvataggio appropriato, non Frontex, a decidere se chiedere assistenza a qualsiasi nave della zona. Tuttavia, desidero sottolineare qui che Frontex non aveva navi vicino a quest’area”.

Il memorandum sta creando non poco dibattito nei vertici della Marina militare italiana. A Tripoli, infatti, si trova la nave Gorgona, ufficialmente incaricata di assistere la cosiddetta guardia costiera libica per conto di Roma. E certo i marinai italiani non vogliono finire a fare gli addetti alla manutenzione delle motovedette donate dall’Italia ma che tra pochi giorni si coordineranno con Malta. «Mentre l’obiettivo dichiarato nell’accordo vi è il benessere del popolo libico e di quello maltese, il benessere delle principali vittime, cioè migranti, richiedenti asilo e rifugiati, non viene mai menzionato», ha commentato sul portale cattolico Newsbook il giudice maltese Giovanni Bonelli, già membro della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo. «Si potrebbe pensare - aggiunge - che questo memorandum si riferisca all’estrazione di minerali, non a degli esseri umani».Fonti delle Nazioni Unite contattate da “Avvenire” hanno reagito a caldo considerando l’intesa come una «regolamentazione di fatto dei respingimenti illegali».

Negli anni scorsi più volte Avvenire ha documentato, anche con registrazioni audio, il collegamento diretto tra la Marina italiana e la Guardia costiera libica. Ma ora Malta si spinge oltre, ufficializzando una alleanza operativa che inoltre rischierà di causare conflitti con l’operazione navale europea Irini a guida italiana. Fonti delle Nazioni Unite contattate da Avvenire hanno reagito a caldo considerando l’intesa come una “regolamentazione di fatto dei respingimenti illegali”.

▻https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/accordo-malta-libia-respingimento-migranti

Petrolio e migranti. Il « patto libico »
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/862595

Malta: Illegal tactics mar another year of suffering in central Mediterranean

The Maltese government has resorted to dangerous and illegal measures for dealing with the arrivals of refugees and migrants at sea, which are exposing countless people to appalling suffering and risking their lives, Amnesty International revealed today in a report “Waves of impunity: Malta’s violations of the rights of refugees and migrants in the Central Mediterranean”. As Amnesty is launching this new report, despair is growing aboard the Maersk Etienne, which has been denied a port to disembark for over a month, after rescuing 27 people on a request from Maltese authorities

The Maltese government’s change in approach to arrivals in the central Mediterranean in 2020 has seen them take unlawful, and sometimes unprecedented, measures to avoid assisting refugees and migrants. This escalation of tactics included arranging unlawful pushbacks to Libya, diverting boats towards Italy rather than rescuing people in distress, illegally detaining hundreds of people on ill-equipped ferries off Malta’s waters, and signing a new agreement with Libya to prevent people from reaching Malta.

“Malta is stooping to ever more despicable and illegal tactics to shirk their responsibilities to people in need. Shamefully, the EU and Italy have normalized cooperation with Libya on border control, but sending people back to danger in Libya is anything but normal,” said Elisa De Pieri, Regional Researcher at Amnesty International.

“EU member states must stop assisting in the return of people to a country where they face unspeakable horrors.”

Some of the actions taken by the Maltese authorities may have involved criminal acts being committed, resulting in avoidable deaths, prolonged arbitrary detention, and illegal returns to war-torn Libya. The authorities also used the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to declare that Malta was not a safe place to disembark – to discourage people from seeking safety and a decent life in Europe.

The abusive practices by Malta are part and parcel of wider efforts by EU member states and institutions to outsource the control of the central Mediterranean to Libya, in order that EU-supported Libyan authorities might intercept refugees and migrants at sea before they reach Europe.

People are then returned to Libya and arbitrarily detained in places where torture and other ill-treatment is highly likely. From the beginning of January to 27 August 2020 7,256 people were ‘pulled back’ to Libya by the EU-supported Libyan Coast Guard, which was often alerted of the presence of boats at sea by airplanes engaged in Frontex and other EU operations.

The Easter Monday pushback

The case of the “Easter Monday pushback” illustrates the desperate lengths to which the Maltese authorities are willing to go to prevent people arriving on their shores.

On 15 April 2020, a group of 51 people, including seven women and three children, were unlawfully returned to Tripoli after being rescued in Malta’s search and rescue region by the commercial fishing boat Dar Al Salam 1.

The boat, which had been contracted by the Maltese government, took those onboard back to Libya and handed them over to the Libyan authorities, exposing refugees and migrants – who had just survived a deadly shipwreck – to further risks to their life.

Five people were dead when the vessel reached Libya, and the survivors reported that a further seven people were missing at sea. Survivors reported that those on board were not given medical assistance. In an official statement the Maltese authorities confirmed they had coordinated the operation.

Lack of accountability in Malta

While a magisterial inquiry into the case was conducted, it left many questions unanswered. It is still unknown how the 12 people died and how 51 were returned to Libya despite it being illegal to transfer people there. The magistrate conducting the inquiry did not hear the testimonies of the 51 people transferred to Libya, nor probe the chain of responsibility to contract the Dar El Salam 1 and instruct it to transfer people to Libya.

The NGO Alarm Phone has evidence that other pushbacks by Maltese authorities may also have occurred in 2019 and 2020, which have not been investigated.

EU and Italian cooperation with Libya

Italy in particular has worked closely with Libya, having provided support to Libyan maritime authorities by providing vessels, training and assistance in the establishment of a Libyan SAR region to facilitate pullbacks by the Libyan coastguard.

Despite intensifying conflict and the arrival of COVID-19 threatening the humanitarian situation of refugees and migrants in Libya, Italy has continued to implement policies to keep people in Libya. These include extending its Memorandum of Understanding on Migration with Libya aimed at boosting Libyan authorities’ resources to prevent departures, for another three years, extending its military operations in the region focusing on supporting Libya’s maritime authorities, and maintaining legislation and practices aimed at the criminalization of NGOs rescuing people in the central Mediterranean.

The central Mediterranean is the latest border on which Amnesty International is highlighting abuses by EU member states authorities. In 2020, Amnesty International has also documented abuses on the borders between Croatia and Bosnia, and Greece and Turkey. The EU urgently needs an independent and effective human rights monitoring system at its external borders to ensure accountability for violations and abuses.

“The European Commission must turn the page when they launch the New Pact on Migration and Asylum after the summer and ensure European border control and European migration policies uphold the rights of refugees and migrants,” said Elisa De Pieri.

“The horrors faced by people returned to Libya must caution European leaders against cooperating with countries which don’t respect human rights. By continuing to empower abusers and to hide their heads in the sand when violations are committed, those EU leaders share responsibility for them.”

▻https://www.amnesty.eu/news/malta-illegal-tactics-mar-another-year-of-suffering-in-central-mediterranean/#:~:text=The%20Maltese%20government%20has%20resorted,Malta's%20violations%20

Irlande du Nord : les accords de paix d’avril 1998
▻https://journal.lutte-ouvriere.org/2023/04/12/irlande-du-nord-les-accords-de-paix-davril-1998_609602.html

L’accord fut signé au terme de trente ans d’une guerre, appelée par euphémisme « Troubles », qui ravagea l’Irlande du Nord de 1968 à 1998. Aux origines du conflit se trouvait la volonté de la puissance coloniale britannique, au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale, de garder la main sur une partie de cette Irlande insurgée. En effet, pour mettre fin au soulèvement armé des nationalistes irlandais (1919-1921), les dirigeants de ce qui était alors le plus grand empire colonial au monde avaient scindé l’île en deux, concédant l’#indépendance à la plus grande part du territoire mais gardant le nord-est, plus industriel et plus riche que le reste de l’île. Londres pouvait garder sous tutelle cette « Irlande du Nord » grâce à une majorité protestante unioniste, c’est-à-dire favorable à l’union avec la Grande-Bretagne, contre les aspirations des nationalistes, largement majoritaires dans l’île mais en minorité au nord-est.

À la fin des années 1960, une part croissante de la classe ouvrière catholique d’Irlande du Nord n’acceptait plus la pauvreté, le chômage, les inégalités criantes et les discriminations dont elle faisait l’objet. Les protestations, d’abord pacifiques au sein d’un mouvement pour les droits civiques et le droit au logement, furent brutalement réprimées par la police, puis par l’armée britannique d’occupation, comme lors du « #Bloody_Sunday », le « dimanche sanglant », de 1972. L’#État\britannique était ainsi responsable de l’escalade violente qui s’engageait. Parmi les unionistes, des milices se constituaient, suppléant les forces britanniques et ciblant souvent des catholiques de façon aveugle. Du côté des nationalistes, les organisations paramilitaires comme l’IRA s’érigeaient en bras armé des catholiques, frappant l’armée, les paramilitaires unionistes, ainsi que de nombreux civils lors d’attentats dans des centres commerciaux, des centres-villes, etc. Les Troubles allaient faire quelque 3 500 morts et 38 000 blessés, un bilan considérable à l’échelle d’une province de 1,5 million d’habitants. Aujourd’hui encore, de nombreuses familles gardent des séquelles de cette guerre. Et c’est d’abord au sein de la population que l’aspiration à la cessation des violences s’est exprimée.

En 1998, l’accord de paix fut négocié sous la houlette du Premier ministre britannique #Tony Blair et, derrière lui, des États-Unis. Il était censé mettre un terme aux trente années de guerre civile. Pour cela, les dirigeants britanniques ont confié des prérogatives aux différents protagonistes du conflit. Les anciens paramilitaires ont enfilé le costume et obtenu des postes de pouvoir. Les partis nationalistes et unionistes ont obtenu un droit de veto dans les institutions locales, par conséquent souvent paralysées, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui où le principal parti unioniste (#DUP) refuse de reconnaître sa défaite aux dernières élections. L’accord de 1998 prévoyait également l’ouverture de la frontière avec la #République_d’Irlande, une ouverture dont les unionistes se sont accommodés… jusqu’au #Brexit, qui s’est traduit, à leur grand dam, par la mise en place d’une frontière douanière entre l’Irlande du Nord et la Grande-Bretagne.

L’#accord_de_1998 a figé les Nord-Irlandais dans deux « communautés » confessionnelles, #protestants et #catholiques, en créant des institutions partagées où leurs partis respectifs, unionistes et nationalistes, doivent siéger ensemble. Le poids de ces partis ainsi que celui des Églises font que la plupart des écoles restent ségréguées et que, encore aujourd’hui, des dizaines de « #murs_de_la_paix » séparent quartiers catholiques et protestants. La politique coloniale de « diviser pour régner » a éloigné ainsi les travailleurs les uns des autres pendant longtemps, mais n’a pas pu les empêcher d’entretenir d’innombrables liens de solidarité. Une partie des #Nord-Irlandais, qui côtoient dans leurs relations de travail, amicales voire familiales, des membres de « l’autre » #communauté, refusent désormais de s’inscrire dans ce #clivage_confessionnel gravé dans le marbre par les accords de 1998.

Si la fin des affrontements a fait le bonheur des capitalistes qui font des affaires en Irlande du Nord, elle n’a mis fin ni aux inégalités, ni à la pauvreté, aujourd’hui plus importante qu’en #Grande-Bretagne. Le NHS, le système national de santé, est dans un état catastrophique dans la province d’Irlande du Nord où, par exemple, 6 000 patients attendent une opération depuis plus de cinq ans.

Il y a donc quelque chose d’indécent à voir les dirigeants du monde impérialiste célébrer aujourd’hui l’accord sordide qu’ils négocièrent pour mettre fin à une guerre civile dont ils étaient largement responsables.

On mentionne ici #Joseph_Ndukaku_Chiakwa alias #Alex_Khamma sur un vol spécial

Depuis le décès d’un Nigérian, survenu le 17 mars 2010, juste avant l’embarquement dans un de ces vols, des médecins sont requis pour déclarer « Fit to fly » les personnes ainsi renvoyées et sont mandatés pour accompagner ces vols. On les a vus prêts à injecter des sédatifs¹ lorsque menottes et baillons ne suffisaient plus…

#caricature #dessin_de_presse
#fit_to_fly
#asile #migrations #réfugiés #vols #avion #médecins #privatisation #expulsions #Suisse #médecine

Mandats privés | Médecins aux ordres du #SEM

Dans le domaine médical et a fortiori lorsqu’il s’agit de renvois, la tension entre devoir de réserve et déontologie est à son comble. La société médicale #OSEARA vient de voir son mandat prolongé dans de drôles de circonstances. Ceci, alors qu’elle a été dénoncée pour son manque d’indépendance à l’égard du SEM, pour avoir par le passé administré des psychotropes prohibés lors de vols spéciaux et plus récemment pour avoir avalisé des expulsions hautement problématiques(1). Alertée par les pratiques de l’entreprise, un groupe de médecins indépendants appelle à documenter tout manquement lors de renvois.

Le 9 juillet 2020, le SEM annonçait avoir interrompu la procédure d’adjudication du mandat de #prestations_médicales lancée en avril 2020 et avoir prolongé le contrat de l’entreprise OSEARA, qui assure cette prestation depuis 2012(2). Motif : les cinq propositions reçues en réponse à l’appel d’offres étaient trop chères.

Suite aux critiques concernant la qualification des #médecins d’OSEARA de nouvelles règles avaient été édictées dans le cadre de l’appel d’offres, notamment l’obligation d’engager uniquement des #médecins_secouristes. Il avait également été décidé de séparer les mandats en deux lots et de les confier à deux entités séparées : l’une pour établir l’aptitude au renvoi des personnes, l’autre pour l’#accompagnement_médical durant les vols.

De graves négligences(3) lors de renvois avaient également mis en lumière un conflit d’intérêts : OSEARA avait en effet une incitation à déclarer les personnes aptes à être renvoyées (« fit to fly ») dans la mesure où elle était ensuite rémunérée pour l’accompagnement médical du vol. Autre problème éthique, dénoncé par le Tages-Anzeiger(4) suite à une bavure à Zurich : l’entreprise n’était rémunérée que si la personne était déclarée apte au renvoi. « Dans la plupart des cas, un médecin d’OSEARA certifie la transportabilité et un autre accompagne le vol spécial. L’entreprise gagne donc deux fois plus dans ces cas. Si une personne est jugée inapte au transport, elle ne gagne rien. Le pourcentage de ceux qui sont jugés inaptes à voler est très faible. […] ».

L’annonce de cette scission des mandats et le fait qu’OSEARA ne soit pas certifiée pour les services de secours(5) – l’excluant de fait d’un des mandats – ont eu un impact immédiat : le président du conseil d’administration d’OSEARA a annoncé sa démission de cette fonction en avril. Il estimait en outre « peu probable » que l’entreprise postule pour assumer uniquement l’un des mandats. Derrière le peu probable, on comprend peu rentable.

Trois mois plus tard, c’est donc un rétropédalage total. Le SEM indique qu’« en fin de compte, [la scission] ne sera pas mis[e] en oeuvre car les avantages qu’[elle] présente ne suffisent pas à justifier le surcoût qu’il engendre. Le respect des normes médicales est également assuré dans le cadre des prescriptions du contrat en cours. » Peut-on les croire sur parole ?

►https://asile.ch/2020/12/23/dossier-privatisation-de-lasile-oseara-le-e-meilleur-rapport-qualite-prix-vrai

Sur la Carte, il faut considérer Calais comme un mur et la France devrait donc être en vert.

La costruzione di muri: un business

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del Muro di Berlino, l’Europa fa parlare di sé ancora una volta per i suoi muri di frontiera. Questa volta non è tanto l’ideologia che la divide, quanto la paura di rifugiati e migranti, alcune tra le persone più vulnerabili al mondo.

Riassunto del rapporto «The Business of Building Walls» [1]:

Chi ha ucciso il sogno di un’Europa più aperta? Cosa ha dato inizio a questa nuova era dei muri?
Ci sono evidentemente molte ragioni: il crescente spostamento di persone a causa di conflitti, repressione e impoverimento, l’ascesa di politiche securitarie sulla scia dell’11 settembre, l’insicurezza economica e sociale percepita in Europa dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008, solo per nominarne alcune. Tuttavia, c’è un gruppo che ha di gran lunga da guadagnare da questo innalzamento di nuovi muri: le imprese che li costruiscono. La loro influenza nel dare forma ad un mondo di muri necessita di un esame più profondo.

Questo rapporto esplora il business della costruzione di muri, che è stato alimentato e ha beneficiato di un aumento considerevole della spesa pubblica dedicata alla sicurezza delle frontiere dall’Unione Europea (EU) e dai suoi Stati membri. Alcune imprese beneficiarie sono delle multinazionali che approfittano di un mercato globale per la sicurezza delle frontiere che si stima valere approssimativamente 17,5 miliardi di euro nel 2018, con una crescita annuale prevista almeno dell’8% nei prossimi anni.

È importante guardare sia oltre che dietro i muri e le barriere d’Europa, perché i reali ostacoli alla migrazione contemporanea non sono tanto le recinzioni, quanto la vasta gamma di tecnologie che vi è alla base, dai sistemi radar ai droni, dalle telecamere di sorveglianza ai sistemi biometrici di rilevamento delle impronte digitali. Allo stesso modo, alcuni tra i più pericolosi muri d’Europa non sono nemmeno fisici o sulla terraferma. Le navi, gli aerei e i droni usati per pattugliare il Mediterraneo hanno creato un muro marittimo e un cimitero per i migliaia di migranti e di rifugiati che non hanno un passaggio legale verso la salvezza o per esercitare il loro diritto di asilo.

Tutto ciò rende insignificanti le dichiarazioni della Commissione Europea secondo le quali essa non finanzierebbe i muri e le recinzioni. Il portavoce della Commissione, Alexander Winterstein, per esempio, nel rifiutare la richiesta dell’Ungheria di rimborsare la metà dei costi delle recinzioni costruite sul suo confine con la Croazia e la Serbia, ha affermato: “Noi sosteniamo le misure di gestione delle frontiere presso i confini esterni. Queste possono consistere in misure di sorveglianza o in equipaggiamento di controllo delle frontiere... . Ma le recinzioni, quelle non le finanziamo”. In altre parole, la Commissione è disposta a pagare per qualunque cosa che fortifichi un confine fintanto che ciò non sia visto come propriamente costruire dei muri.

Questo rapporto è il seguito di “Building Walls - Fear and securitizazion in the Euopean Union”, co-pubblicato nel 2018 con Centre Delàs e Stop Wapenhandel, che per primi hanno misurato e identificato i muri che attraversano l’Europa.

Questo nuovo rapporto si focalizza sulle imprese che hanno tratto profitto dai tre differenti tipi di muro in Europa:
– Le imprese di costruzione ingaggiate per costruire i muri fisici costruiti dagli Stati membri UE e dall’Area Schengen in collaborazione con le imprese esperte in sicurezza e tecnologia che provvedono le tecnologie, l’equipaggiamento e i servizi associati;
– le imprese di trasporto marittimo e di armamenti che forniscono le navi, gli aerei, gli elicotteri e i droni che costituiscono i muri marittimi dell’Europa per tentare di controllare i flussi migratori nel Mediterraneo, in particolare le operazioni di Frontex, l’operazione Sophia e l’operazione italiana Mare Nostrum;
– e le imprese specializzate in informatica e in sicurezza incaricate di sviluppare, eseguire, estendere e mantenere i sistemi dell’UE che controllano i movimento delle persone, quali SIS II (Schengen Information System) e EES (Entry/Exii Scheme), che costituiscono i muri virtuali dell’Europa.
Dei budget fiorenti

Il flusso di denaro dai contribuenti ai costruttori di muri è stato estremamente lucrativo e non cessa di aumentare. Il report rivela che dalla fine della guerra fredda, le imprese hanno raccolto i profitti di almeno 900 milioni di euro di spese dei paesi dell’UE per i muri fisici e per le recinzioni. Con i dati parziali (sia nella portata e che negli anni), i costi reali raggiungerebbero almeno 1 miliardo di euro. Inoltre, le imprese che forniscono la tecnologia e i servizi che accompagnano i muri hanno ugualmente beneficiato di un flusso costante di finanziamenti da parte dell’UE, in particolare i Fondi per le frontiere esterne (1,7 miliardi di euro, 2007-2013) e i Fondi per la sicurezza interna - Fondi per le Frontiere (2,76 miliardi di euro, 2014-2020).

Le spese dell’UE per i muri marittimi hanno raggiunto almeno 676,4 milioni di euro tra il 2006 e il 2017 (di cui 534 milioni sono stati spesi da Frontex, 28 milioni dall’UE nell’operazione Sophia e 114 milioni dall’Italia nell’operazione Mare Nostrum) e sarebbero molto superiori se si includessero tutte le operazioni delle guardie costiera nazionali nel Mediterraneo.

Questa esplosione dei budget per le frontiere ha le condizioni per proseguire. Nel quadro del suo budget per il prossimo ciclo di bilancio dell’Unione Europea (2021-2027), la Commissione europea ha attribuito 8,02 miliardi di euro al suo fondo di gestione integrata delle frontiere (2021-2027), 11,27 miliardi a Frontex (dei quali 2,2 miliardi saranno utilizzati per l’acquisizione, il mantenimento e l’utilizzo di mezzi aerei, marittimi e terrestri) e almeno 1,9 miliardi di euro di spese totali (2000-2027) alle sue banche dati di identificazione e a Eurosur (il sistemo europeo di sorveglianza delle frontiere).
I principali attori del settore degli armamenti

Tre giganti europei del settore della difesa e della sicurezza giocano un ruolo cruciale nei differenti tipi di frontiere d’Europa: Thales, Leonardo e Airbus.

– Thales è un’impresa francese specializzata negli armamenti e nella sicurezza, con una presenza significativa nei Paesi Bassi, che produce sistemi radar e sensori utilizzati da numerose navi della sicurezza frontaliera. I sistemi Thales, per esempio, sono stati utilizzati dalle navi olandesi e portoghesi impiegate nelle operazioni di Frontex.
Thales produce ugualmente sistemi di sorveglianza marittima per droni e lavora attualmente per sviluppare una infrastruttura di sorveglianza delle frontiere per Eurosus, che permetta di seguire e controllare i rifugiati prima che raggiungano l’Europa con l’aiuto di applicazioni per Smartphone, e studia ugualmente l’utilizzo di “High Altitude Pseudo-Satellites - HAPS” per la sicurezza delle frontiere, per l’Agenzia spaziale europea e Frontex. Thales fornisce attualmente il sistema di sicurezza del porto altamente militarizzato di Calais.
Con l’acquisto nel 2019 di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza e identità (biometrica), Thales diventa un attore importante nello sviluppo e nel mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE. L’impresa ha partecipato a 27 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

– La società di armamenti italiana Leonardo (originariamente Finmeccanica o Leonardo-Finmeccanica) è uno dei principali fornitori di elicotteri per la sicurezza delle frontiere, utilizzati dalle operazioni Mare Nostrum, Hera e Sophia in Italia. Ha ugualmente fatto parte dei principali fornitori di UAV (o droni), ottenendo un contratto di 67,1 milioni di euro nel 2017 con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima) per fornire le agenzie di guardia costiera dell’UE.
Leonardo faceva ugualmente parte di un consorzio che si è visto attribuire un contratto di 142,1 milioni di euro nel 2019 per attuare e assicurare il mantenimento dei muri virtuali dell’UE, ossia il Sistema di entrata/uscita (EES). La società detiene, con Thales, Telespazio, che partecipa ai progetti di osservazione dai satelliti dell’UE (React e Copernicus) utilizzati per controllare le frontiere. Leonardo ha partecipato a 24 progetti di ricerca dell’UE sulla sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere, tra cui lo sviluppo di Eurosur.

– Il gigante degli armamenti pan-europei Airbus è un importante fornitore di elicotteri utilizzati nella sorveglianza delle frontiere marittime e di alcune frontiere terrestri, impiegati da Belgio, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Italia, Lituania e Spagna, in particolare nelle operazioni marittime Sophia, Poseidon e Triton. Airbus e le sue filiali hanno partecipato almeno a 13 progetti di ricerca sulla sicurezza delle frontiere finanziati dall’UE, tra cui OCEAN2020, PERSEUS e LOBOS.

Il ruolo chiave di queste società di armamenti in realtà non è sorprendente. Come è stato dimostrato da “Border Wars” (2016), queste imprese, in quanto appartenenti a lobby come EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza) e ASD (Associazione delle industrie aerospaziali e della difesa in Europa), hanno ampiamente contribuito a influenzare l’orientamento della politica delle frontiere dell’UE. Paradossalmente, questi stessi marchi fanno ugualmente parte dei quattro più grandi venditori europei di armi al Medio Oriente e all’Africa del Nord, contribuendo così ad alimentare i conflitti all’origine di queste migrazioni forzate.

Allo stesso modo Indra gioca un ruolo non indifferente nel controllo delle frontiere in Spagna e nel Mediterraneo. L’impresa ha ottenuto una serie di contratti per fortificare Ceuta e Melilla (enclavi spagnole nel Nord del Marocco). Indra ha ugualmente sviluppato il sistema di controllo delle frontiere SIVE (con sistemi radar, di sensori e visivi) che è installato nella maggior parte delle frontiere della Spagna, così come in Portogallo e in Romania. Nel luglio 2018, Indra ha ottenuto un contratto di 10 milioni di euro per assicurare la gestione di SIVE su più siti per due anni. L’impresa è molto attiva nel fare lobby presso l’UE. È ugualmente una dei grandi beneficiari dei finanziamenti per la ricerca dell’UE, che assicurano il coordinamento del progetto PERSEUS per lo sviluppo di Eurosur e il Seahorse Network, la rete di scambio di informazioni tra le forze di polizia dei paesi mediterranei (in Europa e in Africa) per fermare le migrazioni.

Le società di armamenti israeliane hanno anch’esse ottenuto numerosi contratti nel quadro della sicurezza delle frontiere in UE. Nel 2018, Frontex ha selezionato il drone Heron delle Israel Aerospace Industries per i voli di sorveglianza degli esperimenti pilota nel Mediterraneo. Nel 2015, la società israeliana Elbit Systems ha venduto sei dei suoi droni Hermes al Corpo di guardie di frontiera svizzero, nel quadro di un contratto controverso di 230 milioni di euro. Ha anche firmato in seguito un contratto per droni con l’EMSA (Agenzia europea per la sicurezza marittima), in quanto subappaltatore della società portoghese CEIIA (2018), così come dei contratti per equipaggiare tre navi di pattugliamento per la Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
Gli appaltatori dei muri fisici

La maggioranza di muri e recinzioni che sono stati rapidamente eretti attraverso l’Europa, sono stati costruiti da società di BTP nazionali/società nazionali di costruzioni, ma un’impresa europea ha dominato nel mercato: la European Security Fencing, un produttore spagnolo di filo spinato, in particolare di un filo a spirale chiamato “concertina”. È famosa per aver fornito i fili spinati delle recinzioni che circondano Ceuta e Melilla. L’impresa ha ugualmente dotato di fili spinati le frontiere tra l’Ungheria e la Serbia, e i suoi fili spinati “concertina” sono stati installati alle frontiere tra Bulgaria e Turchia e tra l’Austria e la Slovenia, così come a Calais e, per qualche giorno, alla frontiera tra Ungheria e Slovenia, prima di essere ritirati. Dato che essi detengono il monopolio sul mercato da un po’ di tempo a questa parte, è probabile che i fili spinati “concertina” siano stati utilizzati presso altre frontiere in Europa.

Tra le altre imprese che hanno fornito i muri e le tecnologie ad essi associate, si trova DAT-CON (Croazia, Cipro, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia e Ucraina), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén e Eulen (Spagna/Marocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov et Indra (Bulgaria/Turchia), Nordecon e Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft e SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Lettonia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lituania/Russi), Minis e Legi-SGS (Slovenia/Croazia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia e Zaun Ltd (Francia/Regno Unito).

I costi reali dei muri e delle tecnologie associate superano spesso le stime originali. Numerose accuse e denunce per corruzione sono state allo stesso modo formulate, in certi casi perché i progetti erano stati attribuiti a delle imprese che appartenevano ad amici di alti funzionari. In Slovenia, per esempio, accuse di corruzione riguardanti un contratto per la costruzione di muri alle frontiere hanno portato a tre anni di battaglie legali per avere accesso ai documenti; la questione è passata poi alla Corte suprema.

Malgrado tutto ciò, il Fondo europeo per le frontiere esterne ha sostenuto finanziariamente le infrastrutture e i servizi tecnologici di numerose operazioni alle frontiere degli Stati membri. In Macedonia, per esempio, l’UE ha versato 9 milioni di euro per finanziare dei veicoli di pattugliamento, delle telecamere a visione notturna, dei rivelatori di battito cardiaco e sostegno tecnico alle guardie di frontiera nell’aiuto della gestione della sua frontiera meridionale.
Gli speculatori dei muri marittimi

I dati che permettono di determinare quali imbarcazioni, elicotteri e aerei sono utilizzati nelle operazioni marittime in Europa mancano di trasparenza. È dunque difficile recuperare tutte le informazioni. Le nostre ricerche mostrano comunque che tra le principali società implicate figurano i giganti europei degli armamenti Airbus e Leonardo, così come grandi imprese di costruzione navale come l’olandese Damen e l’italiana Fincantieri.

Le imbarcazioni di pattugliamento di Damen sono servite per delle operazioni frontaliere portate avanti da Albania, Belgio, Bulgaria, Portogallo, Paesi Bassi, Romania, Svezia e Regno Unito, così come per le vaste operazioni di Frontex (Poseidon, Triton e Themis), per l’operazione Sophia e hanno ugualmente sostento la NATO nell’operazione Poseidon.

Al di fuori dell’Europa, la Libia, il Marocco, la Tunisia e la Turchia utilizzano delle imbarcazioni Damen per la sicurezza delle frontiere, spesso in collaborazione con l’UE o i suoi Stati membri. Per esempio, le sei navi Damen che la Turchia ha comprato per la sua guardia costiera nel 2006, per un totale di 20 milioni di euro, sono state finanziate attraverso lo strumento europeo che contribuirebbe alla stabilità e alla pace (IcSP), destinato a mantenere la pace e a prevenire i conflitti.

La vendita di imbarcazioni Damen alla Libia mette in evidenza l’inquietante costo umano di questo commercio. Nel 2012, Damen ha fornito quattro imbarcazioni di pattugliamento alla guardia costiera libica, che sono state vendute come equipaggiamento civile col fine di evitare la licenza di esportazione di armi nei Paesi Bassi. I ricercatori hanno poi scoperto che non solo le imbarcazioni erano state vendute con dei punti di fissaggio per le armi, ma che erano state in seguito armate ed utilizzate per fermare le imbarcazioni di rifugiati. Numerosi incidenti che hanno implicato queste imbarcazioni sono stati segnalati, tra i quali l’annegamento di 20 o 30 rifugiati. Damen si è rifiutata di commentare, dichiarando di aver convenuto col governo libico di non divulgare alcuna informazione riguardante le imbarcazioni.

Numerosi costruttori navali nazionali, oltre a Damen, giocano un ruolo determinante nelle operizioni marittime poiché sono sistematicamente scelti con priorità dai paesi partecipanti a ogni operazione di Frontex o ad altre operazioni nel Mediterraneo. Tutte le imbarcazioni fornite dall’Italia all’operazione Sophia sono state costruite da Fincantieri e tutte quelle spagnole sono fornite da Navantia e dai suoi predecessori. Allo stesso modo, la Francia si rifornisce da DCN/DCNS, ormai Naval Group, e tutte le imbarcazioni tedesche sono state costruite da diversi cantieri navali tedeschi (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Altre imprese hanno partecipato alle operazioni di Frontex, tra cui la società greca Motomarine Shipyards, che ha prodotto i pattugliatori rapidi Panther 57 utilizzati dalla guardia costiera greca, così come la Hellenic Shipyards e la Israel Shipyards.

La società austriaca Schiebel, che fornisce i droni S-100, gioca un ruolo importante nella sorveglianza aerea delle attività marittime. Nel novembre 2018, è stata selezionata dall’EMSA per un contratto di sorveglianza marittima di 24 milioni di euro riguardante differenti operazioni che includevano la sicurezza delle frontiere. Dal 2017, Schiebel ha ugualmente ottenuto dei contratti con la Croazia, la Danimarca, l’Islanda, l’Italia, il Portogallo e la Spagna. L’impresa ha un passato controverso: ha venduto dei droni a numerosi paesi in conflitto armato o governati da regimi repressivi come la Libia, il Myanmar, gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e lo Yemen.

La Finlandia e i Paesi Bassi hanno impiegato degli aerei Dornier rispettivamente nel quadro delle operazioni Hermès, Poseidon e Triton. Dornier appartiene ormai alla filiale americana della società di armamenti israeliana Elbit Systems.
CAE Aviation (Lussemburgo), DEA Aviation (Regno Unito) e EASP Air (Paesi Bassi) hanno tutte ottenuto dei contratti di sorveglianza aerea per Frontex.
Airbus, Dassault Aviation, Leonardo e l’americana Lockheed Martin hanno fornito il più grande numero di aerei utilizzati per l’operazione Sophia.

L’UE e i suoi Stati membri difendono le loro operazioni marittime pubblicizzando il loro ruolo nel salvataggio dei rifugiati in mare. Ma non è questo il loro obiettivo principale, come sottolinea il direttore di Frontex Fabrice Leggeri nell’aprile 2015, dichiarando che “le azioni volontarie di ricerca e salvataggio” non fanno parte del mandato affidato a Frontex, e che salvare delle vite non dovrebbe essere una priorità. La criminalizzazione delle operazioni di salvataggio da parte delle ONG, gli ostacoli che esse incontrano, così come la violenza e i respingimenti illegali dei rifugiati, spesso denunciati, illustrano bene il fatto che queste operazioni marittime sono volte soprattutto a costituire muri piuttosto che missioni umanitarie.
I muri virtuali

I principali contratti dell’UE legati ai muri virtuali sono stati affidati a due imprese, a volte in quanto leader di un consorzio.
Sopra Steria è il partner principale per lo sviluppo e il mantenimento del Sistema d’informazione dei visti (SIV), del Sistema di informazione Schengen (SIS II) e di Eurodac (European Dactyloscopy) e GMV ha firmato una serie di contratti per Eurosur. I sistemi che essi concepiscono permettono di controllare e di sorvegliare i movimenti delle persone attraverso l’Europa e, sempre più spesso, al di là delle sue frontiere.

Sopra Steria è un’impresa francese di servizi per consultazioni in tecnologia che ha, ad oggi, ottenuto dei contratti con l’UE per un valore totale di più di 150 milioni di euro. Nel quadro di alcuni di questi grossi contratti, Sopra Steria ha formato dei consorzi con HP Belgio, Bull e 3M Belgio.

Malgrado l’ampiezza di questi mercati, Sopra Steria ha ricevuto importanti critiche per la sua mancanza di rigore nel rispetto delle tempistiche e dei budget. Il lancio di SIS II è stato costantemente ritardato, costringendo la Commissione a prolungare i contratti e ad aumentare i budget. Sopra Steria aveva ugualmente fatto parte di un altro consorzio, Trusted Borders, impegnato nello sviluppo del programma e-Borders nel Regno Unito. Quest’ultimo è terminato nel 2010 dopo un accumulo di ritardi e di mancate consegne. Tuttavia, la società ha continuato a ottenere contratti, a causa del suo quasi monopolio di conoscenze e di relazioni con i rappresentanti dell’UE. Il ruolo centrale di Sopra Steria nello sviluppo dei sistemi biometrici dell’UE ha ugualmente portato alla firma di altri contratti nazionali con, tra gli altri, il Belgio, la Bulgaria, la Repubblica ceca, la Finlandia, la Francia, la Germania, la Romania e la Slovenia.

GMV, un’impresa tecnologica spagnola, ha concluso una serie di grossi contratti per Eurosur, dopo la sua fase sperimentale nel 2010, per almeno 25 milioni di euro. Essa rifornisce ugualmente di tecnologie la Guardia Civil spagnola, tecnologie quali, ad esempio, i centri di controllo del suo Sistema integrato di sorveglianza esterna (SIVE), sistema di sicurezza delle frontiere, così come rifornisce di servizi di sviluppo logistico Frontex. L’impresa ha partecipato ad almeno dieci progetti di ricerca finanziati dall’UE sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

La maggior parte dei grossi contratti riguardanti i muri virtuali che non sono stati conclusi con consorzi di cui facesse parte Sopra Steria, sono stati attribuiti da eu-LISA (l’Agenzia europea per la gestione operazionale dei sistemi di informazione su vasta scale in seno allo spazio di libertà, di sicurezza e di giustizia) a dei consorzi di imprese specializzate nell’informazione e nelle nuove tecnologie, tra questi: Accenture, Atos Belgium e Morpho (rinominato Idemia).
Lobby

Come testimonia il nostro report “Border Wars”, il settore della difesa e della sicurezza, grazie ad una lobbying efficace, ha un’influenza considerabile nell’elaborazione delle politiche di difesa e di sicurezza dell’UE. Le imprese di questo settore industriale sono riuscite a posizionarsi come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, portando avanti il loro discorso secondo il quale la migrazione è prima di tutto una minaccia per la sicurezza che deve essere combattuta tramite mezzi militari e securitari. Questo crea così una domanda continua del catalogo sempre più fornito di equipaggiamenti e servizi che esse forniscono per la sicurezza e il controllo delle frontiere.

Un numero alto di imprese che abbiamo nominato, in particolare le grandi società di armamenti, fanno parte dell’EOS (Organizzazione europea per la sicurezza), il più importante gruppo di pressione sulla sicurezza delle frontiere.

Molte imprese informatiche che hanno concepito i muri virtuali dell’UE sono membri dell’EAB (Associazione Europea per la Biometria). L’EOS ha un “Gruppo di lavoro sulla sicurezza integrata delle frontiere” per “permettere lo sviluppo e l’adozione delle migliori soluzioni tecnologiche per la sicurezza delle frontiere sia ai checkpoint che lungo le frontiere marittime e terrestri”.
Il gruppo di lavoro è presieduto da Giorgio Gulienetti, della società di armi italiana Leonardo, Isto Mattila (diplomato all’università di scienze applicate) e Peter Smallridge di Gemalto, multinazionale specializzata nella sicurezza numerica, recentemente acquisita da Thales.

I lobbisti di imprese e i rappresentanti di questi gruppi di pressione incontrano regolarmente le istituzioni dell’UE, tra cui la Commissione europea, nel quadro di comitati di consiglio ufficiali, pubblicano proposte influenti, organizzano incontri tra il settore industriale, i policy-makers e i dirigenti e si ritrovano allo stesso modo in tutti i saloni, le conferenze e i seminari sulla difesa e la sicurezza.

Airbus, Leonardo e Thales e l’EOS hanno anche assistito a 226 riunioni ufficiali di lobby con la Commissione europea tra il 2014 e il 2019. In queste riunioni, i rappresentanti del settore si presentano come esperti della sicurezza delle frontiere, e propongono i loro prodotti e servizi come soluzione alle “minacce alla sicurezza” costituite dall’immigrazione. Nel 2017, queste stesse imprese e l’EOS hanno speso fino a 2,56 milioni di euro in lobbying.

Si constata una relazione simile per quanto riguarda i muri virtuali: il Centro comune della ricerca della Commissione europea domanda apertamente che le politiche pubbliche favoriscano “l’emergenza di una industria biometrica europea dinamica”.
Un business mortale, una scelta

La conclusione di questa inchiesta sul business dell’innalzamento di muri è chiara: la presenza di un’Europa piena di muri si rivela molto fruttuosa per una larga fetta di imprese del settore degli armamenti, della difesa, dell’informatica, del trasporto marittimo e delle imprese di costruzioni. I budget che l’UE ha pianificato per la sicurezza delle frontiere nei prossimi dieci anni mostrano che si tratta di un commercio che continua a prosperare.

Si tratta altresì di un commercio mortale. A causa della vasta militarizzazione delle frontiere dell’Europa sulla terraferma e in mare, i rifugiati e i migranti intraprendono dei percorsi molto più pericolosi e alcuni si trovano anche intrappolati in terribili condizioni in paesi limitrofi come la Libia. Non vengono registrate tutte le morti, ma quelle che sono registrate nel Mediterraneo mostrano che il numero di migranti che annegano provando a raggiungere l’Europa continua ad aumentare ogni anno.

Questo stato di cose non è inevitabile. È il risultato sia di decisioni politiche prese dall’UE e dai suoi Stati membri, sia dalle decisioni delle imprese di trarre profitto da queste politiche. Sono rare le imprese che prendono posizione, come il produttore tedesco di filo spinato Mutinox che ha dichiarato nel 2015 che non avrebbe venduto i suoi prodotti al governo ungherese per il seguente motivo: “I fili spinati sono concepiti per impedire atti criminali, come il furto. Dei rifugiati, bambini e adulti, non sono dei criminali”.

È tempo che altri politici e capi d’impresa riconoscano questa stessa verità: erigere muri contro le popolazioni più vulnerabili viola i diritti umani e costituisce un atto immorale che sarà evidentemente condannato dalla storia.

Trent’anni dopo la caduta del muro di Berlino, è tempo che l’Europa abbatta i suoi nuovi muri.

▻https://www.meltingpot.org/La-costruzione-di-muri-un-business.html

How the arms industry drives Fortress Europe’s expansion

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In recent years, rising calls for deterrence have intensified the physical violence migrants face at the EU border. The externalization of the border through deals with sending and transit countries signals the expansion of this securitization process. Financial gains by international arms firms in this militarization trend form an obstacle for policy change.

In March, April, and May of this year, multiple European countries deployed military forces to their national borders. This was done to assist with controls and patrols in the wake of border closures and other movement restrictions due to the Covid-19 crisis. Poland deployed 1,460 soldiers to the border to support the Border Guard and police as part of a larger military operation in reaction to Covid-19. And the Portuguese police used military drones as a complement to their land border checks. According to overviews from NATO, the Czech Republic, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands (military police), Slovakia, and Slovenia all stationed armed forces at their national borders.

While some of these deployments have been or will be rolled back as the Corona crisis dies down, they are not exceptional developments. Rather, using armed forces for border security and control has been a common occurrence at EU external borders since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. They are part of the continuing militarisation of European border and migration policies, which is known to put refugees at risk but is increasingly being expanded to third party countries. Successful lobbying from the military and security industry has been an important driver for these policies, from which large European arms companies have benefited.

The militarization of borders happens when EU member states send armies to border regions, as they did in Operation Sophia off the Libyan coast. This was the first outright EU military mission to stop migration. But border militarization also includes the use of military equipment for migration control, such as helicopters and patrol vessels, as well as the the EU-wide surveillance system Eurosur, which connects surveillance data from all individual member states. Furthermore, EU countries now have over 1,000 kilometers of walls and fences on their borders. These are rigged with surveillance, monitoring, and detection technologies, and accompanied by an increasing use of drones and other autonomous systems. The EU also funds a constant stream of Research & Technology (R&T) projects to develop new technologies and services to monitor and manage migration.

This process has been going on for decades. The Schengen Agreement of 1985, and the subsequent creation of the Schengen Area, which coupled the opening of the internal EU borders with robust control at the external borders, can be seen as a starting point for these developments. After 2011, when the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ led to fears of mass migration to Europe, and especially since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU accelerated the boosting and militarising of border security, enormously. Since then, stopping migration has been at the top of the EU agenda.

An increasingly important part of the process of border militarization isn’t happening at the European borders, but far beyond them. The EU and its member states are incentivizing third party countries to help stop migrants long before they reach Europe. This externalising of borders has taken many forms, from expanding the goals of EUCAP missions in Mali and Niger to include the prevention of irregular migration, to funding and training the Libyan Coast Guard to return refugees back to torture and starvation in the infamous detention centers in Libya. It also includes the donation of border security equipment, for example from Germany to Tunisia, and funding for purchases, such as Turkey’s acquisition of coast guard vessels to strengthen its operational capacities.

Next to the direct consequences of European border externalisation efforts, these policies cause and worsen problems in the third party countries concerned: diverting development funds and priorities, ruining migration-based economies, and strengthening authoritarian regimes such as those in Chad, Belarus, Eritrea, and Sudan by providing funding, training and equipment to their military and security forces. Precisely these state organs are most responsible for repression and abuses of human rights. All this feeds drivers of migration, including violence, repression, and unemployment. As such, it is almost a guarantee for more refugees in the future.

EU border security agency Frontex has also extended its operations into non-EU-countries. Ongoing negotiations and conclusions of agreements with Balkan countries resulted in the first operation in Albania having started in May 2019. And this is only a small part of Frontex’ expanding role in recent years. In response to the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the European Commission launched a series of proposals that saw large increases in the powers of the agency, including giving member states binding advice to boost their border security, and giving Frontex the right to intervene in member states’ affairs (even without their consent) by decision of the Commission or Council.

These proposals also included the creation of a 10,000 person strong standing corps of border guards and a budget to buy or lease its own equipment. Concretely, Frontex started with a budget of €6 million in 2005, which grew to €143 million in 2015. This was then quickly increased again from €239 million in 2016 to €460 million in 2020. The enormous expansion of EU border security and control has been accompanied by rapidly increasing budgets in general. In recent years, billions of euros have been spent on fortifying borders, setting up biometric databases, increasing surveillance capacities, and paying non-EU-countries to play their parts in this expansion process.

Negotiations about the next seven-year-budget for the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, are still ongoing. In the European Commission’s latest proposal, which is clearly positioned as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the fund for strengthening member states’ border security, the Integrated Border Management Fund, has been allotted €12.5 billion. Its predecessors, the External Borders Fund (2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders (2014-2020), had much smaller budgets: €1.76 billion and €2.70 billion, respectively. For Frontex, €7.5 billion is reserved, with €2.2 billion earmarked for purchasing or leasing equipment such as helicopters, drones, and patrol vessels. These huge budget increases are exemplary of the priority the EU attaches to stopping migration.

The narrative underlying these policies and budget growths is the perception of migration as a threat; a security problem. As researcher, Ainhoa Ruiz (Centre Delàs) writes, “the securitisation process also includes militarisation,” because “the prevailing paradigm for providing security is based on military principles: the use of force and coercion, more weapons equating to more security, and the achievement of security by eliminating threats.”

This narrative hasn’t come out of the blue. It is pushed by right wing politicians and often followed by centrist and leftist parties afraid of losing voters. Importantly, it is also promoted by an extensive and successful industrial lobby. According to Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (Assistant Professor in Global Refugee Studies, Aalborg University), arms companies “establish themselves as experts on border security, and use this position to frame immigration to Europe as leading to evermore security threats in need of evermore advanced [security] products.” The narrative of migration as a security problem thus sets the stage for militaries, and the security companies behind the commercial arms lobby, to offer their goods and services as the solution. The range of militarization policies mentioned so far reflects the broad adoption of this narrative.

The lobby organizations of large European military and security companies regularly interact with the European Commission and EU border agencies. They have meetings, organise roundtables, and see each other at military and security fairs and conferences. Industry representatives also take part in official advisory groups, are invited to present new arms and technologies, and write policy proposals. These proposals can sometimes be so influential that they are adopted as policy, almost unamended.

This happened, for instance, when the the Commission decided to open up the Instrument contributing to Security and Peace, a fund meant for peace-building and conflict prevention. The fund’s terms were expanded to cover provision of third party countries with non-lethal security equipment, for example, for border security purposes. The new policy document for this turned out to be a step-by-step reproduction of an earlier proposal from lobby organisation, Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). Yet, perhaps the most far-reaching success of this kind is the expansion of Frontex, itself, into a European Border Guard. Years before it actually happened, the industry had already been pushing for this outcome.

The same companies that are at the forefront of the border security and control lobby are, not surprisingly, also the big winners of EU and member states’ contracts in these areas. These include three of the largest European (and global) arms companies, namely, Airbus (Paneuropean), Leonardo (Italy) and Thales (France). These companies are active in many aspects of the border security and control market. Airbus’ and Leonardo’s main product in this field are helicopters, with EU funds paying for many purchases by EU and third countries. Thales provides radar, for example, for border patrol vessels, and is heavily involved in biometric and digital identification, especially after having acquired market leader, Gemalto, last year.

These three companies are the main beneficiaries of the European anti-migration obsession. At the same time, these very three companies also contribute to new migration streams to Europe’s shores through their trade in arms. They are responsible for significant parts of Europe’s arms exports to countries at war, and they provide the arms used by parties in internal armed conflicts, by human rights violators, and by repressive regimes. These are the forces fueling the reasons for which people are forced to flee in the first place.

Many other military and security companies also earn up to hundreds of millions of euros from large border security and control projects oriented around logistics and transport. Dutch shipbuilder Damen provided not only many southern European countries with border patrol vessels, but also controversially sold those to Libya and Turkey, among others. Its ships have also been used in Frontex operations, in Operation Sophia, and on the Channel between Calais and Dover.

The Spanish company, European Security Fencing, provided razor wire for the fences around the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla, in Morocco, as well as the fence at Calais and the fences on the borders of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), and Greece leased border surveillance drones from Elbit and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). These are Israeli military companies that routinely promote their products as ‘combat-proven’ or ‘battlefield tested’ against Palestinians.

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe. These are just a few examples of the companies that benefit from the billions of euros that the EU and its member states spend on a broad range of purchases and projects in their bid to stop migration.

The numbers of forcibly displaced people in the world grew to a staggering 79.5 million by the end of last year. Instead of helping to eliminate the root causes of migration, EU border and migration policies, as well as its arms exports to the rest of the world, are bound to lead to more refugees in the future. The consequences of these policies have already been devastating. As experts in the field of migration have repeatedly warned, the militarisation of borders primarily pushes migrants to take alternative migration routes that are often more dangerous and involve the risks of relying on criminal smuggling networks. The Mediterranean Sea has become a sad witness of this, turning into a graveyard for a growing percentage of refugees trying to cross it.

The EU approach to border security doesn’t stand on its own. Many other countries, in particular Western ones and those with authoritarian leaders, follow the same narrative and policies. Governments all over the world, but particularly those in the US, Australia, and Europe, continue to spend billions of euros on border security and control equipment and services. And they plan to increase budgets even more in the coming years. For military and security companies, this is good news; the global border security market is expected to grow by over 7% annually for the next five years to a total of $65 billion in 2025. It looks like they will belong to the very few winners of increasingly restrictive policies targeting vulnerable people on the run.

▻https://crisismag.net/2020/06/27/how-the-arms-industry-drives-fortress-europes-expansion
#industrie_militaire #covid-19 #coronavirus #frontières_extérieures #Operation_Sophia #Eurosur #surveillance #drones #technologie #EUCAP #externalisation #Albanie #budget #Integrated_Border_Management_Fund #menace #lobby_industriel #Instrument_contributing_to_Security_and_Peace #conflits #paix #prévention_de_conflits #Aerospace_and_Defence_Industries_Association_of_Europe (#ASD) #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #hélicoptères #radar #biométrie #identification_digitale #Gemalto #commerce_d'armes #armement #Damen #European_Security_Fencing #barbelé #European_Maritime_Safety_Agency (#EMSA) #Elbit #Israel_Aerospace_Industries (#IAI) #Civipol #Safran #base_de_données

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Pour @etraces :

Civipol, a French public-private company owned by the state, and several large arms producers (including Thales, Airbus, and Safran), run a string of EU-/member state-funded border security projects in third party countries. This includes setting up fingerprint databases of the whole populations of Mali and Senegal, which facilitates identification and deportation of their nationals from Europe

GUARDING THE FORTRESS. The role of Frontex in the militarisation and securitisation of migration flows in the European Union

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The report focuses on 19 Frontex operations run by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex) to explore how the agency is militarising borders and criminalising migrants, undermining fundamental rights to freedom of movement and the right to asylum.

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This report is set in a wider context in which more than 70.8 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced, according to the 2018 figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2019). Some of these have reached the borders of the European Union (EU), seeking protection and asylum, but instead have encountered policy responses that mostly aim to halt and intercept migration flows, against the background of securitisation policies in which the governments of EU Member States see migration as a threat. One of the responses to address migration flows is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter Frontex), established in 2004 as the EU body in charge of guarding what many have called ‘Fortress Europe’, and whose practices have helped to consolidate the criminalisation of migrants and the securitisation of their movements.

The report focuses on analysing the tools deployed by Fortress Europe, in this case through Frontex, to prevent the freedom of movement and the right to asylum, from its creation in 2004 to the present day.

The sources used to write this report were from the EU and Frontex, based on its budgets and annual reports. The analysis focused on the Frontex regulations, the language used and its meaning, as well as the budgetary trends, identifying the most significant items – namely, the joint operations and migrant-return operations.

A table was compiled of all the joint operations mentioned in the annual reports since the Agency was established in 2005 up to 2018 (see annexes). The joint operations were found on government websites but were not mentioned in the Frontex annual reports. Of these operations, we analysed those of the longest duration, or that have showed recent signs of becoming long-term operations. The joint operations are analysed in terms of their objectives, area of action, the mandates of the personnel deployed, and their most noteworthy characteristics.

Basically, the research sought to answer the following questions: What policies are being implemented in border areas and in what context? How does Frontex act in response to migration movements? A second objective was to analyse how Frontex securitises the movement of refugees and other migrants, with the aim of contributing to the analysis of the process of border militarisation and the security policies applied to non-EU migrants by the EU and its Member States.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/guarding-the-fortress

Pour télécharger le rapport_
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/informe40_eng_ok.pdf

#rapport #TNI #Transnational_institute

voir aussi :
Asylum Outsourced : McKinsey’s Secret Role in Europe’s Refugee Crisis
►https://seenthis.net/messages/862826

#Frontex aircraft : Below the radar against international law

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For three years, Frontex has been chartering small aircraft for the surveillance of the EU’s external borders. First Italy was thus supported, then Croatia followed. Frontex keeps the planes details secret, and the companies also switch off the transponders for position display during operations.

The European Commission does not want to make public which private surveillance planes Frontex uses in the Mediterranean. In the non-public answer to a parliamentary question, the EU border agency writes that the information on the aircraft is „commercially confidential“ as it contains „personal data and sensitive operational information“.

Frontex offers EU member states the option of monitoring their external borders using aircraft. For this „Frontex Aerial Surveillance Service“ (FASS), Frontex charters twin-engined airplanes from European companies. Italy first made use of the service in 2017, followed a year later by Croatia. In 2018, Frontex carried out at least 1,800 flight hours under the FASS, no figures are yet available for 2019.

Air service to be supplemented with #drones

The FASS flights are carried out under the umbrella of „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, which includes satellite surveillance as well as drones. Before the end of this year, the border agency plans to station large drones in the Mediterranean for up to four years. The situation pictures of the European Union’s „pre-frontier area“ are fed into the surveillance system EUROSUR, whose headquarter is located at Frontex in Warsaw. The national EUROSUR contact points, for example in Spain, Portugal and Italy, also receive this information.

In addition to private charter planes, Frontex also uses aircraft and helicopters provided by EU Member States, in the central Mediterranean via the „Themis“ mission. The EU Commission also keeps the call signs of the state aircraft operating there secret. They would be considered „sensitive operational information“ and could not be disclosed to MEPs.

Previously, the FOIA platform „Frag den Staat“ („Ask the State“) had also tried to find out details about the sea and air capacities of the member states in „Themis“. Frontex refused to provide any information on this matter. „Frag den Staat“ lost a case against Frontex before the European Court of Justice and is now to pay 23,700 Euros to the agency for legal fees.

Real-time tracking with FlightAware

The confidentiality of Frontex comes as a surprise, because companies that monitor the Mediterranean for the agency are known through a tender. Frontex has signed framework contracts with the Spanish arms group Indra as well as the charter companies CAE Aviation (Canada), Diamond-Executive Aviation (Great Britain) and EASP Air (Netherlands). Frontex is spending up to 14.5 million euros each on the contracts.

Finally, online service providers such as FlightAware can also be used to draw conclusions about which private and state airplanes are flying for Frontex in the Mediterranean. For real-time positioning, the providers use data from ADS-B transponders, which all larger aircraft must have installed. A worldwide community of non-commercial trackers receives this geodata and feeds it into the Internet. In this way, for example, Italian journalist Sergio Scandura documents practically all movements of Frontex aerial assets in the central Mediterranean.

Among the aircraft tracked this way are the twin-engined „DA-42“, „DA-62“ and „Beech 350“ of Diamond-Executive Aviation, which patrol the Mediterranean Sea on behalf of Frontex as „Osprey1“, „Osprey3“ and „Tasty“, in former times also „Osprey2“ and „Eagle1“. They are all operated by Diamond-Executive Aviation and take off and land at airports in Malta and Sicily.

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„Push-backs“ become „pull-backs“

In accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees, the EU Border Agency may not return people to states where they are at risk of torture or other serious human rights violations. Libya is not a safe haven; this assessment has been reiterated on several occasions by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, among others.

Because these „push-backs“ are prohibited, Frontex has since 2017 been helping with so-called „pull-backs“ by bringing refugees back to Libya by the Libyan coast guard rather than by EU units. With the „Multipurpose Aerial Surveillance“, Frontex is de facto conducting air reconnaissance for Libya. By November 2019, the EU border agency had notified Libyan authorities about refugee boats on the high seas in at least 42 cases.

Many international law experts consider this practice illegal. Since Libya would not be able to track down the refugees without the help of Frontex, the agency must take responsibility for the refoulements. The lawyers Omer Shatz and Juan Branco therefore want to sue responsibles of the European Union before the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

Frontex watches refugees drown

This is probably the reason why Frontex disguises the exact location of its air surveillance. Private maritime rescue organisations have repeatedly pointed out that Frontex aircrafts occasionally switch off their transponders so that they cannot be tracked via ADS-B. In the answer now available, this is confirmed by the EU Commission. According to this, the visibility of the aircraft would disclose „sensitive operational information“ and, in combination with other kinds of information, „undermine“ the operational objectives.

The German Ministry of the Interior had already made similar comments on the Federal Police’s assets in Frontex missions, according to which „general tracking“ of their routes in real time would „endanger the success of the mission“.

However, Frontex claims it did not issue instructions to online service providers to block the real-time position display of its planes, as journalist Scandura described. Nonetheless, the existing concealment of the operations only allows the conclusion that Frontex does not want to be controlled when the deployed aircraft watch refugees drown and Italy and Malta, as neighbouring EU member states, do not provide any assistance.

▻https://digit.site36.net/2020/06/11/frontex-aircraft-blind-flight-against-international-law
#avions #Italie #Croatie #confidentialité #transparence #Frontex_Aerial_Surveillance_Service (#FASS) #Multipurpose_Aerial_Surveillance #satellites #Méditerranée #Thermis #information_sensible #Indra #CAE_Aviation #Diamond-Executive_Aviation #EASP_Air #FlightAware #ADS-B #DA-42 #DA-62 #Beech_350 #Osprey1 #Osprey3 #Tasty #Osprey2 #Eagle1 #Malte #Sicile #pull-back #push-back #refoulement #Sergio_Scandura

Walls Must Fall: Ending the deadly politics of border militarisation - webinar recording
This webinar explored the trajectory and globalization of border militarization and anti-migrant racism across the world, the history, ideologies and actors that have shaped it, the pillars and policies that underpin the border industrial complex, the resistance of migrants, refugees and activists, and the shifting dynamics within this pandemic.

- #Harsha_Walia, author of Undoing Border Imperialism (2013)
- #Jille_Belisario, Transnational Migrant Platform-Europe (TMP-E)
- #Todd_Miller, author of Empire of Borders (2020), Storming the Wall (2019) and TNI’s report More than A Wall (2019)
- #Kavita_Krishnan, All India Progressive Women’s Association (AIPWA).
▻https://www.tni.org/en/article/walls-must-fall
▻https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8B-cJ2bTi8&feature=emb_logo

#conférence #webinar

Le business meurtrier des frontières

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Le 21ème siècle sera-t-il celui des barrières ? Probable, au rythme où les frontières nationales se renforcent. Dans un livre riche et documenté, publié aux éditions Syllepse, le géographe Stéphane Rosière dresse un indispensable état des lieux.

Une nuit du mois de juin, dans un centre de rétention de l’île de Rhodes, la police grecque vient chercher une vingtaine de migrant·e·s, dont deux bébés. Après un trajet en bus, elle abandonne le groupe dans un canot de sauvetage sans moteur, au milieu des eaux territoriales turques. En août, le New York Times publie une enquête révélant que cette pratique, avec la combinaison de l’arrivée aux affaires du premier ministre conservateur Kyriakos Mitsotakis et de la diffusion de la pandémie de Covid-19, est devenue courante depuis mars.

Illégales au regard du droit international, ces expulsions illustrent surtout le durcissement constant de la politique migratoire de l’Europe depuis 20 ans. Elles témoignent aussi d’un processus mondial de « pixellisation » des frontières : celles-ci ne se réduisent pas à des lignes mais à un ensemble de points plus ou moins en amont ou en aval (ports, aéroports, eaux territoriales…), où opèrent les polices frontalières.
La fin de la fin des frontières

Plus largement, le récent ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière, Frontières de fer, le cloisonnement du monde, permet de prendre la mesure d’un processus en cours de « rebordering » à travers le monde. À la fois synthèse des recherches récentes sur les frontières et résultats des travaux de l’auteur sur la résurgence de barrières frontalières, le livre est une lecture incontournable sur l’évolution contemporaine des frontières nationales.

D’autant qu’il n’y a pas si longtemps, la mondialisation semblait promettre l’affaissement des frontières, dans la foulée de la disparition de l’Union soviétique et, corollairement, de la généralisation de l’économie de marché. La Guerre froide terminée annonçait la « fin de l’histoire » et, avec elle, la disparition des limites territoriales héritées de l’époque moderne. Au point de ringardiser, rappelle Stéphane Rosière, les études sur les frontières au sein de la géographie des années 1990, parallèlement au succès d’une valorisation tous azimuts de la mobilité dans le discours politique dominant comme dans les sciences sociales.

Trente ans après, le monde se réveille avec 25 000 kilomètres de barrières frontalières – record pour l’Inde, avec plus de 3 000 kilomètres de clôtures pour prévenir l’immigration depuis le Bangladesh. Barbelés, murs de briques, caméras, détecteurs de mouvements, grilles électrifiées, les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier fleurissent en continu sur les cinq continents.
L’âge des « murs anti-pauvres »

La contradiction n’est qu’apparente. Les barrières du 21e siècle ne ferment pas les frontières mais les cloisonnent – d’où le titre du livre. C’est-à-dire que l’objectif n’est pas de supprimer les flux mondialisés – de personnes et encore moins de marchandises ni de capitaux – mais de les contrôler. Les « teichopolitiques », terme qui recouvre, pour Stéphane Rosière, les politiques de cloisonnement de l’espace, matérialisent un « ordre mondial asymétrique et coercitif », dans lequel on valorise la mobilité des plus riches tout en assignant les populations pauvres à résidence.

De fait, on observe que les barrières frontalières redoublent des discontinuités économiques majeures. Derrière l’argument de la sécurité, elles visent à contenir les mouvements migratoires des régions les plus pauvres vers des pays mieux lotis économiquement : du Mexique vers les États-Unis, bien sûr, ou de l’Afrique vers l’Europe, mais aussi de l’Irak vers l’Arabie Saoudite ou du Pakistan vers l’Iran.

Les dispositifs de contrôle frontalier sont des outils parmi d’autres d’une « implacable hiérarchisation » des individus en fonction de leur nationalité. Comme l’a montré le géographe Matthew Sparke à propos de la politique migratoire nord-américaine, la population mondiale se trouve divisée entre une classe hypermobile de citoyen·ne·s « business-class » et une masse entravée de citoyen·ne·s « low-cost ». C’est le sens du « passport index » publié chaque année par le cabinet Henley : alors qu’un passeport japonais ou allemand donne accès à plus de 150 pays, ce chiffre descend en-dessous de 30 avec un passeport afghan ou syrien.
Le business des barrières

Si les frontières revêtent une dimension économique, c’est aussi parce qu’elles sont un marché juteux. À l’heure où les pays européens ferment des lits d’hôpital faute de moyens, on retiendra ce chiffre ahurissant : entre 2005 et 2016, le budget de Frontex, l’agence en charge du contrôle des frontières de l’Union européenne, est passé de 6,3 à 238,7 millions d’euros. À quoi s’ajoutent les budgets colossaux débloqués pour construire et entretenir les barrières – budgets entourés d’opacité et sur lesquels, témoigne l’auteur, il est particulièrement difficile d’enquêter, faute d’obtenir… des fonds publics.

L’argent public alimente ainsi une « teichoéconomie » dont les principaux bénéficiaires sont des entreprises du BTP et de la sécurité européennes, nord-américaines, israéliennes et, de plus en plus, indiennes ou saoudiennes. Ce complexe sécuritaro-industriel, identifié par Julien Saada, commercialise des dispositifs de surveillance toujours plus sophistiqués et prospère au rythme de l’inflation de barrières entre pays, mais aussi entre quartiers urbains.

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Un business d’autant plus florissant qu’il s’auto-entretient, dès lors que les mêmes entreprises vendent des armes. On sait que les ventes d’armes, alimentant les guerres, stimulent les migrations : un « cercle vertueux » s’enclenche pour les entreprises du secteur, appelées à la rescousse pour contenir des mouvements de population qu’elles participent à encourager.
« Mourir aux frontières »

Bénéfices juteux, profits politiques, les barrières font des heureux. Elles tuent aussi et l’ouvrage de Stéphane Rosière se termine sur un décompte macabre. C’est, dit-il, une « guerre migratoire » qui est en cours. Guerre asymétrique, elle oppose la police armée des puissances économiques à des groupes le plus souvent désarmés, venant de périphéries dominées économiquement et dont on entend contrôler la mobilité. Au nom de la souveraineté des États, cette guerre fait plusieurs milliers de victimes par an et la moindre des choses est de « prendre la pleine mesure de la létalité contemporaine aux frontières ».

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Sur le blog :

– Une synthèse sur les murs frontaliers : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/01/28/lamour-des-murs

– Le compte rendu d’un autre livre incontournable sur les frontières : ▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2019/08/03/frontieres-en-mouvement

– Une synthèse sur les barricades à l’échelle intraurbaine : ►http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/10/21/gated-communities-le-paradis-entre-quatre-murs

▻http://geographiesenmouvement.blogs.liberation.fr/2020/11/05/le-business-meurtrier-des-frontieres

The big wall

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An ActionAid investigation into how Italy tried to stop migration from Africa, using EU funds, and how much money it spent

►https://thebigwall.org/en
►https://seenthis.net/messages/905345

#Italie

How Private Security Firms Profit Off the Refugee Crisis

The UK has pumped money to corporations turning #Calais into a bleak fortress.

Tall white fences lined with barbed wire – welcome to Calais. The city in northern France is an obligatory stop for anyone trying to reach the UK across the channel. But some travellers are more welcome than others, and in recent decades, a slew of private security companies have profited millions of pounds off a very expensive – an unattractive – operation to keep migrants from crossing.

Every year, thousands of passengers and lorries take the ferry at the Port of Calais-Fréthun, a trading route heavily relied upon by the UK for imports. But the entrance to the port looks more like a maximum-security prison than your typical EU border. Even before Brexit, the UK was never part of the Schengen area, which allows EU residents to move freely across 26 countries. For decades, Britain has strictly controlled its southern border in an attempt to stop migrants and asylum seekers from entering.

As early as 2000, the Port of Calais was surrounded by a 2.8 metre-high fence to prevent people from jumping into lorries waiting at the ferry departure point. In 1999, the Red Cross set up a refugee camp in the nearby town of Sangatte which quickly became overcrowded. The UK pushed for it to be closed in 2002 and then negotiated a treaty with France to regulate migration between the two countries.

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The 2003 Le Toquet Treaty allowed the UK to check travellers on French soil before their arrival, and France to do the same on UK soil. Although the deal looks fair on paper, in practice it unduly burdens French authorities, as there are more unauthorised migrants trying to reach the UK from France than vice versa.

The treaty effectively moved the UK border onto French territory, but people still need to cross the channel to request asylum. That’s why thousands of refugees from conflict zones like Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves stranded in Calais, waiting for a chance to cross illegally – often in search of family members who’ve already made it to the UK. Many end up paying people smugglers to hide them in lorries or help them cross by boat.

These underlying issues came to a head during the Syrian crisis, when refugees began camping out near Calais in 2014. The so-called Calais Jungle became infamous for its squalid conditions, and at its peak, hosted more than 7,000 people. They were all relocated to other centres in France before the camp was bulldozed in 2016. That same year, the UK also decided to build a €2.7 million border wall in Calais to block access to the port from the camp, but the project wasn’t completed until after the camp was cleared, attracting a fair deal of criticism. Between 2015 and 2018, the UK spent over €110 million on border security in France, only to top it up with over €56 million more in 2018.

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But much of this public money actually flows into the accounts of private corporations, hired to build and maintain the high-tech fences and conduct security checks. According to a 2020 report by the NGO Care4Calais, there are more than 40 private security companies working in the city. One of the biggest, Eamus Cork Solutions (ECS), was founded by a former Calais police officer in 2004 and is reported to have benefited at least €30 million from various contracts as of 2016.

Stéphane Rosière, a geography professor at the University of Reims, wrote his book Iron Borders (only available in French) about the many border walls erected around the world. Rosière calls this the “security-industrial” complex – private firms that have largely replaced the traditional military-industrial sector in Europe since WW2.

“These companies are getting rich by making security systems adaptable to all types of customers – individuals, companies or states,” he said. According to Rosière, three-quarters of the world’s border security barriers were built in the 21st century.

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Brigitte, a pensioner living close to the former site of the Calais Jungle, has seen her town change drastically over the past two decades. “Everything is cordoned off with wire mesh," she said. "I have the before and after photos, and it’s not a pretty sight. It’s just wire, wire, wire.” For the past 15 years, Brigitte has been opening her garage door for asylum seekers to stop by for a cup of tea and charge their phones and laptops, earning her the nickname "Mama Charge”.

“For a while, the purpose of these fences and barriers was to stop people from crossing,” said François Guennoc, president of L’Auberge des Migrants, an NGO helping displaced migrants in Calais.

Migrants have still been desperate enough to try their luck. “They risked a lot to get into the port area, and many of them came back bruised and battered,” Guennoc said. Today, walls and fences are mainly being built to deter people from settling in new camps near Calais after being evicted.

In the city centre, all public squares have been fenced off. The city’s bridges have been fitted with blue lights and even with randomly-placed bike racks, so people won’t sleep under them.

“They’ve also been cutting down trees for some time now,” said Brigitte, pointing to a patch near her home that was once woods. Guennoc said the authorities are now placing large rocks in areas where NGOs distribute meals and warm clothes, to prevent displaced people from receiving the donations. “The objective of the measures now is also to make the NGOs’ work more difficult,” he said.

According to the NGO Refugee Rights Europe, about 1,500 men, women and minors were living in makeshift camps in and around Calais as of April 2020. In July 2020, French police raided a camp of over 500 people, destroying residents’ tents and belongings, in the largest operation since the Calais Jungle was cleared. An investigation by Slate found that smaller camps are cleared almost every day by the French police, even in the middle of winter. NGOs keep providing new tents and basic necessities to displaced residents, but they are frustrated by the waste of resources. The organisations are also concerned about COVID-19 outbreaks in the camps.

As VICE World News has previously reported, the crackdown is only pushing people to take more desperate measures to get into the UK. Boat crossings reached record-highs in 2020, and four people have died since August 2020 while trying to cross, by land and sea. “When you create an obstacle, people find a way to get around it,” Guennoc said. “If they build a wall all the way along the coast to prevent boat departures, people will go to Normandy – and that has already started.” Crossing the open sea puts migrants at even greater risk.

Rosière agrees security measures are only further endangering migrants.“All locks eventually open, no matter how complex they may be. It’s just a matter of time.”

He believes the only parties who stand to profit from the status quo are criminal organisations and private security firms: “At the end of the day, this a messed-up use of public money.”

▻https://www.vice.com/en/article/wx8yax/how-private-security-firms-profit-off-the-refugee-crisis

En français:
À Calais, la ville s’emmure
▻https://www.vice.com/fr/article/wx8yax/a-calais-la-ville-semmure

Financing Border Wars. The border industry, its financiers and human rights

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This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.

Executive summary

Migration will be one of the defining human rights issues of the 21st century. The growing pressures to migrate combined with the increasingly militarised state security response will only exacerbate an already desperate situation for refugees and migrants. Refugees already live in a world where human rights are systematically denied. So as the climate crisis deepens and intersects with other economic and political crises, forcing more people from their homes, and as states retreat to ever more authoritarian security-based responses, the situation for upholding and supporting migrants’ rights looks ever bleaker.

States, most of all those in the richest countries, bear the ultimate responsibility to uphold the human rights of refugees and migrants recognised under International Human Rights Law. Yet corporations are also deeply implicated. It is their finance, their products, their services, their infrastructure that underpins the structures of state migration and border control. In some cases, they are directly involved in human rights violations themselves; in other cases they are indirectly involved as they facilitate the system that systematically denies refugees and migrants their rights. Most of all, through their lobbying, involvement in government ‘expert’ groups, revolving doors with state agencies, it becomes clear that corporations are not just accidental beneficiaries of the militarisation of borders. Rather they actively shape the policies from which they profit and therefore share responsibility for the human rights violations that result.

This state-corporate fusion is best described as a Border Industrial Complex, drawing on former US President Eisenhower’s warning of the dangers of a Military-Industrial Complex. Indeed it is noticeable that many of the leading border industries today are also military companies, seeking to diversify their security products to a rapidly expanding new market.

This report seeks to explore and highlight the extent of today’s global border security industry, by focusing on the most important geographical markets—Australia, Europe, USA—listing the human rights violations and risks involved in each sector of the industry, profiling important corporate players and putting a spotlight on the key investors in each company.
A booming industry

The border industry is experiencing spectacular growth, seemingly immune to austerity or economic downturns. Market research agencies predict annual growth of the border security market of between 7.2% and 8.6%, reaching a total of $65–68 billion by 2025. The largest expansion is in the global Biometrics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) markets. Markets and Markets forecasts the biometric systems market to double from $33 billion in 2019 to $65.3 billion by 2024—of which biometrics for migration purposes will be a significant sector. It says that the AI market will equal US$190.61 billion by 2025.

The report investigates five key sectors of the expanding industry: border security (including monitoring, surveillance, walls and fences), biometrics and smart borders, migrant detention, deportation, and audit and consultancy services. From these sectors, it profiles 23 corporations as significant actors: Accenture, Airbus, Booz Allen Hamilton, Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Deloitte, Elbit, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, IBM, IDEMIA, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Mitie, Palantir, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Serco, Sopra Steria, Thales, Thomson Reuters, Unisys.

– The border security and control field, the technological infrastructure of security and surveillance at the border, is led by US, Australian, European and Israeli firms including Airbus, Elbit, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Airbus, Leonardo and Thales— all of which are among the world’s major arms sellers. They benefit not only from border contracts within the EU, US, and Australia but also increasingly from border externalisation programmes funded by these same countries. Jean Pierre Talamoni, head of sales and marketing at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), said in 2016 that he estimates that two thirds of new military market opportunities over the next 10 years will be in Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Companies are also trying to muscle in on providing the personnel to staff these walls, including border guards.

- The Smart Borders sector encompasses the use of a broad range of (newer) technologies, including biometrics (such as fingerprints and iris-scans), AI and phone and social media tracking. The goal is to speed up processes for national citizens and other acceptable travellers and stop or deport unwanted migrants through the use of more sophisticated IT and biometric systems. Key corporations include large IT companies, such as IBM and Unisys, and multinational services company Accenture for whom migration is part of their extensive portfolio, as well as small firms, such as IDEMIA and Palantir Technologies, for whom migration-related work is central. The French public–private company Civipol, co-owned by the state and several large French arms companies, is another key player, selected to set up fingerprint databases of the whole population of Mali and Senegal.

– Deportation. With the exception of the UK and the US, it is uncommon to privatise deportation. The UK has hired British company Mitie for its whole deportation process, while Classic Air Charter dominates in the US. Almost all major commercial airlines, however, are also involved in deportations. Newsweek reported, for example, that in the US, 93% of the 1,386 ICE deportation flights to Latin American countries on commercial airlines in 2019 were facilitated by United Airlines (677), American Airlines (345) and Delta Airlines (266).

- Detention. The Global Detention Project lists over 1,350 migrant detention centres worldwide, of which over 400 are located in Europe, almost 200 in the US and nine in Australia. In many EU countries, the state manages detention centres, while in other countries (e.g. Australia, UK, USA) there are completely privatised prisons. Many other countries have a mix of public and private involvement, such as state facilities with private guards. Australia outsourced refugee detention to camps outside its territories. Australian service companies Broadspectrum and Canstruct International managed the detention centres, while the private security companies G4S, Paladin Solutions and Wilson Security were contracted for security services, including providing guards. Migrant detention in third countries is also an increasingly important part of EU migration policy, with the EU funding construction of migrant detention centres in ten non-EU countries.

- Advisory and audit services are a more hidden part of public policies and practices, but can be influential in shaping new policies. A striking example is Civipol, which in 2003 wrote a study on maritime borders for the European Commission, which adopted its key policy recommendations in October 2003 and in later policy documents despite its derogatory language against refugees. Civipol’s study also laid foundations for later measures on border externalisation, including elements of the migration deal with Turkey and the EU’s Operation Sophia. Since 2003 Civipol has received funding for a large number of migration-related projects, especially in African countries. Between 2015 and 2017, it was the fourth most-funded organisation under the EU Trust Fund. Other prominent corporations in this sector include Eurasylum, as well as major international consultancy firms, particularly Deloitte and PricewaterhouseCoopers, for which migration-related work is part of their expansive portfolio.

Financing the industry

The markets for military and border control procurement are characterized by massively capital intensive investments and contracts, which would not be possible without the involvement of financial actors. Using data from marketscreener.com, the report shows that the world’s largest investment companies are also among the major shareholders in the border industry.

– The Vanguard Group owns shares in 15 of the 17 companies, including over 15% of the shares of CoreCivic and GEO Group that manage private prisons and detention facilities.

- Other important investors are Blackrock, which is a major shareholder in 11 companies, Capital Research and Management (part of the Capital Group), with shares in arms giants Airbus and Lockheed Martin, and State Street Global Advisors (SsgA), which owns over 15% of Lockheed Martin shares and is also a major shareholder in six other companies.

- Although these giant asset management firms dominate, two of the profiled companies, Cobham and IDEMIA, are currently owned by the private equity firm Advent International. Advent specialises in buyouts and restructuring, and it seems likely that it will attempt to split up Cobham in the hope of making a profit by selling on the component companies to other owners.

- In addition, three large European arms companies, Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, active in the border security market, are partly owned by the governments of the countries where they are headquartered.

In all cases, therefore, the financing depends on our money. In the case of state ownership, through our taxes, and in terms of asset management funds, through the way individual savings, pension funds, insurance companies and university endowments are directly invested in these companies via the giant Asset Management Funds. This financing means that the border industry survives on at least the tacit approved use of the public’s funds which makes it vulnerable to social pressure as the human rights costs of the industry become ever more clear.
Human rights and the border industry

Universal human rights apply to every single human being, including refugees and migrants. While the International Bill of Human Rights provides the foundation, including defining universal rights that are important in the context of migration, such as the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right to freedom from torture or cruel or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom from discrimination, there are other instruments such as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Geneva Convention) of 1951 that are also relevant. There are also regional agreements, including the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that play a role relevant to the countries that have ratified them.

Yet despite these important and legally binding human rights agreements, the human rights situation for refugees and migrants has become ever more desperate. States frequently deny their rights under international law, such as the right to seek asylum or non-refoulement principles, or more general rights such as the freedom from torture, cruel or inhumane treatment. There is a gap with regard to effective legal means or grievance mechanisms to counter this or to legally enforce or hold to account states that fail to implement instruments such as the UDHR and the Refugee Convention of 1951. A Permanent Peoples Tribunal in 2019 even concluded that ‘taken together, the immigration and asylum policies and practices of the EU and its Member States constitute a total denial of the fundamental rights of people and migrants, and are veritable crimes against humanity’. A similar conclusion can be made of the US and Australian border and immigration regime.

The increased militarisation of border security worldwide and state-sanctioned hostility toward migrants has had a deeply detrimental impact on the human rights of refugees and migrants.

– Increased border security has led to direct violence against refugees, pushbacks with the risk of returning people to unsafe countries and inhumane circumstances (contravening the principle of non-refoulement), and a disturbing rise in avoidable deaths, as countries close off certain migration routes, forcing migrants to look for other, often more dangerous, alternatives and pushing them into the arms of criminal smuggling networks.

– The increased use of autonomous systems of border security such as drones threaten new dangers related to human rights. There is already evidence that they push migrants to take more dangerous routes, but there is also concern that there is a gradual trend towards weaponized systems that will further threaten migrants’ lives.

– The rise in deportations has threatened fundamental human rights including the right to family unity, the right to seek asylum, the right to humane treatment in detention, the right to due process, and the rights of children’. There have been many instances of violence in the course of deportations, sometimes resulting in death or permanent harm, against desperate people who try to do everything to prevent being deported. Moreover, deportations often return refugees to unsafe countries, where they face violence, persecution, discrimination and poverty.

- The widespread detention of migrants also fundamentally undermines their human rights . There have been many reports of violence and neglect by guards and prison authorities, limited access to adequate legal and medical support, a lack of decent food, overcrowding and poor and unhealthy conditions. Privatisation of detention exacerbates these problems, because companies benefit from locking up a growing number of migrants and minimising costs.

– The building of major migration databases such as EU’s Eurodac and SIS II, VIS gives rise to a range of human rights concerns, including issues of privacy, civil liberties, bias leading to discrimination—worsened by AI processes -, and misuse of collected information. Migrants are already subject to unprecedented levels of surveillance, and are often now treated as guinea pigs where even more intrusive technologies such as facial recognition and social media tracking are tried out without migrants consent.

The trend towards externalisation of migration policies raises new concerns as it seeks to put the human costs of border militarisation beyond the border and out of public sight. This has led to the EU, US and Australia all cooperating with authoritarian regimes to try and prevent migrants from even getting close to their borders. Moreover as countries donate money, equipment or training to security forces in authoritarian regimes, they end up expanding and strengthening their capacities which leads to a rise in human rights violations more broadly. Nowhere are the human rights consequences of border externalisation policies clearer than in the case of Libya, where the EU and individual member states (in particular Italy and Malta) funding, training and cooperation with security forces and militias have led to violence at the borders, murder, disappearances, rape, enslavement and abuse of migrants in the country and torture in detention centres.

The 23 corporations profiled in this report have all been involved in or connected to policies and practices that have come under fire because of violations of the human rights of refugees and migrants. As mentioned earlier, sometimes the companies are directly responsible for human rights violations or concerns. In other cases, they are indirectly responsible through their contribution to a border infrastructure that denies human rights and through lobbying to influence policy-making to prioritize militarized responses to migration. 11 of the companies profiled publicly proclaim their commitment to human rights as signatories to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), but as these are weak voluntary codes this has not led to noticeable changes in their business operations related to migration.

The most prominent examples of direct human rights abuses come from the corporations involved in detention and deportation. Classic Air Charter, Cobham, CoreCivic, Eurasylum, G4S, GEO Group, Mitie and Serco all have faced allegations of violence and abuse by their staff towards migrants. G4S has been one of the companies most often in the spotlight. In 2017, not only were assaults by its staff on migrants at the Brook House immigration removal centre in the UK broadcast by the BBC, but it was also hit with a class suit in Australia by almost 2,000 people who are or were detained at the externalised detention centre on Manus Island, because of physical and psychological injuries as a result of harsh treatment and dangerous conditions. The company eventually settled the case for A$70 million (about $53 million) in the largest-ever human rights class-action settlement. G4S has also faced allegations related to its involvement in deportations.

The other companies listed all play a pivotal role in the border infrastructure that denies refugees’ human rights. Airbus P-3 Orion surveillance planes of the Australian Air Force, for example, play a part in the highly controversial maritime wall that prevents migrants arriving by boat and leads to their detention in terrible conditions offshore. Lockheed Martin is a leading supplier of border security on the US-Mexico border. Leonardo is one of the main suppliers of drones for Europe’s borders. Thales produces the radar and sensor systems, critical to patrolling the Mediterrean. Elbit Systems provides surveillance technologies to both the EU and US, marketed on their success as technologies used in the separation wall in the Palestinian occupied territories. Accenture, IDEMIA and Sopra Steria manage many border biometric projects. Deloitte has been one of the key consulting companies to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency since 2003, while PriceWaterhouseCoopers provides similar consultancy services to Frontex and the Australian border forces. IBM, Palantir and UNISYS provide the IT infrastructure that underpins the border and immigration apparatus.
Time to divest

The report concludes by calling for campaigns to divest from the border industry. There is a long history of campaigns and movements that call for divestment from industries that support human rights violations—from the campaigns to divest from Apartheid South Africa to more recent campaigns to divest from the fossil fuel industry. The border industry has become an equally morally toxic asset for any financial institution, given the litany of human rights abuses tied to it and the likelihood they will intensify in years to come.

There are already examples of existing campaigns targeting particular border industries that have borne fruit. A spotlight on US migrant detention, as part of former President Trump’s anti- immigration policies, contributed to six large US banks (Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Fifth Third Bancorp, JPMorgan Chase, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo) publicly announcing that they would not provide new financing to the private prison industry. The two largest public US pension funds, CalSTRS and CalPERS, also decided to divest from the same two companies. Geo Group acknowledged that these acts of ‘public resistance’ hit the company financially, criticising the banks as ‘clearly bow[ing] down to a small group of activists protesting and conducting targeted social media campaigns’.

Every company involved or accused of human rights violations either denies them or says that they are atypical exceptions to corporate behavior. This report shows however that a militarised border regime built on exclusion will always be a violent apparatus that perpetuates human rights violations. It is a regime that every day locks up refugees in intolerable conditions, separates families causing untold trauma and heartbreak, and causes a devastating death toll as refugees are forced to take unimaginable dangerous journeys because the alternatives are worse. However well-intentioned, any industry that provides services and products for this border regime will bear responsibility for its human consequences and its human rights violations, and over time will suffer their own serious reputational costs for their involvement in this immoral industry. On the other hand, a widespread exodus of the leading corporations on which the border regime depends could force states to change course, and to embrace a politics that protects and upholds the rights of refugees and migrants. Worldwide, social movements and the public are starting to wake up to the human costs of border militarisation and demanding a fundamental change. It is time now for the border industry and their financiers to make a choice.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/financingborderwars

#TNI #rapport
#industrie_frontalière #militarisation_des_frontières #biométrie #Intelligence_artificielle #AI #IA

#Accenture #Airbus #Booz_Allen_Hamilton #Classic_Air_Charter #Cobham #CoreCivic #Deloitte #Elbit #Eurasylum #G4S #GEO_Group #IBM #IDEMIA #Leonardo #Lockheed_Martin #Mitie #Palantir #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Serco #Sopra_Steria #Thales #Thomson_Reuters #Unisys
#contrôles_frontaliers #surveillance #technologie #Jean-Pierre_Talamoni #Airbus_Defence_and_Space (#ADS) #smart_borders #frontières_intelligentes #iris #empreintes_digitales #réseaux_sociaux #IT #Civipol #Mali #Sénégal #renvois #expulsions #déportations #Mitie #Classic_Air_Charter #compagnies_aériennes #United_Airlines #ICE #American_Airlines #Delta_Airlines #rétention #détention_administrative #privatisation #Broadspectrum #Canstruct_International #Paladin_Solutions #Wilson_Security #Operation_Sophia #EU_Trust_Fund #Trust_Fund #externalisation #Eurasylum #Deloitte #PricewaterhouseCoopers #Vanguard_Group #CoreCivic #Blackrock #investisseurs #investissement #Capital_Research_and_Management #Capital_Group #Lockheed_Martin #State_Street_Global_Advisors (#SsgA) #Cobham #IDEMIA #Advent_International #droits_humains #VIS #SIS_II #P-3_Orion #Accenture #Sopra_Steria #Frontex #Australie

Outsourcing oppression. How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores

https://www.tni.org/files/styles/cover_image/public/cover-images/outsourcingoppression-report-tnicover.png?itok=mwQBC1JP#.jpg

This report seeks to address the gap and join the dots between Europe’s outsourcing of migrant detention to third countries and the notorious conditions within the migrant detention centres. In a nutshell, Europe calls the shots on migrant detention beyond its shores but is rarely held to account for the deeply oppressive consequences, including arbitrary detention, torture, forced disappearance, violence, sexual violence, and death.

Key findings

– The European Union (EU), and its member states, externalise detention to third countries as part of a strategy to keep migrants out at all costs. This leads to migrants being detained and subjected to gross human rights violations in transit countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, West Asia and Africa.

– Candidate countries wishing to join the EU are obligated to detain migrants and stop them from crossing into the EU as a prerequisite for accession to the Union. Funding is made available through pre-accession agreements specifically for the purpose of detaining migrants.

– Beyond EU candidate countries, this report identifies 22 countries in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and West Asia where the EU and its member states fund the construction of detention centres, detention related activities such as trainings, or advocate for detention in other ways such as through aggressively pushing for detention legislation or agreeing to relax visa requirements for nationals of these countries in exchange for increased migrant detention.

- The main goal of detention externalisation is to pre-empt migrants from reaching the external borders of the EU by turning third countries into border outposts. In many cases this involves the EU and its member states propping up and maintaining authoritarian regimes.

– Europe is in effect following the ‘Australian model’ that has been highly criticised by UN experts and human rights organisations for the torturous conditions inside detention centres. Nevertheless, Europe continues to advance a system that mirrors Australia’s outsourced model, focusing not on guaranteeing the rights of migrants, but instead on deterring and pushing back would-be asylum seekers at all costs.

- Human rights are systematically violated in detention centres directly and indirectly funded by the EU and its member states, including cases of torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention, sexual violence, no access to legal recourse, humanitarian assistance, or asylum procedures, the detention of victims of trafficking, and many other serious violations in which Europe is implicated.

- Particularly horrendous is the case of Libya, which continues to receive financial and political support from Europe despite mounting evidence of brutality, enslavement, torture, forced disappearance and death. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), implement EU policies in Libya and, according to aid officials, actively whitewash the consequences of European policies to safeguard substantial EU funding.

- Not only does the EU deport and push back migrants to unsafe third countries, it actively finances and coercively pushes for their detention in these countries. Often they have no choice but to sign ‘voluntary’ agreements to be returned to their countries of origin as the only means of getting out of torturous detention facilities.

- The EU implements a carrot and stick approach, in particular in its dealings with Africa, prolonging colonialist dynamics and uneven power structures – in Niger, for example, the EU pushed for legislation on detention, in exchange for development aid funding.

– The EU envisages a greater role for migrant detention in third countries going forward, as was evidenced in the European Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum.

- The EU acts on the premise of containment and deterrence, namely, that if migrants seeking to reach Europe are intercepted and detained along that journey, they will be deterred from making the journey in the first place. This approach completely misses the point that people migrate to survive, often fleeing war and other forms of violence. The EU continues to overlook the structural reasons behind why people flee and the EU’s own role in provoking such migration.

– The border industrial complex profits from the increased securitisation of borders. Far from being passive spectators, the military and security industry is actively involved in shaping EU border policies by positioning themselves as experts on the issue. We can already see a trend of privatising migrant detention, paralleling what is happening in prison systems worldwide.

▻https://www.tni.org/en/outsourcingoppression

pour télécharger le rapport :
▻https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/outsourcingoppression-report-tni.pdf

#externalisation #rétention #détention #détention_arbitraire #violence #disparitions #disparitions_forcées #violence #violence_sexuelle #morts #mort #décès #Afrique #Europe_de_l'Est #Balkans #Asie #modèle_australien #EU #UE #Union_européenne #torture #Libye #droits_humains #droits_fondamentaux #HCR #UNHCR #OIM #IOM #dissuasion #privatisation

#Border_Profiteers. Corporations profiting from borders, detentions and deportations - Berlin edition

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L212xH300/Border-Profiea1c-b6061.jpg

Fortress Europe: the millions spent on military-grade tech to deter refugees

We map out the rising number of #high-tech surveillance and deterrent systems facing asylum seekers along EU borders.

From military-grade drones to sensor systems and experimental technology, the EU and its members have spent hundreds of millions of euros over the past decade on technologies to track down and keep at bay the refugees on its borders.

Poland’s border with Belarus is becoming the latest frontline for this technology, with the country approving last month a €350m (£300m) wall with advanced cameras and motion sensors.

The Guardian has mapped out the result of the EU’s investment: a digital wall on the harsh sea, forest and mountain frontiers, and a technological playground for military and tech companies repurposing products for new markets.

https://i.imgur.com/H565BYR.png

The EU is central to the push towards using technology on its borders, whether it has been bought by the EU’s border force, Frontex, or financed for member states through EU sources, such as its internal security fund or Horizon 2020, a project to drive innovation.

In 2018, the EU predicted that the European security market would grow to €128bn (£108bn) by 2020. Beneficiaries are arms and tech companies who heavily courted the EU, raising the concerns of campaigners and MEPs.

“In effect, none of this stops people from crossing; having drones or helicopters doesn’t stop people from crossing, you just see people taking more risky ways,” says Jack Sapoch, formerly with Border Violence Monitoring Network. “This is a history that’s so long, as security increases on one section of the border, movement continues in another section.”

Petra Molnar, who runs the migration and technology monitor at Refugee Law Lab, says the EU’s reliance on these companies to develop “hare-brained ideas” into tech for use on its borders is inappropriate.

“They rely on the private sector to create these toys for them. But there’s very little regulation,” she says. “Some sort of tech bro is having a field day with this.”

“For me, what’s really sad is that it’s almost a done deal that all this money is being spent on camps, enclosures, surveillance, drones.”

Air Surveillance

Refugees and migrants trying to enter the EU by land or sea are watched from the air. Border officers use drones and helicopters in the Balkans, while Greece has airships on its border with Turkey. The most expensive tool is the long-endurance Heron drone operating over the Mediterranean.

Frontex awarded a €100m (£91m) contract last year for the Heron and Hermes drones made by two Israeli arms companies, both of which had been used by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip. Capable of flying for more than 30 hours and at heights of 10,000 metres (30,000 feet), the drones beam almost real-time feeds back to Frontex’s HQ in Warsaw.

Missions mostly start from Malta, focusing on the Libyan search and rescue zone – where the Libyan coastguard will perform “pull backs” when informed by EU forces of boats trying to cross the Mediterranean.

https://i.imgur.com/AsNnGoD.png

German MEP Özlem Demirel is campaigning against the EU’s use of drones and links to arms companies, which she says has turned migration into a security issue.

“The arms industries are saying: ‘This is a security problem, so buy my weapons, buy my drones, buy my surveillance system,’” says Demirel.

“The EU is always talking about values like human rights, [speaking out] against violations but … week-by-week we see more people dying and we have to question if the EU is breaking its values,” she says.

Sensors and cameras

EU air assets are accompanied on the ground by sensors and specialised cameras that border authorities throughout Europe use to spot movement and find people in hiding. They include mobile radars and thermal cameras mounted on vehicles, as well as heartbeat detectors and CO2 monitors used to detect signs of people concealed inside vehicles.

Greece deploys thermal cameras and sensors along its land border with Turkey, monitoring the feeds from operations centres, such as in Nea Vyssa, near the meeting of the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders. Along the same stretch, in June, Greece deployed a vehicle-mounted sound cannon that blasts “deafening” bursts of up to 162 decibels to force people to turn back.

Poland is hoping to emulate Greece in response to the crisis on its border with Belarus. In October, its parliament approved a €350m wall that will stretch along half the border and reach up to 5.5 metres (18 feet), equipped with motion detectors and thermal cameras.

Surveillance centres

In September, Greece opened a refugee camp on the island of Samos that has been described as prison-like. The €38m (£32m) facility for 3,000 asylum seekers has military-grade fencing and #CCTV to track people’s movements. Access is controlled by fingerprint, turnstiles and X-rays. A private security company and 50 uniformed officers monitor the camp. It is the first of five that Greece has planned; two more opened in November.

https://i.imgur.com/yvPgDsz.png

▻https://twitter.com/_PMolnar/status/1465224733771939841

At the same time, Greece opened a new surveillance centre on Samos, capable of viewing video feeds from the country’s 35 refugee camps from a wall of monitors. Greece says the “smart” software helps to alert camps of emergencies.

Artificial intelligence

The EU spent €4.5m (£3.8m) on a three-year trial of artificial intelligence-powered lie detectors in Greece, Hungary and Latvia. A machine scans refugees and migrants’ facial expressions as they answer questions it poses, deciding whether they have lied and passing the information on to a border officer.

The last trial finished in late 2019 and was hailed as a success by the EU but academics have called it pseudoscience, arguing that the “micro-expressions” the software analyses cannot be reliably used to judge whether someone is lying. The software is the subject of a court case taken by MEP Patrick Breyer to the European court of justice in Luxembourg, arguing that there should be more public scrutiny of such technology. A decision is expected on 15 December.

►https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/06/fortress-europe-the-millions-spent-on-military-grade-tech-to-deter-refu

#fautes_d'orthographe #erreurs_d'orthographe #orthographe #faute_d'orthographe #langue #français #écriture #code_graphique #outil #tedx #respect #pourquoi #histoire #pouvoir #Académie_française #dictionnaire #norme #classe_sociale #bon_usage #bourgeoisie #sélection #dictée #fonction_publique #identité_nationale #nation #Etat-nation #héritage #patrimoine #langue_française #esthétique #sens_d'effort #effort #simplification #emploi #accès_à_l'emploi #discrimination #sacré #valeur #dogme #jugement #vidéo #conférence

Projet d’Orthographe d’Apparat, Brrhüsgë gd Ürrhghtücrrhigtph gd igtbigtrrhigt

https://i.imgur.com/NeFy2xR.png

voir aussi :
#Orthographe, #grammaire : sommes-nous coincés de la #langue ?
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/877407

Des articles plus théoriques sur les villes-refuge :

How Cities Can Shape a Fairer, More Humane Immigration Policy
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message737077

Avec la « ville-refuge », ce serait un nouveau concept de Ville qui pourrait émerger, un autre droit d’asile, une autre hospitalité qui transformerait le droit international
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message751607

#Jacques_Derrida und die Idee der Zufluchtsstädte
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message751608

The Cities Refugees Saved
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message757468

#Chowra_Makaremi : « Les #villes sont des nœuds sur les trajectoires des migrants »
►https://seenthis.net/messages/674762

More than a welcome : the power of cities
►https://seenthis.net/messages/478438

Numéro spécial sur villes et hospitalité de la revue #Plein_Droit :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759148

Entre accueil et rejet : ce que les villes font aux migrants. Ce que les villes font aux migrants
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759152

Mobile Commons, Migrant Digitalities and the Right to the City
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759157

Ce qu’ils font est juste : ils mettent la solidarité et l’hospitalité à l’honneur
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759158

#Villes-refuge, villes rebelles et néo-municipalisme
►https://seenthis.net/messages/656848

Des dizaines de villes inventent une politique d’accueil des migrants
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/656848#message705607

If mayors ruled migration : Promises and gaps
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/783876

Villes refuges | Exclusions d’État versus inclusions urbaines
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/798557

Data shows sanctuary cities keep communities safer
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/824538
#crimes #criminalité

webinar : Solidarity Cities of Europe - How can we work together on progressive migration policy ?

https://i.imgur.com/xBpvBB4.png

Au Proche-Orient, #Beirut (#Liban) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759154

Alors qu’au même temps le ministre des affaires extérieures libanais veut s’inspirer du #modèle_hongrois (sic) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/770467

#Censure d’un #film qui devait sortir sur le système #SPRAR en Italie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/766813

Des #initiatives_citoyennes :

#sursaut_citoyen, en #France :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/771840

#A4 : #Association_d’accueil_en_agriculture_et_en_artisanat_ville-campagne
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/983462
#agriculture #artisanat #campagne #rural

#églises-refuge

“Mettiamo a disposizione le nostre strutture e quelle delle chiese sorelle d’Europa per accogliere i migranti della Sea Watch”. Il pastore Luca Negro, presidente della Federazione delle chiese evangeliche Italia ha teso la mano e offerto una soluzione per sbloccare l’empasse sulla nave che da giorni stanzia a un passo dalle acque territoriali italiane, una quarantina di migranti a bordo.

►https://seenthis.net/messages/782050

La Chiesa italiana accoglie 58 profughi della Ocean Viking (a sue spese)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/803712

#Eglise #églises

#Geneva_Declaration_on_Human_Rights_at_Sea :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/773238

#Genève l’a signée : ►https://seenthis.net/messages/782876

#Déclaration_de_Genève_sur_les_droits_de_l’Homme_en_mer

Dossier « Migrants : comment les territoires ont pris le relais de l’Etat » de la Gazette des communes :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/782971

Villes-refuge pour #artistes
#International_Cities_of_Refuge_Network (#ICORN) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/798031
#écrivains #art

Des revendications de citoyen·nes de différentes villes autour de la notion de « #citoyenneté_locale », « #citoyenneté_urbaine »... dans l’idée de se dire que : devrait être considéré citoyen celui et celle qui résident dans une ville, égal son statut légal.

Quelques exemples ci-dessous.

"Wir alle sind #Bern"
►https://seenthis.net/messages/801885
#Suisse

Züri_city_card
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/801885#message801887
Ville de Zurich : Soins médicaux pour personnes sans assurance maladie
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/981751
#Zurich

#Genève : Vers une #carte_d’identification_universelle en Ville ?
►https://seenthis.net/messages/904221

#La_Chaux-de-Fonds :
Une carte d’identité communale
►https://seenthis.net/messages/896514

En lien avec la #crise_sanitaire (#coronavirus, #covid-19)

►https://seenthis.net/messages/847078
–-> #régularisation

Un contre-exemple, l’association #ma_commune_sans_migrants :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/864697

#USA #Etats-Unis

Sanctuary Cities: All You Need In An Infographic

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L340xH700/uz31PY4png-11a4b-e31a4.png

Map: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH590/2ZkxgBepng-ffe73-33c5f.png

#Atlanta:
https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message724208

#New-York_City #NYC:
https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message751011
New Sanctuary Coalition of #NYC:
https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message756227

Chicago announces $5M fund for people excluded from federal coronavirus relief act
https://seenthis.net/messages/860103
#Chicago #coronavirus #covid-19

#Petaluma City Council unanimously adopts ‘It Won’t Happen Here’ resolution
https://seenthis.net/messages/874258

#universités-refuge :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/731110

–---

Des amphis occupés en #France pour y abriter des migrants (et des projets avec elleux) :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/718619
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/653193
#occupation
#Patio_solidaire à #Grenoble, mais aussi #Lyon, #Paris_8

–---

#Italie
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/877069

–—

#Every_Campus_A_Refuge, en lien avec les programmes de #réinstallation aux #USA #Etats-Unis
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/746116

–—

Universities of sanctuary
▻https://universities.cityofsanctuary.org

–—

#University_corridors and the role of academia in opening safe and legal pathways for refugees to Europe
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/863585

–---

Article scientifique
Enabling Pathways for Students from Refugee and Asylum-Seeker Backgrounds in Higher Education : Aspirations About Progression to Postgraduate Studies
▻https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/39/2/244/5864824?redirectedFrom=fulltext

–—

Education : la Grèce octroie l’asile à un étudiant Guinéen admis à Sciences Po Paris
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/868331

–—

#Sorbonne nouvelle annonce son diplôme #DU_Passerelle
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/873618

–—

#université_de_Genève #Scholars_at_risk, un réseau d’institutions universitaires qui défend la #liberté_académique
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/1046966
#UNIGE

#université

En #Europe :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/878327

#Espagne #Italie #Pologne #Bosnie #France #Belgique #UK #Angleterre #Allemagne #Serbie #Suisse #Pays-Bas

#Ports-refuge
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/878648

33 European cities sign ’alliance of safe harbours’ declaration
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/921792

Associations et appels :

#ANVITA, #association_nationale_des_villes_et_territoires_accueillants :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message726383
►https://seenthis.net/messages/759638

City Initiative on Migrants with Irregular Status in Europe (#C-MISE) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/727455#message727456

#ICORN :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message751609
#International_Cities_of_Refuge_Network

#Eine_Stadt_für_Alle
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705769#message756231

#Guide de l’hospitalité du collectif #Le_Perou :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message714073

#Convention_sur_l'accueil de #Grande-Synthe
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759150
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759151

Projet #APROP de Barcelone :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759153

En lien avec le mouvement #Right_to_the_city :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/675436#message759155

L’alleanza dei sindaci del Mediterraneo
►https://seenthis.net/messages/759141

#Cities_of_Migration
▻http://citiesofmigration.ca

“#From_the_Sea_to_the_Cities !”
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/788948
#From_Sea_to_Cities
–-> et la version française : "l’appel de 28 collectivités pour ’l’inconditionnalité du sauvetage en mer’" :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/897821

#Appel_de_Vézelay pour l’#accueil des migrants
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/798026

#Mayors_Migration_Council (#MMC)
▻https://www.mayorsmigrationcouncil.org

Marrakech mayors declaration : Cities working together for migrants and refugees
▻https://www.mayorsmigrationcouncil.org/pdf/marrakech_mayors_declaration-2019_02_19.pdf

#CitiesMustAct (qui fait partie de la #campagne #EuropeMustAct)
►https://seenthis.net/messages/847078
#relocalisation #Grèce

#From_Sea_to_city
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/862343

Libérez l’« Ocean Viking » et les autres navires humanitaires
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/875603

#Mediterranean_City-to-City_Migration_Project
#City-to-City (#MC2CM)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/885661
#Méditerranée

Processo Open Arms, la città di Barcellona si costituisce parte civile contro Salvini
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/898791

#justice #procès #Barcelone

Humanitarian support - cities of #Rijeka & #Zagreb
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/981315
#Croatie #route_des_Balkans #Balkans

Entre la #Suisse et l’#Italie :
Accord entre la Confédération suisse et la République italienne relatif à la réadmission des personnes en situation irrégulière
►https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/20022507/index.html
v. aussi : ►https://asile.ch/2016/09/16/decryptage-frontieres-migrants-refugies-usage-termes-chiffres

–—

voir aussi le rapport ASGI :
▻https://medea.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Report-Riammissioni-Chiasso_ASGI_31.8.16_def.pdf
signalé ici :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/892443

Entre la #France et l’#Italie :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/730361

Il s’agit de l’#accord_de_Chambéry. Décret n° 2000-923 du 18 septembre 2000 portant publication de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République italienne relatif à la #coopération_transfrontalière en matière policière et douanière, signé à Chambéry le 3 octobre #1997
▻https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000766303

voir aussi le rapport ASGI :
▻https://medea.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/all-4-scheda-DM-5-agosto_def.pdf
signalé ici :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/892443

Et entre l’Italie et la #Slovénie (sens inverse):
#Trieste, valico con la Slovenia. Le «riammissioni» dei migranti. Dopo settimane di marcia nei boschi rimandati indietro anche se arrivati su territorio italiano.
►https://seenthis.net/messages/733273

Rapporto RiVolti ai Balcani + decisione del Tribunale di Roma:
►https://seenthis.net/messages/879033

Entre l’#Espagne et la #France:
–-> #accord_de_Malaga signé le 26 novembre 2002 entre la France et l’Espagne.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/901308

–---

Un accord signé entre la France et l’Espagne prévoit de renvoyer tout migrant se trouvant sur le territoire français depuis moins de quatre heures.

►http://www.infomigrants.net/fr/post/13368/france-19-migrants-interpelles-dans-un-bus-en-provenance-de-bayonne-et

–---

Concernant l’accord entre l’Espagne et la France, voici un complément, reçu via la mailing-list Migreurop:

C’est un accord de réadmission bilatéral signé entre la France et l’Espagne (comme tas d’autres) qui prévoit la réadmission des nationaux ou de ressortissants de pays tiers ayant transité par le territoire de l’un de ces pays.

L’article 7 de cet accord prévoit :
Les autorités responsables des contrôles aux frontières des deux Parties contractantes réadmettent immédiatement sur leur territoire les étrangers, ressortissants d’Etats tiers, qui sont présentés par les autorités des frontières de l’autre Partie, dans les quatre heures suivant le passage illégal de la frontière commune.

Il a été signé le 26 novembre 2002, et concernant la France, publié par le décret n° 2004-226 du 9 mars 2004.

Vous trouverez sur le site de Migreurop, d’autres accords signés par la France (et aussi par d’autres pays de l’UE),

▻http://www.migreurop.org/article1931.html

–---

Francia devolvió a España casi 16.000 migrantes en solo cinco meses (2021)

Para expulsar a los inmigrantes que entran irregularmente a su territorio, Francia y España se valen de un acuerdo bilateral de 2002 (►https://elpais.com/politica/2018/11/02/actualidad/1541179682_837419.html) que les permite la devolución en las cuatro horas siguientes al paso de la frontera. El acuerdo contempla una serie de garantías, como que los inmigrantes sean entregados a la policía española o que se formalice por escrito su devolución. Los datos de la policía francesa no especifican cuántos inmigrantes han sido devueltos sobre la base de este acuerdo bilateral, pero fuentes policiales y los propios inmigrantes han señalado que la mayor parte se realiza sin que medie un solo trámite.

▻https://seenthis.net/messages/912645

Press Release: Court find Slovenian state guilty of chain pushback to Bosnia-Herzegovina

https://www.borderviolence.eu/wp-content/uploads/report.png

Civil initiative Info Kolpa, a key member of the Border Violence Monitoring Network, are sharing here the landmark judgement issued on 16th July 2020 by the Slovenian Administrative Court. The findings prove that the national police force carried out an illegal collective expulsion of a member of a persecuted English-speaking minority from Cameroon who wanted to apply for asylum in Slovenia.

The court heard the experience of the applicant, J.D., who was held in a Slovenian police station for two days and denied access to asylum, despite making three verbal requests. After this procedural gatekeeping, the applicant was readmitted to Croatia – under an agreement described by the Slovenian Ombudswoman as “against the European legal order”. From Croatia, J.D. was chain refouled to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a pattern analysed in a feature length report by InfoKolpa published in May 2019.

The Administrative Court found that the Republic of Slovenia violated the applicant’s right to asylum (Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), the prohibition of collective expulsions (Article 19 § 1) and the principle of non-refoulement (Article 19 § 2):

“that no one shall be removed, expelled or extradited to a State in which he or she is in serious danger of being subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.

The court ruled that the police had not informed J.D. of his asylum rights, as mandated to do so, in clear breach of domestic and EU law. The pushback also breached the prohibition of collective expulsion because the applicant was not issued a removal order, nor given translation and legal aid prior to his readmission to Croatia. In regards to the chain refoulement, the judgement found “sufficiently reliable reports on possible risks from the point of view of Article 3 of the ECHR” in both Croatia where the applicant was initially removed, and also in Bosnia-Herzegovina where he was subsequently pushed back. This is inline with evidence provided by BVMN in 2019 showing that 80% of recorded pushback cases from Croatia breached law on torture or inhumane and degrading treatment.

In a groundbreaking step, once the judgment becomes final, it will oblige the Republic of Slovenia to allow the applicant to enter the country and file an application for international protection without delay, as well as provide €5,000 in compensation. Commenting on the outcome, the applicant stated:

“I know and believe that the judgement will help those that come after me. It may not have a direct solution for me, but I know that we are creating awareness and you give more trust to the law of the country.” — J. D., Bosnia, 17th July 2020

While the Ministry of Internal Affairs have stated they will appeal the judgement, the lawyer representing J.D. stated the case is a landmark because it not only proves the human rights violations suffered by the applicant, but establishes that chain pushbacks to Bosnia-Herzegovina are “systematic and routine”.

▻https://www.borderviolence.eu/press-release-court-find-slovenian-state-guilty-of-chain-pushback-to-

#Slovénie #Bosnie

Court confirms systematic human rights violations by Austrian police

Regional Administrative Court of Styria confirmed the practice of chain puchbacks and found the Austrian police guilty of violating the right to human dignity and the right of documentation

On 28th of September 2020 eight people were pushed back after being chased and humiliated by Austrian police. Their repeated verbal demand for asylum had been ignored, and no interpreter was involved, as our friends from the initiative „Push Back Alarm Austria“ documented, as we reported earlier on, and later pressed charges in the one case of Ayoub N.

Now, the court confirmed the methodical practice of chain pushbacks and for the first time the existence of a chain pushback route from Austria or Italy crossing Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia, including the collaboration of the police in different countries.

The actions of the police officers who intervened were purposefully aimed at the rejection of the complainant and there is no room for any other interpretation

In synopsis of the entire official act, the court concludes that there was an obvious bias of the officers against the complainant, since the physical search was disproportionate, no food was provided, and the involvement of an interpreter was omitted despite obvious language difficulties and the use of the word “asylum”, the verdict states (asyl.at/de/info/presseaussendungen/push-back-routevonoesterreichbisbosnien/?s=pushbacks).

The joint press release of Push-Alarm Austria & Asylkoordination notes that, despite a court finding that his rights were disregarded, due to a legal loophole, the complainant Ayoub N. will not be allowed to enter the country. “I was confident that we would win the case. After returning to Bosnia, I felt like shattered glass. At the moment, I am trying to sort out my life and move forward,” he said.

“We are talking about systematic human rights violations, inhumane treatment and ignoring the principles of the rule of law by police in Austria. It is completely unimaginable that this is happening without the knowledge and against the expressed will of the Minister of the Interior and his officials. If someone questions the Geneva Refugee Convention, one of the greatest lessons of the Shoah, and at the same time does not take consistent action against systematic human rights violations by the police, the only thing left to do is to resign!”

Lawyer Clemens Lahner sees the finding as a clear warning to the Ministry of the Interior to put an end to the systematic disregard for the rule of law as soon as possible: “Not everyone who applies for asylum in Austria automatically will receive a substantive asylum procedure or be granted protection. But these questions are to be examined and decided by the competent authorities or courts,” the lawyer clarifies. “If the police presume to decide who will get an asylum procedure at all, this is clearly illegal. The Ministry of the Interior has now been put on written notice, in the name of the Republic.”

Klaudia Wieser of Push-Back Alarm Austria said. “This case shows the necessity of our initiative to prevent systematic breaches of the law at Austrian borders. Austrian push-backs frequently constitute the first step of chain push-backs beyond the EU’s external borders. Sebastian Kurz is the spiritus rector of systematic human rights violations along the push-back route to Bosnia.”

The finding from Graz also puts the Slovenian government which has just taken over the EU Presidency under considerable pressure. For the first time, it is possible to prove in a court case what human rights organisations such as ours and particularly everyone within the Border Violence Monitoring Network have been documenting since 2016: a continuous pushback route via Austria or Italy via Slovenia and Croatia to Bosnia.

“If someone questions the Geneva Refugee Convention, one of the greatest lessons of the Shoah, and at the same time does not take consistent action against systematic human rights violations by the police, the only thing left to do is to resign!” — University Professor Dr. Benedek of the Institute of International Law and International Relations from the University of Graz said.

However, as in other such cases in countries along the so called Balkan Route, no higher responsibility has so far been established by a court or other instance deemed valid by the states, so we expect to see more tacit acceptance of the anti-people and anti-human rights commands by those on the top.

▻https://medium.com/are-you-syrious/ays-daily-digest-5-7-21-court-confirmed-the-systemic-chain-pushbacks-b8e0749

#Autriche

Entre #Croatie et #Bosnie-Herzégovine
Reportage tra i “nuovi” respinti dalla Croazia verso i campi della Bosnia ed Erzegovina
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/999495

#Balkans #route_des_Balkans

Liste sur les #morts_aux_frontières alpines :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/758646
#mourir_aux_frontières #décès #morts

Ici, la querelle frontalière entre Italie (gouvernement #Salvini) et France :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/730361

Ici, les #statistiques et #chiffres des #expulsions, #renvois aux frontières françaises.
Tout le parcours de la frontière nationale, dont la frontière avec l’Italie :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/705057

Un lien sur les interventions de #Erri_de_Luca concernant la frontière sud-alpine :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/697047

Sur le #procès des #7_de_Briançon (ou #3+4_de_Briançon) —> attention : à partir de novembre 2018, d’autres documents existent sur le long fil de discussion initial :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/734863

Appel contre les violences policières dans le Briançonnais (et rassemblement à Gap, le 10 janvier 2018) :
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/748369

#militarisation_des_frontières #mourir_aux_frontières #morts #décès

Janvier 2019 : des migrants arrivent à la frontière en conséquence du #decreto_Salvini :
►https://seenthis.net/messages/751386
#decreto_sicurezza

Septembre 2020 :
A Briançon, le nouveau maire LR veut fermer le refuge solidaire des migrants
►https://seenthis.net/messages/876342

Hiver 2020-2021...

Pourquoi les migrants iraniens transitent par les Alpes
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/886921

Novembre 2020 : DEUX SOLIDAIRES POURSUIVIS PAR LA JUSTICE
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/888329

Dans les Alpes, migrants et bénévoles face à une police aux frontières renforcée (vidéo)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/891137

Une famille en détresse en montagne héliportée vers un poste de police sans même être emmenée à l’hôpital
►https://www.bastamag.net/Un-helicoptere-de-secours-en-montagne-ramene-une-famille-d-exiles-avec-deu
►https://seenthis.net/messages/897857

Senza stringhe , un photo-reportage par des jeunes pour des jeunes sur la région frontalière de Briançon-Oulx :

https://seenthis.net/local/cache-vignettes/L600xH323/GlChqNvpng-ee775-681e8.png

’Pushbacks’ in the French Alps : Migrants report immediate deportations to Italy
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/903818

Dans la nuit du col de #Montgenèvre, le cortège des migrants a repris sur les sentiers enneigés
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/909066

À #Briançon, maintenir l’aide aux migrants malgré la crise
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/910848

Villageois solidaires Ep01 : Les sentinelles de #Névache
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/911470

#Tribune / #appel
Migrants à la frontière franco-italienne : « La solidarité n’est pas un délit ! »
–-> Alors que se tiendront, le 22 avril et le 27 mai à Gap et à Grenoble, les procès de plusieurs personnes solidaires de migrants, les élus écologistes #Damien_Carême et #Guillaume_Gontard ont lancé un #appel pour demander au gouvernement français de cesser ses pratiques indignes.
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/912085

Eté 2021
La situation continue d’être critique à la frontière briançonnaise + Vallée de Suse :

Dalla frontiera alpina del Nord-ovest (valle di Susa)
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/925944

Sur le #Refuge_solidaire de Briançon :
– Sauvé, le refuge solidaire de #Briançon s’adapte à de nouveaux arrivants
►https://seenthis.net/messages/913269

– ouverture des #Terrasses_solidaires :
#Ouverture du nouveau lieu Les #Terrasses_Solidaires et manifestation du 25 août 2021
►https://seenthis.net/messages/926957

– Immigration : pour le symbole, le Refuge solidaire de Briançon ferme son accueil
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/926083

Automne-hiver 2021-2022 :

Septembre 2021
Aide aux migrants : les « 7 de Briançon » relaxés en appel
►https://seenthis.net/messages/929316

Septembre 2021 :
A #Oulx un nuovo rifugio per i migranti « Più posti e più dignitosi in vista dell’inverno »
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/930100

Octobre 2021 :
Le #bus ne s’arrête plus à #Clavière...
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/933514

24.10.2021 :
#Refuges_Solidaires a décidé d’interrompre totalement l’#accueil aux #Terrasses_Solidaires à partir d’aujourd’hui (24.10.2021)
►https://seenthis.net/messages/934336

Décembre 2021 :
À #Briançon, les exilé.es risquent leur vie à la frontière
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/939242
Montgenèvre : une plainte contre un tract des maraudeurs portant assistance aux migrants
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/939281

Reportage. #Alta_Val_di_Susa, quei profughi ora accolti sulla rotta di neve e gelo
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/940748

Janvier 2022 :
Migrants risk life and limb crossing snow-choked Alpine passes
▻https://seenthis.net/messages/941946